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ABSTRACT 
 
What is the revolutionary event and what tongue does its desire speak? 
Can we really understand and analyse revolutionary events through a logic of 
representation that works through processes of Identification and Signification? 
This thesis challenges assumptions that the revolutionary event/experience can 
be thought through the logic of Representation/Signification/Identification. It 
does so by highlighting the continuities between the colonial and post-colonial 
moments in Egypt. In this, it critiques both modern thought and modern political 
thought and their assumption that the regime of Representation and its 
Symbolic Simulations of experience remains an unescapable subjective 
panopticon. Indeed, the thesis proposes to look at revolutionary events as 
moments that challenge the Simulation and its production of experiences as 
simulacra. To his end the research asks the following question:  Is (post)-Colonial 
revolutionary thought thinking revolutionary events/experiences as their 
colonial simulacra? To explore this problematic of liberation, the research looks 
at three series of times that all share a similar temporal sequencing of space: 
the Modern Fold. The thesis starts its analysis of the mode of subjectivations 
that keep thought prisoner of its Simulation by looking at the modern 
colonisation of Egypt. It then moves into postcolonialism and explores the 
continuities between the Nasserist and Colonial Symbolics by highlighting how 
they both function by Oedipalizing desire. Its third moment looks at the thought 
of Sayyid Qutb as an illustration of a thought that challenges postcolonial reality 
and beyond it, modern reality as a Simulation.  However, as the research 
highlights, Qutb’s moment of escape turns into a line of death. So, can 
revolutionary desire free itself from the Symbolics of Simulation and their 
capture of desire? Perhaps, the thesis concludes, if we move from a paranoid to 
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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER PART I 






In 2011, Khaled Saeed was smashed to death; but the Egyptian security forces covered 
up this fact.1 They came up with an alternative version for his death; they replaced the real 
moments with a simulation. The initial post-mortem examination concluded he had swallowed 
a packet of hash he had been carrying. A police investigation co-signed the verdict: he had died 
by self-inflicted suffocation.2 Despite the Simulation, Egyptians hung on to this fact: that 
Khaled Saeed had been killed. The State's attempts to cover-up his actual death were failing. 
A simulation cannot determine the real; it can only simulate its real as the real. 
Fast-forward to 2014, and two policemen were convicted of Saeed's death. His murder 
could now be signified as a fact in/of law.3 The 2011 Egyptian revolution had dislocated the 
Signified/Image that the State had chosen to represent Saeed's death– he had suffocated on 
hash- and exposed it as a cover-up, a distorted copy, a  simulacrum. In denouncing the 
 
1 Khaled Saeed was a young whistle-blower. He was in Alexandria when on June 6, 2011 he caught the 
police in an act of corruption and filmed them. He then went to an internet café to upload his video on the 
internet, but the police had been on his track. They found him in the café, took him to a police station where 
they beat him to death. he was just 28 years old.   Ahram online, “Khaled Said the Face that Launched the 
Revolution”, June 6, 2012, Ahram online, accessible from: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/43995/Egypt/Politics-/Khaled-Said-The-face-that-launched-
a-revolution.aspx 
2 Aswat Masriya, “Allegations of police torture spark outrage”, December 02, 2015, Aswatmasriya online, 
accessible from: http://www.aswatmasriya.com/en/news/details/3323 
3 This thesis does not support the disciplinary function of law and as we will see in the conclusion, 
problematises the very notion of responsibility. However, it also highlights how an organic revolutionary 
event was able to produce a semiotic dislocation by using law as a determinant of the Real: Khaled Saeed 
had been murdered, tortured to death.  
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simulacrum that had been made of Khaled Saeed's last moments, millions of Egyptians 
denounced the simulacrum that the official reality - the reality advocated by the State, its laws, 
its officials - had become. Through their gatherings, their slogans, their screams, their bodies, 
their arts, their blogs, their social media posts, their videos, they denounced, outlined, 
explained, exposed a simulation that silenced the real of their experience, that suppressed it 
from its discourse on reality. The Simulation was losing its power of affection; the 
revolutionary event/experience was dislocating it.  
The Egyptian revolution opened up a tear that exposed how the Simulation masked the 
real and substituted itself for the real. Liberation had never really happened. This tear was 
somehow allowing people to breathe again because beyond the veneer of neo-liberalism, they 
had been gasping for air. By suffocating the reality of Saeed's death, the Egyptian State had 
exposed one of its vilest articulatory practice: it silenced experience by suffocating it with its 
simulacrum. 4  Through this practice, the state totalizes individual experience: it 
subjectivizes/subjectifies people into its Simulation through repression. Repression 
traumatizes; Repression crushes the real; it silences it. The police had smashed Khaled Saeed 
because he was exposing reality as a simulacrum. Postcolonialism, Justice, Modernity, 
Independence, they were all still colonial simulacra. Although in appearances, things looked 
different, in-itself, not much had changed.  
In his written works, Frantz Fanon denounced how repression crushes individual 
subjectivities and bodies and through this crushing, imprints them.5 This imprint can be so 
profound, it pathologizes. Black Skin White Masks denounces colonialism as a Simulation.6 It 
coequally attests of its maddening imprinting. It is as dangerous to be subjectivized/subjected 
into it as it is to come out of it: in both cases, one's sense of reality is vacillating. There is, 
 
4 The thesis draws from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in its use of the concept of ‘articulatory practice’ 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe critique the ways in traditional political thought, 
including Marxism, assumes that the concept of ‘society’ exists as a totality that determines the meaning and 
identity of each elements that constitute it. In contrast, they argue that the totalisation of the social is 
impossible since the social itself does not have an essence (HSS, p.95, p96).  They thus use the concept of 
articulation to mean  ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified 
as a result of the articulatory practice’, (HSS, p.105). See Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, (London: Verso, 2013).  
5 See for example, Khalfa, Jean, Young, Robert, (Ed.),  Corcoran, Steve (Trans.) , Alienation and Freedom, 
(London: Bloomsbury Publishing 2018); Frantz, Fanon, Charles, Lam Markmann (Trans.), Black Skin, White 
Masks, (London: Pluto Press, 2008); Frantz Fanon, Les Damnes de la Terre, Paris: La decourvete, 2002) and 
in English, The Wretched of the Earth, ( London:Penguin Classice, 2001),  Frantz Fanon A Dying 
Colonialism, (New York: Grove Press, 1994) , Frantz Fanon, Haakon Chevalier (Trans.) Toward the African 
Revolution, (New York: Grove Press, 1988); Fanon, Frantz, Nigel C. Gibson (Ed.),  Decolonizing Madness: 
The Psychiatric Writings of Frantz Fanon (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015),   
6Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, see for example p.42, p.92, p.101, p.173, p.210,  
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however, an essential difference between these two states of being. One's 
subjectivation/subjectification into the colonial Simulation dislocates the individual's sense of 
being-in-the-world and being-in-themselves. In contrast, attempts to come out of the 
Simulation implies a vital momentum: a struggle against the colonial Symbolic and its 
suffocation of reality. Indeed, for Fanon, on more levels than one, suffocation is a colonial 
articulatory practice and the anti-colonial struggle a resistance against this suffocation: 
 
“Ce n'est pas parce que l'Indochinois a découvert une culture propre qu'il s'est révolté. 
C'est parce que « tout simplement » il lui devenait, à plus d'un titre, impossible de respirer”7 
Alternatively:  
"It is not because the Indo-Chinese has discovered a culture of his own that he is in 
revolt. It is because "quite simply" it was, in more than one way, becoming impossible for him 
to breathe."8 
 
Things were not fine; things had not been fine. The persistence of suffocation as a statist 
articulatory practice could only mean one thing: the postcolonial era had remained 
pathologically colonial. Khaled Saeed's last moments were now a percept of the transhistorical 
experience of millions of people: they could not breathe anymore. How could the colonial 
Simulation continue to reproduce itself after Egypt's independence? In both Black Skin White 
Masks and The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon's works emphasize how topologically, colonial 
space expands long past its geographical boundaries. Colonial space even colonizes affects: its 
discourse subjectivizes individuals by affecting how they experience themselves and the world. 
Colonial space; thus, coextensively articulates itself as a social time or a Symbolic order that 
enframes subjectivity. Colonial space expands into thinking: 
 
“Je me découvre un jour dans un monde où les choses font mal; un monde où l'on me 
réclame de me battre; un monde où il est toujours question d'anéantissement ou de victoire.”9  
Alternatively:  
"I find myself – I, a man – in a world where words wrap themselves in silence; in a 
world where the other endlessly hardens himself." 10 
 
7 Fanon, Peau Noire, Masques Blancs, p.182 
8 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p.176 
9  Fanon, Peau noire masques blancs, p.185 
10 Ibid., p.178 
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As a social time that delineates the frontiers of subjectivity and thus of its  thought and 
its speech,  colonial space structures both the conscious and unconscious: 
 
“Nous espérons avoir montré qu'il n'en est rien et qu'en fait cet inconscient collectif est 
culturel, c'est-à-dire acquis. De même qu'un jeune campagnard des Carpathes, dans les 
conditions physico-chimiques de la région, verra apparaître chez lui un myxcedème, de même 
un nègre comme René Maran, ayant vécu en France, respiré, ingéré les mythes et préjugés de 
l'Europe raciste, assimilé l'inconscient collectif de cette Europe, ne pourra, s'il se dédouble, que 
constater sa haine du nègre.” 
Alternatively:  
"I have shown […] that in fact, the collective unconscious is cultural, which means 
acquired. Just as a young mountaineer of the Carpathians, under the physico-chemical 
conditions of his country, is likely to develop a myxedema, so a Negro like René Maran, who 
has lived in France and breathed and eaten the myths and prejudices of racist Europe, and 
assimilated the collective unconscious of that Europe, will be able, if he stands outside himself, 
to express only his hatred of the Negro."11  
 
With Fanon, colonial space and colonial time form a continuum, this is why the colonial 
Simulation can pass as the real. Colonialism simulates itself as the real by articulating itself as 
a continuum of discourse, thought, and reality. Conjointly, as Fanon explains, this colonial 
continuum permeates the conscious and unconscious of the body politics that it subjectivizes. 
It becomes a regime of truth. 
 
"Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of 
constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 
'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as 
true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, 
the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the 
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.  
 
In societies like ours, the 'political economy' of truth is characterized by five important 
 
11 Ibid., p.145 
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traits. 'Truth' is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce 
it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for 
economic production as for political power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense 
diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information 
whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, notwithstanding certain strict limitations); 
it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great 
political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it is the issue of 
a whole political debate and social confrontation ('ideological' struggles) ."12 
 
The colonial regime of truth takes up a spectrum that starts with a white race as its most 
progressive and a black race as its most digressive.  It is by acting as a regime of truth that 
mediates our sense of reality, that colonialism subjectivizes its historicity into our becoming. 
The becoming of colonialism is contingent on a mystification of the real; colonization unfolds 
by mythologizing experience.  Colonial representations/concepts/myths mediate experience. 
In Egypt, for example, Lord Cromer described Egyptian peasants as ignorant and stupid. This 
ignorant, stupid peasant is the Fellahin of the colonial discourse: 
 
"The Egyptian Oriental is quite one of the most stupid… in the world…stupidity, not 
cunning is his chief characteristic."13 The fellah is blinded by "a thick mist of ignorance and 
misrepresentation."14 
 
Picking up from Cromer's logic, it must have been because:  
 
"[T]here can be no doubt that it is in the hand of England which first raised him from 
the abject moral and material condition in which he had for centuries wallowed"15 
 that: 
"In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the people of Egypt were made inmates 
in their own villages … The village was to be run like a barracks, its inhabitants placed under 
 
12 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power, interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino”, In 
Michel Foucault, Colin Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge, Selected Interviews  and Other Writings, 1972-77, 
Michel Foucault, (New York: Pantheon Books, c1980),  p.131 
13 Lufti al-Sayyid, Afaf, Egypt and Cromer, a Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations, (London: John Murray, 
1968), p.77 
14 Ibid. 
15 Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt,  Rpt.  New Edition, 1 vol_, (London: Macmillan & Co limited, 1911),  
p.613 
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the surveillance of guards night and day, and under the supervision of inspectors as they 
cultivated the land – and surrendered to the government warehouse its produce."16 
 
The colonial Symbolic mythologizes reality, and coloniality concretizes this 
mythologization. It gives the reality to the Colonial Symbolic order. The colonized were 
becoming a pre-condition of colonial historicity: their future could only actualize itself as 
anteriority. They were being turned into the Totems and Taboos of the European collective 
unconscious.17 Fanon explains that while all the colonial subjects are mystified, the white 
colonizer has a power of mystification over the colonized. The white colonizer is mystified by 
colonial thought and its discourse. By embracing it and enacting it as a reality, they mystify 
the colonized into a Signified of colonial symbolic. By embracing the colonial Simulation, the 
white colonizer helps simulate colonialism as the only (real) possible. They help make the 
absurd pass for the real.  For the white colonizer, the reality of the Simulation is ego-boosting 
since it reifies their whiteness as a power of superiority, as a deserving better, as a being freer, 
more affluent, more likeable, more beautiful, more modern, kinder, more intelligent, more 
developed, more civilized…more. The ideal-Is or specular images that the colonial Symbolic 
produces for the colonizer are narcissistically boosting. They project a colonizer who is 
thriving, who is enjoying, who is powerful. The white subjects have an incentive: colonial 
reality offers them the possibility of becoming the concrete representation of the good of the 
system, of the truth of its goodness. 
Nevertheless, there is a steep price to pay. In failing to problematizes the Simulation 
and in asserting its reality, white colonizers induce their mystification. Colonization 
subjectivizes people into colonial concepts; it petrifies them.  In doing so, colonial thought 
covers reality; it superimposes discourse as an experience over the real. The White Masks 
colonize Black Skin: 
 
“Vous arrivez trop tard, beaucoup trop tard. Il y aura toujours un monde — blanc — 
entre vous et nous... Cette impossibilité pour l'autre de liquider une fois pour toutes le passé. 
On comprend que, devant cette ankylose affective du Blanc, j'ai pu décider de pousser mon cri 
nègre. Petit à petit, lançant çà et là des pseudopodes, je sécrétai une race.”18 
 
16 Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, (University of California Press, c1988), p.32 
17  Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: some points of agreement between the mental lives of savages and 
neurotics, (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1975)  




"There will always be a world- a white world- between you and us. The other's total 
inability to liquidate the past once and for all. In the face of this affective ankylosis of the white 
man, it is understandable that I could have made up my mind to utter my Negro cry. Little by 
little, putting out pseudopodia here and there, I secreted a race."19 
 
This race that the colonized secreted was nothing but a white phantasm:   
 
"But the English man is a Western albeit an Anglo-Saxon Western, and from the point 
of view of all process of reasoning, the gulf which separates any one member of the European 
family from another is infinitely less wide than that which divides all Westerns from all 
Orientals."20 
 
For Fanon, the anti-colonial struggle is an élan vital against colonial phantasmatic 
petrification. It emerges at a very advanced stage of colonial pathologizing: after its cultural 
myxedema, affective ankylosis, after its pseudopodia, its phobogenesis, and its 
epidermisation.21  It comes when the colonized cannot breathe anymore. 
How had we gotten there? How could colonial concepts act as the ideals against which 
we measure(d), apprehend(ed) and sense(d) existence? How was the colonial Symbolic able to 
enfold subjectivity in its Simulation? Cromer's discourse unveils it all: thought processed the 
Simulation as reality. Thought had determined that "from the point of view of all process of 
reasoning" races were real, they were a 'fact'.  Thought had produced social Signifiers that 
hierarchically re-organized human beings according to a racial spectrum. Thought simulated a 
white race as its most progressive form of experience and a black race as its most digressive. 
A colonial System had colonized thought, in both its conscious and unconscious state. 
But this had supposedly all ended with the postcolonial turn. What happened to 
postcolonialism? In our collective history/memory, postcolonialism represents a movement out 
of colonialism and its coloniality. In Egypt, the Nasserist Revolution represents the 
 
19 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p. 92; see original in Frantz fanon, Peau noire masques blancs, (Paris: 
Edition du Seuil, c1952), p.98 
20 The Earl of Cromer, “The government of subject races”, in Political and literary essays, 1908-1913 
(London: MacMillan, and Co Limited, 1913,), p.40  
21 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p.145, p.92, p117 
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concretization of this moving away from colonialism. Nasser had opened up the horizon of 
existence beyond colonial capture. Beyond the borders of Egypt, the Middle East, Africa, Latin 
America and parts of Asia would reverse colonial reality. The coming into being of 
postcolonialism could, would, and was putting an end to the suffocation. Or had it all been just 
another fold of the Simulation?  The thesis asks the following question in further exploring this 
problematic: Is (post)-Colonial revolutionary thought thinking revolutionary 
events/experiences as their colonial simulacra?  
 
 
1 POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AS A SIMULACRUM: PRESENTATION  OF THE 
ARGUMENT OF THE  THESIS  
 
This thesis postulates that postcolonial thought thinks revolutionary events/experiences 
as their colonial simulacra. Its starting point of reflection is the 2011 Egyptian revolutionary 
event, which challenged a Simulation to which we all are participants. It exposed our shared 
experience: we are simulacra. Although it did denounce the official reality as a simulacrum, by 
calling for the army's return against Morsi, this revolutionary subjectivity/desire also ended up 
calling for the return of the Simulation. It was enfolded back into the spoken of the State. Is 
(post)-Colonial revolutionary thought thinking revolutionary events/experiences as their 
colonial simulacra? This thesis explores the enfolding of Egyptian reality into the Modern 
Simulation through three moments. The first moment looks at the penetration and formalization 
of the colonial Simulation. The second moment examines Nasserism as a machine of capture 
of revolutionary subjectivity. Finally, its third moment explores how Sayyid Qutb's solution to 
free thought from the modern Simulation ended up becoming a line of death rather than a line 
of flight.22  
As we will see throughout this thesis, the research argues that a thought that thinks 
revolutionary events/experiences as either the copies or the degraded reproductions of an Idea 
thinks simulacra for the event/experience. This thinking exposes a Symbolic totalization of 
 
22 “A line of flight' is a path of mutation precipitated through the actualisation of connections among bodies 
that were previously only implicit (or 'virtual') that releases new powers in the capacities of those bodies to 
act and respond.”, also “In the texts written with Guattari, this concept of freedom appears only in the guise 
of other concepts such as 'line of flight', 'deterritorialisation' or 'smooth space'.” Adrian Parr (Ed.), The 
Deleuze Dictionary, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), p.63 and  p.145, p. 
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experience since it can only think the field of experience/immanence by mediating it through 
the field of Ideality/transcendence. This semiotic logic means that the Symbolic simulates itself 
as equivalent in meaning and in given to experience. Per definition, such a Simulation cannot 
think organic experience; it can only think experience Symbolically. As we will see in part two 
of this introductory chapter, the research develops its understanding of modern semiosis from 
a series of thinkers, including Plato, Jacques Lacan, Charles S. Peirce, Jean Baudrillard and 
especially Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. In drawing from them, the research argues that 
modern semiosis operates through a logic that mimics a paranoid structure: it thinks knowledge 
as phantasms. The thesis further argues that this thought is caught up in an obsessive Symbolic, 
a Symbolic that stalks its preys, always ready to recapture/re-enfold them them into its fold. 
In his Film El, Luis Buñuel gives us a Face for this obsessive Symbolic with Francisco 
Galvone de Montemayor's character.23 Francisco, who is deeply pious encounters an attractive 
young woman in a church, Gloria. Francisco cannot get Gloria out of his head and soon his 
feelings for her turn into an obsession. Gloria refuses his advances, but he stops at nothing to 
seduce her into his Simulation of love. Gloria eventually falls for him, and to her horror 
encounters the Real of Francisco's desire: he is a paranoiac who desires a desire for repression. 
He sees imaginaries 'others' everywhere, others who want to steal his object of 
affection/phantasm, Gloria, from him. He blames Gloria for his spiralling into the worlds of 
phantasms;  he is convinced she is guilty. As he feels she escapes his power of subjectivisation, 
he tries to kill her.  Gloria had rapidly unmasked the Simulation: Francisco only saw her as an 
object of phantasm; he had never really seen her. 
In 2011 in Egypt, it was the State that stalked its preys. Everywhere, the secret police, 
waiting to hear the wrong Signified ,the wrong signifier, the wrong look, the wrong movement, 
the wrong act. The State was on the lookout for the guiltiness of its Subjects. People spoke of 
it in Tahrir Square. They spoke of this Face that haunts them, that terrifies them, that 
traumatizes them. This speech is a speech that is being spoken across the MENA streets.  In 
2011 in Tunisia, Syria, Libya, Bahrain, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, it became impossible not 
to hear it. In 2019 Algeria re-joined the revolutionary experience as the Hirak, (the Movement), 
emerged. But these are only a few of the instances where this speech has been/is being spoken. 
The MENA streets are always full of speeches that challenge the Simulation. But as it was the 
case with Gloria in Francisco's Simulation, the speech of the revolutionary event/experience, 
this thesis argues, is haunted by the Symbolic speech it wants to escape. In the Wretched of the 
 
23  Luis, Bunúel, El, 1953 
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Earth, Frantz Fanon had already warned Algerian revolutionaries who spoke that free speech, 
that their revolution was being suffocated by the State's speech, the speech spoken by elites 
and vanguards. The leaders of the Revolution/War of Liberation were now also speaking this 
speech.24 They were speaking the Faces of power and their exercising of repressive desire. 
They were drawing blood. The nation was attempting to kill its revolutionary self by 
suffocating its revolutionary becoming. 25  This becoming that the Wretched spoke, and that 
any revolutionary event speaks, has never been able to take the 'form' of a movement of 
liberation. Indeed, the thesis argues that this revolutionary speech is continuously recaptured 
by the multiple Faces of civilization and their image of thought. 
This speech of the revolutionary event, the thesis further argues, speaks a free 
tongue/speech; it speaks a speech 'liberated' from the Symbolics of Simulation. This speech 
does not speak an Outside; it speaks an un-enfolding of the Symbolic, not its Symbolic 
infoldings. 26  This form of speech has been a speech of the streets for millenniums. 
Nevertheless, it has always been suffocated by a Symbolic Order of language that speaks a 
tongue of hierarchy, purity and totality. Throughout, this thesis thinks and conceptualizes the 
State as a subjective machine-of-capture that speaks this tongue. As we will see in  Chapter 
One, The Symbolic Order - the Order of Language and Subjectivity -, projects reality as a 
distorted mirrored image. Chapter Two explores the parallax quality of this Image/Idea that the 
Symbolic produces. Colonial reality pretends to be open to all the series of time, yet it only 
operates through one particular temporal sequencing of space. Drawing from Deleuze, this 
logic or law of semiosis, the Chapter argues, is a logic of the absurd. This absurd is a reality 
where the Real is deprived of the possibility of Signification.27 In Chapter Two, this absurd-
real takes the Face of Plunderland. Chapter Three of the thesis looks deeper int to the Symbolics 
of Simulation. It illustrates its argument by looking at the Nasserist State as a Face of Oedipal 
desire. Its Symbolic proceeds through Facialization and subjectivizes subjectivities into the 
Ideal surface of its Simulation. 
Moreover, the Chapter problematizes Nasserism by conceptualizing it as a Simulation 
of liberation. Indeed, just as in the Colonial fold, the Nasserist fold produces a two-sensed 
reality. On the one hand, it appears as a world open to all the series of times, yet, on the other, 
 
24 Fanon, Les Damnés de la Terre, see for example, “ Spontaneity, its strengths and weaknesses”, pp.85-
118 and “On the pitfalls of National Consciousness”, p.119-165 
25 Ibid.  
26 More on this in the Conclusion of the thesis. 
27 The thesis defines The Real as an un-enfolded Symbolic. More on this in the Conclusion of the thesis.  
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it forecloses the series of time that do not fit its Symbolic temporal sequencing of Space. 
Chapter Four of the thesis further looks into the mechanisms of capture of the Nasserist state. 
It highlights how the Nasserist State is able to trick/seduce Egyptian subjectivity into its fold 
by producing sensations and perceptions of reality. It thus enfolds Subjectivity, the Chapter 
argues. Chapter Five then turns its attention to the thought of Sayyid Qutb, which it argues,  
challenged the Simulation but ended up spiralling further and further into it’s a world of 
simulacra. In the thesis's Conclusion, we will see that to think liberation Sayyid Qutb thinks 
free desire as pure desire. This vision of desire as total and totalizing exposes the fascist latency 
of the concept. In line with Deleuze and Guattari, the thesis argues that there is a fascist latency 
to all the forms of thought that think the Symbolic order as the origin of the Real/immediacy. 
The thesis argues that these forms of thought totalize experience with their Symbolic, they 
suffocate it.  
All in all, the thesis thus argues that Colonial, Nasserist and Qutubist thoughts are three 
models of thought that reproduce a paranoid semiotic process, which thinks knowledge as 
simulacrum. Although these three thoughts take up different forms - Colonial Liberalism, Arab 
Socialism and Qutubism -, they share a similarity. They all think the revolution as the concrete 
reproduction of an Idea/simulacra.  Beyond their external differences, these thoughts share an 
internal similarity; they think a same difference/ a different Simulation. Before moving to Part 
Two of this Introductory Chapter, which theoretically grounds the thesis's argument, the next 
moment provides theoretical definitions of three critical Faces of the desire for repression that 
capture desiring-machines into the Subjects of their Simulation. 
 
 
2 THEORETICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE FACES  
DESIRE AND ITS OEDIPAL CAPTURE 
Desire is a concept central to Deleuze's chaosophy. Desire is an expression of the 
vitality of being, of its push to be, to exist. One could say that with Deleuze, desire works in 
the same ways as light. In physics, light is both energy and momentum: it can penetrate objects 
thereby allowing us to distinguish their colours and/or forms, it can be refracted from them, 
and it can also cause an object with mass to change its velocity.  Deleuzean desire like light is 
a force of flux and movements that "is productive, and that is able to make connections and 
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enhance the power of bodies in their connections."28 It is not a psychic existence; it does not 
lack as psychoanalytical theory argues; instead, it is a vital reality. In drawing from Spinoza 
and Bergson,  Deleuze developed a definition of desire as an élan vital, a vital force with neither 
object nor fixed subject. 29  He also borrowed from the Freudian concept of Libido to 
conceptualize desire as an agencement (assemblage, layout) of flux and movements and thus 
as a productive force. 30  Unlike Freud, Deleuze did not limit libidinal desire to sexual 
investment. Desire expresses a desire to be social, to act on the real. For example, drawing on 
the thesis's analysis, one can say that the desire expressed by all revolutionary event/experience 
is a desire to challenge the 'real' of the Simulation and bring about the differentials it carries.  
From a Deleuzean perspective, power cannot be taken as an analytical lens because 
power only exists in-itself as the becoming of a desire to dominate, to totalize: "There isn't a 
desire for power; it is power itself that is desire. Not a desire-lack, but desire as a plenitude, 
exercise, and functioning, even in the most subaltern of workers. Being an assemblage 
[agencement], desire is precisely one with the gears and the components of the machine, one 
with the power of the machine. And the desire that someone has for power is only his 
fascination with these gears, his desire to make certain of these gears go into operation, to be 
himself one of these gears—or, for want of anything better, to be the material treated by these 
gears, a material that is a gear in its way."31 
With Deleuze and Guattari, the social emerges from our desire to be-in-the-world, not 
out of our desire for power. Deleuzean desire is thus similar to the Nietzschean will to power. 
Accordingly, semiosis is not stimulated by a desire for the real but by a desire to become.  
Before being co-opted by the symbolic, desire is immanent to the real and thus to becoming. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, beyond their social phenomena, economic and political institutions 
are first the expression of a Symbolic desire. In their chaosophy, a desire that takes its root in 
the Symbolic is an Oedipal desire. This desire maps or codes reality according to the Symbolic 
Order. Both the State and capitalism have an Oedipal function; they capture our desire to be 
and enfold it into their Symbolic Simulations. Oedipus, they write "is this displaced of 
internalized limits where desire lets itself be caught. The Oedipal triangle is the personal and 
 
28 Parr (Ed.), The Deleuze Dictionary, p.63  
29 Ibid., p.64 
30 The term agencement is part of the Deleuzean repertoire. The French term of agencement is preferred as 
neither assemblage nor apparatuses convey the original meaning. Indeed, in contrast with the French term, 
both terms emphasise the visual/structural form rather than the idea of difference and multiplicity that the 
French term emphasises.  
31  Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, Dana Polan (trans.), 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p.63 
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private territoriality that corresponds to all of capitalism's efforts of social 
reterritorialization."32  Thus, Oedipalisation is "a contemporary form of social repression that 
reduces the form desire takes – and thus the connections desire makes – to those that sustain 
the social formation of capitalism".33They use of the concept of Oedipalisation "to analyse the 
specific nature of the libidinal investments in the economic and political spheres, and thereby 
to show how, in the subject who desires, desire can be made to desire its own repression".34 
 
THE STATE 
Deleuze and Guattari think the emergence of the State through its correlation with the 
emergence of a desire for the State. They take as an example the despotic State in the Marxian 
"Asiatic mode of production".35  They argue this model does not conceptualize the State as a 
machine of capture at the service of a dominant class. Instead, it thinks the State as the maker 
of a class, which it then uses to exercise its domination over the entire socius it governs. This 
domination, they further explain, is primarily exercised through a bureaucratic apparatus.36 The 
State is thus the expression of a Symbolic desire that creates its conditions for domination.37 
From this angle, all states are the expression of a despotic desire. Thus, despite the differences 
in the apparitions or forms they take, that is, whether we talk about the archaic State or the 
modern State, all states express a similar desire. This convergence finds its expression in the 
concept of the Urstaat ( ur [proto] + staat [State]): "Asiatic production, with the State that 
expresses or constitute its objective movement, is not an objective formation.; it is the basic 
formation, on the horizon throughout history. There comes back to us from all quarters the 
discovery of imperial machines that preceded the traditional historical forms, machine 
characterized by State ownership of property with communal possessions bricked into it, and 
collective dependence. Every form that is more "evolved" is like a palimpsest: it covers a 
despotic inscription, a Mycenaean manuscript. Under every Black and every Jew, there is an 
Egyptian, and a Mycenaean under the Greeks, an Etruscan under the Romans. And yet their 
origin sinks into oblivion, a latency that takes hold of the State itself, and where the writing 
 
32 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.266 
33 Parr, The Deleuze Dictionary, p.190 
34 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.105 
35 Ibid.,p.194 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., pp.194-5 
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system sometimes disappears."38 
 
The Idea of the Urstaat refers to the State as a machine of capture. The State captures 
flows (flows correspond to the real, to experience) and as its Idea, the Urstaat is "the eternal 
model of everything the State wants to be and desires".39 The State and its desiring economy 
unfold as a seizing of individual and collective desire. By expressing itself as a "contemporary 
form of social repression that reduces the form desire takes – and thus the connections desire 
makes – to those that sustain the social formation of capitalism" the modern state proceeds 
through Oedipalisation.40  
For Deleuze and Guattari, as forces of productions of the Symbolic, the State and the 
economy act as the symbolic laws of the social and subjectivizes us into their Simulation: "In 
this way, different totalitarian systems produced different formulas for a collective seizing of 
desire, depending on the transformation of the productive forces and the relationships of 
production. […] The historical transversality of the machines of desire on which totalitarian 
system depends, is in fact, inseparable from their social transversality. Therefore, the analysis 
of fascism is not simply a historian's speciality. I repeat: what fascism set in motion yesterday 
continues to proliferate in other forms, within the complex of contemporary social space. A 
whole totalitarian chemistry manipulates the structures of the state political and union 
structures, institutional and family structures, and even individual structures inasmuch as one 
can speak of a sort of fascism of the superego in situations of guilt and neurosis."41 
In A Thousand Plateaus, they exposed the archaic despotism through which the modern 
state articulate itself.42 They argued that the main difference between the two lies in their 
relationship to the real or what they call flows. The archaic State coded flows while through 
capitalism, the modern State both codes and decodes flows. As mentioned earlier, this shift 
into the decoding of flows is at the core of Deleuze' analysis of the shift from disciplinary 
society to control society.43 Deleuze and Guattari see the State as a transhistorical machine that 
produces the social as a concrete copy of the dominant Symbolic. The State thus transversally 
 
38 Ibid., p.218 
39 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.217 
40 Parr, The Deleuze Dictionary, p.190 
41 Felix Guattari, Sylvere Loringer Francois Dosse (eds.), Chaosophy, Textes and Interviews 1972-77, (Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), p.163 
42 Gilles, Deleuze, Felix, Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, (Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p.574 
43 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, pp.3-7 
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delineates the frontiers of social subjectivity.44 It is a "fantastic machine for repression" whose 
desire "passes from the head of the despot to the hearts of his subjects, and from the intellectual 
law to the entire physical system".45 From a Deleuzean perspective, the Urstaat thus not only 
haunts the State in its concrete forms, but it also haunts us, by shaping our desire to its desire 
for domination and repression. The desire of the Urstaat metastasizes itself across the social 
field. Overall, they define the State as a "cerebral ideality that is added to, superimposed, on 
the material evolution of societies, a regulating idea or principle of reflection (terror) that 
organizes the parts and the flows into a whole."46 
 
CAPITALISM 
Deleuze and Guattari coequally envision capitalism as both a machine of capture of 
desire and Symbolic production. Capitalism exists as an economy of Symbolic domination. Its 
origins are as murky as the origins of the State. 47  In Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, they argue that features of the capitalist market already existed in feudal times 
and even much earlier.  So did David Graeber in his book 5000 years of debt.48 The function 
of capitalism is to produce economic forms of domination through which it can continue to 
expand and capture flows. In "Le Capital en fin de compte", Felix Guattari and Eric Alliez 
defined capitalism as a 'semioticoperator' that in correlation with its topological relation to both 
the economic and social orders,  is able to permeate and affect both material and subjective 
productions.49  
As mentioned earlier, in relationship to the modern State, capitalism both codes and 
decode flows. Capitalism unfolds through two semiotic register: a signifying semiosis- the 
register of representation- and an a-signifying semiotics-the register of transvaluation.  Control 
societies capitalist semiotics increasingly operate through a-signifying semiotics. Maurizio 
Lazzarato successfully resumes Deleuze and Guattari's complex vision of capitalism as a 
systemic libidinal reality:  
 
 
44 Deleuze, Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.221 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid., p.219 
47 Deleuze, Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.219 
48 David Graeber, Debt: the First 5000 Years, (New York: Melville House), 2011 
49  Felix Guattari, Eric Alliez, “Le Capital en fin de Compte: systems, structures et processus 
capitalistiques”, Change International, Vol.1 (Autumn 1983), pp.101-6 
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"According to Deleuze and Guattari, the semiotic components in control societies 
always operate in a dual register. The first is the register of "representation" and "signification" 
organized by signifying semiotics (the most important of which are "natural languages") for 
the purpose of producing the "subject", the "individual", the "I". Signifying semiotics fulfil the 
functions of social subjection and subjective alienation since, through representation and 
Signification, they create and allocate roles and places, they provide us with a subjectivity and 
they assign us to an identity, a gender, a profession, a nationality, etc. so that everyone is 
implicated in a semiotic trap that is both signifying and representative."50 
 
 "The second semiotic register is organized by a-signifying semiotics (such as money, 
analogue or digital machines that produce images, sounds and information, the equations, 
functions, diagrams of science, music, etc.).  Like Félix Guattari, we can call these "a-
signifying" semiotics for, while they bring into play signs with a potentially symbolic or 
signifying effect, they have a machinic rather than a symbolic or signifying effect in the way 
they actually function. Signifying semiotics speak, interpret, narrate, perform, while a- 
signifying semiotics fulfil the functions of machinic enslavement since this second register is 
not aimed at subject constitution, but at capturing and activating pre-individual and trans-
individual elements (affects, emotions, perceptions)" Lazzarato illustrates this by examples: 
"Stock-exchange indices, economic statistics, scientific diagrams and computer languages do 
not generate discourse; they operate, rather, by keeping the socio-economic machine running. 
Let the European Central Bank raise its bank rate by 1% and tens of thousands of "projects" go 
up in smoke for lack of credit. Let the French national health service accounts show a deficit 




 "signs and semiotics can operate according to these two heterogeneous and yet 
complementary logics; they can fulfil two functions at the same time. On the one hand, through 
a-signifying semiotics, they have a direct impact on the real, they produce processes, trigger 
actions, work, constitute the input and output elements of a social or technological machine 
 
50 Maurizio Lazzarato, “Semiotic capitalism: social subjection and machinic enslavement”; accessible from: 
http://automatist.net/deptofreading/wiki/pmwiki.php/SemioticCapitalism 
51 Lazzarato, “Semiotic capitalism” 
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while on the other, they produce meaning, representations, discourses in which the subject 
recognizes himself/herself and is alienated from himself/herself. On the other hand, through 
signifying semiotics, signs are no longer linked to processes but to representations, to 
meanings. The same semiotic devices can be devices for both machinic enslavement and social 
subjection simultaneously. Television, for instance, can constitute us as subjects, as users, or it 
can even use us as simple relays for transmitting information, emotions, affects or signs, which 
trigger an action-reaction sequence. We have the privilege of being subjected simultaneously 
to the effects of both."52 
 
As a semiotic force, capitalism subjectivizes us into its desire and makes us desire 
capitalist forms of domination. For example, capitalism produces individuals as producer-
consumer, hence the transvaluation of our desire into capitalist desire. Deleuze and Guattari 
call this the capitalist molecularisation of the process of repression. This molecularisation 
articulates itself through the pain and pleasure principle. Capitalism, like the State, does not 
just coercively objectify us, it also produces gentle forms of subjugations that produce a 
"collective drowsiness". Capitalism is "genius" in the Latin sense of the word: it is present from 
one's birth and consciously and unconsciously enframes our subjectivity. Besides, capitalism 
is also genius because of its capacity to neutralize anti-capitalist desire by capturing 
revolutionary movements into its fold. In doing so, it draws these movements away from the 
revolutionary event/experience and re-codes them into its Simulation.53  
The repressive and totalitarian desire of capitalism thus reproduces itself by activating 
the micro-fascist desire of the masses, and in doing so, creates the conditions for its 
reproduction. (post)Modern societies are hosts for the metastasizing of capitalist forms of 
fascism, forming a new form of molecular fascism: "Alongside the fascism of concentration 
camps, which continues to exist today in several countries, new forms of molecular fascism 
are developing, a slow burning fascism in familialism, in schools, in racism, in every kind of 
ghetto, which advantageously makes up for the crematory ovens. Everywhere the totalitarian 
machine is in search of proper structures capable of adapting desire to the profit economy."54 
By creating micro-fascism as forms of its social domination, capitalism proceeds through 
Oedipalisation. The Oedipal essence of the State and Capitalism haunts their historicity by 
 
52 Ibid. 
53 Deleuze, Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.76 
54 Guattari, Chaosophy, p.171 
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totalizing their becoming. Through them, this haunting becomes ours and subjectivizes us into 




INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER PART II 
OLD AND NEWER REFLECTIONS ON THE SIMULATIONS 
OF OUR TIMES 
 
 
1 POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AS A SIMULACRUM: REPRESENTATION 
AND ITS DEADLY CAPTURE OF BECOMING 
 
Postcolonial thought has been inquiring into the postcolonial reproduction of 
coloniality for some time.1 Colonialism, it argues, has continued to multiply by diversifying 
the forms it takes up. Colonialism continues to exist as territorial occupation and as the 
continuation of metropole-periphery economic relations that reproduce forms of colonial 
exploitation.2 International institutions such as the World Bank or the IMF,  transnational 
corporations and states, all participate in the continuation of colonial reality. However, 
colonialism also refers to a force of/in language: it produces colonial concepts for /as realities. 
Its Symbolic laws structure discourse and thus thought. Thus, postcolonial thought questions 
the continued presence of colonialism both in thought and in concrete existence. It questions 
 
1 Amy Allen, The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory, (Columbia 
University Press, 2016); Kwame Anthony Appiah, , Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. 
Reprint Edition, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007); James. Baldwin, Conversations with 
James Baldwin, ( Univ. Press of Mississippi, 1989); Gurminder Bhambra, “Cosmopolitanism and the 
Postcolonial Critique.” In The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism, edited by Maria Rovisco 
and Magdalena Nowicka, (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2011); Ronit Lentin (Ed.), Thinking Palestine, (London 
and New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2013); Dipesh,  Chakrabarty, Homi K. Bhabha, Sheldon Pollock, and Carol 
A. Breckenridge, Cosmopolitanism, (Duke University Press, 2002), Angela Y.  Davis, Abolition Democracy 
: Beyond Empire, Prisons, and Torture, 1st ed.New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005); Mahmoud Darwish, 
Munir Akash  and Daniel Abdal Ayy Moore, State of Siege, (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University 
Press, c2010) 
2  See for examples: Onur Ulas. Ince, Colonial Capitalism and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, (Oxford 
University Press, 2018); Sandro Mezzadra, ,  “How Many Histories of Labour? Towards a Theory of 
Postcolonial Capitalism.” Postcolonial Studies 14, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 151–70; 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2011.563458 ; Chris Chen, “The Limit Point of Capitalist Equality”,  
Endnotes 3, accessed from: https://endnotes.org.uk/issues/3/en/chris-chen-the-limit-point-of-
capitalistequality ;  
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the continued use of its representations as Signifiers of our reality as well as the hierarchical 
spectrum of being on which these are founded.  
 
Up to now, to understand the shifting forms of colonialism and explain its continuation, 
the bulk of the post/decolonial literature has primarily explored the ways in which the 
colonialism of/in language affects our relationship to social/political reality. For example, in 
Orientalism, Culture and Imperialism and, Dans l'ombre de l'occident, et autres propos, 
Edward Said argued that colonial thought/discourse gave rise to a particular form of aesthetics 
known as Orientalism. 3  He explained this form has continued to permeate and structure 
thought/discourse throughout the postcolonial era.  It continues to apprehend 'Orientals' as 
Signifieds of the Orientalist discourse and in doing so, reproduces the colonial Symbolic. Said 
equally argued that this way of existing as an Other's representation has now been internalized 
and invested by Orientals.19 In doing so, Said unveiled how colonialism had enfolded or 
subjectivized the Arabs into its system of significations, which meant they now narcissistically 
invested the Colonial Symbolic. To use Fanon's word, they secreted a race. From this, we take 
that an Idea is a concept that thinks experience through an imagined representation.  It is a 
Simulation that produces experience as its simulacra. 
Since Said, the colonial process of subjective alienation and its impact on how reality 
actualizes itself has been referred to as one of coloniality. Aníbal Quijano coined the expression 
"coloniality of power", which refers to the structures of power, control, and hegemony that 
have emerged during the modern colonial era, which stretches from the Americas' conquest to 
the present.4 According to Nelson Maldonado-Torres, it applies to "the logic, culture, and 
structure of the modern world-system."5 This concept takes as a  point of departure the ways 
in which colonial relations of power affect our relationship to authority,  sexuality,   knowledge 
and the economy. Therefore, fundamentally the concept of coloniality showcases how 
colonialism goes far beyond just taking up the form of a political arrangement. In contrast, it 
highlights how it also articulates itself as epistemology. Nelson Maldonado-Torres further 
explained the conceptual difference between colonialism and coloniality:  
 
3  Edward W.,Said, Orientalism, (London, Penguin Books, 1995) and Edward W.,Said, Culture and 
Imperialism, (London: Vintage, 1993), Edward W.,Said, Seloua Luste Boulbina, Dans l'ombre de l'occident, 
et autres propos, (Paris: Les Presses du reel, 2011) 
4 Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “On the coloniality of human rights”, Revisista Critica de Ciensias Sociais, 
n.115 (2017), pp.117-36, p.117 




"Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and 
economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another 
nation, which makes such nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing 
patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, 
intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial 
administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the 
criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of 
peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, 
as modern subjects we breath coloniality all the time and everyday."6 
 
As Walter Mignolo also wrote, "Modernity, capitalism and coloniality are aspects of 
the same package of control of economy and authority, of gender and sexuality, of knowledge 
and subjectivity."7  Both Mignolo and Maldonado-Torres thus imply that coloniality is an 
epistemic form of knowledge inherited from colonialism and that it constitutes the current 
epistemic space through which being articulates itself.8 Furthermore, Mignolo coined the term 
coloniality of being, which he developed in correlation to the nexus coloniality-power- 
knowledge: 
 
"'Science' (knowledge and wisdom) cannot be detached from language; languages are 
not just 'cultural' phenomena in which people find their 'identity'; they are also the location 
where knowledge is inscribed. And, since languages are not something human beings have but 
rather something of what human beings are, coloniality of power and of knowledge engendered 
the coloniality of being [colonialidad del ser]".9 
 
Accordingly, colonialism still epistemically structures thought and through it being. 
Today, he adds, the concrete form of this epistemological structure takes is Globalization: 
 
"What is termed Globalisation is the culmination of a process that began with the 
 
6 Maldonado-Torres, “On the coloniality of being”, p.243 
7 Walter D. Mignolo, “Coloniality of power and decolonial thinking”, Cultural Studies,Vol.21, Issue 2-3 
(2007), p.1 
8 Maldonado-Torres, “On the coloniality of being”, p.242 
9 Walter D. Mignolo, “Coloniality of power and decolonial thinking”, p.242 
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constitution of America and colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism as a new global power. 
One of the fundamental axes of this model of power is the social classification of the world's 
population around the idea of race, a mental construction that expresses the basic experience 
of colonial domination and pervades the more important dimensions of global power, including 
its specific rationality: Eurocentrism. The racial axis has a colonial origin and character, but it 
has proven to be more durable and stable than the colonialism in whose matrix it was 
established. Therefore, the model of power that is globally hegemonic today presupposes an 
element of coloniality."10 
 
The concept of coloniality of being examines how the coloniality-knowledge-power 
nexus enframes our rationality and shapes our reality. It thus examines coloniality through the 
lenses of its apparitions. It takes notes of its presence and examines how it imprints existence 
symbolically and at its concrete level. To this end, it draws on the Foucauldian theory of 
knowledge/power. For Foucault, power objectifies things but cannot be possessed. Power is 
spread along with various social practices; it is not possessed by those who exercises it; it 
transversally passes through them. Power exercises itself through us; it permeates our social 
organization. With Foucault, power is at the root of the social link; it is what makes the social 
possible: 
 
"What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does 
not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it transverses and produces things, it 
induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a 
productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative 
instance whose function is repression."11 
 
The essence of power escapes symbolization; power runs is the surplus that comes out 
of the convergence of Symbolic reality and concrete reality. The convergence of the Real and 
the Symbolic produces a desire to be representation, a desire to identify the real with a regime 
of Representation. For Foucault, our desire to be social stems from this desire to be 
representation, this desire to make sense of our being-in-the-world through language. 
 
10 Quijano, Anibal, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America”, International Sociology, 
Vol.15, Issue 2, pp.215-32, p.215. 
11 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p.119. 
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Ultimately then, the power of representation is ineluctable. Besides, representation is not all 
negative. Foucault closely associates pleasure, knowledge, and discourse as positive 
inductions/productions of power in the above definition. Power expresses itself as a desire to 
be social, to form a socius. 
Nonetheless, for Foucault, power is also a prisoner to representation; representation 
subjectivizes power. The modalities of power, the forms that it takes-up are regulated by the 
regimes of truth of historical formations. Historical formations exercise power by producing 
particular forms of knowledge and discourse that act as their regimes of truth. With Foucault,  
regimes of truth produce power before power is subjectivized by discourse; before it can even 
be exercised. Since regimes of truth produce power, the locus of power is language. Power is 
the Signified of a Signifier before becoming a sign. Power is, just like us, the subject of the 
Symbolic and its laws.  From a Foucauldian perspective, our historicity imprints our concrete 
becoming: we are the subjects of language and language is the subject of the historicity of the 
Symbolic order. Foucault did not see a way out this capture. He maintained that ultimately, it 
remains impossible for us to express a knowledge of the world, of ourselves and thus of reality 
beyond language and since language is first subjectivized by the Symbolic, we are locked in a 
position of being subjects of the regime of representation: 
 
"I would suggest rather (but these are hypotheses which will need exploring): (i) that 
power is co-extensive with the social body; there are no spaces of primal liberty between the 
meshes of its network; (ii) that relations of power are interwoven with other kinds of relations 
(production, kinship, family, sexuality) for which they play at once a conditioning and a 
conditioned role; (iii) that these relations don't take the sole form of prohibition and 
punishment, but are of multiple forms; (iv) that their interconnections delineate general 
conditions of domination, and this domination is organized into a more-or-less coherent and 
unitary strategic form; that dispersed, heteromorphous localized procedures of power are 
adapted, reinforced and transformed by these global strategies, all this being accompanied by 
numerous phenomena of inertia, displacement and resistance; hence one should not assume a 
massive and primal condition of domination, a binary structure with 'dominators' on one side 
and 'dominated' on the other, but rather a multiform production of relations of domination 
which are partially susceptible of integration into overall strategies".12  
 
 
12 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p.142 
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All in all, with Foucault, power is ineluctable because it expresses itself as our desire 
to be, to invest the social through language. This power of representation masks a lack: we 
cannot think existence as an object of knowledge beyond the logic of representation. Overall, 
this conception of power helps us think about the phenomena the Simulation produces but tells 
us little about the semiotic process that produces these simulacra. The next section theoretically 
explores in more depth the concepts of Simulation and simulacrum.   
 
 




In Simulacra and Simulation, Jean Baudrillard argued that the shift from Modernity to 
postmodernity inaugurated the Symbolic order's totalization of the Real order.13 He explained 
this totalization results from a shift in our semiosis of being, which has affected our experience 
of, and relationship with, the Real.  Semiotics is a vast academic field, so as an introduction to 
its basics, this section provides a  brief overview of the approaches developed by Ferdinand de 
Saussure, Jacques Lacan and Charles S. Peirce.  
Ferdinand de Saussure developed a structural model of semiosis in which the sign is 
constituted through the dyadic interaction of a signified and a signifier. In Saussurean 
linguistics, a signified is the concept or representation of a word,  a signifier is an acoustic 
image or word (the phonological element of the sign), and the sign is what results from the 
association of the signifier with the signified.14 In the Saussurean system, the signified and the 
signifier are mutually interdependent, and 'signification' emerges from this interdependence.15 
Saussure's dyadic model has been reworked in linguistics and beyond. For example, in 
psychoanalytical theory, Jacques Lacan rethought the relationship between signifier and 
signified through the psychic process of Identification rather than through the linguistic process 
of Signification. He introduced a third element to the dyadic structure: the Real as the Object 
 
13 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacres et Simulation, (Paris: Editions Galillee, 1981), p.11 
14 Marianne Jorgensen, Louise J. Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, (London: Sage 
Publications, 2002),  pp.9-10 
15 Jorgensen, Phillips, Discourse Analysis, pp.9-10 
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of Identification production.16 With Lacan, the hegemonizing of the Real by the Symbolic 
order produces the Real as an Object a of experience; it produces the Real as an object of desire 
or phantasm of thought.17 Yet, even as an Object a, the Symbolic-Real has a parallax quality: 
it can never be totalized by representation. The subject's sense of the Real as its Symbolic Other 
is thus founded on a Simulation. As we will in Chapter One, the Ideal-I (an image of concrete 
experience seen in a mirror or an image of concrete experience thought as a concept), which 
the subject identifies with to enter the Symbolic/social order is a distorted image of the real. 
With Lacan subjective reality is a simulacrum of the Real, it misrepresents it.18 For Lacan in-
itself, subjectivity can experience itself in three different orders of being. The Real is the order 
of immediate experience and eludes representation. The Symbolic is the order of symbolic 
experience in both its conceptual and concrete forms and the Imaginary is the order of 
fundamental narcissism through which the subject creates phantasms of both themselves and 
their ideal objects of desire (Objects a).19 The imaginary is a vital force out of which the 
Symbolic emerges. The Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary are linked like a Borromean 
knot.20 
With Lacan, the subject's Identification with an Ideal-I produces a displacement in the 
subject's experience, which concomitantly dislocates the subject's relationship to experience.21 
The Real becomes experienced as an Object a. The parallax nature of the real as an Object a 
projects the Symbolic Order as the order in which being can take up different 
perspectives/dimensions. This, in turn, produces a stimuli/desire to cognize unmediated 
experience as its Symbolic equivalent/specular. Drawing from Lacan, one could say that the 
Simulation's phantasmatic quality allows it to pass as the real. The totalizing nature of the 
Symbolic order also expresses itself through language.  For Lacan, signs are not the unit of 
language, signifiers are. In the Lacanian model of Identification, the signifier is primary and 
thereby produces the signified. The signified inevitably 'slips beneath' the signifier, and in 
 
16 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), p.25: “C'est qu'on ne peut dire à la lettre que ceci 
manque à sa place, que de ce qui peut en changer, c'est-à-dire du symbolique. Car pour le réel, quelque 
bouleversement qu'on puisse y apporter, il y est toujours et en tout cas, à sa place, il l'emporte collée à sa 
semelle, sans rien connaître qui puisse l'en exiler.”  
17 Lacan, Ecrits, p.549, p.553  
18 Ibid., p.553 
19 Ibid., p.807, see for example: “Mais il est clair que la Parole ne commence qu'avec le passage de la feinte 
à l'ordre du signifiant, et que le signifiant exige un autre lieu, - le lieu de l'Autre, l'Autre témoin, le témoin 
Autre qu'aucun des partenaires, - pour que la Parole qu'il supporte puisse mentir, c'est-à-dire se poser comme 
Vérité.” 
20 Tom Eyers, Lacan and the Concept of the ‘Real, (Hampshire: Plagrave Macmillan, 2012), p.17, see also  
21 Jacques Lacan,  Jacques-Alain Miller (Ed.), The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X Anxiety, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2014)  p.26 
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doing so, it resists our attempts to delimit it. 22   Lacan defined the signifier as "that 
which represents a subject for another signifier," in opposition to the sign, which "represents 
something for somebody".23  A signifier is first a sign without a fixed referent, rather its 
identity/meaning emerges out of its relationship with other signifiers, which means that 
language/thought functions metonymically. The signified can never totally represent the Real 
of its Object -  the real a thing, person, or property- because it can only think it from the 
Symbolic order's perspective. The signifier's primacy lies in its power of subjectivation: it re-
constitutes or represents its Object (the real of a thing, property, person) as a subject of its 
symbolic. Overall, Lacan highlights how processes of Identification think/ apprehend the real 
through representation. Thus representation masks a parallax gap: it can only simulate its Self 
as a quality of the real.24  
The theory of Charles S. Peirce also conceives a triadic process of semiosis. The sign 
is thought in relation to its function, not structure. Semiosis emerges out of the relationship 
between the Representamen, its Object, and its Interpretant.25  The Representamen is the form 
that the sign takes. The Representamen can refer to the conceptual representation of a sign or 
refer to the sign, in its concrete existence (for example, a prison as both a concept and an 
institution is a Representamen).26 The function of the Representamen is to represent another 
thing: its Object. The Representamen's function is then to represent/produce the Symbolic as a 
copy of the Real. For example, in Peircean terms, one can say that the Object of prison is 
disciplinary power. Its function is to represent/produce disciplinary power as both a form of 
knowledge and a concrete experience. 
Moreover, for Peirce, Representamen pre-exist their representation as pure 
potentialities. Initially, the Representamen comes first in the semiotic process, while the Object 
is second because it is thought of in relation to something else,  whether the individual, 
experience, fact, existence, and action-reaction.27 Thought then thinks its Object as the object 
of knowledge of a historicity. The Interpretant thinks the relationship between the 
Representamen and its Object.  Thought can thus only think the Object and the Representamen 
 
22 Jacques Lacan,  Alan Sheridan (Trans.), Écrits, (London: Routledge, 1977), p.149, p.154. 
23 Lacan, J. (2006). “The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious” 
(Trans. B. Fink), in Écrits the First Complete Edition in English (New York; London: W.W. Norton), 671–
702 
24 Ibid, pp.90-1 
25  Charles C. Peirce,  Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Eds.), 1931-58 The Collected Papers of C. S. 
Peirce, Vol. 2, (Cambridge: Harvard. University Press,  1931-1935), paragraph 228 
26 Ibid., paragraph 228. 
27 Ibid., Vol. 5, paragraph 484 
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from the Symbolic of the Interpretant.28 The Interpretant echoes the Foucauldian regime of 
truth. Our current regime of truth, for example, still likes to think of a prison as having 
rehabilitation as its primary function or Object.29  
In a way, by attributing semiotic referents to the real, the Interpretant can easily mask 
the real Object of the Representamen (in the case of a prison, the production of disciplinary 
power). As such, the Interpretant does not tell us about the being-in-itself of the Object. For 
Peirce, since initially the Interpretant is the mediator that brings a first and a second into a 
relation, it comes as a  third.  Peircean semiotics, therefore, follow an initial order of 
distribution: Representamen, Object and Interpretant. However, for Peirce semiosis is 
dynamic: its distributive order can change because its production is dynamic: it produces the 
real as an Object of thought and experience.  When thought thinks the sign a priori, the 
Representamen is first,  the Interpretant is second, and the Object is third. A semiotic process 
that simulates disciplinary power as justice would follow this order. It would think disciplining 
as a Representamen, justice as the Object and would Interpret the function of disciplinary 
power as the production of justice.  When a sign is determined a posteriori, the Object can 
come first, the Representamen second and the Interpretant third. In this case, experiences 
produce concepts, so overall, this process is less totalizing. However, the Interpretant still 
mediates its Identification/Signification, meaning that representation still hegemonizes the 
semiotic process. Ultimately then, experience is still apprehended as representation. The 
distributive order of semiosis depends on the Object's position, but regardless of its position, 
the Object is dynamic, it escapes total representation.30  Thought can only apprehend it as a 
sign of semiosis, as an object of its Simulation of knowledge/phantasm. With Peirce, in line 
with Lacan, the Real overflows from the immediate, it is a dynamical object, it cannot be 
totalized by semiosis although it lies at the root of its production.  
Saussure's, Lacan's and Peirce's semiotics theories are much more complicated, but the 
above overviews are enough to help us understand Baudrillard's argument. While Saussure 
used semiotics to investigate the inner workings of Signification, Lacan examined the coming 
onto itself of subjectivity through Identification processes while Peirce gave an account of 
Signification as representation. Baudrillard, drew from semiology to look at how changes in 
semiosis impact the social production of reality. Baudrillard's analysis of postmodern semiosis 
 
28 Ibid, Vol.2, paragraphs 203, 228, Vol. 1, paragraph 339 
29 Ibid., Vol. 2 paragraph 249 
30 Peirce,  1931-58 The Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce, Vol. 2, paragraph 299 
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postulates that in postmodernity, the semiotic process of thought has moved from a triadic to a 
dyadic process.  
This semiotic process is locked in a dyad between the signifier or Representamen and 
the Interpretant or signified. In the semiotic process of Simulation, for Baudrillard, the real is 
not an Object of semiotic production anymore, not even as an Object a. With Baudrillard, the 
phantasm becomes a quality of the real and as such it loses its phantasmatic quality. 31 
Baudrillard's critique of postmodernity is in line with Lacan's Mirror Stage, which lays out how 
our entrance into the Symbolic order dislocates the Real from its immediately, which means 
thought thinks the Real as phantasms/simulacra. However, with Baudrillard, the Simulation 
articulates itself as the totalization of representation: subjects totally identify with its Ideal-Is. 
They do not just strive to identify with them; they experience the Ideal-Is as a Real:  
 
"If once we were able to view the Borges fable in which the cartographers of the Empire 
draw up a map so detailed that it ends up covering the territory exactly (the decline of the 
Empire witnesses the fraying of this map, little by little, and its fall into ruins, though some 
shreds are still discernible in the deserts - the metaphysical beauty of this ruined abstraction 
testifying to a pride equal to the Empire and rotting like a carcass, returning to the substance 
of the soil, a bit as the double ends by being confused with the real through aging) - as the most 
beautiful allegory of simulation, this fable has now come full circle for us, and possesses 
nothing but the discrete charm of second-order simulacra."32 
 
The Simulation operates through a process of "museification" that mystifies the real.33 
Furthermore, as the Real is excluded from the semiotic process,  it slips beneath Signification. 
This hypermania of the Symbolic, Baudrillard called it the hyperreal: 
 
"Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. 
Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation 
by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the 
map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory - precession of 
simulacra - that engenders the territory, and if one must return to the fable, today it is the 
 
31 Ibid., paragraph p.304 
32  Jean Baudrillard,  Sheila Faria Glaser, Simulacra and Simulations, (Michigan: The University of 
Michigan Press, 2010), p.1 
33 Ibid., pp.8-10 
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territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent of the map. It is the real, and not the map, 
whose vestiges persist here and there in the deserts that are no longer those of the Empire, but 
ours. The desert of the real itself."34 
 
In the fable of Borges, the real is left to rot; the map totally recovers it. Eventually, 
people forget that, beyond the map, there is a real.   In the end, the map simulates itself as the 
real.  This analogy illustrates how the postmodern semiotic process does not 'make' the 
difference between the Real and its concepts and between the Idea and its copies. There is no 
Imaginary Order, no Real Order, just a metastasis of the Symbolic:   
 
"This imaginary of representation, which simultaneously culminates in and is engulfed 
by the cartographer's mad project of the ideal coextensivity of map and territory, disappears in 
the Simulation whose operation is nuclear and genetic, no longer at all specular or discursive. 
It is all of metaphysics that is lost. No more mirror of being and appearances, of the real and 
its concept. No more imaginary coextensivity: it is genetic miniaturization that is the dimension 
of Simulation. The real is produced from miniaturized cells, matrices, and memory banks, 
models of control - and it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times from these. It no 
longer needs to be rational, because it no longer measures itself against either an ideal or 
negative instance. It is no longer anything but operational. In fact, it is no longer really the real, 
because no imaginary envelops it anymore. It is a hyperreal, produced from a radiating 
synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere."35 
 
There are "No more mirror of being and appearances, of the real and its concept".36 
Postmodern semiosis precludes a Symbolic-Real dialectics because thought does not think 
being/essence anymore. In Baudrillard's view, this totalization of representation produces a 
new order: the Simulation. In this order, the sign has lost its semiotic referents. Indeed, 
Baudrillard differentiates between Representation and Simulation.  
 
"Such is Simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. Representation stems 
from the principle of the equivalence of the sign and of the real (even if this equivalence is 
 
34 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, p.1 
35  Ibid., p.2 
36 Ibid. 
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Utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Simulation, on the contrary, stems from the Utopia of the 
principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as the 
reversion and death sentence of every reference. Whereas representation attempts to absorb 
Simulation by interpreting it as a false representation, Simulation envelops the whole edifice 
of representation itself as a simulacrum. Such would be the successive phases of the image: it 
is the reflection of a profound reality; it masks and denatures a profound reality; it masks the 
absence of a profound reality; it has no relation to any reality whatsoever; it is its own pure 
simulacrum. In the first case, the image is a good appearance - representation is of the 
sacramental order. In the second, it is an evil appearance - it is of the order of maleficence. In 
the third, it plays at being an appearance - it is of the order of sorcery. In the fourth, it is no 
longer of the order of appearances, but of Simulation."37 
 
Baudrillard highlights the dissimilitude between the Symbolic-Real of Representation 
and the Symbolic-Real of Simulation. The Symbolic-Real of the Simulation is emptied of the 
potentialities of the Real, of its becomings.  It is a 'museified real', a Real that exists as a ghostly 
figure, a Real that is already dead. While Representation simulates a resemblance to the Real, 
the Simulation simulates a self-identicality to it.  
The difference between Representation and Simulation is that with Simulation, 
Representation totalizes experience.38 The Symbolic-Real of the Simulation is not a bearer of 
potentials but of their hypertrophy; it suffocates them. The real of the Simulation is a 
mummified real: a Symbolic representation. In Peircean term, the Simulation is the result of a 
third produced without a second. The results of this inter-symbolic operation are bounds to 
produce concrete reality as an absurd. Hyperreality is a reality where the real is valueless, its 
sign has no value, and its only quality is transvaluation. Furthermore, this transvaluation 
mirrors capitalist semiotics.39 With capitalism, the screen acts as a surface that mediates the 
Real (reality tv, livestreaming,….). 40  The screen/surface mediates immediacy, but this 
immediacy is simulated. This simulated real, this Symbolic-Real, has no depths of its own, no 
dimensions. It is a one-dimensional Simulation. 
 
 
37 Baudrillard,  Simulacra and Simulations, p.6 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid., p.21, p.106 
40 Ibid., pp.27-8 
 34 
3 DELEUZE AND THE OVERTURNING OF PLATONISM: REALITY IS A 
SIMULATION  
 
FOUCAULT AND DELEUZE: POSTMODERNITY AS CONTROL SOCIETIES 
The ability of capitalism to flatten experience into its Symbolic and in doing so, to 
produce a one-dimensional world, is also an argument made by Herbert Marcuse in the book, 
One-dimensional man. 41  Before Baudrillard, the Frankfurt School had argued that in 
Modernity, commodities, bureaucratic institutions, media and technology act as signifiers that 
redefine individual identity/values/desire.42 Baudrillard saw postmodernity as a historical stage 
that reifies the social forms of domination already denounced by the Frankfurt School. 
Accordingly, in postmodernity, human subjectivity is totalized by the object world 
(Symbolic/Capitalist order.) Michel Foucault,  Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari also critiqued 
this objectification of human subjectivity.43 Deleuze, in particular, argued that disciplinary 
societies were shifting to control societies.44  He also postulated that changes in semiotic 
processes, which include signs losing their referents, produce shifts in the structures of social 
domination.45  Previously, disciplinary societies had primarily rooted power in fixed and thus 
identifiable institutions/places such as prisons, schools, military forces, police forces, the State, 
etc. However, in control societies, power permeates the social without taking up concrete 
institutional forms. Disciplinary power has metastasized into every stage of our life:  
 
"In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, 
from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never finished with 
anything–the corporation, the educational system, the armed services being metastable states 
 
41 Herbert Marcuse, One-dimensional man: studies in ideology of advanced industrial society, (London: 
Routledge, 2002)  
42 See for example Marx Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Gunzelin Noeri, Dialectics of the Enlightenment 
(London: Verso Books, 2016), Benjamin, Walter, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction”, in Illuminations, (New York: Schocken Books, 1969) 
43 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books , 
1977); Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, October, Vol. 59, (Winter 1992), pp.3-7 
44 Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, pp.3-7; see also Chantal Mouffe, “Space, hegemony 
and radical critique”,  in D. Featherstone, and J. Painter, (Eds.), Spatial Politics: Essays for Doreen Massey, 
(West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 19–31 
45 Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, p.7 
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coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation."46 
 
This shift in the production of the real coequally implies a shift in the process of 
capitalist production: 
 
"It no-longer buys raw materials and no longer sells the finished products: it buys the 
finished products or assembles parts. What it wants to sell is services but what it wants to buy 
is stocks. This is no longer a capitalism for production but for the product, which is to say, for 
being sold or marketed. Thus, it is essentially dispersive, and the factory has given way to the 
corporation. The family, the school, the army, the factory are no longer the distinct analogical 
spaces that converge towards an owner--State or private power-- but coded figures--deformable 
and transformable--of a single corporation that now has only stockholders. Even art has left the 
spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open circuits of the bank. The conquests of the 
market are made by grabbing control and no longer by disciplinary training, by fixing the 
exchange rate much more than by lowering costs, by transformation of the product more than 
by specialization of production."47 
 
Overall, for Deleuze, the shift from disciplinary to control societies means the 
emergence of new forms of domination and subjectivation, which are far less identifiable, 
although as totalizing as the old ones. 48  Control societies simulate freedom but produce 
totalizing forms of control that are difficulty discernible. The panopticon has lost its walls and 
exercises its control over the social transversally. While in disciplinary societies, capitalism 
subjectivized the social by multiplying itself through analogical forms of power, in control 
societies, it multiplies itself by taking up only one form: corporate power.  This produces a 
reality where the individual and social reality become organized by the market's principle: 
capitalist deregulation. This deregulation of the diffusion of power allows it to permeate the 
social which maximizes its disciplinary capacities. In the Symbolic order, signs have lost their 
semiotic referents, and chains of significations are replaced by a system that both codes and 
decodes empty signifiers. Lacan emphasized the initial lack of signifiers, but for Deleuze, it is 
capitalist semiosis that produces empty signs and allows the market to process them into its 
 
46 Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, p.5 
47 Ibid., p.6 
48 Ibid., p.7 
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system of values.  
For Deleuze, the Simulation is not a modern or postmodern moment; it is the logic of 
thought through which civilization has emerged and has unfolded from antiquity up to now. 
From this perspective, Representation is an order of Simulation. 49   For Deleuze, history 
illustrates the totalizing affect of regimes of Representation on experience. Indeed, the process 
of museification that Baudrillard refers to in Simulacra and Simulations echoes the colonial 
petrification of Black Skin White Masks and Nietzsche's critique of the 'Egyptianism' of thought 
and its production of a history that has lost its dynamic sense/vitality.50  
Deleuze explains that Simulation and Identification are metonymic. 51  For Deleuze 
Representation is always based on a simulacrum, because thought thinks the Real as an Object 
of Symbolic/phantasm.52 In Anti-Oedipus Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari 
critique the Platonic Idea.  
Plato's theory of Ideas aims at accounting for the difference between the real of a thing-
in-itself and its apparition as a concrete form of/in experience. It differentiates between the two 
by deducing the degree of realness or falsity of an experience. To account for this differential, 
Plato proceeded through division.53 He divided/differentiated existence into two spaces, two 
rival spaces or orders of being.54 The first order is a conceptual space, a space where being 
exists in self-identicality. Conceptually, the image of an experience (its sign) and its 
representation (concept) can be self-identical. The thing (sign) can be identical to its concept  
(i.e., justice is just). Plato thinks Ideas (eidos) as concepts that can represent an experience in 
its unmediated form.55 In doing so, Platonic thought posits Representation as the original 
presentation of being, as the first order of being.  Being can be the same with itself in-itself 
only as Representation. Justice can only be entirely just in thought, that is to say, justice can 
only be entirely just in/as Representation.  
As a concrete institution, however, justice can only strive to reproduce this perfect 
Ideal. Concrete existence is marked by a dissonance between the Idea and its concrete forms. 
 
49 Gilles Deleuze , Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia, (Minneapolis, University 
of Minesto Press, 2000), p.87 
50 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in Friedrich Nietzsche , R. J. Hollingdale (Trans.), Twilight of 
the Idols and The Anti-Christ, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 35 
51 Deleuze , Guattari, Anti-Oedipus,p.87 
52 Ibid.  
53 Gilles Deleuze, Rosalind Krauss (Trans.), ‘Plato and the Simulacrum’, October, Vol.27 (Winter 1983), 
pp.45-56, p. 45 
54 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum”, p.46 
55 Daniel W. Smith,  ‘The concept of simulacrum, Deleuze and the overturning of Platonism’ Continental 
Philosophy Review, (2006), pp.1-35 , p.11 
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The representation and its concrete form are not self-identical. Existence is a distorted 
experience or image (eidolon) of Ideas.56 Thus, the theory of Ideas thinks concrete experience 
as the eidolon of an eidos, an image or copy of the Idea. This consequently means that concrete 
existence can only be a copy of its Ideality. 
Furthermore, thought thinks experience as the distorted reproduction of an Image/Idea, 
hence the thesis' argument that thought thinks experience as a phantasm (phantasma) or 
simulacrum. Indeed, thought thinks experience as either similar, analogous or opposed to 
concepts but never as self-identical to them. For example, in its concrete form, justice can never 
be totally/entirely just. It can be similar, analogous or opposed to the concept of justice-in-
itself. In this regime of Representation, as a concrete experience, justice can never be justice-
in-itself; it can only be a similar, analogous or opposed representation. Deleuze and Guattari's 
critique challenges Platonic Idealism and the spectrum according to which it judges the 
relationship between the Real or concrete experiences/events, and the representations or 
concepts thought uses to 'make' sense of them. When thought 'judges' whether a court's decision 
is similar, analogous or opposed to justice-in-itself, it relies on the thinker's a priori 
interpretation of justice-in-itself. 
Therefore, in this regime of representation, whether it is thought as in-itself or as a 
concrete experience,  the meaning/Signification of justice is 'made' contingent on the 
interpretation that the Interpretant/thinker 'makes' of it.  This exposes how Platonic Idealism 
Symbolically totalizes experience: it can only think experience through processes of 
Identification.  
It can only think experience by enfolding it in an Identity. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
Identification and Simulation function through Representation and thus both take their origin 
in the Symbolic. Representation simulates its relation to the Real: it claims they both share the 
same sense of self, a similar interiority. It pretends that the 'I' of the thinker can think the 
interiority of justice. It claims that a Subject of knowledge/language can think/’judge' the inner 
being of a concrete thing/experience by 'measuring' its relations to its Idea. The processes of 
Signification that thought uses think the relation between concrete experience and the Symbolic 
order in terms of Identity. 
In contrast, for Deleuze and Guattari, the relation between the Symbolic and the Real 
cannot be thought in terms/relations of Identity. The Symbolic takes up Identity as its central 
system of being while the Real takes up difference.  When the thinker thinks the Real through 
 
56 Ibid., p.6 
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the principle of Identity, the Symbolic totalizes the semiotic process. With Deleuze and 
Guattari,  the method of 'division' through which Platonic Idealism proceeds to 'make' sense of 
immediate experience means it thinks a mirrored image or Symbolic copy of Real experience. 
It thinks a Simulation of Identity; it misrecognizes the Symbolic as a Real, it misrepresents it. 
 
"But Simulation must be understood in the same way as we spoke of Identification. It 
expresses those non-decomposable distances always enveloped in the intensities that divide 
into one another while changing their form. If Identification is a nomination, a designation, 
then Simulation is the writing corresponding to it, a writing that is strangely polyvocal, flush 
with the real. It carries the real beyond its principle to the point where it is effectively produced 
by the desiring-machine. The point where the copy ceases to be a copy in order to become the 
Real and its artifice. To seize an intensive real as produced in the coextension of nature and 
history, to ransack the Roman Empire, the Mexican cities, the Greek gods, and the discovered 
continents so as to extract from them this always-surplus reality, and to form the treasure of 
the paranoiac tortures and the celibate glories—all the pogroms of history, that's what I am, 
and all the triumphs, too, as if a few simple univocal events could be extricated from this 
extreme polyvocity: such is the "histrionism" of the schizophrenic, according to Klossowski's 
formula, the true program for a theatre of cruelty, the mise-en-scene of a machine to produce 
the real."57 
 
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari, therefore dismiss the distinction that 
Baudrillard makes between Representation and Simulation by thinking Representation as an 
order of Simulations. Thought has never had a dialectical relationship with the Real because it 
has never been able to think the Real through its own plane of immanence. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze critiques the quadruple root of the regime of Representation and the 
limitations it imposes of thought. To think difference, Representation equivalences it to one of 
its quadruple roots: the identical, the similar, the analogous, the opposed.58 Representation 
rethinks difference as an object of its Symbolic regime. Thus, thought has always thought the 
Real as an Object a, and consequently, as a phantasmatic quality of the Symbolic. With Deleuze 
even when it is thought as an Idea, the Real is thought as an eidolon or Symbolic copy, which 
illustrates the totalizing quality of the order of Representation. This is very important as it 
 
57 Deleuze , Guattari, Anti-Oedipus,p.87 
58 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, (London: Athlone, 2011 edition), p.138 
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means that thought can be affected by the real of experience/existence, but the regime of 
Representations from which it thinks cannot.  
 
 
DELEUZE AND THE PLATONIC REVERSAL OF THE SIMULACRUM 
Deleuze developed his own concept of simulacrum in Difference and Repetition and 
The Logic of Sense.59 To rethink the simulacrum, he drew from Plato's conception of the 
simulacrum in three works, The Statesman, The Phaedrus and The Sophist.60 As mentioned 
earlier, Plato wanted to know how to differentiate essence from appearance. To this end, he 
developed a theory of Ideas. For Plato, at the conceptual level (Symbolic order), the Idea's 
image can be self-identical to its form. With Plato, the cosmos or physical world is modelled 
on the world of forms/representations (Ideality). 
 
This means that thought can think a thing, a property, a person, in its unmediated 
existence and thus as a pure re-presentation, but only conceptually. With Plato, Ideality is the 
only space of being where a representation of being (a concept) is self-identical to its form 
(existence): "it is what objectively possesses a pure quality, or what is nothing other than what 
it is."61  
 
In contrast, concrete existence does not articulate itself through the principle of Identity. 
A thing, person, property can only lay claim to an Ideal identity, to the Idea in its pure form. 
For example, in its concrete existence, justice is not (always) just, but it lays claims to being 
just. So, how do we discern the degrees of falsity and truthfulness of an experience? How do 
we differentiate the true from the illusion?  
Plato thinks this differential through an ascending spectrum of being that goes from a 
perfect form to all its possible degraded forms. In this spectrum, being is first a perfect/total 
Idea and is followed by all its concrete existences, which ranges from the best copy to the 
worst.  The Platonic unity of measure of the Real is one of the degrees of similitude between 
 
59  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of  Sense, (London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2004) 
60 Deleuze, ‘Plato and the Simulacrum’, p.47 
61 Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Hugh Tomlinson, and Graham Burchell (Trans.), What is Philosphy, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994) pp.29-30 
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Ideas and their copies. The best copy resembles the original the most, and the worst is so 
dissimilar to it, it cannot be said to resemble it.  In The Statesman, for example, Plato defines 
the Statesman as the "shepherd of men", as he who takes care of men.62 Throughout the book, 
different persons come forward to lay claim to being the shepherd of men.63 The problematic 
is then to make the difference between the true shepherd, who is the true claimant to the idea 
and its rivals. The true shepherd is the man who is the best concrete representation or 
reproduction of the Idea of the shepherd.64 In addition to explaining how thought thinks being 
through a gradient of good and bad, the Platonic selection process of thought exposes how the 
Idea acts as a foundation, an initial image against which we measure the real. The Idea is a pure 
model. 65  In being the same with itself, in-itself it pretends to self-identicality, to totality. 
In The Sophist, Plato further investigates the differences between the copy and the 
simulacrum.66 A copy is marked by its internal resemblance or similitude to an a priori original 
while the simulacrum is marked by its internal dissemblance to this original.67 For Plato then, 
in its concrete form, being can either be a copy (eikons) or a simulacrum (phantasma). This 
logic of thinking concrete experience as the reproduction of an Ideal illustrates how  
 
"difference becomes an object of representation always in relation to a conceived 
identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived similitude. Under these four 
coincident figures, difference acquires a sufficient reason in the form of a principium 
comparationis."68 
 
 Representation can thus only think difference represented as Identity, analogy, 
opposition or similitude. In doing so, Representation reduces difference to a difference between 
two elements.  Furthermore, to be compared, two things have to be equivalenced. 
Representation thus thinks difference as a repetition of the same or as the non-repetition of the 
same (opposition). Therefore, with the theory of Ideas, Platonic thought thinks being through 
a field of immanence, but this immanence is only thought from the field of transcendence. It 
thinks concrete experience through its resemblance or lack, therefore with a total Ideal 
 
62 Deleuze, ‘Plato and the Simulacrum’, p.46 
63 Ibid.  
64 Deleuze, ‘Plato and the Simulacrum’, p.46 
65 Ibid., p.50 
66 Ibid., p.47 
67 Deleuze, Deleuze, ‘Plato and the Simulacrum’, p.46 




"The poisoned gift of Platonism is to have introduced transcendence into philosophy, 
to have given transcendence a plausible philosophical meaning. Modern philosophy will 
continue to follow Plato in this regard, encountering a transcendence at the heart of immanence 
as such."69  
 
Thought can think things in their concrete being but only by mediating /measuring them 
against a pre-set Idea. In other words, the Idea is the unity of measure against which thought 
thinks the real. We think the real through its representations. Plato's 'poisoned gift' is 
nonetheless a gift, Deleuze tells us because, in The Sophist, he offers us an inroad into the 
potential overturning of this spectral logic of thinking being. Although Deleuze notes that the 
overturning of Platonism is a Nietzschean project, he also highlights that the double objection 
to essences and appearance goes back to Hegel, and further still, to Kant."70 In The Sophist, 
Deleuze tells us, is illustrated by the Platonic reversal of the function of the simulacrum.71 In 
The Stateman and Republic, the simulacrum was a bad copy of an Idea: it is a simulacrum 
because of its dissimilitude to the original. In contrast, The Sophist offers us a different 
conception of the simulacrum and gives it a different function.72  At the end of the dialogues, 
Deleuze notes that: 
 
"The final definition of the Sophist leads us to the point where we can no longer 
distinguish him from Socrates himself: the ironist operating in private by elliptical arguments. 
Was it not inevitable that irony be pushed this far? And that Plato be the first to indicate this 
direction for the overthrow of Platonism?"73 
 
This time, it is impossible to make the difference between the model (the original) and 
the copy:  
 
"By simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but rather the act by which 
 
69 Gilles Deleuze, Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco  Trans.) “Plato, the Greeks,” in Essays Critical 
and Clinical, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 137 
70 Deleuze, ‘Plato and the Simulacrum’, p. 45 
71 Ibid., p.47 
72 Ibid.  
73 Ibid.  
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the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged and overturned".74 
 
 In The Sophist, the simulacrum's function is then to challenge, to problematize the idea 
of an original foundation by contesting the distinction between original and copy. Knowledge 
has been reached to its point of limit, and its Simulation collapses: How can two different Ideas 
share the same experience? 
 
"Resemblance is always on the exterior, and difference – small or large – occupies the 
centre of the system."75 
 
Thus, the simulacrum is constituted by an internal difference, a disparity that is not 
derived from an a priori identity. Its only unit of measurement is the 'disparate'. As Deleuze 
explains in Difference and Repetition, simulacra are differential systems of being in which "the 
different is related to the different through difference itself."76 Ideality and materiality are 
motored by the disparate. For Deleuze, in The Sophist, Plato tells us that beyond the Simulation, 
the simulacrum is its own singularity. Per its Identity as a simulacrum, it can expose reality as 
a simulation. The uncovering of the real as a simulation reveals a real founded on the 
unfounded, a real with no myth or origins, no originals or copies. In its concrete existence, 
experience is bound to be dissimilar to Ideas; they occupy two different orders. The Idea has 
an ideal existence while concrete existence has a plastic existence. The Simulation simulates 
an equivalence that cannot be made. This is what Nietzsche called the 'power of the false':  
 
"Simulation is the phantasm itself, that is, the effect of the functioning of the 
simulacrum as machinery—a Dionysian machine. It involves the false as power, Pseudos, in 
the sense in which Nietzsche speaks of the highest power of the false."77  
 
This power of the false simulates depths and dimensions, but hides a flat surface, a 
surface that has lost all its potentials:  
 
"the simulacrum implies huge dimensions, depths, and distances that the observer 
 
74 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.69 
75 Ibid., p.171 
76 Ibid., p.299 
77 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum”, p.53 
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cannot master. It is precisely because he cannot master them than he experiences an impression 
of resemblance."78  
 
There can be no equivalence made between the Real and the Symbolic they have 
different systems of being. They operate in different orders. The Symbolic operates within the 
regime of Representation, which is based on Identification/Signification while the Real 
functions through a regime of difference based on the disparate. With Deleuze, the system 
central to the being-in-itself of a thing is difference. When the simulacrum stops thinking in 
terms/relations of Identity and accepts their singularity and all the potentials that it bears, they 
stop being the Subject of a Simulation. The simulacrum is neither original nor copy; it follows 
the Law of excluded middle: that which is neither, nor.  This means that in-itself experience 
has no a priori identity outside of being in becoming:  
 
"Simulacra are those systems in which the different relates to the different by means of 
difference itself. What is essential is that we find in these systems no prior identity and internal 
resemblance: it is all a matter of difference."79 
 
Deleuze's overturning of the function of the simulacrum is a poignant critique of 
Representation as an order/regime of Simulation. Drawing on him this thesis defines 
representational thought as a thought that thinks the concrete being of a thing/person by 
measuring it to an a priori Idea, whose meaning/existence is structured by symbolic laws.  
 
"Representation has only a single centre, a unique and receding perspective, and 
consequently a false depth. Movement for its part implies a plurality of centres, a superposition 
of perspectives, a tangle of points of view, a coexistence of moments which essentially distort 
representation: paintings or sculptures are already such 'distorters,' forcing us to create 
movement."80   
 
With Deleuze, it is in accepting ourselves as simulacra that we can challenge the 
 
78 Ibid., p.49 
79 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.299 
80 Ibid., p.56 
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Simulation's reality and expose the unfounded quality of what we call reality. The 'reality' of 
the Simulation is the product of a Symbolic totalization of the Real and as such, is marked by 
its dissimilitude to the Real. However, in contrast with Baudrillard, Deleuze argues that the 
totalization of the real is a simulation. Indeed, by definition, the real cannot be totalized. 
Accordingly, while Baudrillard foresaw no potential ending to postmodern semiosis, Deleuze 
and Guattari insist that new forms of dominations, however totalizing, always gave rise to new 
forms of resistance. 
With Deleuze, the real has no foundational law or image, no myth of origins. 
Accordingly, thought cannot think being-in-itself through a spectrum of good and evil, of true 
and false. Thinking the quality of being quantitatively is bound to produce reality as an absurd. 
We cannot 'measure' the internal quality of being by comparing the degrees of similitude or 
lack thereof between its exteriority (concrete apparition) and an Ideal representation. In doing 
so, Deleuze highlights the qualitative quality of being: being is in becoming. Being is always 
in becoming, in both its conceptual and concrete levels. It is then morality that assumes that 
the world of forms is fixed. For Deleuze, the real is always a dynamical object that resists 
totalization. Thus Ideality ought not to be thought of as an order of being where experience is 
total.  All in all, Representation thinks Simulations; it produces us as simulacra because thought 
cannot think things in their immediacy. We are all simulacra because we do think beyond 
representation, but yet, as simulacra, we have the power to expose the Simulation, to denounce 
it:  
 
"Things are simulacra themselves, simulacra are the superior forms, and the difficulty 
facing everything is to become its own simulacrum."81 
 
The Simulation does not replace the real; it creates a phantasmatic duplicate, a copy. 
This duplicate, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is born out of incest. The unmediated copulation 
between Signifiers and Signifieds produce the Simulation:  
 
"Simulation does not replace reality, it is not an equivalent that stands for reality, but 
rather it appropriates reality in the operation of despotic overcoding, it produces reality on the 
new full body that replaces the earth. It expresses the appropriation and production of the real 
by a quasi-cause. In incest it is the signifier that makes love with its Signifieds. System of 
 
81 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.67 
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Simulation is the other name for Signification and subordination."82 
 
Signification/identification/r/simulation all pertain to the order of Representation 
because they all pervert a dynamic experience by producing it as a simulacrum. The stronger 
the Simulation grows, the more it equivalences itself for the real. This growing sense of 
equivalence between the simulation and the real offsets the subject's sensing of the real, it 
colonises it.  
All in all, Deleuze argues that the simulacrum's function is to challenge the Simulation, 
to challenge the foundations of its reality. Platonic thought, Kantian thought and dialectical 
thought all pretend they can think the real as an object of knowledge, but this is a simulation. 
To move forward and liberate ourselves from the simulations of the regime of Representation, 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that we need to rethink the Idea. With Anti-Oedipus and through 
much of their works, they developed their own approach of the concept by thinking the Idea as 
a multiplicity founded on the disparate.  In-itself, an Idea does not refer to a total or perfect 
state of being (experience) but to the different qualities of a common experience. In this, each 
experience of this common is marked by its own singularity. Their Idea is founded on 
multiplicity, disparity, just like being. For Deleuze, the concept of simulacrum ultimately 
proved to be too tainted by Platonism. As he developed his rethinking of the Idea as a 
communal experience that refers to multiple experiences, Deleuze left the concept of 
simulacrum for the concept of agencement, which refers to an assemblage of disparities, of 
differentials. In saying that we are simulacra, it is our constitutive disparity that we are 
affirming. We are agencements, assemblages of desiring-productions. In a way, Deleuze came 
up with a simulacrum of the Platonic Idea:  a concept constituted on an internal dissimilitude 
to the Idea. If the Platonic Idea thought the cosmos as a copy of the world of forms, the 
Deleuzean Idea thinks concrete experience through Chaos, a becoming founded on the 
unfounded. It is then the cosmos becomes a Chaosmos that Deleuze and Guattari think through 
their Chaosophy.83  
In drawing from these theoretical perspectives, the thesis argues that postcolonial 
thought thinks revolutionary events/experiences as their colonial simulacra, that is, as colonial 
phantasms of knowledge.  It does so by thinking experience through a Symbolic Order of 
 
82 Deleuze, Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.210 
83 Felix Guattari, Chaosophy, Textes and Interviews, 1977-77, (Los Angeles: Semiot(e), c2009) 
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language that operates through Identification processes that totalize experience.84 Processes of 
Identification as Signification think the Symbolic as the foundation or origin against which the 
concreteness of an event/experience can be measured. The Idea acts as the unit of measure 
against which the 'realness' of event/experience is judged.  This logic follows the logic/laws of 
Platonic Idealism, which, as we have seen, thinks concrete existence as the degraded apparition 
of an Idea. In thinking the Symbolic Order as the origin of temporality, it postulates that 
subjectivity emerges out its encounter with a Symbolic Ideal-I or Gestalt. This thesis proposes 
to examine how in reproducing the logic of Representation, postcolonial thought is still stuck 
in the colonial Simulation. It problematises the ways in which political and revolutionary 
thought thinks the event/experience as Representation by drawing on the thoughts of Frantz 
Fanon and Gilles Deleuze. It argues that postcolonial semiosis also thinks experience (the Real)  
real as an Object a, that is as an Object of phantasms of the symbolic. The thesis further 
postulates that as Representation, the continued phantasmatic quality of knowledge means that 
thought thinks becoming as an event/experience that has already passed. This coequally helps 
explain the continued museification or petrification of experience. This thesis then challenges 
the thoughts of Simulation. In line with Deleuzean thought,  this thesis argues that 
Representation only allows us to think the Real through an invented/simulated equivalence 
with the Symbolic Order. Representation thinks the Real as a world of copies, but it does not 
sense the affect that this production has on the immediate experience (The Real) and thus on 
subjective experience. In doing so, the thesis concludes it reduces concrete existence to the 
world of simulacra. 
 
 
OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS  
Chapter 1 highlights the processes through which the colonial system folded Egypt in 
its Simulation. It proposes to look at the colonial symbolic as a fold of Modernity that gradually 
enfolded Egyptian subjectivity in its Simulation. In doing so, it argues that Egyptians were 
subjectivized into taking up the colonial symbolic as their new Big Other and consequently 
 
84 This approach stands in contrast to Jean-Paul Sartre’s argument that a ‘liberated’ thought is a thought that 
the Subject totally identifies with it, so as to move from its position of simulacrum to a position of perfect 
representation.  See for example, Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique de la raison dialectique, ,précédé  de Question 
de méthode,  (Paris: Gallimard, 1985) or  L’être et le néant, essai d’ontologie phenomenologique, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2019, c1943) 
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espoused the colonial regime of Representation, which thinks concrete experience as a copy or 
reproduction of Bourgeois capitalist modernity. The argument of this Chapter unfolds in two 
moments. The first outlines how both subjectivity and thought are tricked/seduced into thinking 
a simulation. The second examines how the colonial Simulation subjectivized Egyptian reality 
into its fold. It argues that by reshaping public spaces according to capitalist desire, the Colonial 
Symbolic projected colonialism as the concrete production of the Idea/reality of Modernity. 
Chapter 2 draws from Deleuze's critique of the modern Kantian understanding of LAW. 
It argues that in Egypt, colonial reality articulated itself in two senses. On the one hand, it 
projected itself as open to all series of time. On the other, it foreclosed the series of time that 
did not fit its temporal sequencing of space. The Chapter contends that the ways in which 
colonial reality deprives the Real of the possibility of Signification expose its semiotics of the 
absurd. This Chapter is divided into two moments. The first moment focuses on how the 
capitalist reality of the Simulation worked at foreclosing non-colonial possibles. The second 
moment continues to empirically highlight how colonial law further concretized Egypt's 
colonial becoming by foreclosing the possibles that did not fit the requirements of capitalist 
desire.    
Chapter 3 looks at the processes of subjectivation and alienation of desire that set the 
scene for the postcolonial State's Oedipalisation of social relations.  Its first moment examines 
the rise of fascist tendencies in the 1930s before moving to the Free Officers' coup and Gamal 
Abdel Nasser's rise.  The Free Officers and Nasser assigned roles and places that help redefined 
the citizens' Identity in correlations with the State's desire, the Chapter argues.  The second 
moment of the Chapter sets the scene for Chapter Four by illustrating how the State came to 
dominate the means of production of national subjectivity, thereby acting as the primary 
signifier or LAW of reality.  
Chapter 4 draws from the concept of faciality, to argue that as a Face of the fold of the 
colonial Simulation, Nasserism thought Liberation as a copy of its colonial simulacrum. 
Nasserism's spiralling into the world of phantasms further illustrates its pathologisation of the 
politics of Liberation, the Chapter contends. The Chapter thus examines how Nasserist thought 
produced multiple Signifiers/simulacra of liberation. It highlights how this surface Nasserism 
presents itself as both an affect and percept of liberation. The Chapter then challenges the 
liberated affects of Nasserism by looking at how its facialization reduced the social to the 
Objects of phantasm/knowledge of its Symbolic. Finally, the Chapter exposes the repressive 
function of the Nasserist Simulation. It examines how Nasserism simulated itself as a 
revolutionary affect, an affect of 'liberated time'.  
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Chapter 5 looks at Sayyid Qutb's thought by drawing from Deleuze's concept of the 
image of thought. It proposes to see how Qutb's thought moved from challenging the 
Simulation to falling back into its capture. To this end, it is divided into two moments. The first 
illustrates Qutb's writings from the late 1920s until the mid-1940s. The second from the mid-
1940s up to the mid-1960s. The Chapter argues that while Qutb did challenge the modern 
Simulation, the model of thought that he developed to liberate thought only captured it further 
into the world of phantasms. Qutb acknowledged the need to rethink the semiosis of Liberation, 
but, the Chapter further argues, he inversed not reversed the colonial regime of Representation.  
In doing so, he also thought Liberation as the copy of a simulacrum. Qutb, the Chapter 
contends, remained a prisoner of the image of thought. Besides, in his increasingly 
orthodox/dogmatic vision Qutb reproduced the logic of alienation he tried to escape and 
reproduced the pathologisation of the politics of Liberation, the Chapter concludes.  
 
Finally, the Conclusion summarises the argument and contributions of the thesis. It also 
provides concluding remarks on the research and the outcome of its analysis. Finally, the thesis 
argues that Deleuze and Guattari's schizoid semiotic assemblage, its free speech and free desire, 
seems to be a liberating departure from the paranoid semiosis of Representation. Through this 











CHAPTER 1  
THE COLONIAL FOLD AND ITS LOGIC OF THE UN-SENSE 
 
 
“The important thing in representation is that the prefix: re -presentation implies an 
active taking up of that which is presented; hence an activity and a unity distinct from the 
passivity and diversity which characterize sensibility as such. From this standpoint we no 
longer need to define knowledge as a synthesis of representations. It is the representation 







 This chapter highlights the processes through which the colonial system folded Egypt 
in its Simulation. The concept of the fold is taken from a vocabulary that Deleuze uses in his 
books on Foucault and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, although it was foregrounded in Difference 
and Repetition.1 It acts as a critique of the typical accounts of subjectivity, which presume an 
initial division between the interiority and exteriority of being by dividing between essence 
and appearances or between surface and depth. 2  It challenges this division by exposing 
 
1 See Gilles Deleuze, Tom Conley (Trans.), The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, (Minneapolis University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012, c1993);Gilles Deleuze, Sean Hand (Trans.),  Michel Foucault,  (Minneapolis 
University of Minnesota Press, 2016). 
2  “Fold over folds: such is the status of the two modes of perception, or of microscopic and macroscopic 
processes. That is why the unfolded surface is never the opposite of the fold. but rather the movement that 
goes from some to the others. Unfolding sometimes means that I am developing – that I am the undoing - 
infinite tiny folds that are forever agitating background. with the goal of drawing a great fold on the side 
whence forms appear; it is the operation of a vigil: I project world "on the surface of a folding At other times, 
I on the contrary, undo the folds of consciousness that pass through every one of my thresholds, the "twenty-
two folds" that surround me and separate me from the deep, in order to unveil in a single movement this 
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interiority as a fold of the outside.3 Through the fold, Deleuze problematises and questions the 
affect of the Self on the self and the ways in which the Self subjectivizes the self, into its fold. 
For him, the Self is always enfolded by the Big Other and the outside, while thought is unfolded 
by difference in the forms of repetitions.4 Thus thought can challenge the fold; it can un-enfold 
it because its modes of questioning and problematising cannot be represented by pre-
determined criteria.5 Thus, although thought tricks itself into thinking the Simulation as the 
true, it can also problematise the Simulation and challenge it. Overall, the folding of 
subjectivity into the enfolding of the Simulation gives the illusion that being is initially divided 
between two claimants: the Self and the self. It then simulates the Symbolic of Simulations as 
the only language/speech that can ‘make’ sense of our exteriority or Self and our interiority or 
self. This illusion masks a Simulation: the central system of the fold is founded on the disparate, 
not on a rivalry between two claimants and an identity. 
This chapter proposes to look at the colonial symbolic as a fold of modernity that 
gradually enfolded Egyptian subjectivity in its Simulation. In doing so, it argues that Egyptians 
were subjectivized into taking up the colonial symbolic as their new Big Other and 
consequently espoused the colonial logic of representation that thinks concrete experience as a 
copy or reproduction of Bourgeois capitalist modernity. As we have seen in the introduction, 
drawing on Deleuze and Baudrillard, modern semiosis results from a Symbolic totalisation of 
the semiotic process. This totalisation of semiosis by the regime of Representation unfolds 
itself as an experience totalised by the Object/Sign world. Indeed, drawing on Fanon, we have 
 
unfathomable depth of the tiny and moving folds that waft me along at excessive speeds in the operation of 
vertigo, like the "enraged charioteer's whiplash”, I am forever unfolding, between two folds, and if to 
perceive means to unfold. Then am forever perceiving within the folds.”, Deleuze, Leibniz, p.93. 
3 “The One specifically has a power of envelopment and development. while the multiple is inseparable from 
the folds that it makes when it is enveloped. and of unfoldings when it is developed”, Deleuze, The Fold, 
p.23 
4  “Why would something be folded, if it were not to be enveloped, wrapped, or put into something else? 
It appears that here the envelope acquires its ultimate or perhaps final meaning: it is longer an envelope of 
coherence or cohesion, like an egg, in the "reciprocal envelopment" of organic parts. Nor even mathematical 
envelope of adherence or adhesion. where a fold still envelops other folds, as in the enveloping envelope 
that touches an infinity of curves in infinity of points. It is an envelope of inherence or of unilateral 
"inhesion": inclusion or inherence is the final cause of the fold, such that we move indiscernibly from the 
latter to the former. Between the two, a gap is opened which makes the envelope the reason for the fold: 
what is folded is the included, the inherent. It can be stated that what is folded is only virtual and currently 
exists only in envelope, in something that envelops it.” Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 
p.22; See also Deleuze, Difference and Repetition 
5 “ We cannot say in advance whether a problem is well posed, whether a solution fits, is really the case, or 
whether a persona is viable. This is because the criteria for each philosophical activity are found only in the 
other two, which is why philosophy develops in paradox. Philosophy does not consist in knowing and is not 
inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success 
or failure.”, Deleuze, Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p.82 
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seen how colonial modernity totalised experience by producing it as a concrete representation 
of its Symbolic. Overall, the unfolding of colonialism as a fold of modernity coextensively 
points to colonial thought being a fold of modern thought. 
 Firstly, colonial thought reproduces the Kantian postulate that there are objects that 
can be true objects of knowledge, namely phenomena, and there are objects that cannot be 
true/total objects of knowledge, namely noumena. Secondly, colonial thought reproduces the 
internal division trough which modern thought resolves this disjunction by thinking 
phenomena through the non-disjunctive axiom apparitions/conditions.6 Modern thought thinks 
things through their apparitions or phenomena by measuring concrete events against the Idea 
its Symbolic produces for them. Furthermore, to measure or judge the degree of similarity 
between the event and the Idea, colonial thought reproduces the modern spectrum of thought, 
which posits white experience as the true claimant of modernity and black experience as its 
simulacrum. This logic thinks experience as internally constituted by an antagonism or rivalry 
that can be resolved by being synthesised into representation reproduces the Platonic method 
of division that Plato articulated in his theory of Ideas. Colonial thought thus thinks the Idea as 
the original of the phenomenon and the phenomenon as a copy or simulacrum of its original ( 
the Idea).    
As the concrete expression of a semiosis totalised by the Symbolic, modernity produces 
an experience totalised by reason. The totalising subjectivation of modern reason is based on 
the Enlightenment postulate, which asserts that it is by thinking the apparition of a 
thing/event/person that thought can think this it as an objective form of knowledge. Such logic 
is exemplified by the 18th-century shift in the conception of the event of History as a scientific 
object of knowledge.7 Indeed, thinkers of the enlightenment including Giambattista Vico, 
Montesquieu, Voltaire, Gibbon, Herder, Turgor or Condorcet, thought history through a 
scientific analysis of the relationship between cause and effect by drawing from a rule of 
physics, which states that for every action there is an equivalent reaction.8 In historical terms, 
this implies that every event has a cause, and is itself the cause of subsequent events, which 
may be considered its effect(s), or consequences. In this logic, the Self causes the Other. 
 
6 In Modern European thought, the couple apparitions/conditions was introduced by Kant. See Immanuel 
Kant, Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood (Trans.), Critique of Pure Reason, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press), pp.338-353; see also Gilles Deleuze, “Lecture on Kant: Syntheses et temps”,  14/03/1978, Vincennes. 
Accessed from: https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/kant-synthesis-and-time/lecture-01 
7 Francois Dosse, Renaissance de l’evenement: Un Defi pour l’historien, entre sphinx et phenix, (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires De France, 2010), pp.13-4 
8 Ibid.  
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Besides, the causal lens presupposes that it can think events in real-time by thinking their 
successive series of time: it can think the apparition, think the cause of the apparition, and think 
the effect of the apparition as the cause of another event. This logic of signification pretends 
that thought can think the movement of history as the apparition of successive series of times. 
This line of thought follows the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which, according to Kant thinks 
the possible grounds of experience, “namely the objective cognition of appearances with 
regards to their relation in the successive series of time.”9 In following this principle as a 
ground for thinking experience, modern thought presumes that it thinks the true and that this 
truth can be cognised as an object of knowledge by measuring the degrees of Identification 
between a phenomenon and the Idea to which it corresponds.10 Ironically,  in this logic of 
signification, the Idea acts as a ‘noumenon’ of the phenomenon.  
As both a concrete and symbolic signified and Signifier of the modern Big Other,  
colonial thought is enfolded by a racial partitioning of being that compares individuals to an 
Ideal spectrum of being that divides them into good copies and bad copies. In this spectrum, 
‘White people’ are a good copy of being; they are the concrete representations of its intelligence 
and reason ‘Black people’ on the other hand, are the concrete representations of a defect in 
being, of a Symbolic lack-in-being. In this logic, the principle of comparison organises the 
objective cognition of appearances in analogy to an Ideal successive series of time. As we have 
seen in the introduction, colonial thought can re-organise existence through the unfolding of 
its Symbolic as a concrete reality, thereby forming a time-space continuum. Indeed, in Black 
Skin White Masks, Frantz Fanon highlights how the colonial Self increasingly subjectivized 
his sense of self. This subjectivation was so strong, Fanon tells us, that it disrupted his sense of 
selfhood, and of the sense he had of reality. To his horror, he was interiorly being colonised by 
one concept: the Negro. The Self affected the self, so much so that the self, became the Self. 
Fanon outlines through Black Skin White Masks the affective impact of colonial 
thought/subjectivity on how individuals experience their sense of Self and self. 11   This 
subjective force of affectation produces a displacement of the individual’s Big Other, and its 
gradual replacement with the Colonial Symbolic as the new Real of the Subject.  
As a signifier or attribute of modernity, the colonial system also expresses the 
 
9 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,  p.311 
10 It is important to reminisce the words of Deleuze already quoted in the Introductory chapter: “difference 
becomes an object of representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined 
opposition or a perceived similitude. Under these four coincident figures, difference acquires a sufficient 
reason in the form of a principium comparationis”, in Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.138. 
11 Fanon, Black Skins White Masks 
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repressive quality of the socius as civilization. As already noted in the introduction, in line with 
Deleuze, this thesis argues that as the concrete expression of a successive series of not time but 
simulations of time, civilisation is the transhistorical concrete experience of a multiplicity of 
repressive desires through which the Symbolic thinks repression. Modern thought thinks its 
Simulation and thus repression of the Real through three main agencements or assemblages: 
the individual as a Subject, the State as the Symbolic Law, and Capitalism as a desiring 
economy. From a Deleuzean perspective or counterpoint, the totalising quality of the Symbolic 
means its paramount quality of being is a desire for repression. This desire for repression takes 
up concrete forms by colonising individual desire, capturing it and folding it. Again, as a 
modern form of repression, Oedipalisation,  is “a contemporary form of social repression that 
reduces the form desire takes – and thus the connections desire makes – to those that sustain 
the social formation of capitalism”12. It is thus contingent on the capture of individual desire. 
Capitalism enfolds individual desire with its fundamental/internal laws, which postulates that 
capitalism is immanent to both experience and desire. These laws assume a prohibitive function 
because the capitalist Simulation prohibits any other Real of experience.  Instead, it expands 
as The Real of experience.  The state is also an agent of repression by organising, partitioning 
social and concrete spaces into the representations of its Symbolic.  In line with post-Marxist 
thought, the Frankfurt School, the Situationists, and Deleuze and Guattari, this chapter also 
conceptualises of the modern fold as a Symbolic totalised by capitalism. As a sub-set of the 
modern fold, so is the colonial fold. The state is also an agent of capitalist totalisation as both 
share a similar quality: they both think the Real as an Object a. 
The modern theories of the social contract reflect the parallax quality of knowledge by 
thinking an Imaginary origin. Accordingly, in modernity, capitalism ‘fills’ this parallax gap by 
Simulating itself as a total economy of both knowledge and desire. In the Wretched of the 
Earth, Fanon exposed the capitalist structure of colonial desire and its partitioning of space 
between native-backwards-poor and coloniser-moderns-rich.13 As we will see in this chapter, 
in Egypt, colonial desire reshaped public and cultural spaces by recoding them as the concrete 
representation of capitalist desire. Additionally, in Egypt, modernity increasingly came to be 
thought of as the concrete representation of progress, technology, responsibility, and 
productivity. Coalescent to this, Egyptians increasingly ‘realised’ that Egypt needed to get out 
of idleness, backwardness, and primitivity to become modern. Egypt needed to copy what 
 
12 Deleuze, Guattari, Anti Oedipus,  p.35 
13 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp.35-6, p.40-1  
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Europe had done and become modern. This image of thought of the colonised, the chapter 
argues, is a colonial simulacrum or phantasm that thinks the colonised as the lost Real and thus 
past of Europe. In this image, the chapter further discusses, the colonised is a castrated subject, 
a Symbolic lack-in-being.  
The argument of this chapter unfolds in two moments. The first outlines how both 
subjectivity and thought are tricked/seduced into thinking a simulation. Its first section is a 
theoretical section that draws from Jacques Lacan’s model of the Mirror Stage. It lays out how 
Identification works as representation and outlines the processes through which both thought, 
and subjectivity get tricked into thinking the Simulation as the real. Its second section 
empirically looks at the ways in which while European powers established themselves as 
centres of knowledge in Egypt, colonial reason thought Egyptians as the castrated subjects of 
its phantasm of a lost Real/past. The second moment of this chapter examines how the colonial 
Simulation subjectivized Egyptian reality into its fold. It argues that by reshaping public spaces 
as the concrete representations of capitalist desire, it projected colonialism as the concrete 
production of the Idea/reality of Modernity. Its first section looks at how European powers 
modernised institutions. It especially highlights how the colonial exterior or Symbolic enfolded 
modern Egyptian national institutions. Its second section looks at capitalism as an agent of both 
colonial castration and recoding of public spaces. It also argues that capitalism projected itself 
as an agent of liberation from the colonial system by producing a native Bourgeoisie that would 
open up Egyptians to a becoming modern.  In doing so, the laws of capitalism postulate that 
capitalism can select or ‘make the difference’ between the ‘backward’ and the ‘modern’, it can 
make the ‘backward’ ‘modern’. 
 
1 THE UNFOLDING OF A COLONIAL LOGIC OF THOUGHT: 
REPRESENTATION AND ITS VIRTUALISATION OF EXPERIENCE AS A 
SIGNIFIED 
 
THE SYMBOLIC-MIRROR AS A SITE OF IDENTIFICATION PROCESSES: WHEN THE 
PRESENT IS  APPREHENDED AS REPRESENTATION 
As already stated above, the symbolic totalisation of modern experience thinks its 
Simulation and thus its repression through three main agencements or assemblages: the 
individual, the state, and capitalism. This section proposes to look at how the Colonial 
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Symbolic of Simulation progressively enfolded individual subjectivity. To this end, it takes as 
its model of thought the Lacanian model of a process of Identification called the Mirror Stage. 
With the Mirror Stage, Jacques Lacan examines the shift of human subjectivity from 
unmediated experience to social experience.14  
 
“We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense that 
analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he 
assumes an image - whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the 
use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term imago.”15 
 
It postulates that infants pass through a development stage between the age of six and 
eighteen months that marks the start of social Identification processes.16 These processes are 
instigated when an external image of the body produces a psychic response that gives rise to 
the mental representation of an “I”. 17 This image can be the infant’s reflection in an actual 
mirror, or it can be the symbolic image a primary caregiver projects of the infant through 
language.18 In any case, the mirror stage marks when infants start to identify with a social 
representation of themselves, which then acts as a gestalt of their emerging sense of “I” or 
selfhood.19 This gestalt or imago of the Self presents itself as a unified body image while infants 
still experience their body as a disparate.20 Lacan notes that there is a fundamental difference 
between these two experiences. Pre-Mirror Stage, subjectivity experiences itself in the 
immediacy of the Real, its experience of its self is not mediated by language and thus by the 
Symbolic order.  Lacan also calls the Symbolic order the Big Other.21 With the Mirror Stage, 
subjectivity leaves this unmediated modality of experience and is enfolded by the Symbolic 
and its regime of representation. It learns to think and experience itself as a Self. In the Mirror 
Stage Lacan tells us that Identification follows a logic of representation, that it belongs to the 
order of representation. As we have seen in the introductory chapter, Deleuze follows a similar 
 
14 “The diagram on the blackboard is designed to ground the function of the ideal ego and the Ego Ideal, 
and to show you how the subject's relation to the Other functions when the specular relation is dominant 
there, a relation that on this occasion is being called the mirror of the big Other.”, in  Lacan, Anxiety, p.253 
15 Jacques Lacan,  Alan Sheridan (Trans.), Ecrits, (London: Routledge, 2005), p.2 
16 Ibid, p.1, see also Tome Eyre, Lacan and the Concept of the ‘Real’, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012),  
pp.109-10 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Lacan, Ecrits, p.2 
20 Ibid. 
21 Lacan, Anxiety, p.253 
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line of thought by explaining that Identification and representation both work in the same way. 
Indeed, subjectivity (self) strives to experience itself as the Ideal-I (Self) projected by 
the Symbolic. The Self then acts as a Platonic Idea that the subject seeks to represent by 
becoming its concrete reality. In the Mirror Stage, the processes of social Identification also 
reproduce the Platonic division of being. They divide between being as conceptuality and being 
as a concrete experience. In representation, the Self is the same with itself in-itself, but as its 
concrete experience, the Subject or self can only be a copy of this Ideal-I. Subjectivity thus 
divides being into two rival orders: originals and copies, the true and the false, the real and its 
Simulation. With Lacan, our constitution as Subjects of the Symbolic or “Is”, illustrates how 
subjectivity folds itself into the Symbolic Simulation.22  
Identification simulates an original similarity between the Ideal-I and its concrete 
experience. This simulation masks a difference in-itself between the original modality of 
subjective experience and its adopted modality of representation. Ultimately then, 
Identification produces a simulation because its logic of representation cannot think difference 
in itself. It ‘thinks’ difference as the internal central of being by presupposing an original 
division of being. In doing so, it does not ‘make’ or think the difference between the two orders 
of being: the Real and the Symbolic. Instead, it simulates an original equivalence or similarity 
between the two. Identification does not think the difference constitutive of the relationship 
between unmediated and mediated experience. Instead, it simulates an original similarity 
between them or lack thereof. With Lacan, the Mirror Stage thus marks a shift in our semiosis 
of being. Initially, we experience ourselves and the world as unmediated signs. As the 
Symbolic Simulation enfolds us, we start to experience ourselves and the world as signs of 
representations.23 In this semiotic process, the Idea becomes the object of semiosis production. 
The Real slips beneath signification and the Symbolic totalises the semiotic process. 24 
 
22 “I have myself shown in the social dialectic that structures human knowledge as paranoiac why human 
knowledge has greater autonomy than animal knowledge in relation to the field of force of desire, but also 
why human knowledge is determined in that ‘little reality’ (ce peu de réalité), which the Surrealists, in their 
restless way, saw as its limitation.”, Jacques Lacan, Ecrits, p.3 
23 “This development is experienced as a temporal dialectic that decisively projects the formation of the 
individual into history. The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency 
to anticipation – and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the 
succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call 
orthopaedic – and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its 
rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development.”, Lacan, Ecrits, p.3  
24 “Pour ce faire, la relation polaire par où l'image spéculaire (de la relation narcissique) est liée comme 
unifiante à l'ensemble d'éléments imaginaires dit du corps morcelé, fournit un couple qui n'est pas seulement 
préparé par une convenance naturelle de développement et de structure à servir d'homologue à la relation 
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The Lacanian model illustrates how Identification necessarily implies the alienation of 
the real by representation. The Self emerges as a social subject by positing a Symbolic Ideal-I 
as its myth/law of origin. Like representation, Identification thinks the Symbolic order as the 
original or first space of being, as an Ideality where forms can be self-identical to their images. 
In contrast, concrete experience can never achieve this internal sameness. It is marked by an 
internal difference that cannot be resolved but that the subject attempts to repress by striving 
to become the perfect representation of an Image or Ideal-I. 
Furthermore, by thinking being through an initial division between the Real and its 
Simulation, Identification further illustrates the Symbolic’s sovereignty as a Signifier of the 
subject’s reality. Semiotically, Identification is totalised by the Symbolic; it excludes both the 
Real and the Imaginary orders from its semiotic process.25 As we have seen in the Introduction, 
Baudrillard also came to the same conclusion in Simulacra and Simulations. The semiotic 
division between the real and its Simulation is essential because it reduces both the real and 
the imaginary to qualities/attributes of the Symbolic.  
The Lacanian model of the processes of Identification also connects desire and 
language. It stipulates that our desire to invest the social is triggered by our entrance into 
representation, by our constitution as subjects/signs of representation. However, this 
subjectivation also entails the loss of pre-symbolic subjectivity. From a Lacanian point of view, 
desire is contingent on lack because it is triggered by a loss of the Real; the Real is from then 
on lack(ing).  It becomes a gap-in-meaning; it still exists but cannot be made sense of again; it 
can only be signified/represented as an Object a. Moreover, as the title of the stage indicates 
through its reference to a mirror, the image projected by the social is distorted. As a Symbolic 
representation of the Real, the Ideal-I is made-up of an aggregate of historical perceptions 
whose concrete sensorial experiences are deprived of the possibility of signification. The 
mirrored image does not and cannot represent the internal subjective shifts that the subject 
experience: “the myth of the unity of the personality, the myth of synthesis…. All these types 
 
symbolique Mère-Enfant. Le couple imaginaire du stade du miroir, par ce qu'il manifeste de contre-nature, 
s'il faut le rapporter à une prématuration spécifique de la naissance chez l'homme, se trouve approprié à 
donner au triangle imaginaire la base que la relation symbolique puisse en quelque sorte recouvrir. (Voir le 
schéma R.)”, Lacan, Les Ecrits, p.552. 
25 “This development is experienced as a temporal dialectic that decisively projects the formation of the 
individual into history. The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency 
to anticipation – and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the 
succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call 
orthopaedic – and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its 
rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development.”, Lacan, les Ecrits, p.69 
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of organisation of the objective field constantly reveal cracks, tears and rents, negation of the 
facts and misrecognition of the most immediate experience”26.  
Still though for Lacan, representation thinks the real as its simulacrum, yet it allows us 
to access experience as an Object a - as an object of knowledge of thought-, even if just as a 
phantasma (image). Our enfolding as subjects of knowledge is contingent on our enfoldment 
by the Symbolic and of its laws of Simulation. In this model, representation produces 
knowledge, meaning the latter takes its origin in the Symbolic. Knowledge is then an aggregate 
of historical postulates or perceptions. Accordingly, knowledge is contingent on the historicity 
of the subjects who produce it. This historicity subjectivizes the Symbolic into its laws of 
signification and their sequencing of time. Since the regime of representation cannot represent 
immediate experience, thought can only think subjectivity as a fold of social time. In line with 
Kantian thought, time-in-itself becomes an internal limit of subjectivity because it cannot be 
represented.27 It is replaced by its simulacrum: Historical time.28 The Mirror Stage illustrates 
how subjectivity is tricked into thinking a Simulation by thinking the present of the social as 
Historical time. It misrecognises the mirrored image/Ideal-I as a virtual representation of the 
subject’s concrete becoming. This process of thinking time as a causal succession of images or 
series of times reduces the Real and the Imaginary to being qualities of the Symbolic. In 
simulating itself as the actual (Real) of time, the Symbolic tricks thought into misrecognising 
the Real as its Symbolic copy. 
Ultimately, the Lacanian model of subjectivity as Identification reveals how thought 
thinks experience as the copy of an Idea. It can think immanence but only by mediating it by a 
transcendent plane. Although the Ideal-I of the mirror stage represents a unified body/Sign, as 
a Subject of language, the Self is constituted by a multiplicity of Signifieds that act as signifiers. 
Indeed for Lacan, the Self is the sum of its selves. In conceptualising the human mind as an 
assemblage of Symbolic multiplicities, the Mirror Stage proposes a critique of the Cartesian 
Cogito.29  The mind leaves its Cartesian canvas: the “I” is not a unified whole, but a multiplicity 
totalised signs. Moreover, the subject of the Mirror Stage is an I-language and as such its 
 
26 Jacques Lacan, R. Grigg (Trans.), The Seminar, Book III, The Psychoses, (W.W. Norton & Company, 
1993), p.8  
27 Joly K. Poncet-Montange, “Clinique Psychanalytique, L’angoisse ICP 2013”, Association Lacanienne 
internationale Rhoines-Alpes. Accessed from: https://www.ali-rhonealpes.org/archives/clinique-
psychanalytique/210-l-angoisse-icp-2013 
28 Lacan, Les Ecrits, p.278 
29 For more on Kant and time as a frontier of subjectivity see Gilles Deleuze, “Third, Lecture on Kant: 
Synthesis and Time”, 28/03/1978, Vincennes. Accessed from: https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/kant-
synthesis-and-time/lecture-03 
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interiority is determined by its exteriority: its interiority is a fold of the Symbolic. Thus, the 
Mirror Stage marks a subjective shift in the subject’s apprehension of the experience of its 
interiority, which changes both their being-in-the-world and their being in-themselves. The 
Lacanian subject shifts from a being-in-nomos to a being-in-logos.  This being-in-logos 
operates through what Lacan calls the name-of-the-father. The name-of-the-father can be 
interpreted on two levels.  
From a clinical psychology perspective, the initial ‘real’ of the infant is its mother. As 
the infant enters the Symbolic order, it moves to the father, and gradually, the social establishes 
itself as the primary Big Other. A displacement in the mother-infant relationship marks the 
entrance in the Symbolic. When the infant loses the mother as a Big Other, it also loses the 
unmediated symbiotic relationship it has with her. This shift is experienced as a castration, a 
loss and the infant produces fantasies of re-experiencing this relationship.30 The mother thus 
becomes an Object a. The infant takes-up the Symbolic as its new Signifier and strives to 
identify with its Ideal-Is/Signifiers.  
 Lacan highlights the jubilatory reaction of the infant when they perceive their 
reflection in the mirror.31 In his view, this jubilation exposes how the Symbolic comes to fill 
an original “manque à être” or lack-in-being; desire is the desire for the Other (Mother and then 
Big Other).32  As an Object a, the mother represents the image of complete pleasure and 
unmediated experience; as a signifier of experience, the Symbolic represents the image of 
castration and mediated experience. 33  This Signifier is the name-of-the-father. Unlike the 
mother, as a Big Other, the symbolic operates through prohibition and the name-of-the-father 
is the name Lacan gave to its prohibitive function.34 For Lacan, there are two laws, two bans 
that structure the Symbolic. The first prohibits the Subject from going back to a pre-Symbolic 
unmediated state, hence the necessary separation from the mother. The second prohibition, 
which follows from the first, is that pleasure cannot be this complete pleasure that the infant 
 
30 For a child to successfully enter the symbolic order, the fantasies the infant produces of the mother have 
to be castrated, through another development stage, the Oedipus complex. “At the oral stage there is a certain 
relationship between demand and the mother's veiled desire. At the anal stage, the mother's demand comes 
into the picture for desire. At the stage of phallic castration, there is the minus-phallus, the entry of negativity 
with regard to the instrument of desire when sexual desire as such emerges in the field of the Other. But the 
process doesn't stop with these three stages, because at its limit we have to meet up with thestructure of the 
a as something separated off.”, Lacan, Anxiety, p.228 
31 Lacan, Ecrits, p.2 
32 Lacan, Les Ecrits, p.522 
33Poncet-Montange, “Clinique Psychanalytique, L’angoisse, accessed from:  
https://www.ali-rhonealpes.org/archives/clinique-psychanalytique/210-l-angoisse-icp-2013 
34 “C'est dans le nom du père qu'il nous faut reconnaître le support de la function symbolique qui, depuis 
l'orée des temps historiques, identifie sa personne à la figure de la loi.”, Lacan, Les Ecrits, p.278 
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experienced pre-symbolic. It has to be mediated by the Symbolic. 
From a psychoanalytical theory perspective, it is the Real that acts as the initial Big 
Other of the subject and the Mirror Stage marks the displacement of this function to the 
Symbolic. This displacement is experienced as a loss, a castration, and the subject produces 
fantasies of returning to their previous sense of the Real. It also means that the Real is from 
then on experienced as an Object a. As the subject takes-up the symbolic as its new Signifier, 
it will strive to reproduce the similar feeling of self-identicality it had with the Real, with its 
social Self. Notably, the Mirror Stage illustrates the phantasmatic quality of what we call 
knowledge.35 This vision of knowledge is in line with Foucault’s critique of knowledge in the 
order of things. Furthermore, while as an Object a the Real represents the image of complete 
pleasure and lawlessness,  as a signifier of experience, the Symbolic represents the image of 
castration and mediated experience: Its subjects must operate through its laws. The first 
prohibition of the Symbolic is that one cannot go back to the pre-symbolic state. The second 
prohibition is that one must not question/challenge the authority/legitimacy of its function of 
representation and thus of Simulation. From both a Lacanian and Deleuzean perspective, the 
Symbolic has an Oedipal function; it is structured by prohibitions.  
Moving away from subjectivity and looking at the laws that structure thought, Deleuze 
developed the concept of the image of thought.36 If the Symbolic operates through prohibition 
and thus takes-up a prohibitive function, what of thought? What are the pre-suppositions 
through which thought operates? How does thought think of itself? How is the Self of thought 
affecting its self?  According to Deleuze, like the Symbolic, thought is enfolded by prohibitions 
because the postulates through which it operates produce laws that impose limitations on 
thought. As we will see in more depth in Chapter Five, such postulates think the good nature 
of thought, the thinker and representation,  and assert the authority/legitimacy of representation 
and reason. Eight postulates altogether form the image of thought: a dogmatic image of what 
thinking is. As illustrated by the above postulates, this image presupposes that thought wants 
to get at the true. For Deleuze and in line with Nietzschean thought, morality presents thought 
as ‘upright’, good-natured and truth-seeking. It is morality that presupposes that the function 
of thought is to think the true and that its representation of truth is true. These are the two laws 
that structure the image of thought.  
In concluding, this section has explained how the Simulation enfolds both subjectivities 
 
35 Lacan, Ecrits, p.3 
36 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.167 
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and thoughts. It has argued that as a theoretical model, the Mirror Stage outlines the processes 
of the folding of subjectivity into the Symbolic Simulation. In doing so, it helps us better 
understand how modern semiosis produces experience as Simulation. It has shown that 
ultimately, it is by taking up a prohibitive function of repression of the real and desire, that the 
Symbolic order subjectivizes us into its Simulation. And it is by thinking of itself as thinking 
The True and The Good,  that thought gets tricked into thinking the Simulation. The next 
section looks into how the colonial Simulation thinks the colonised as a representation of the 
absence or lack of/in modernity.  
 
 
THE BECOMING PHANTASM OF EGYPT: EGYPT AS AN OBJECT A OF MODERNITY 
This section illustrates how the colonised was thought as a phantasm or Object a of 
Europe’s lost Real. In doing so, this section argues, colonial thought constructed/folded the 
colonised as a castrated subject. From this perspective, the colonial system is an agent that 
concretised this castration: it thinks the colonised as its simulacrum or mirrored image.  This 
section coequally highlights how colonial thought reconceptualised Ancient Egypt as a lost 
European Real by recoding ancient Egypt as the origin of the immanence of European 
modernity in history.  This symbolic dislocation also castrated  Egyptian agency in History. 
Indeed, colonial thought thinks the colonised as lacking-in-modernity and thus as lacking-in-
historicity. Accordingly, the colonised is a subject that suffers from a lack-of-selfhood. 
In contrast, the colonial recoding of ancient Egyptian civilisation as an analogous copy 
of European civilisation, reified the modern quality of European experience, its modern sense 
of selfhood. This signification process conceives modernity as a precept of both time and 
selfhood/Identity. As a concrete expression of modern thought, European modernity thus 
required the recoding of the epistemological space as a space of production of modern 
perceptions and sensations.
 
This recoding proceeds by producing historicisms. Historicism is 
the idea of linking a society's values and its movements of thought to their greater historical 
context. This rearrangement included the re-invention of European identity along two poles of 
being (Other), each having a different temporality. The first pole included a new image, a new 
Ideal-I of European past, which included the invention of a continuous link of filiation between 
Europe, Greek and Roman antiquity. Europe was reconceptualised as the successor of the 
Western Roman Empire, which was itself reconceptualised as Greece's successor. The growing 
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focus of the political writings on the models of the Greek polis and the Roman Republic as 
inspiration for the rethinking of the European political horizon illustrates such process. 
European identity was rethought as an essence that stretched across the space-time continuum; 
it had existed in a form or another. It was a constant in the successive series of time as the 
advent (not event) of progress:  
  
The Greek Polis→The Roman Republic→The Modern European State.  
 
Modern colonisation produces a new signifier or simulacra: 
 
Ancient Egypt →The Greek Polis→The Roman Republic→The Modern 
European State 
 
How is a symbolic perception or specular image tuned into a perceived concrete reality? 
Thought thinks that some of its Ideal-Is/ Signifiers are the representations of scientific facts or 
truths. It represses the phantasmatic quality of knowledge. Through this process, the 
simulacra/Signifiers of the modern Simulation are thought and experienced as a Real, a True. 
The Simulation produces a ‘reality’: a real thought and experienced as a phantasmatic quality 
of the Symbolic.  Thus, when we refer to the Real as an Object a, we think of experience as an 
infolding of a sign; experience becomes an object of misrecognised knowledge. The Object a  
thus masks the real, which in-itself, remains beneath the surface of the fold.37 In rethinking 
ancient Egypt as the origin of European modernity, colonial thought produced Egypt as an 
object of misrecognised knowledge, an alternative fact.  
This phantasm of Egypt as an Object a of European subjectivity gained momentum in 
the arts, diplomacy, and spread to other sectors of the political economy.  Before the 18th 
century, interest in Egypt had already emerged as illustrated, for example, by Shakespeare’s 
Anthony and Cleopatra. The play is partly set in Egypt, although it does not focus much on 
local colour. Following the revival of curiosity about Antiquity that Historicism provoked, a 
 
 37 This is why Deleuze and Guattari preferred to talk of desire as flow rather that as object. According to 
Deleuze the Lacanian object a is more of an illusion, a specular that ticks us into focusing on it rather as on 
the landscape that hides behind it. For him, desire is a force that invests space, A desire is always about a 
landscape, about how we feel in a particular landscape. See letter D in L’Abecedaire de Gilles Deleuze, 
directed by par Pierre-André Boutang with Gilles Deleuze, Claire Parnet, (DVD format, editor: 
Montparnasse, Collection Regards). 
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series of fiction books that presented a detailed yet imagined Egypt emerged. In the 18
th 
century, the European fixation on Ancient Egypt as its object of phantasm illustrated this point. 
Indeed, Egypt, as rediscovered through Greek writings birthed a new filiation in the history of 
Europe. Before Greece, there had been Egypt that had been a centre of knowledge and magic. 
Egypt had also been present in Hebrew and Christian religious writings. This Egypt could only 
be mostly fantasised -misrepresented-because at the time hieroglyphics had not yet been 
deciphered. Interest in ancient Egypt was promoted by Jean Terrasson, a French priest and man 
of letters fluent in Greek and Latin, who wrote the Life of Sethos in 1731.38
 
The book was a 
work of fiction inspired by an antique Greek writer who depicted ancient Egypt as a centre of 
knowledge and mysticism. It became popular and was translated in English and published in 
London in 1732, launching the notion of Egyptian mysteries that a century later would 
captivate the European imaginary. 
Laying between England and India- the crown’s prized possession, in the course of the 
18
th 
century Egypt also became of significant geostrategic importance for European imperial 
powers and the inter-imperial economy (both in economic and epistemic terms.) From 1798 
until 1882, the 19
th 
century’s two most powerful imperial forces - France and Britain – led a 
veritable fight over the country.39
 
Talks of a French intervention were initiated during the 
French revolution following the end of King Louis XV's reign but did not materialise until the 
Napoleonian expedition (1778-1801). 40
 
Beyond the taking of control of Egypt, the expedition 
had three aims. The first objective was to destroy British commerce with India, thereby 
illustrating the link between the country's geostrategic and geo-economic importance. The 
second was to literally bring the enlightenment to Egypt with the Commission, a group of 167 
specialists from France. Napoleon also used the expedition to draw a parallel with Alexander 
of Macedon (ca. 330 BC)  and his supposed liberation of Egypt. Egypt had been a centre of 
knowledge for the Greeks; it had fascinated Rome and had been colonised by both. By freeing 
Egypt from the oppression of the Mamluks, Napoleon had found his universal telos. If 
 
38 Jean terrasson, The life of Sethos. Taken from private memoirs of the ancient Egyptians. Tr. from a Greek 
manuscript into French, (London, Printed for J. Walthoe, 1732) 
39 David G. Jeffreys, Views of Ancient Egypt Since Napoleon Bonaparte: Imperialism, Colonialization, and 
Modern Appropriations (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2003), p.58. The signature in 1797 of the treaty of 
Campo between France and Austria meant that France only had one rival left: Britain. The fight over the 
Rosetta Stone is also telling. The precious artefact had been discovered by Napoleon’s officers but the British 
rapidly seized it after Napoleon’s defeat. While British authors had tended to lead discussions over ancient 
Egypt, the Napoleonic expedition changed that. 
40 Ibid., p.58. 
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successful, the expedition would have helped legitimise Napoleon and assure him of a place in 
the pantheon of modernity.41
 
The third objective was to use the scientists and scholars to 
collect as much information as possible to integrate Egypt as a French colony. 
To this end, the fields that mattered the most were: geography, topography, agriculture, 
hydrography, commerce, manufacture, and the study of the ethnic population and translation.42
 
Although the expedition failed in its objective of colonising Egypt, it allowed France to 
establish itself as a centre of knowledge production by founding several institutions. These 
included the creation of l’Institut d’Egypte, modelled on the famous Institute de France, a 
printing house, two periodicals, and a public library. In 1809, an encyclopaedic work, La 
Description de l’Egypte, was published. Finally, Jean-François Champollion’s deciphering of 
hieroglyphs in 1822 provided a crucial contribution to the study of Egyptology. It also helped 
consolidate the idea that ancient Egypt seen through Europeans' eyes would from then on be 
empirically objective. French was also the nobility's preferred foreign language, and by the 
1820s, the popularity of the French language in Egypt had only grown.  
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt represents the perfect model of a scientific appropriation 
of a culture by another.43
 
It also helped instigate a shift in European identification processes 
that would progressively conceptualise Ancient Egypt as a past Gestalt of Europe. Indeed, 
From the late 18
th 
century (1798) and until the early 19
th 
century, Egypt became much more 
than just a territory. It became the bearer of a lost essence whose rightful inheritor was the 
West.  The colonial simulacrum for Ancient Egypt was used as a measuring stick for European 
modernity. The Napoleonian expedition instigated a competition over culture and knowledge 
accumulation and a  fascination for ancient  Egypt that lasted throughout the  19
th   
century.  
Under Mohammed Ali, artefacts gained economic and Symbolic value, even becoming a 
currency in a competition between art collectors and diplomats.44The Egyptian government 
even used the promise of objects to playoff diplomats against one another. 
Interestingly, the obelisks are a case in point. Before the Napoleonic expedition, 
Egyptian obelisks adorned the city of Rome, the capital of the Empire that Western Europe had 
adopted as one of its cultural birthplaces. 45
 
In 1814, it was Louis XVIII who asked 
Mohammed Ali for an obelisk. The move was part of the celebration of the re-establishment 
 
41 Jeffreys, Views of Ancient Egypt,  p. 15. 
42 Ibid., p.15 
43 Said, Orientalism, p.50 
44 Jeffreys, Views of Ancient Egypt Since Napoleon Bonaparte, p.3 
45 Ibid., p.23 
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of kingship in France.46As the obelisk made its way to Paris, the British pressured Mohammed 
Ali to give them two obelisks from Luxor's temple. 
Similarly, after the British defeated the French navy in the battle of Abu Qir, they put 
the statue of a triumphant Colonel Nelson in Trafalgar Square. Then, in 1819, to 
commemorate Lord Nelson and Sir Ralph Abercromby's victories, Mohammed Ali presented 
them with one of the fallen Thutmose III obelisks - an obelisk from the King “who conquers 
all the lands”.47
 
To the British, the obelisk represented a symbol of world power's inheritance 
and marked a new era: London would now be the new Rome.48
  
Soon after, in 1879, the 
Egyptian Palace announced the gift of an obelisk to America. Egyptomania had crossed the 
Atlantic and despite the engineering challenges posed by the transportation of the monument 
the obelisk was erected in New York’s Central Park in 1881. A crowd of 10,000 people had 
come to watch the event. A reporter from the New York Herald wrote at the time: 
 
“It would be absurd for the people of any great city to hope to be happy without an 
Egyptian obelisk. Rome has had them this great while, and so has Constantinople. Paris has 
one. London has one. If New York was without one, all those great cities might point the finger 
of scorn at us and intimate that we could never rise to any real moral grandeur until we had our 
obelisk.”49 
 
The insertion of fantasised or fictional Egypt into the European present went far beyond 
the political realms. Fictional Egypt came to populate the European imaginary. In Britain, 
romantic poets Percy Bysshe Shelley and Horace Smith released competing versions of 
Ozymandias (1818), a Greek name for Ramses II and in 1894 Oscar Wilde wrote The Sphinx. 
Meanwhile, Georg Ebers, a German Egyptologist and novelist who discovered the Egyptian 
medical papyrus wrote in his two-volume Egypt: Descriptive, Historical and Picturesque 
(1878): “Everyone, high and low, has heard of Egypt and its primeval wonders. The child 
knows the names of the good and the wicked pharaohs before it has learned those of the princes 
of his own country” 50
 
The Times of London published numerous excited letters from 
 
46 Ibid., p.61. 
47 Cleopatra’s needle is still on the Victoria Embankment. It is worth noting that the obelisk only made its 
way to London in 1878. 
48 Ibid., p.64; See also Labib Habachi, The Obelisks of Egypt: Skyscrapers of the past, (Cairo: American 
University of Cairo, 1985 Edition), pp.165-170 
49 Jeffreys, Views of Ancient Egypt, p.64 
50 Georg Ebers, Egypt: Descriptive, Historical, and Picturesque, vol. 1, translated from the German by 
Clara Bell (London: Cassell, 1885), p.IIV 
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archaeologists who recounted their discoveries of chamber tombs and description of temples. 
One of those asserted that ancient Egyptian art uncovered a culture of such an extraordinary 
calibre that its acquisition would help raise the British cultural standing. 51 Egyptian influences 
could be found in women’s mourning jewellery, while ancient Egyptian trinkets were quite 
popular. Members of the British nobility became avid collectors of jewellery, figurines, 
ornamental boxes, and scarabs. Ancient Egyptian symbolism was also present on tombs, 
mausolea, cemetery gates and even entire graveyards, which had an Egyptian architecture style 
or decorative features. Most prominent of these is London’s Highgate Cemetery, with the 
Egyptian Avenue and the sunken Circle of Lebanon added by James Bunstone Bunning 
between 1839 and 1842. The Egyptian avenue became a tourist attraction instantly. 
Symbolisms of ancient Egypt did not stop at cemeteries. Built in an over-the-top 
“Egyptian style” in 1812, the Egyptian Hall was originally a museum designed to house 
curiosities from Captain Cook’s adventures the South Seas. However, by the late 1800s, it was 
associated with séances, theatre and magic shows with tricks involving sudden disappearances. 
The most popular was the trick, known as The Vanishing lady.52Public events where people 
could watch mummies being unwrapped also grew in fashion. Such events were more coated 
in entertainment than scientific technics. The idea was to play on people’s desire to be both 
scared and entertained. Influential circles of oculists who performed ancient Egyptian rituals 
and who believed in Egyptian curses and magic also emerged in England, Germany, or even 
Russia. From the late 18
th 
century, Freemasons also started to use ancient Egyptian imagery 
and rituals. In literature, ancient Egypt had appeared in European plays and novels corpus in 
the 17
th
 century. However, tales focusing on mummies, maledictions and revenge started to 
emerge in 1869 and peaked in the aftermath of British occupation. The mummy-mania even 
crossed the pond following newspaper reports that several people connected to the British 
archaeologist Howard Carter had died untimely. In 1922, he led an expedition in the Valley of 
the Kings where he discovered the tomb of Tutankhamun. A media frenzy followed the 
excavation and later on peaked as reports of a series of “related” deaths multiplied. In America, 
this interest in Egypt fed into the development of the architectural style, Art Deco. American 
movie houses of the 1920s were typically adorned with extravagant Egyptian décor that 
 
51  Kenna Hawes, ‘Oscar Wilde’s “The Sphinx” and Victorian Egyptomania’, Accessible from: 
http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/wilde/hawes2.html 
52 The Vanishing Lady was originally a trick by Robert Houdini and many illusionists then drew from him 
and reproduced the trick. In England the illusionist the most known for those sudden disappearances in the 
late 1880s was David Devant. 
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mimicked Ancient Egypt's imagined opulence. Capitalising on this eruption of Egyptomania, 
Universal Studios unleashed The Mummy in 1932.53 
From the late 18
th 
century (1798) and until the early 19
th 
century, uncovered from 
the depth of time, Egypt and been modern before modernity. This was of course done through 
the incorporation of ancient Egyptians into the White Race. The growth of the field of 
Egyptology was concomitant with the development of transatlantic slave trade. The 
categorization of the ‘negro’ as uncivilized prohibited the possibility that ancient Egyptians 
were blacks.
 
The ‘whitification’ of ancient Egypt has led to many debates. The re-insertion 
of the blackness of ancient Egypt became essential to both Afrocentric and Pan-African 
movements. In the US, W.E. B. Du Bois, one of the forefathers of pan-Africanism trained in 
Berlin to become an Egyptologist but had to cut short his studies after the American 
government stopped his funding. Over half a century later Cheikh Anta Diop made attempted 
to reverse the colonial simulacrum of Africanness by re-defining it through the modernity of 
its history. Through this, Diop joins the Negritude movement in its redefinition of blackness as 
the affirmation of African history's modernity.54 The epistemological re-shuffling of ancient 
Egyptian identity that allowed it to become a marker of modern European identity is quite 
troubling. By constructing Egypt as an Object a of European modernity, colonial thought 
invented the colonised Egyptian as a castrated subject, a subject lacking-in-modernity and thus 
in experience. Ancient Egypt was rethought as a myth of origin of European modernity and 
through it as another element in the myth of European Identity as a precept of time. The power 
of the West lied in its ability to turn a virtual construction of the Oriental - a phantasm or 
simulacra- into a real production: the colonised and its heir, the post-colonised. 
 
  
2 SUBJECTIVITY AS REPRESENTATION: THE IDEAL OF THE BOURGEOIS 
AS CAPITALIST HORIZON OF THE MODERN SIMULATION 
 
The second moment of this chapter examines how the colonial Simulation 
subjectivized/enfolded Egyptian reality into its fold. It argues that by reshaping colonial public 
spaces as the concrete representations of capitalist desire, capitalism acted as an agent of 
 
53 Ailise Bulfin, ‘Fiction of Gothic Egypt and British Imperial Paranoia: The Curse of the Suez Canal,’ in 
English Literature in Transition 1880-1920, 54(4):411-443 · January 2011 
54 Fanon seems to hint at this throughout Black Skin White Masks. 
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production of colonial reality. It did so by projecting itself as immanent to both desire and 
experience. In the colonial Simulation,  this chapter argues that one of the functions of 
capitalism is to ‘make’ the difference between the ‘backwards’ and the ‘moderns’ while 
claiming to ‘make’ the ‘backwards’ ‘modern’.  
 
 
THE ACTUALISATION OF VIRTUAL EGYPT: THE BAROQUE FOLDING OF MODERN 
EGYPTIANNESS 
This section illustrates the progressive penetration of Modern Imperial subjectivity in 
Egyptian subjectivity. It does not claim to provide an empirical study of Egyptian subjectivity 
and simply seeks to explain how colonial subjectivity managed to fold Egyptian reality into its 
Symbolic order. It will also highlight how colonial modernization produced national 
institutions enfolded in the colonial symbolic. As machines of capture and production of 
national subjectivity, these institutions ‘invented’ an Egyptian national subjectivity whose 
sense of selfhood is determined by colonial subjectivity, the section further argues. 
In Egypt, the Napoleonic expedition had brought Muhammad Ali to power. Ali had 
taken advantage of the vacuum or a gap-in-meaning of power in the aftermath of the French 
departure to gain control of the Palace. The situation was precarious: he needed to consolidate 
his position and gain more agency from the Ottoman Sultan who was in alliance with the 
British. To consolidate his position, Ali needed to modernise Egypt. He turned to France for 
assistance in the modernization processes he instigated through military, administrative and 
economic reforms. He used the skills of the French technocrats who had remained after the 
Napoleonic fleet had left as well as those who had flocked to Egypt in the lookout for a job 
after the collapse of the Empire. He also imported military and naval advisers from France. Ali 
had a mix of French, Britons, Italians, Germans and Spaniards in charge of the military corps.55 
Amongst the growing number of French ex-pats, from the mid-1820s, a French doctor 
named Antoine Barthélemy Clot led reforms in the health sector. Clot became Surgeon-in-chief 
of the Armies, he instituted French army regulations in Egyptian army camps and made 
 
55 Laverne, Kuhnke,  Lives at risk: public health in nineteenth-century Egypt, (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1990), p.32. 
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smallpox vaccination mandatory for civilians. 56
  
He also founded the Egyptian School of 
Medicine in 1827 under the Department of War's supervision, which curriculum included 
training in anatomy, pathology, physiology, surgery, internal medicine, hygiene, toxicology, 
and forensic medicine.57The school was affiliated with a new military hospital that included 
a lecture hall and a pharmacy.58
 
In 1827, a Veterinary School was opened, and in 1829, it was 
a Pharmacy School. Clot Bey also formed a Health Council to supervise and coordinate health 
efforts and keep records of doctors,  pharmacists,  midwives, and barbers practising in the 
country.59
 
In the schools, most of the courses were taught in French by Europeans, which 
led to three developments. First, schools needed translators to communicate the lessons to the 
students. Secondly, new tertiary and primary schools where teaching was in French were 
opened so that future Medicine students could understand the courses. 
Thirdly, in the nineteenth century, there were also several Egyptian medical student 
missions to Europe. Some of Bey’s educational practices such as post-mortem dissection of 
human cadavers and the study of anatomy were seen suspiciously by both the’ Ulemas and the 
population. The ‘Ulemas suspicions grew as they were pitted against modern doctors. They 
also were entangled in the growing rivalry between the Institute of Egypt and al-Azhar. 
Besides, previously, most of the hospitals were run by religious organisations. The 
implantation of modern medicine modelled on French rules also impacted the Egyptian market 
for drugs.60
 
Indeed, before the emergence of pharmaceuticals, herbalists and home remedies 
had previously dominated the domestic market. Gradually, over the nineteenth century, modern 
pharmacists replaced herbalists as the primary purveyors of medicines. Ali also hired many 
French mercenaries to remodel the army, and several military schools were opened. 
 
After his death, Ali was replaced by his son Said, who under growing European 
pressure for money closed most of the schools his father had opened. Said’s successor Isma’il 
was intent on modelling Egypt to the image of a European state to achieve sovereignty-
independence from European powers and Istanbul. Following his father’s footsteps, he 
launched a series of infrastructure projects and restructuration of the army. This meant he 
 
56 Gerard n. Burrow, ‘Clot-Bey: Founder of Western Medical Practice in Egypt’, The Yale journal of biology 
and medicine, 48, (1975),pp.251-257, p.251; see also Clot, Antoine Barthélémy, Mémoires de A.-B. Clot 
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required investors to help fund his projects.  Said’s ambitions coincided with new financial 
developments in Europe. Indeed, between1850-1876, bankers in London, Paris and other 
financial centres expanded their investments beyond the sphere of Europe, and aware of Isma’il 
plans, they had their eyes set on Egypt.61 
As we will see in the next chapter, these developments in the international economy 
had important repercussions on the Egyptian economy. The country soon became reliant on 
loans and ultimately found itself in indebtedness. Amid all this chaos, a new player inserted 
itself in the epistemic inter-imperial rivalry between France and Great Britain: the to-be-new-
empire, America. Indeed, America had made its inroads in Egypt before the Obelisk gift. From 
1869 to 1883, fifty American Army officers, ex-confederate and union officers were 
voluntarily dispatched to Egypt to help model the military on the West Point model. They also 
designed coastal fortification, lighthouses, and cartographic surveys in Uganda, the  Congo and 
Sudan.62
  
They also participated in the  Egyptian-Ethiopian war. 
The project called “Americans on the Nile”, was launched by Isma’il. Thaddeus Mott, 
an ex-union artillery officer who served in the Sultan’s court in 1868, had been initially 
introduced him to the idea.63
 
Although the mission started as an unofficial project, President 
Ulysses S. Grant’s Army Chief of Staff, Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman eventually 
authorised it. Mott travelled in 1869 to Egypt, accompanied by Gen. Charles Pomeroy Stone 
and Gen. Henry H. Sibley. In 1872, Gen. Sherman paid a visit to the Americans in Egypt. In 
1878, former President Grant, as part of a world tour, also visited the Americans serving the 
Khedive. Stone remained in Egypt until 1883 and became the Chief of Staff of Isma’il. At the 
time American soldiers were considered superior to French and English soldiers. Indeed, the 
American civil war was seen as the most technologically advanced war. Besides, unlike the 
French and the British, the Americans did not have a vested interest in the Suez Canal.64 
Most importantly, the American soldiers, led by General Stone, remodelled the army. 
Following a request from Stone, Isma’il ordered that no men be promoted within the Egyptian 
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military unless they could read and write well.65A second order called on establishing schools 
for each battalion so that officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers could receive the 
required training.66
  
A third order announced the establishment of a good staff college.67
 
A 
school that specialised in courses that taught the use of the latest sub- marine equipment was 
opened in Rosetta.68
 
Another special school for non-commissioned officers was opened.69
 
Finally, in 1974, a school for the children of non-commissioned officers was opened in 1974.70
 
Fellahin who achieved the battalion school could then also attend this school.71
 
Some of the 
Egyptians who participated in the Urabi revolt attended these schools.
72
Additionally, some of 
the leaders of the 1919 and 1922 revolution had gone to these schools or had parents who went 
there.73
 
Urabi himself had encountered the Americans during the Egyptian-Ethiopian war. 
All did not welcome the American presence. First, tensions arose within American 
ranks as some officers were unhappy and did not get on well with Egyptian officers, with racial 
and religious tensions high on the list. Several incidents that turned violent between American 
officers and their American superiors were reported. Secondly, the Turco-Circassian elite also 
did not see the American-led reforms from a good eye as they threatened their superiority. 
Indeed, opening schools to fellahin and other Egyptian conscripts menaced the authority of the 
Turco- Circassian class. Finally, the French and the British were angry at the American 
presence. The spiralling debt crises meant that France and Britain had increased their control 
over the Egyptian government. In 1878, the two imperial forces imposed the abdication of 
Tawfik, and British and French officials were installed as heads of the Finance Ministry and 
other key posts. The first demand of the French-Anglo debt holders was the dismantling of the 
American-built Egyptian Army and Navy. Soon, 80 per cent of the armed forces were shut 
down, and most American officers were sent home.74 
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Looking at the foundations of the institutional and legal apparatuses that form the basis 
of Egypt’s modern state, it is difficult to see what is “Egyptian” about it. The modern Egyptian 
state is an infolding of the colonial Symbolic. These foundations look like a mosaic of different 
European and American assemblages that invented a kind of  Baroque hybrid supposed to 
produce Egypt as a passable copy of European modernity. By embracing the modern Egyptian 
sovereign state as the defining Signifier of Egyptian modernity, Egyptian anti-colonial 
nationalist thought remained bound to reproduce colonial semiotics.  Amidst this growing 
desire to recode the Egyptian state as a copy of its colonial sign, the seeds of the Egyptian 
anti/post-colonial national subjectivity were birthed. Egyptian nationalism thus emerged as 
Egypt was taking up a different Big Other.  
 COLONIAL MODERNITY HAS A NEW SIGNIFIER: BEING MODERN AS BEING  
BOURGEOIS 
This section argues that in colonial Egypt, capitalism had a double function. It acts as 
both an agent of colonial castration and an agent of production of the bourgeoisie. Indeed, as 
we have seen in the previous section, capitalism acted as an agent of castration by dislocating 
the Historical presence of colonised people. The integration of ancient Egyptian culture in the 
capitalist economy in the 19th century and diplomacy illustrates this. The capitalist 
transvaluations of culture as an economic marker of modernity acted as a reifier of the validity 
of the modern Identity of Europe. As we will see in this section, the re-shifting of public spaces 
was also experienced as a castrating experience, although it did trigger a desire for Bourgeois 
modernity. Furthermore, by projecting itself as an Ideal-I with which the castrated subjected 
can self-identify, capitalism also projected itself as an agent of liberation. Indeed, by producing 
a native Egyptian bourgeoisie, capitalism projected itself as an agent of liberation that could 
‘make’ all Egyptians into subjects of modernity.   
 
In the course of the 19
th 
century, European subjectivity continued to insert itself in the 
horizon of Egyptian subjectivity. While previously, the Idea of Egyptianness had been 
dominated by the image of the peasant, the image of the Bourgeois offered up a new possible 
representation of Egyptians as being-in-modernity.  This process of dislocation highlights how 
capitalists signifying semiotics operate through dislocation and recoding. This displacement 
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posited the peasant as a connecting point between Egypt’s ancient past and its more recent past. 
In contrast, the image of the Bourgeois represented the possibility of economic emancipation 
and through it, of individual emancipation. One of the ways through which the Bourgeois Ideal 
was projected involved the restructuration of the Egyptian public space. 
Although Napoleon and his army had already started to remodel Cairo architecturally 
during the attempted  French expedition, similar efforts were continued by the Ali dynasty.75
 
In  Cairo, Egyptian public spaces were remodelled to turn the city into an Imperial capital.76
 
To this end, new public gardens were a must-have. They are an interesting example because 
they represent both an actual and a virtual point of convergence between Empire, modern 
national state and capitalism. Connecting entertainment to public health, they were closely 
associated with the idea of an independent and sovereign state, making them a symbol of state 
modernity. They had become a craze in the Ottoman Tanzimat, the Habsburg, British and 
French empires, and the USA.77
  
Egypt, under Ali’s sons, was no different.  In his continuous 
efforts to aesthetically modernise Cairo, Ismail Pasha established what is now called Horeyya 
Garden in Tahrir street, the Aquarium Grotto Garden in Zamalek, the Zoo and the Orman 
Gardens in Giza and restructured the Azbakiyya garden. A closer look at the impact of public 
parks highlights the link between aesthetics and existence, in that aesthetics participate to 
actualising a particular form of reality, a specific subjectivity. The Azbakiyya garden can be 
used as a case in point to illustrate the growing enfolding power of Imperial subjectivity. The 
garden had fences and an entrance fee. 78
  
It was thus not accessible to most Egyptians.  
Enjoyment of the park and its facilities, including kiosks, a restaurant, a garden theatre, a 
Comedie, a Circus, an Opera House and a Hippodrome, was exclusively reserved to those who 
could afford it.79
 
Additionally, the Palace freely distributed parcels of land to the Ottoman-
Egyptian elite and Europeans on the condition that they build houses. 80As a result, a new 
upper-class quarter developed in the vicinity of the Garden. 
In the official imaginary, public gardens and their leisure function were parts and parcel 
of creating a new Egyptian civilisation similar to European society. In the 19
th 
century Europe, 
music and musical theatre were the symbols, if not the standard of cultured sociability: here 
 
75 Adam Mestyan, ‘Power and Music in Cairo, Azbakiyya’, Urban History, Vol. 40, Special Issue 04, 
(November 2013), pp.681-704, p. 682 
76 Ibid.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., p. 682 
79 Ibid., p.106 
80 Ibid., p.46 
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civilisation and bourgeois etiquette are co-constitutive. 81
 
In 1871, Draneht Bey, the 
superintendent of the new Opera, claimed in a conversation with an Arab journalist that musical 
theatre was ‘the relaxing side of civilization’. Azbakiyya thus embodied the production of new 
social hierarchy.82
 
The development of public gardens is also interesting because these new 
buildings and gardens initially did not correspond to the needs of an existing audience. 83
 
Although their creation has often been interpreted as an illustration of colonial transfer, this 
chapter argues they are the illustration not just of a transfer, but instead of the penetration of 
imperial subjectivity and through it of capitalist signifying semiotics. 
The emergence of the notion of enjoyment as the public through public spaces whose 
access is contingent on money effectively entails a new process of signification of what public 
signifies. It also creates enjoyment as a capitalist pleasure and posits it a marker of an 
individual’s ability to be in modernity and enjoy it. The emergence of this new agencement 
(assemblage) did not take place linearly or without ambivalence. The next few paragraphs 
highlight attempts made by the Khedive to use capitalist signifying semiotics to his advantage. 
The reshaping of Egyptian public spaces took place as tensions increased between Egypt and 
its European creditors, engineering a shift from Egypt's image as a possible identical image of 
being European to an image analogous with it. This shift also implied a displacement of the 
role of Ottoman identity and a turn towards a more Arab one. Indeed, Arabism opened the 
possibility for a new and more ‘national’ Tanzimat. This new vision is illustrated by Isma’il 
increasing portrayal of himself as a benevolent Arab ruler by, for example, inciting migrations 
from Syrians to Egypt. Furthermore, Isma’il advocated the use of the Arabic language to 
increase popular interests in some of the leisure attractions. In 1869, for example, more 
Egyptians visited Rancy’s circus in Cairo because it advertised its events programme in 
Arabic.84 
Following the opera House construction, Isma’il offered free seats to Arab journalists 
hoping they would help popularise the place amongst the nascent Egyptian upper-class.85
 
Amongst them were  Muhammad  Unsi and his father, Abu’l- Su’ud Effendi,  the Wadi al-Nil 
journal editors who began to engage extensively in theatre and opera.86Wadi al-Nil was the first 
privately owned Arabic Newspaper in Egypt. It covered political and literary issues but steered 
 
81 Mestyan, ‘Power and Music in Cairo, Azbakiyya’,  p.114 
82 Ibid., p.694 
83 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p.114 
84 Mestyan, ‘Power and Music in Cairo, Azbakiyya’, p.697. 
85 Ibid., p.701 
86 Mestyan, ‘Arabic theatre in early khedivial culture’, p.701 
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clear of religion and was a mouthpiece of the Khedive. Muhammad Unsi also edited the 
Egyptian armed forces' official paper, Rawdhat al-Akhbar, which specialised in political, 
scientific, literary,  agricultural and commercial journalism.87
 
Throughout this period, Isma’il 
became increasingly involved in press matters. He used the press as a tool to try and compete 
with the rising power of imperial subjectivity. Despite the attempt to Egyptianize and Arabise 
the public spaces by advertising them to the Effendis, ordinary Egyptians turned their interests 
to popular Egyptian traditions, including street entertainments, folk songs and the Arab art 
music. These were characteristic of mid-nineteenth century Azbakiyya and were used to try 
and reclaim the modernised garden.88
  
In 1871, James Sanua, now seen in Egypt as the father 
of modern Egyptian theatre, staged his ‘operettas’ in colloquial Egyptian Arabic and used 
popular tunes to bring ordinary Egyptians to the Azbakiyya Garden Theatre.89
 
However, he 
soon found himself out of the Khedive's favours because his theatre was deemed too vulgar. 
Clearly, the popular style did not match the Bourgeois etiquette that Egypt needed to make 
itself analogous to Europe. The same year, Muhammad Unsi asked the Khedive’s support to 
set up an Arab state theatre to no avail. For some time, the only ordinary Egyptians welcomed 
in the garden were the guards. The ‘Urabi revolt in 1882 allowed for a temporary breaking of 
those codes as the Egyptian singer Salama Hijazi first performed in the spring of 1882 in the 
Opera House for Colonel’ Urabi Pasha.90 
After the ‘Urabi revolt in 1882, which was followed by the British occupation, the 
Khedive shifted his position and increasingly used popular arts as a popular tool against the 
British. “Abduh al-Hamuli, an Egyptian musician who together with his wife, formed one of 
the most successful musical duets and who had served the Khedive privately returned to 
performing publicly with regular concerts at the Opera House. Attending his performances 
became increasingly associated with a patriotic act of opposition to colonialism with attendees 
including ordinary Egyptians, Syrians and a Turco-Circassian elite which was in the process 
of self- nationalizing as more Egyptian than Ottoman. The increase of autocracy with Isma’il’s 
successor Tawfik led to an alliance between Syrians and Egyptian singers, which launched an 
intraregional musical-theatre genre in Egypt. By the 1890s, the British excluded Arabic from 
use in the Opera. Entertainment in Arabic, be it colloquial or classical, was confined to 
 
87 Ibid., p.703 
88 Ziad Fahmy, Ordinary Egyptians, creating the Modern Nation Through Popular Culture, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press), p.40-43 
89 Mestyan, ‘Arabic theatre in early khedivial culture’ pp.117–137 
90 Ibid., p.702. 
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private/semi-private theatres or coffeehouses in Cairo, Alexandria, Tanta, Port Said. Those 
coffee houses defied the newly emerging social hierarchy by becoming a space where 
individuals who would today be considered middle class (writers, lawyers, doctors, 
bureaucrats, soldiers) and the urban poor could mix. 
Besides, Isma’il’s developments had opened a new economic market: the arts. 
Capitalist signifying semiotics thus also unfold through what we call culture. Amongst the arts 
that developed rapidly in the first half of the 20
th 
century was music. From 1900 to 1910, 
the gramophone Corporation marketed 1,192 different records in Egypt and 1912, Germany 
exported 65,000 records to Egypt.91By 1929,  the estimated number of records imported by 
Egypt from the US, UK, Germany and France was 728,000. Concomitantly, there was also a 
growing shift from classical to colloquial language in the arts and the press: writers who could 
write Ajzal (colloquial poems and songs) were more in demand. Moreover, they were 
increasingly being paid to write theatre plays and comedic sketches.92Odeon started recording 
Egyptian artists from 1905 and made its reputation by signing the most well-known Egyptian 
artists including Salama Hijazi, Asma al-Kumsariyya or Bahiyya al-Mahalawiyya. These 
singers were paid very well. Reports from 1906 claim that there was such a demand for Arab 
records in Egypt that artists were paid the unprecedented sum of 10,000 Francs.93 
Less than three decades after Ismail's restructuration of public gardens, Musical theatre 
had become increasingly popular in Egypt. Beyond the plot, most people came to see a rising 
singing star. Amongst them was Munira al-Mahadiyya, a female singer who became very 
famous in the 1910s. She was one of the very few female singers at the time. She founded a 
coffee shop in the Azbakiyya area of Cairo called Nuzhat al-Nufus, which became a meeting 
place for politicians and intellectuals from Egypt, Sudan and the Levant who would meet to 
discuss their ideas.94
  
After the British closed Nuzhat al-Nufus,  she went into theatre.  In 1915, 
she joined a troop headed by Salama Hijazi, and as he became fatally ill, she performed the 
male roles originally written for him to great acclaim.95 She sang nationalist and anti-colonial 
songs, which made her so famous that a slogan emerged: ‘Hawa’ al-hurriyya fi Masrah Minira 
 
91 Ziad Fahmy, ‘Media-Capitalism: Colloquial Mass Culture and Nationalism in Egypt’, 1908–18, 
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al-Mahdiyya” (there is a love of freedom in the theatre of Munira al- Mahdiyya).96
 
She founded 
her own theatre company after the British tried to ban her from the stage. She assumed 
management responsibilities for her troop, negotiating with theatre owners,  composers, 
lyricists and singers, she dealt with payroll and planning schedules.97 She was closer to the 
Wafd than Mustafa Kamil’s party, and she sang at Saad Zaghloul’s funeral. Tauhida, a Syrian 
immigrant was another famous singer. She began her career as a dancer in the Azbakiyya 
area.98
  
Her husband has opened a club,  Alf Laila wa Laila especially for her to perform from 
1887. After his death, she continued to own and manage the business until her passing in 1932. 
Na’ima al-Masriyya, raised in a lower-middle-class neighbourhood of Cairo, became a singer 
after a divorce. By 1927 she had bought a casino the Alhambra, which she managed and where 
she performed. 
All in all, with the public gardens, the restructuration of public spaces promoted the 
Bourgeois as a new possible becoming of Egyptians. This process also marked the growing 
penetration of capitalist signifying semiotics, as illustrated by the rise of the press and a class 
of entertainers. This helps demonstrate how, similarly to the state, capitalism also works like a 
cerebral-ideality. Furthermore, Bourgeois Identity was used to delineate both the possibilities 
and limits of public enjoyment. As such, the Ideal of being Bourgeois was projected as an 
image of both individual economic emancipation. This identity was both embraced and 
rebuked by Egyptians, leading to an ambivalence towards what it meant to be modern. Still, in 
being the concrete representation of new possibilities that colonial capitalism offered, the 
Bourgeois Ideal seduced Egyptian subjectivity into its fold. This enfolding helps explain how 






This chapter has examined how Egyptian subjectivity became enfolded by the colonial 
Simulation. It has first argued that the Mirror Stage can be used as a conceptual model that 
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thinks how subjectivity comes onto itself as the simulacrum of a simulation. It drew from 
Jacques Lacan, who argued that the Symbolic order acts as a Big Other of the Subject. This 
Big Other produces images of reality, what Lacan calls Ideal-Is,  which the subject identifies 
with throughout their life. In effect, the Big Other produces virtual images that act as sites of 
Identification through which Subjects mediate their sense of selfhood and of being-in-the-
world. The Symbolic order effectively codifies the subject’s sense of reality; it acts as the map 
through which the subject experience their sense of self in reality.99 As in Borges' fable and 
lining with Baudrillard’s argument, the map becomes the real and the Real is left to rot beneath 
the map. It has slipped beneath signification.  
The chapter has also highlighted the dynamic dimension of the mirror stage. Indeed, it 
outlines the processes through which the subject shifts from one sense of self to another. This 
shift into a new sense of reality, it argues, is gained by an entrance into a new modality of being 
and therefore a new sense of Self. It is also experienced as a castration because it implies losing 
a previous sense of real. This sense of castration is further exacerbated by the laws through 
which the real of the new colonial Simulation articulates itself. Indeed, as we have seen, the 
Symbolic has a prohibitive function: the real has to be mediated by language. It cannot be 
unmediated anymore. As a result, the ‘first real’ can only be re-experienced as an Object a or 
phantasm that needs to be castrated to affirm the power of subjectivation of the new Big Other. 
Drawing from this the chapter has argued that eighteenth-century Europe fantasised a lost Real. 
This phantasm or simulacrum divided Egypt between a True claimant of modernity, namely 
ancient Egypt, and a fake claimant, modern Egypt. This displacement of the Egyptian historical 
agency illustrates how colonial thought thought the Egyptian colonised as a castrated subject. 
It thought the relationship between ancient and modern Egypt through their non-relationship 
and fantasised a Historical link of filiation between ancient Egypt and Modern European 
identity.  Thus, while colonial reason thought the colonised as a subject that lacks historicity, 
a subject that lacks a sense of selfhood,  In contrast, the modern European Subject is thought 
as a surplus of affectation: it is a precept of time. The invented link of filiation thus plays an 
affective role; it reifies European identity's temporal immanence. This affective construction 
went so far, European and the American governments rivalled over their acquisitions of ancient 
 
99 Drawing from Foucault and Deleuze’s take on societies of control, one can say that modernity increasingly 
articulates itself as through codes that a a-signifying: codes that do not signify but de-signify. They do so by 
thinking being not through the process of identity but opposition: either/or. 
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Egyptian artefacts and knowledge. As the American newspaper article pointed, true claimants 
of modernity had to have an obelisk.  
 The chapter also highlighted how this Symbolic and concrete penetration was 
coalescent with the emergence of the Capitalist-Bourgeois Ideal as having a double function of 
‘liberation’ and castration of desire. Capitalism recoded public gardens as private spaces of 
Bourgeois enjoyment by setting entrance fees and a dress code. Moreover, to fully be a 
participant in the enjoyment, one had to have money to partake in the gardens' activities.  
However, it also acted as an agent of ‘liberation’ of desire by ‘making’ enjoyment a public 
business. The return of folk songs and colloquial Arabic in songs and theatre as the signs of 
popular enjoyment illustrates this. Furthermore, by offering the colonised a concrete way out 
of their economic poverty and into the bourgeoisie, capitalism reified its function of 
‘liberation’. This process also highlights how capitalism works through transvaluation. In 
Egypt, we have seen how capitalism acted as an agent of ‘liberation’ of women in several ways. 
It ‘made’ dancing more of a professional and thus respectable profession, it allowed women to 
become not just performers but also owners, managers, and writers… 
Furthermore, in the music industry, it produced both men and women millionaires who 
gained international recognition. By articulating itself through the pleasure principle, 
capitalism can seduce subjectivity into its Simulation. According to Freud, the Id is driven by 
a force that desires the experience of pleasure while seeking to avoid or minimise 
displeasure.100 The pleasure principle thus acts as a subjective regulator of the economy of 
desire that assesses the gains and losses of satisfaction that the outcomes of various courses of 
actions produce.101 This regulative function of the subjective economy of desire is not the 
function through which the Id proceeds but the strategy through which the ego negotiates the 
demands/exigencies of reality on behalf of the Id. In mimicking the pleasure principle and thus 
acting as a drive that regulates subjective affects, capitalism can capture the interiority of 
individual desire and project itself as immanent to both experience and desire.  
Thus, the ‘liberation’ of capitalism offers the colonised active participation into the 
modern Simulation since a subject with capital is a subject with agency. As we will see 
throughout the thesis, this transvaluation of values through which capitalism functions also 
produced a desire to disidentify with the Simulation, a desire for de-subjectivation from it. 
 
100 See for example, Sigmund Freud, James Strachey (Trans.), The Ego and the id, ( New York: Norton, 
1962) 
101 Ibid.  
 80 
Besides, as we will see in the next chapter, this economic ‘liberation’ of capitalism was the 
experience limited to a nascent class. For the majority of the population, capitalism was 
experienced as an economic and legal castration. Thus, in fine,  capitalism did open up of the 
social to more enjoyable becomings, but it ‘made’ this difference possible, by castrating the 




ALICE IN PLUNDERLAND 
 
 
Central Premise: Modernity is an object (the whole that is greater than the sum of its 
parts) that the subject can acquire through a particular set of processes. The production of a 
specific set of processes is called a procedure. 
Second Premise: Modernity is acquired through a procedure. A procedure is the 
production of a particular mode of production (production of a set of processes); 
Conclusion: Modernity is acquired through the production of a particular mode of 






On November 5, 1896, the first Egyptian cinema projection took place in Alexandria. 
On November 12, the journal El Mou’ayed published an anonymous letter written by an 
Egyptian who had attended the screening: 
 
“I will not go into all those things people wonder about regarding the affairs of 
foreigners, for endless tomes are needed to explain that. There are all sorts of evidence for us 
to see and almost touch with our fingers, to admit that we are as far behind them as a tortoise 
is from a hare. But what has made me use this title is not a futile matter which can be 
comprehended by anybody who has a heart or heard and was witness. What has happened is 
that a few days ago some foreigners came to Alexandria with a camera capable of capturing 
motion pictures, which they call “cinematograph”. They presented it in a spacious hall in the 
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Toussoun Pasha Bourse. An incredible number of people gathered round to watch it, and I 
among them. I left intoxicated by the wonders I had seen. 
This marvellous invention which has aroused such amazement has also made me aware 
of a multitude of things, the most important of which is that I apprehended the secret of the 
progress of the foreigners. I found out that we would be no less than them if we had the same 
material, and if, like them, we related work to science and linked the tangible with the 
intangible. 
[…..] 
If we know all this, and also that trade, industry and agriculture are resources in the 
lands of the foreigners, … which make life easier for them and eliminate the fear of hunger and 
poverty that is so firmly fixed in our country. If we know all this we will no longer hesitate to 
confess that to compare us Orientals to the West is to compare the dead to the living or earth 
to sky. All we can do is lament our luck, wail at our destiny, and grieve that our government is 
in the iron grip of the foreigners. The souls of its people are rising to their throats from harsh 
pressure and murderous oppression. Then there is no harm in blaming our rich, who have made 
of their safes a graveyard of piles of money at which termites are gnawing. … 
This is all that came to my mind when I saw that wonderful machine I have referred to. 
I left thinking that as long as we were proceeding down that road, we were heading for an 
inevitable abyss that has been dug for us by the progress and civilization of the foreigners. If 
we do not do as our ancestors have done, and shake off the dust of apathy, we will be 
overwhelmed by their flood. Oh, people, our only salvation lies in following in their footsteps 
and making the progress of our country our only aim, so that we can catch up with them. I 
showed in today’s letter, that described the progress of the West, the beauty of the 
cinematograph (motion pictures).”1 
 
As this letter highlights, the projection of a film on a screen can be intoxicating to those 
watching it can arouse amazement. This effectively means that a screen can mediate affect and 
that the mediation of a Symbolic reality through a screen has the power to subjectivize us 
affectively. We can thus be affectively subjectivized into a symbolic/virtual reflection of 
reality. In the introductory and first chapters, we have seen how the symbolic order acts as a 
screen that projects images of a symbolic/fictive reality that the subjects of the social strive to 
 
1 Letter accessed from  the website of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina website, Alex cinema, section “Historical 
background”, accessed from: https://www.bibalex.org/alexcinema/historical/beginnings.html 
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identify with, by becoming their concrete representations. When a subject is assigned an image 
that castrates their internal experience of their selves and their being-in-the-world, the subject 
experiences identification as a totalising external force of colonisation.  We have also seen how 
by opening up the social to a becoming Bourgeois, capitalism produced images that ‘liberated’ 
the colonised experience of modernity. It did so by delivering experience as enjoyment, thereby 
providing the subject with some sense of ‘agency’ in their history and through this in History.  
In the letter, it is because the foreigners produced a machine that provides enjoyment - the 
cinematograph- that the colonised envies their Modernity. The letter, however, does not tell the 
whole story. During the first projection, the images also triggered fear and panic. When images 
of a speeding train appeared on the screen, many ran out of the room.2 They were frightened 
that the train would come out of the screen. Their instinctive reaction was that another real 
could come out of the screen and colonise their reality. Surely, a virtual Symbolic reality could 
not act on our reality; it could not affect our reality? If a train came out of a screen, the screen 
would have the power to displace our sense of reality, to ‘make’ it different. So much so in fact 
that in this case,  the real would be deprived of the possibility of signification. And surely, if 
reality articulates itself as a real deprived of the possibility of signification, then reality would 
be absurd. A train coming out of a screen is absurd, and so is the a-signifying  real it produces. 
Gilles Deleuze defines the absurd as a signifier deprived of the very possibility of 
signification.3 Such a  signifier has no referent in semiotics; it is a concept/sign that does not 
refer to a fixed object /image and has no agreed-upon meaning. In this case, this signifier can 
be called an empty or floating signifier.4 In the introduction, we have seen how for Baudrillard, 
in postmodern semiotics, the real had lost its referents.5 This loss of reference of the real, 
Baudrillard argued, means that as a concrete historical formation, postmodernity articulates 
itself as a post-truth era. Baudrillard called it a hyperreal that produces an empty real, hence its 
deathly quality.6 We have also seen that for Deleuze what Baudrillard calls postmodernity is, 
yet another simulation produced by the regime of representation. Indeed for Deleuze, it is the 
regime of representation that ‘causes’ subjectivity and thought to cognize experience as an 
 
2 As explained by Alaa al-Aswani Conference at the Mediatheque de Vaise, Assises Internationales du 
Roman, 2019, Lyon, May 21st, 2019  
3 Deleuze, The Logic of  Sense, p.69 
4 Howarth, Stavrakakis, “Introducing discourse theory and political analysis”, in D. Howarth, A.J. Norval, 
J. Aletta and Y. Stavrakakis (Eds.), Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and 
Social Change (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp.1-23; See also Ernesto Laclau, Chantal 
Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
5 See Introductory Chapter, p.19. 
6 Ibid. 
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object of knowledge/phantasm.7 This simulation marks a shift from disciplinary to control 
societies, and according to Deleuze, disciplinary societies produced the a priori conditions for 
their becoming as societies of control.8 Indeed, from a Deleuzean perspective, a simulation 
‘makes’ the conditions for its possible shift into another simulation and through semiotic 
folding.  
In Masochism, Coldness and Cruelty, Deleuze argued that modernity expresses itself 
as a semiosis that thinks THE LAW - and through it the reality that is underpinned by THIS 
LAW - as an empty signifier. He outlined how the emergence of modern thought converged 
with a shift in how thought thinks the Idea of law. Up to Kant, he argued, classical thought 
took up THE GOOD as a referent for the Idea of law. Accordingly,  it thought law in itself as 
a regulation that ought to produce a better experience of being-in-the-world, a better society. 
Things changed when in his second Critique, Kant argued that the Idea of law does not have a 
referent in semiotics since the  Idea of law is founded on similarity. He thus asserted that the 
concept/representation of Law is not mediated by another Idea; it is the same in-itself- with-
itself.  
 
“In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant gave a rigorous formulation of a radically 
new conception, in which the law is no longer regarded as dependent on the Good, but on the 
contrary, the Good itself is made dependent on the law. This means that the law no longer has 
its foundation in some higher principle from which it would derive its authority, but that it is 
self-grounded and valid solely by virtue of its own form. For the first time we can now speak 
of THE LAW, regarded as an absolute, without further specification or reference to an object. 
[….] Clearly, THE LAW, as defined by its pure form, without substance or object or any 
determination whatsoever, is such that no one knows or can know what it is. It operates without 
making itself known. It defines a realm of transgression where one is already guilty, and where 
one oversteps the bounds without knowing what they are, as in the case of Oedipus.  Even guilt 
and punishment do not tell us what the law is but leave it in a state of indeterminacy equalled 
only by the extreme specificity of the punishment. This is the world described by Kafka.”9 
 
Thus, for Kant, as a noumenon, or Idea, the image/concept of law cannot be 
 
7 Ibid., p.25 
8 Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, pp.3-7 
9 Gilles Deleuze, Masochism, Coldness and Cruelty,(New York: Zone Books, 1991) p .82-84  
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apprehended as an object of knowledge because its form is identical to its image. In other 
words, in-itself, The law is THE LAW.  Followingly, the image or concept of law can only be 
apprehended as an object of knowledge through the concrete forms that THE LAW takes up. 
In thinking THE LAW as having no semiotic referents,  Kant rethought law as an empty 
signifier. An example of a thought that thinks law through this semiotic process is financial 
thought. Financial law is primarily determined by the financial sector's requirements, not by 
the degree of Good that it produces as an experience. This shift in semiotics that Kantian 
thought operates in its thinking of the concept of law as an Idea of THE LAW opens up the 
door to what Deleuze calls a Kafkian reality. Kantian thought cognizes the Identity of the 
image/concept of law through its function. It does not mediate the Representamen/signifier it 
produces for the image/concept of law by its affect/sense on the social. Drawing from Peirce, 
one could say that the Representamen/signifier is not interpreted through its relationship with 
an Object, but through its relationship with its concrete Self. Kantian thought thus thinks the 
meaning of the image/concept of law through its tangible Symbolic representations. This is 
problematic since, as we have seen in the introduction, the Representamen's function is to 
represent/produce the real of the sign (the Object) as being equivalent to its symbolic 
representation.10 Thus in thinking of itself through a dyadic semiotic process between the 
Representamen/signifier as a concept and the Representamen/signifier as a concrete 
Representation, semiosis is totalised by the Symbolic order. The semiotic production is the 
result of “a signifier that makes love with its signifieds.”11 
Besides, if the concrete representation determines the concept's meaning, then the 
concrete representation acts as the Interpretant of its own symbolic. To go back to our example 
of financial law, this means that ultimately,  financiers act as the Interpretant of the 
concept/image of financial law.  As a consequence, the Idea is tailored to the requirements of 
the financial sector its capitalist desire. As we will see in this chapter, in Egypt, colonial 
financial law was determined by the needs of European financiers.  In the colonial semiotic 
process, the function of the concept/image of law is not to represent a Symbolic that is the 
equivalent of a Real nor to judge/think the Symbolic by looking at its affect on the production 
of social reality. Instead, the function of  THE LAW is determined by the requirements of 
European financiers and through them, of capitalist desire. Thus, further drawing from Peirce, 
 
10 For example, in Peircean terms, the function of a prison is to exercise disciplinary power. The Object  of 
a prison is to produce discipline, to discipline us. Or again, to think the function of a prison  as the exercise 
of disciplinary power thought  thinks prison as a panopticon 
11 Deleuze, Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.210 
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one could say that in modern thought, the meaning of the concept of law is determined by the 
requirements set by its symbolic function: the totalisation of experience by the Modern 
Symbolic.  
In fine, Kantian thought thinks the function of repression of the image/concept of law 
as the affect (Object) that law ought to produce on the real: its foreclosure. In foreclosing the 
affective reality that laws produce from its image/concept, Kantian thought opens up law and 
the reality that it structures to the absurd: it thinks law as a force of foreclosure of the reals or 
possibles that do not fit The Law of its Symbolic. In itself, the function of Symbolic LAW is 
then to discipline us into its simulation.  Semiotic deregulation had produced a new regulation: 
repression as the only object of production of the law.  
In thinking law as a supreme or total authority, a pan of modern thought has stopped 
questioning the legitimacy of law in-itself. Instead, it thinks THE LAW as a set of regulations 
that produce a reality partitioned to fit capitalism's requirements/desire. As law lost its sense 
of THE GOOD and found its sense of Capitalist Plasticity, so did its simulation. In modernity, 
the real takes up plasticity as an experience totalised by the object world and the laws of its 
capitalist desire. This means that the real can only be thought through its capitalist referents, 
which remain forever external to it. In itself then, the real is apprehended as de facto lacking-
in-experience because it cannot be made into an object of pure/total knowledge and thus of 
phantasm. Overall, then, Deleuze tells us that by embracing the Kantian semiotic slip, modern 
thought thinks THE GOOD as the repressive function of the law: the law is good because it is 
a necessary form of repression. In this modern semiotic process, THE GOOD is produced out 
of the subject’s acceptance of repression: a lawful subject is a subject that satisfies the 
requirements of capitalist desire.  
This chapter draws on Deleuze’s critique of modern thought to argue that in thinking 
THE LAW as an empty signifier, colonial thought also thinks the reality that structures it as an 
empty signifier. This chapter's title refers to Deleuze’s book The Logic of Sense and Lewis 
Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. In Carroll’s book, Alice ‘falls’ into Wonderland, 
a territory totalised by the object world and its rules. There, to make sense of reality, Alice 
cannot refer to her previous sense of the real and its laws. In Wonderland, the real is an empty 
signifier; it can go all in all senses, widths, dimensions. It is a world that appears open to all 
potentialities. However,  Alice soon discovers that Wonderland functions by foreclosing the 




It appears as a pure becoming <<<----->>> It actualises/concretises itself as a limited 
becoming 
Or: 
It appears as the potential becoming of all possibles <<<----->>>  It concretises itself 
as one possible becoming  
 
In Egypt, the chapter argues, colonial reality articulates itself through a similar paradox. 
It appears as the potential becoming of all possibles and yet concretises itself as a capitalist 
becoming. As we have seen, this paradox is produced by a semiotic slip that ‘makes’ the absurd 
as THE LAW that structures the production of modern thought and modern subjectivity. This 
chapter thus argues that in Egypt, modern colonial reality is as an example of this semiotic law 
of the absurd. In doing so, it highlights how colonial reality produces the absurd by foreclosing 
the possibility of signification of the reals that are not compossible with its Symbolic. This 
chapter is divided into two moments. The first moment includes three sections and highlights 
how the simulation's capitalist reality articulates itself through the foreclosing of non-colonial 
possibles. The moment argues that it does so by problematising the possible becomings of 
Egypt with the debt problem. The first section highlights how colonial powers used the debt 
problem to create a dependency system between European capitalists and the Egyptian Palace. 
Although colonial reason argued that this dependency was for Egypt’s betterment, its 
primary function was to ‘make’  European financiers and through them, European 
governments, richer. The second section argues that the debt problem was then used for the 
gradual domination of the government by colonial powers. While colonial reason argued that 
its restructuration of the legal system would act as the foundation of a social contract between 
the state and its citizens, its function was to legally assert the superiority of European financial 
and political interests in Egypt. The third section looks at the Egyptian struggle for the legal 
negotiation of national independence through the example of the National Programme. It 
highlights how the foreclosure of this possible by colonial powers, led to the  ‘Urabi revolt. 
The second moment of the chapter also empirically highlights how colonial law further 
concretised Egypt's colonial becoming by foreclosing the possibles that did not fit the 
requirements of capitalist desire.   Its first section looks at the consolidation and reproduction 
of colonial hierarchies through the establishment of Mixed Courts. It argues that the courts’ 
function was to protect the interests of the capitalist Bourgeois and participated in the 
concretisation of their socio-economic supremacy. This second section outlines how colonial 
laws foreclosed the peasants’ previous sense of real as it disciplined them into the reality of the 
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simulation. It does so by looking at how widespread foreclosures of peasants’ lands made the 
majority of the Egyptian peasantry landless. The foreclosure of their previous sense of real by 
capitalism, this section argues, meant that for the peasants, modernity expressed itself as the 
affirmation of two senses: one the one hand it appeared to open the door to all the possible yet 
on the other it concretises itself as the a priori guilt of the colonised. The section further argues 
this paradox illustrates the absurd logic of colonial semiotics and their production of a reality 
where the real deprived of the possibility of signification. The third and final section looks at 
the absurd of colonial reality through the illiberalism of what is thought of as the ‘Liberal era’ 
of Egypt. Colonial political laws, it argues, can be taken as another example of the ways in 
which colonial rule was used to totalise the political experience into the colonial Simulation.  
 
 
1 WHEN COLONIAL REASON MASQUERADES AS GOOD SENSE 
 
WELCOME TO PLUNDERLAND: THE DEBT AS THE IMAGE/HOLE INTO COLONIAL 
MODERNITY 
This section highlights how the debt problem was used as an instrument for the gradual 
economic penetration of colonial powers by creating a dependency system between European 
capitalists and the Egyptian Palace.  Although colonial reason argued that this dependency was 
for Egypt’s betterment, its primary function was to ‘make’  European financiers and through 
them European governments richer. In doing so, the section argues, its function is to comply 
with THE LAW of capitalist desire.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, in the 18th-
century Modernity meant business and from Mohammed Ali onwards, the Khedivial system 
became intent on turning Egypt into the copy of a Modern European country. As advertised 
and disseminated by the agent of colonial reason, it was believed that modernity could be 
acquired through a set of processes known as modernisation processes. What we will see in 
this section is analogous to Alice falling in the hole that leads her to Wonderland.  It illustrates 
how the Egyptian Palace's constant borrowing, coupled with bankers and financiers' total 
financial irresponsibility, literally manufactured Egypt’s indebtedness. These developments 
ultimately created a relationship of dependency that became anchored in law and later 
formalised through a system: the colonial system. The situation, however, was presented in a 
different light by colonial powers. From their perspective, the debt was exclusively Egypt’s 
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and its government, a government that lacked a raison d’état.  
 
From the early 1800s, Mohammed Ali’s efforts to modernise the state affected several 
fields. In agriculture, he expanded the cultivation and plantation of crops for exportation and 
reinvested public works' revenues.12 He restructured the army and promoted industrialisation 
by opening factories for weaving cotton, jute, silk, and wool.13 Ali also recruited European 
advisers to help him open sugar, indigo, glass and tanning factories and import the required 
types of machinery.14 Factories came to employ about 4 per cent of the population – between 
180 000 and 200 000 people aged 15 or over. 
Meanwhile, commercial activity was geared towards establishing foreign trade 
monopolies to achieve a favourable commercial balance.15 This angered Britain and France, 
although both engaged in similar practices.16 In a bid to remove Ali, on March 17, 1807, the 
British sent 5,300 troops to Egypt. 17  Ultimately, their military excursion failed, and on 
September 14, they evacuated the country.18 The British also entered a proxy war with Egypt 
and the Ottoman Empire by supporting the Wahhabi movement's expansionist ambitions 
against the Khedive’s initiatives. 19  Ali came out victorious, which only heightened his 
aspirations. In return for helping the Sultan in the Greek war for independence in the late 1820s, 
Ali asked for Syria and Morea. When Istanbul refused, he invaded Syria (1831) with his son 
Ibrahim who came out victorious from the battle of Konia. Britain, France, Austria, Russia and 
Prussia allied with the Ottoman Empire to fight off the Egyptian forces and drove Ibrahim 
out.20 At that point, the relationship between Egypt, France and Britain was a fraught one. 
Said Ali, Muhammad Ali’s son, took over after his father passed away in 1849. He 
wanted to follow in his father’s footsteps, but this required vast sums of money, which could 
only be obtained through borrowing. At the time Egypt’s law on these matters remained 
 
12 These included irrigation, canals, dams and barrages. 
13 Mohammad A. Chaichian, ‘The Effects of World Capitalist Economy on Urbanization in Egypt, 1800–
1970’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 20 Issue 1, (February 1988), pp.23-43, p.27 
14 Osama LTC Shams el-Din, A Military History of Modern Egypt from the Ottoman Conquest to the 
Ramadan War, (CreateSpace Independent Pub, 2012), p.19 
15 Afaf Lufti Al-Sayyid Marsot, A Short History of Modern Egypt, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), p.45 
16 Ibid., p.45 
17Andrew McGregor, A Military History of Modern Egypt, (London: Praeger Security Press, 2006), pp.54-
56. 
18Ibid., , pp.54-56 
19Ibid., , pp.54-56 
20 Osama LTC Shams el-Din, A Military History of Modern Egypt from the Ottoman Conquest to the 
Ramadan War, p.25 
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blurred. While no decrees from the Porte granted the Khedive the privileges of issuing state-
loans, no regulations prevented him from doing so either. Thus, in 1858, to finance the Suez 
Canal construction, Said circumvented the legal fog by issuing treasury bonds, a method on 
which he became increasingly reliant. However, this was not enough to finance the Canal. By 
1860 he turned to a French banking house that loaned him 28 million francs on his personal 
account.21 In 1862, still short of money Said was able, with the Sultan's accord, to negotiate 
the first Egyptian state-loan worth 3.3 million. But there was a trick. The loan conditions meant 
that after the deduction of interests and charges, Egypt only received 2.5 million pounds. 
Besides, the 30-year repayments plan meant Egypt had to repay a total amount of 8 million 
pounds.22  
In 1863, Said was succeeded by his brother Isma’il, who tried to relaunch 
industrialisation processes. He instigated a series of infrastructure projects and worked on the 
restructuration of the army. This required even more financial capital, which the Palace lacked. 
Isma’il opted to follow in Said’s tactic of finding investors.  Coetaneous to this, and as seen in 
Chapter One, between 1850-1876, bankers in European financial centres expanded their 
investments beyond Europe, especially after the 1873 financial crisis that affected Vienna, 
Berlin, Frankfort, New York and London.23  Thence, special banks tasked with organising 
financial flows between European financial centres and Egypt were created.24 By 1873, Egypt 
had accumulated a debt of 60,000,000 million pounds, mainly owed to French and English 
bankers.25 
British bankers focused on long-term loans (20-30 years), and French bankers on short-
term loans. In addition to loans, the Egyptian government continued to issue bonds. Between 
1862-1867, with the support of several British and French banking houses including Frühling 
& Goschen and Anglo-Egyptian Bank, five bonds totalling 18 million pounds were issued.26 
These loans were secured on the revenues of the Delta, Dekahlieh, Charkieh and Behera 
 
21 Ali Coşkun Tunçer, Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control The Middle East and the 
Balkans, 1870–1914,  (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2015), p.31 
22 Ibid., p.32 
23 David S. Landes, Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt, 
(London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1958), p.214, p.235 
24 These included the Anglo-Egyptian Bank (founded in 1864), the Franco-Egyptian Bank (founded in 1870 
and directed by the brother of Jules Ferry, a significant official of the French government) and the Austro-
Egyptian Bank (founded in 1869). The major London banks were also particularly active.  
25 Richard Atkins, ‘The Origins of the Anglo-French Condominium in Egypt, 1875-76’, The Historian, 
Vol.36, n.2, (February 1974), pp.264-282, p.266 
26 Tunçer, Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control, p.31 
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provinces, and the general revenues of the Egyptian state.27  More bonds that were secured on 
the private agricultural lands of the Khedive and his family or Dairas followed.28 In less than 
a decade, Isma’il had mortgaged Egyptian provinces, private estates, and state revenues, but 
more was needed to finance modernisation. In 1868 to meet interest payments the Khedive 
took on yet another loan of 11.9 million issued by the syndicate of IOB, Société Générale and 
Oppenheim.29 This time the consortium imposed a condition: Egypt could not contract another 
loan for five years.30By 1896 the Sultan echoed those sentiments by issuing a decree that 
restricted the Egyptian governor’s rights to acquire a new loan without seeking his 
permission.31 By then, Istanbul had realised the debt would allow European powers to gain 
more and more influence in Egyptian affairs.32  
Still, in 1870 the Palace managed to contract a new loan through the Franco-Egyptian 
Bank and secured it with the revenues of the Dairas. The Sultan declared it illegal prompting a 
series of discussions over the necessity of borrowing between Istanbul and Cairo.33The Palace 
argued that “restrictions [on issuing foreign loans] were creating serious obstacles to the 
complete development of the prosperity of Egypt”.34 By 1872 the Sultan relinquished and gave 
full decisional powers to the Khedive on loan so that Egypt could ‘modernise’. This marked 
the introduction of a law known as “Moukabala” which gave landowners the option of paying 
six years’ land tax in advance at a fifty per cent discount.35 Landowners who could pay this in 
one time beneficiated from an immediate return on their tax. Those who could only afford 
instalments had an 8 per cent discount on their advance, with the amount only reduced upon 
completion of their contribution. This created yet another form of dependency. In effect, this 
meant contracting a domestic loan with landowners at about 9 per cent interest rate. At the time 
of the law, the land tax amounted to about £4.8 million per year. Therefore, the law implied a 
sacrifice of half of this amount to address the government's short-term liquidity needs. During 
 
27Ibid., p.31. 
28 Ibid., p.31.; See also William H. Wynne, State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders: Selected Case 
Histories of Governmental Foreign Bond Defaults and Debt Readjustments, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press 1951), p.593. 
29 Ibid., p.31. 
30 Ibid., p.31 
31 Ibid., p.31 
32 Ibid., p.31 
33 Eric Toussaint, ‘La dette comme instrument de la conquête coloniale de l’Égypte’, May 20, 2016, Centre 
de recherche sur la mondialisation, Mondialilisation.ca, Accessible from:  
 https://www.mondialisation.ca/la-dette-comme-instrument-de-la-conquete-coloniale-de-legypte/5526551   
34 Tunçer, Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control p.47 
35 J.C. McCoan, Egypt under Ismail, a romance of history, (London: Chapman and Hall, 1889), p.122; see 
also William H. Wynne, State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholder, pp.581-82. 
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the first three years of its operation, the Moukabala yielded in total £9.9 million, but this was 
not enough to cover the deficits.36 The loan mania continued, and in 1873, Egypt contracted its 
largest loan to date - £32 million- with a bank consortium that included the Imperial Ottoman 
Bank, Bischoffsheim, Société Générale and banking houses in Alexandria, Istanbul and 
Amsterdam. This loan was secured through all the revenues of the railways of Lower Egypt, 
the proceeds of the personal and indirect taxes, the proceeds of the salt tax and annual receipts 
taken from the proceeds of the Moukabala.37 By then “taken together with the previous ones, 
the overall guarantees corresponded to almost all the Egyptian government's general revenues. 
Although acquiring this loan was seen as a success for the government, the crises in the 
international markets had an immediate effect on Egyptian credit, as it was impossible to 
borrow further.”38  Once again, this loan did not favour Egypt. After all the charges and 
interests, Egypt only received 20 million pounds. Repayments set over 30 years, meant Egypt 
had to repay 77 million pounds.  
Concomitant International developments such as the American civil war (1861-65) 
further affected the Egyptian economy. As the conflict raged, Southern states stopped their 
cotton production and continued demand allowed Egypt to boost its production. To do so, it 
relied on loans and in the process, it became dependent on the cotton revenues to make its 
repayments. When the war ended, and Southern states resumed their cotton production, prices 
plunged, leaving Egypt in an even greater financial precarity. The outset of the Long 
Depression in 1873 also marked the slowing down of European capital export to Egypt. 
Consequently, the Palace stopped making some of its loans repayments and turned to 
short-term loans, which had greater interest rates. In 1875 unable to pay the creditors, Ism’ail 
suspended payments of interests on the loans. Desperate for money he turned to the 
Rothschilds. With their intermediary, he sold 45 per cent of the Suez Canal shares to the British 
government for around 4 million. That same year, the Ottoman Empire ended up in bankruptcy 
which meant Egypt could no longer contract international markets loans.39 By 1876, The 
Egyptian debt totalled 68,5 million pounds against just 3 million in 1863.  In this context of 
growing tensions, with Isma’il’s agreement, the British Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli and 
his government sent two advisors to reassess the state's finances. A few weeks before the 
 
36 Tunçer, Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control, p.34. 
37 William H. Wynne, State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders: Selected Case Histories of Governmental 
Foreign Bond Defaults and Debt Readjustments, pp.582-83 
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British government bought the Khedive’s actions in the Suez Canal, a first investigation 
commission, led by a British Lawyer named Stephen Cave was launched in Cairo. All in all, 
this section has illustrated how the dependency of the Egyptian Palace on European capitalists 
unfolded as the greater penetration of colonial powers in Egypt's internal affairs. As the next 
section explains, a parallel was drawn between European capitalists' interests and their 
governments. Here, capitalist and colonial interests/desires are thus placed in a signifying chain 




THE MIS-SIGNIFICATION OF THE  LAW AND ITS PRODUCTION OF THE COLONIAL 
SYSTEM 
This section further details how the colonial powers used the debt problem to dominate 
the government. Firstly, the colonial Symbolic equivalenced the interests of European 
capitalists and the interests of their governments. In a second step, while colonial reason argued 
that its restructuration of the legal system would act as the foundation of a social contract 
between the state and its citizens, its function was to legally assert the superiority of European 
financial and political interests in Egypt. Empirically, this section outlines how the two legal 
investigations launched by European powers to look into the debt problem helped consolidate 
the legal institutionalisation of colonialism. 
As mentioned in the previous section, in the late 1870s, the British launched the Cave 
investigation. Bitter from the agreement between Isma’il and Disraeli, France decided to send 
its mission in Alexandria. In addition to their political and strategic rivalry, Britain and France’s 
diverging interests meant they had different views on how to solve the debt. Besides the debt 
also involved a complex network of actors that included financial groups and diplomats, which 
resulted in the creation of many concurring plans for its restructuration and repayment. The 
Egyptian debt crisis arrived on the heels of two other similar crises in Tunisia and the Ottoman 
Empire. In 1866-67, following its failure to make debt repayments, Tunisia had been put under 
France's financial tutelage. France led the negotiations, which established an international 
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economic commission in 1868. 40  In contrast, the Ottoman case entailed several sporadic 
attempts to develop mechanisms of financial control, but these repeatedly failed.41 Thus, the 
Tunisian and Ottoman cases were taken as a reference point for the Egyptian situation. France, 
for example, heavily drew from the Tunisian case to rethink the Egyptian position.  
The Cave‘s Report was written in March 1876 and explained the financial state of Egypt 
as follow: “[Egypt] suffers from the ignorance, dishonesty, waste and extravagance of the East, 
such as have brought her suzerain to the verge of ruin, and at the same time from the vast 
expense caused by hasty and inconsiderate endeavours to adopt the civilization of the West.”42 
Colonial powers thus thought that Egypt lacked the business of governing, which echoes the 
words of Balfour.43  The report recommended that Egypt pay-off its short-term loans and 
consolidate all its other debts into a stock of £75 million. French banking houses, which owned 
most of the floating debt, objected to Cave’s solution. Negotiations between the different 
creditors started but ended in deadlock.  At the same time, the Ottoman bankruptcy increasingly 
weighted on Egypt debt’s and on April 6, 1876, the payment of Egypt’s treasury bonds was 
suspended. The Khedive then issued two decrees. On May 2, 1876, at the instigation of a 
consortium of French banks, legislation established the Caisse de la Dette Publique, which was 
set up to represent the interest of Europeans creditors. It was directed by foreign commissioners 
nominated by their respective governments. To service the debt, they had the authority to take 
the revenues directly from local authorities.44 These included, amongst others, the provinces of 
Cairo and Alexandria and the salt and tobacco taxes. While the French, Italians and Austrian 
creditors agreed to the Caisse, British creditors and the British government refused to commit 
to it. On May 7, 1876, the second decree called for the unification of Egypt's total indebtedness, 
which amounted to £91 million. This further angered some creditors, and within weeks the 
enterprise failed. 
New negotiations then took place in London and Paris. These resulted in a new 
 
40 Jean Ganiage, Les origines du protectorat français en Tunisie 1861-1881, (Paris, PUF, 1959),  p. 338-
368. 
41  See Donald Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1929); Christopher Clay, Gold for The Sultan. Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance 
1856-1881 (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000); Edhem Eldem, ‘Ottoman Financial Integration with 
Europe: Foreign Loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman Public Debt’, European Review (2005/13), p. 
431-445. 
42 Cromer, Modern Egypt, p. 4. 
43 Said, Orientalism,p.46 
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investigative commission in summer 1876 led by G.J. Goschen and M. Joubert. Goschen was 
selected to represent the bondholders’ interests in Egypt. 45  Joubert represented French 
interests.46 Together they developed a plan known as the “Dual Control”. This time it was 
accepted by the Khedive and embodied in a decree dated November 18, 1876.47 This decree 
also maintained the Caisse de la Dette Publique. This time the Caisse’s Commission comprised 
a French, a British, an Italian and an Austrian representative. It had to assess the resources and 
the total debt of the Palace, evaluate the totality of the state’s revenues and draw a budget. 
To this end, a system known as General control was set up.48 Two general-controllers, 
one British and the other French, supervised the entire fiscal administration of the country. One 
was mostly responsible for expenditure and the other for the revenues. The State railways, 
Telegraphs, Alexandria Harbour, the port commission, and the Khedive’s private lands were 
brought under international boards' control to provide guaranteed revenues for service of the 
debt.49 The post-office was also placed under the superintendence of an English official. 50 In 
facts, revenues from the most productive provinces ended straight in the hands of the 
Commission. By 1877 more than 60 per cent of all Egyptian revenues went to service the 
national debt. 51  Despite the unification of the debt's capital, the total outstanding amount 
remained the same because of the floating debt. The Caisse also oversaw any changes in taxes 
and new loans. In fine, to compensate the creditors for their losses, the 1876 decrees 
hypothecated the revenues of the Egyptian state and the personal wealth of the Khedive. This 
meant a complete loss of fiscal sovereignty, which was the first step towards the Palace losing 
political authority. The creditors’ control established in Egypt in 1876 marked the beginning 
of direct international control of Egypt’s finances. Colonisation had arrived, albeit informally.  
Furthermore, the Caisse could sue the Egyptian government before the Mixed Court if 
it breached its repayment plan and any single member could personally sue the government in 
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the Mixed Courts. These had been established in September 1875 due to an agreement between 
the Khedive and the Great Powers. Under this scheme, foreigners were empowered to bring 
cases against the government, the administration and the estates of the Khedive as well as 
members of his family. The Commission agreed with Cave’s findings that the root of 
indebtedness stemmed from a lack of reasonable administration of the country’s money. It 
pointed as culprits the arbitrary tax system, the lack of a proper budget system, the unequal 
distribution of lands and water for irrigation, as well as the forced labour used for the Khedive’s 
private estates. The Commission’s findings implicitly established a causal link between fiscal 
reform and state reform. Its report thus called for establishing a constitutional government that 
included a British-headed Ministry of Finance and a French-headed Ministry of Public Works. 
This was an extension of the Controller System set up in 1876. Unbelievably, soon after its 
formation, the new cabinet attempted to raise a new loan. Under European supervision, in 1878, 
Egypt was allowed to borrow £8.5 million, which were secured with the Khedive’s personal 
properties.  As per the agreement, these became state property and were administered by an 
international commission comprised of a French, an English and an Egyptian national. These 
new regulations de facto excluded the Khedive from the administration of Egyptian finances. 
They also engineered a complete shift by putting at its head a European-led executive council. 
European creditors and their governments could now be sure that their interests would 
prevail since they had become the de facto yet informal Egypt rulers. The move fostered 
discontent across the country and strikes and petitions made the rounds. Within months, the 
Caisse and the Controle Général proved ineffective. Internal divisions between the actors 
meant that most of the measures passed were never applied. Besides, disagreements over the 
scope of the investigation remained. For the creditors, the failure of the investigation was 
caused by two factors. First, the commissioners disagreed on the investigation's scope, some 
claiming it was too brief and too superficial, others called for a longer one. Second, the 
investigators had to rely on local sources deemed unreliable because of their conflicting 
interests. Nonetheless, the commissioners now pointed to the despotism and absolutism of the 
Khedive as the source of Egypt’s debt problem. They argued that the Dairas had been acquired 
illegally and should be returned to the state. 52  The Khedive contested the Commission’s 
findings and argued that Egypt’s continued indebtedness was rooted in the miscalculation of 
the country’s financial resources. He also denounced that the investigative reports had never 
mentioned the contestable nature of much of the loans, the high-interest rates or the pressure 
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exercised to have repayments met.53    
 
In 1877, calls for yet another investigation first emerged in British financial and 
diplomatic circles. Amongst them was Evelyn Baring who was then Caisse commissioner. 
Eventually, both France and Egypt agreed on starting negotiations. This time talks took place 
in Paris, London and Cairo and involved a network of actors even more complex than the 
previous ones. These included the initial negotiators, their agents, the Egyptian government 
and its intermediaries in Europe, the Europeans governments and their consuls. The 
heterogeneity of the participants meant that divergences once again rapidly surfaced. The 
Caisse de la Dette requested to be actively involved in the investigation to represent European 
creditors' interests. The Khedive objected and considered it an attack on the last remnants of 
his sovereignty. 54 The Caisse won and its four commissioners, who had little knowledge about 
Egypt's internal affairs, were tasked with the new investigation.55 Charles Rivers Wilson from 
the British National Debt Office and Ferdinand de Lesseps, one of the leading promoters of the 
Suez Canal joined in.56  The Khedive had a consolation prize in Mustafâ Riyâd, the minister 
for commerce and agriculture and a close friend, who was included as a representative of 
Egypt.57  
The investigation went through two phases. Throughout the first one - April 1 until 
August 1878 - the Commission asked ministries to provide information about the organisation 
and attribution of their budget and list of the people in charge. It also requested Egyptian 
officials and government deputies to testify before it and to subpoena all records.58 Egyptian 
officials were offended as the requests openly confirmed their complete loss of sovereignty. 
The Commission also organised personal meetings with ministers and administration chiefs; 
some were conducted in French and required translators.59 The domination of the Commission 
by Europeans meant that highly ranked Egyptian officials did not want to share information 
with them.60 The Khedive’s royal proprieties were also investigated, but officials were equally 
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reluctant to help. This time the report known as the August report mentioned administrative 
disorder and confusion as a significant obstacle to understanding the roots of Egypt’s debt 
problem.61 From Winter 1878 until Avril 1879, the Commission entered its investigation phase. 
Throughout, European officials insisted they could not understand the Egyptian system of 
accountancy and therefore requested that France and Britain lead radical reforms. Lord Baring 
even proposed putting Wilson as the minister for Finance. In the end, the investigative 
Commission recommended a new accountancy budget, a new fiscal system as well as 
recommendations for a new judiciary system that would guarantee the protection of individual 
rights and individual property rights.62  
Most importantly, the report established a causal link between the financial system and 
the political system by arguing for a limitation of the Khedive and Egyptian officials' power as 
a pre-condition to resolving the debt crisis. It still blamed the source of Egypt’s indebtedness 
on the unreason and arbitrariness of its despot.63 In any case, the report failed to mention that 
the proposed reforms consolidated the expansion of the Commission's powers. Indeed, in 
European high-finance milieu,  it was an open secret that creditors ask governments to pass 
political reforms in their favour as a form of guarantee against their investments.64  At the same 
time,  colonial powers used the emphasis that the report’s recommendations put on individual 
and property rights to misrepresent their presence as helping set the foundations of a social 
contract between the state and its citizens.  
In the end, the Khedive accepted the Commission's conditions, including a cabinet 
containing Europeans. He appointed Nubar Pasha as prime minister and asked him to form a 
government.  Europeans cabinet members were paid high salaries, and they were many of them. 
Thirty British officers were appointed to the Land Survey Department alone. The Commission 
insisted on respecting the ministerial responsibility principle, so Isma’il delegated 
governmental responsibility to his cabinet. Disagreement over the root of Egypt indebtedness 
remained. The Khedive insisted that the Goschen-Joubert mission had vastly overestimated the 
state's revenues while European advisors still played the despot card. In 1878 Isma’il formed a 
new government that rejected the Commission’s arrangement. Negotiations started in 1879 
after the new government submitted a counterproposal known as the National Programme.65 
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The talks stopped after European advisers rebuked the proposal. European powers then pressed 
the Porte to oust Isma’il who Prince Tewfik replaced on June 26, 1879. With little legitimacy, 
Tawfik agreed to re-establish the General Control system first set-up in 1876. Following a 
decree issued on November 10, 1879, England and France were put back in charge of the 
administration. This time, they had the authority to investigate the public services of the state. 
Meanwhile,  Baring and De Blignières were appointed controller-generals. They represented 
the foreign bondholders, their respective governments and could investigate all the public 
services. They reinstated some of the reforms that had been suspended, adopted new fiscal 
reforms and repealed the law of Moukabala.  By January 1880, the Controller-Generals 
complained that Egypt could not meet its engagements and suggested the appointment of yet 
another Commission.  
The Commission of Liquidation was set up on May 31, 1880. It had one Commissioner 
named by France, one by Great Britain and one designated by Germany, Austria-Hungary and 
Italy. Only one delegate represented the Egyptian government. On July 17, the Law of 
Liquidation was established. It reinstated the previous dual system of administration. The 
members of the Commission were recognised as legal representatives of the foreign 
bondholders and still had the right to sue the government. Finally, the Porte, which was itself 
in default and was at war with Russia, still managed to weave itself into the situation. When it 
appointed Tewfik, the Sultan issued a decree that limited the right to contract loans without the 
Porte's approval and prohibited the Khedive from ceding territory. Egypt was now marginalised 
from both Europe and the Porte. The Law of Liquidation, combined with the dual control, the 
establishment of new tribunals  (Mixed Courts) and the Porte’s repeated decrees transformed 
Egypt into “the assignee in bankruptcy of Europe, with Great Britain and France as official 
trustee, and the Sultan as bailiff of the Court.”66  The Liquidation Law was the last straw for 
many in the Egyptian army. The controllers-general recommendation to dismiss large numbers 
of officers and further curtail state activities when so many European cabinet members were 
paid so highly provoked a wave of anger that took as form what would be known as the ‘Urabi 
movement.  
All in all, this section has argued that European powers used the debt problem to 
gradually dominate the Egyptian government. Indeed, the reports of the investigations 
repeatedly insisted there was a deficit in the Egyptian government's ability to reason its debt 
problem and blamed Egypt’s financial crisis on the Khedive's despotism. This, it was argued 
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helped misrepresent their intentions by pretending they wanted to protect the rights and 
interests of the Egyptian population. In other words, European powers portrayed their greater 
involvement as being motivated by their willingness to seek a greater good. Ultimately though, 
THE GOOD was ‘made’ dependent on the legal affirmation of the supremacy of their interests 
over the Egyptian population. Eventually, throughout this period, the law was turned from an 
emancipatory tool into a tool that foreclosed the possibilities of Egyptians being given the right 
to negotiate national sovereignty within a legal framework. 
 
 
THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME, THE ‘URABI REVOLT AND THE EGYPTIAN 
STRUGGLE OF THE LAW 
This section looks at the Egyptian struggle to legally negotiate national independence 
through the National Programme. It highlights how the foreclosure of its possible by colonial 
powers, led to the  ‘Urabi revolt. The increase presence, control and rights of European advisers 
and ex-pats in Egypt fermented anger across the country. This came as constitutional changes 
emerged across the region.  1861 had seen the birth of the first Tunisian constitution, and 
between 1876 and 1878 the Ottoman Empire had experimented with constitutional reforms.67  
In 1879, in Egypt, the Consultative Chamber became the primary centre of a constitutional and 
nationalist revindication that mostly focused on the links between the country's financial 
management and political representation.68 Between January and July 1879, the Assembly of 
delegates repeatedly met. Demands included more control over financial matters and the 
accountability of European ministers in front of the Assembly. This took place as a group of 
Egyptian army officers who opposed the mixed cabinet protested a measure that had just placed 
2,500 officers on half-pay. A group even marched and occupied the Ministry of Finance. 
European advisers accused the Khedive of orchestrating the protest. Whether he did or not, at 
that point, Isma’il had realised he could use anti-European feelings to his advantage to rid him 
of foreign control.69 This was not an easy bet given the fraught relationship that the Palace had 
with the army. Indeed, from 1823, a large number of peasants had been forcibly conscribed in 
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the military. Besides, Egyptians had only been allowed in the military as officers since an 1854 
decree that ordered the sons of village notables to join in. It allowed them to be trained and rise 
to the rank of colonel, but the top posts continued to be held by members of the Turco-
Circassian elite.70Ultimately, continued European pressure for more reforms and more control 
helped push Egyptian nationalists towards the Khedive.  
From March 1879, the announcement of the upcoming Liquidation plan furthered 
mobilisation. On March 2, members of the majlis shûrâ-al-nuwwâb organised a protest against 
the European cabinet. They were equally upset by Isma’il’s dissolution of the Assembly of 
Delegates, which they contested. They told the Khedive that they represented the nation and 
would not relinquish their mandate at his order, regardless of how influenced and pressured he 
was.71 About a hundred persons from various influential Egyptian groups formed and gathered 
regularly to discuss the situation between March and April. They included prominent figures 
from the state bureaucracy, indigenous notables known as dhawâts, large landowners known 
as a’yâns, merchants, and ‘Ulemas, army officers, state officials and religious dignitaries.72 
The leaders of the movement were the Dhawâts and the A’yâns. It is interesting that these two 
groups came together because non-Egyptian Dhawâts dominated senior government positions 
while provincial A’yâns dominated the majlis shûrâ-al-nuwwâb.73 The liquidation plan was 
especially threatening to the latter.  
A convention later known as the National Assembly (Jam‘iyya Watanniyya), was held 
on April 2, 1879.74  A programme called al-La’iha al-Watanniyya’ was adopted, signed and 
deposed to the Khedive.75 The document's preamble stresses the viability of the proposed 
counter plan76 The Programme rejected the Liquidation plan and insisted Egypt had covered its 
debt obligations. It also asserted the signatories' continued willingness to apply the stipulations 
they recommended, both in their personal capacity and as national representatives.77 By April 
5, the Khedive welcomed the move and rejected the Liquidation Plan. He confirmed his 
repudiation of absolute rule, embodied in an 1878 decree (the August rescript). This was 
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important because the National Programme demanded parliamentary reforms.78These include 
demands for a parliament based upon the European model and dotted with full legislative 
powers and authority over all internal and financial matters. This condition was at the centre 
of the counterplan but required intensive changes in the law. Thus, the Programme demanded 
the election of a new Majlis based on the existing Electoral law, followed by the revision of 
that law and other pertinent regulations by the Council of Ministers. It also asked the Council 
of Ministers to submit the new Majlis for ratification.79In a shrewd political move, Isma‘il 
summoned the European consuls and informed them he would act per the Programme.  
Furthermore, he pointed to the increased general dissatisfaction with European control. He also 
invited one of the National Programme leaders to form a government, and this new cabinet 
dismissed European ministers.80 It is in this context that in 1879, European powers requested 
the abdication of Isma’il who Tawfik replaced. The Assembly of the delegates was swiftly 
dissolved.  The National Programme was depicted as a Khedivial plot despite the soundness of 
the proposal.  
The overthrow of Ism’ail did not stop the rise of the national movement, which 
culminated in the ‘Urabi revolt. Following British informal annexation, protests against the 
Viceroy Tawfik were organised but suppressed. The push for independence picked up after 
Tawfik’s son, Abaas Hilmi II ascended to the throne. Months later, the National Assembly 
merged with an underground military organisation. A secret society of Egyptian army officers 
had come into existence in 1876. It included Colonel Ahmad ‘Urabi, and colonels Ali Fahmi 
and Abd al Al-Hilmi.  In the aftermath of the merger, the ‘Urabi-led group took Al Hizb al 
Watani al Ahli - the National Popular Party - as a name. Although it has been referred to as a 
political party, Urabi’s formation was more a nationalist faction than a party per se. The title 
mostly represented the members’ opposition to the foreign control of Egypt.81 One of the co-
founders was Jamal al-Afghani, and the group was made of heterogeneous elements, including 
a mix of Muslims, Christians, and Jewish civilians. A British poet Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, a 
friend of Mohammed Abduh, also helped draft the Hizb political Programme. The rise of a 
national subjectivity geared towards Egyptianizing the state is illustrated by the Urabi revolt’s 
slogan: Miṣr li'l Miṣriyyīn (Egypt to the Egyptians).  
In 1881, the nomination of an anti-Urabist minister of War prompted a mutiny which 
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led to the appointment of a more sympathetic minister. In 1882, after continued pressure, Urabi 
joined the government as undersecretary for War. Amidst all the chaos, a law was passed, 
which reinforced the delegates' representative and legislative roles. These developments 
alarmed France and Britain who sent a joint note declaring their support for Tawfik. After all 
diplomatic attempts had failed, the Egyptian group’s leadership shifted tactics. 82  A new 
Cabinet was formed with a dual goal: getting rid of European influence and overthrowing the 
Khedive. To break Urabi's power, the British and French demonstrated a joint show of naval 
strength. They issued a series of demands, including the government's resignation, the 
temporary exile of Urabi, and the internal exile of his two closest associates, Ali Fahmi and 
Abd al Al-Hilmi. As a result, violent riots broke out in Alexandria with considerable loss of 
life on both sides. During the summer, an international conference of European countries met 
in Istanbul, but no agreement was reached. The Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid boycotted the 
meeting and refused to send troops to Egypt. Eventually, Britain decided to act alone. The 
French withdrew their naval squadron from Alexandria, and in July 1882, the British fleet 
began bombarding Alexandria. This marked the beginning of the formal colonisation of Egypt 
by the British. One of their first act was to abolish most of the laws passed by the ‘Urabists, 
including measures that increased the legislative powers of assembly members and those that 
increased ministers’ accountability. 83  This section has illustrated how colonial powers 
repressed Egyptian attempts to negotiate the sovereignty of Egypt. The blocking off of 
Egyptian desire for independence eventually led to an armed revolt known as the ‘Urabi revolt, 
as the section has further argued. The revolt was met with totalising repression, which 
culminated in the British's illegitimate colonisation. The colonial simulation had moved from 
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THE MIXED COURTS AND ITS REPRODUCTION OF COLONIAL HIERARCHIES 
This section looks at the consolidation and reproduction of colonial hierarchies through 
the establishment of Mixed Courts. It argues that these courts' function was to protect the 
interests of capitalist Bourgeois and participated in the concretisation of their socio-economic 
supremacy. While the Mixed Courts were initially created to curb Europeans' capitulatory 
rights, they became a de facto tool of the landed bourgeoisie, whether European or Turco-
Circassians. The expanding totalisation of the colonial Symbolic on the peasants’ sense of 
reality further illustrates the repressive affect colonial laws produced on experience. Mixed 
Courts thus also explain the Oedipal enframing of THE LAW since they define a realm of 
transgression where the peasant is already guilty.84 
As pointed out, legal issues involving the Egyptian government and foreign nationals 
had increased with Egypt’s turn to modernisation. Some even used their national courts to try 
and sue the Egyptian government, but most foreign national courts acknowledged they lacked 
jurisdiction over such cases. The Solon C. Egyptian government case is one such illustration. 
On April 6, 1847, a person brought an individual claim for damages against the Egyptian 
government to the Seine Civil Tribunal. The ruling stated that the tribunal was “incompetent 
to take cognizance of that suit; that the garnishes attachment orders on certain articles in the 
hands of Mr. Mehemet Ali, belonging either to the Egyptian government or to Mr. Mehemet 
Ali, were null and void; and that according to the principles of international law French courts 
have no jurisdiction over foreign governments except, when the action involved real property 
possessed by them in France, to assume jurisdiction in the present case would involve an 
examination of administrative and government act, between a foreign government and an 
individual granted with a mission as an official of that government, for which the French court 
was without competence.”85 The incompetence of municipal courts to review actions brought 
against foreign states was an established principle of international law. By corollary, it 
stipulated that the properties of foreign states were not liable for seizure.86 
 Nonetheless, European nationals continued to use the law to uphold and protect their 
interests. These developments fed Isma’il’s calls for judicial reforms which helped him gain 
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popular favour. In 1866 he adopted the Organic law, (lâ’iha asâsiyya) that instituted the 
Consultative Chamber of the Delegate (majlis shûrâ-al-nuwwâb). From 1865, villages and 
professional organisations elected leaders to represent them in the Consultative Chamber. 
Communal Councils were also set-up.87 The Khedive presented the Chamber as integral to the 
modernisation processes. 88  However, the Chamber was used as a tool against the second 
international investigative Commission.  It was thus used as the tool for mobilisation against 
European governments' growing power in the cabinet.  
As the power struggle continued to rage, Isma'il fought to lead a judiciary reform to 
change capitulatory rights.89 France, Greece and Italy were vehemently opposed to the change 
while the USA and Great Britain supported the move. Most foreign residents from the 
Capitulatory Powers were against the move as it lessened their rights.90 In the 19th century, they 
enjoyed jurisdictional immunity from all courts but that of their country. They also had 
legislative immunity.91This had literally put foreigners beyond the reach of Egyptian law.92 It 
also gave them additional advantages over Egyptians. Like the artisans, Egyptian merchants 
had to pay a series of large and oppressive taxes from which foreign merchants were exempt. 
The capitulatory system allowed foreigners to become a powerful pressure group committed 
to defend and increase its interests93. Between 1867 and 1873, Isma’il ‘s push to lessen the 
rights of foreigners led to negotiations.94 In 1871 he explained: ‘By introducing judicial reform 
in Egypt, I give an example and render a very great service, to all those interested in the well-
being of the population.”95 The proposed reform cost a lot of money - over 2.5 million Gold 
Francs, but it was eventually embodied in the Mixed tribunal Charter.96  
These were inaugurated in 1875 with courts in Cairo, Alexandria, where the Court of 
Appeals was located, and Mansura. In 1876, the first cases were heard.  Their jurisdiction 
covered all legal suits between Egyptians and foreigners except those related to personal status 
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and family disputes. The courts also adjudicated cases involving land.97 Their legal code drew 
heavily from French law. In fact, the first penal code in Egypt was drafted for the Mixed Courts 
and was modelled on French law. 98  The penal code was enacted in 1883 after British 
occupation and was modelled on the Mixed Court Penal Code. Additionally, new national 
courts that handled litigation between citizens who did not fall under the Mixed Courts' 
jurisdiction were also set up.99 Their penal codes equally drew from French Law. The two 
systems of courts applied different sets of civil, criminal, commercial and procedural 
codes.100To complicate matters, these codes did not adhere to Shari’a Law, which had been 
prevalent under the Ottoman Empire.101 By the end of the 19th century, the judicial system was 
composed of mixed codes applied by the Mixed Courts; national laws applied by the national 
courts, Islamic Shari’a Law applied by Shari’a courts and religious rules based on the litigants’ 
religion applied by the different religious courts. 102  This plethora of courts, laws and 
regulations led to many conflicts of jurisdiction and legalised inequalities and hierarchies based 
on nationalities and religions.  
Although in theory, only foreigners from Capitulatory powers should have been able to 
access the courts, the Mixed tribunals opened them to all foreigners.103 The mixed courts were 
also used by Egyptians, mostly the Turco-Circassian Bourgeoisie who had some knowledge of 
European languages. The courts used European languages and applied European laws to land 
disputes involving Europeans, meaning peasants could not understand the proceedings. The 
creditors could now quickly foreclose on loans by taking the peasants’ lands, even if slightly 
in arrears.104 The courts thus primarily served the interests of foreigners.105 The unfairness of 
these tribunals made the peasants feel like strangers in their own country.106 The Mixed Courts 
were set to have a 5-year lifespan but remained opened until 1949.107 By 1930 there were 70 
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judges, two-thirds being drawn from foreign powers.108  At that point, the baroque patchwork 
of laws meant that traditional rules and regulations had been pushed to the margins. The Mixed 
Courts further illustrate how the law was used as a colonial instrument. In so doing, it 
participated in the expansion of colonial capitalism. The Courts also helped consolidate and 
reproduce the superiority of the foreign landed bourgeoisie while expropriating the peasants. 
Within a century, most of them had become landless. Additionally, the Oedipal enfaming of 
the law can be seen in the Mixed Courts ascription of the peasants as a priori guilty subjects, 
who were punished into giving their land to the bourgeoisie. Thus, the Mixed Court illustrates 
the disciplinary power of modern law: a good subject is a subject that meets the requirements 
of capitalist desire.  
 
 
THE LANDLESS PEASANT: MODERNITY AND ITS PRODUCTION OF THE ABSURD 
This second section outlines how colonial laws foreclosed the peasants’ sense of reality 
as it disciplined them into the reality of the Simulation. It does so by looking at how widespread 
foreclosure of peasant lands made the majority of the Egyptian peasantry landless. This section 
argues that the foreclosure of their previous sense of real by capitalism meant that modernity 
expressed itself as the affirmation of two senses. On the one hand, it appeared to open the door 
to all the possible yet, on the other, it concretises itself a series of time where the colonised is 
always guilty. This paradox, the section further argues, is the paradox of the absurd: a reality 
totalised by the colonial symbolic and where the real is deprived of the possibility of 
signification. In the 19th century, Egypt’s socio-economic situation wholly transformed. The 
country's entrance in the capitalist economy was concomitant with its structural placement as 
a periphery economy.  It exported raw materials to Europe but became dependent on the 
importation of European manufactured goods. 109  These developments added a class of 
medium-sized landowners of Egyptian origin to the Turco-Circassian landed elite. Meanwhile, 
due to the debt problem, many peasants became landless and left for the cities where they 
mostly remained unemployed.110 Modernisation had also been coalescent with imperialist, 
expansionist ambitions and to conquer the Sudan Mohammed Ali had relied on mass 
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conscriptions. To some, resisting meant leaving their villages or even maiming themselves, but 
others chose to revolt. 111Another source of popular discontent was the rigidification of social 
hierarchies. For example, Mohammed Ali pressured the village Shaykhs to tighten their hold 
on peasants who owned taxes.112 While peasants became poorer, village Sheikhs grew stronger, 
expanding their properties and thus revenues. They promised that lands from runaway peasants 
would be redistributed amongst the remaining villagers, but redistribution rarely 
happened.113As their financial influence grew, Shaykhs became more and more coercive. They 
forced peasants into corvee labour, took their cattle and machines without paying rent for them, 
hired seasonal labourers without paying them, and employed camel drivers to transport crops 
without paying them.114 
In 1858, Mohammed Ali’s son, Sa’id, had passed a series of laws that changed the 
peasants’ holdings into private properties. The shift to proprietor favoured Europeans and the 
Turco-Circassian elite who had the money to buy the peasants’ lands. The law meant peasants 
could now buy their lands, but most lacked the money to do so, meaning they either sold or 
mortgaged it.115 More reforms targeting rural areas came under Isma’il including abolishing 
forced labour for peasants who worked for the nobility. These policies were designed to end 
the feudal system by transforming farmers into landowners or workers. Still, unfortunately, 
they were only sporadically applied, and wages were rarely paid. Ironically, it is a law aimed 
at increasing the peasant’s rights that facilitated the greater penetration and domination of 
foreign capital in the agriculture sector.116 
Those measures also had unintended effects that would play an essential part in shaping 
the country's future. By anchoring the peasants' status in law, they increased both their political 
involvement, demands and expectations. For a very long time, their grievances had only 
seldomly been acknowledged by the state. They had hoped that their inscription as autonomous 
agents in law would be game-changing. Unfortunately, Egypt’s debt crisis only heightened the 
dichotomy between their new legal status and the reality of their lived experience. The 
American civil war and the resulting cotton boom had been incredibly beneficial to the 
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Egyptian-Ottoman nobility and the village notables.117 It made land more valuable, but because 
Europeans and Turco-Circassians paid lower taxes than Egyptian peasants, they could buy 
larger estates. By the early 1870s, the nobility acquired large amounts of arable land from small 
peasants, often under questionable circumstances.118 As a result, a new agricultural middle 
class emerged, which did not seem dependent on its own labour for livelihood.119 Moreover, 
state policies meant that the boost benefitted certain areas more than others. Cotton production 
was primarily increased in the Nile Delta while Upper Egypt was neglected. The area was 
already suffering from a slump in wheat demands following the industrial revolution in the 
West.120 Besides, the end of the American civil war was also followed by a contraction of the 
Egyptian economy. This only furthered the peasant crisis and Egypt had to face its most serious 
peasant indebtedness problem with all the consequences it implied: mortgages, foreclosure, 
and usurious loans.121  
Between 1860 and 1870, taxes were repeatedly increased. 122Many small peasants 
resorted to selling their crops to usurers who advanced them money for equipment and seeds. 
Unfortunately, the mix of high taxes and prices inflation meant most struggled to make their 
repayments. Instead, they sold their lands to the large landholders.123 Spiralling economic 
hardships bred discontent and waves of revolts and acts of civil disobedience emerged in 
several provinces, prompting a special decree by the Supreme Court.124  Peasants felt slighted 
by their new dealings. Many who were forced to sell their lands refused to vacate them; others 
refused to pay their rent. 125 Some fellahin also blocked irrigation water from large landowners' 
estates and attacked state-owned factories. Armed falatiyya gangs (armed bandits) resorted to 
raiding the houses of village Shaykhs. They also attacked government bureaucrats.126 The 
cabinet responded by shooting them. Rural workers in the sulphur and coal mines were also 
angry at their working conditions which caused high mortality rates.127 Discontent rapidly 
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spread and in 1864, for example, a peasant revolt erupted in Qina province, Upper Egypt.128 
Peasant demands focused on calls for equal land division, leading an English woman who 
witnessed it to compare it to a Bolshevik rebellion.129  In an attempt to bridge the growing social 
hierarchisation peasants also harnessed the petitions system. 
 
Meanwhile, in urban areas, a small working-class had emerged.130 Only a small number 
was employed in building and transport jobs or in the few factories that remained open. Those 
who worked complained about their treatment and low wages. Besides, they faced stiff 
competition from the Mutamassirun and Europeans who were then still protected by the 
capitulatory system.131  The 19th century saw an essential growth in the influx of European ex-
pats. In 1838 they were 10,000, but by 1881 they numbered 90,000. 132  Clashes between 
Egyptians and foreign workers recurrently took place. Egyptian workers felt abused and 
denigrated by the state.133 Peasants and workers were not the only one affected by the influx 
of ex-pats. Other such groups included merchants, artisans and intellectuals.134 A growth of 
more radical leftist ideas soon surfaced across various strata of the population.  Calls for an 
equal and classless society multiplied.  
Following repeated clashes in rural and urban areas, Isma’il launched reforms in the 
police and army forces, increasing the number of high-ranked officers. 135  The police 
concomitantly increasingly targeted ordinary Egyptians workers, often at the demand of 
Europeans employers.136 As the policing expanded so did the violence of its methods and 
punishments never seemed to stop. Egyptian farmers were significantly affected by the steady 
and substantial tax increases. In 1878-9 several protests were organised to denounce over-
taxation even during drought.137  For ordinary Egyptians, the benefits of modernity had hardly 
materialised. The substantial inflow of capital and the cotton boom, coupled with the growth 
of the bureaucracy and the army had created inflation. 138  Rapid population fed the price 
 
128 For a full account of the revolt see Ibid., p.95 
129 Ibid., p.95 
130 El-Din, A Military History of Modern Egypt, p.28. 
131 The word Moutamassirun is used to refer to Syrian Christians, Greeks, Italian, Jews and Armenians 
132 Ibid., , p.28 
133 Abul-Magd, Imagined Empires, p.95 
134 Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East, pp. 66-69.  
135 Ibid., p.66 
136 Ibid., p.66 
137 Ibid., p.66 
138 Ibid., p.66 
 111 
increase of urban housing, services, and food139. The army proved a powerful tool in crushing 
protests, but by the late 1870s, the government was slowly losing its grip.140 As we will see in 
the next section, things continued to worsen with the country's formal colonisation.  
The Dinshaway incident, which happened less than ten years after the British took 
control, is a telling illustration of the violent repression that peasants suffered.  In 1906 a group 
of British officers hunted for sport pigeons that were the collective source of livelihood of a 
village. Villagers complained, a scuffle broke out and officially, an officer’s gun ‘was fired’. 
The bullet wounded the wife of a religious leader which further escalated the confrontation. A 
British soldier who escaped the scene ran back to his camp but collapsed outside, ultimately 
dying of heatstroke. A villager who saw him collapse came to assist him as other soldiers 
arrived at the scene. They saw an Egyptian by the body of their dead colleague and immediately 
assumed the villager was guilty. They killed him on the spot, beating him up to death. Another 
Khaled Saeed….The British authorities then accused the villagers of premeditated murder and 
set up a special tribunal to try them for the British officer's death. Ahmad Lufti al-Sayyid, an 
Egyptian lawyer and national political figure was part of the defence team, but it was in vain; 
fifty-two villagers were found guilty. They were either flogged and executed publicly in the 
village or imprisoned for years. This incident traumatised Egyptians and helped galvanise the 
anti-colonial struggle. In the colonial simulation, their punishment was the concretisation of 
the Good of colonial law. It is then this new sense of reality that the colonial struggle rejected. 
The trauma of Dinshaway activated a collective encounter with the paradoxical reality of the 
simulation. The symbolic colonial was suffocating the peasants’ sensing of a real and replacing 
it with a totalising simulation where their possible became reduced to a capitalist 
Oedipalisation. Modernity presented itself as the potential becoming of all possibles but in-
itself, it actualised itself as the becoming guilty by default of Egyptians. The colonial 
totalisation of experience as an absurd, as a real that is deprived of signification, exposed 
modernity as a simulacrum/Simulation. 
 
 
THE ILLIBERALISM OF THE LIBERAL ERA: THE NON-SENSE OF THE COLONIAL 
LOGIC 
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This section looks at the absurd of colonial reality through the illiberalism of what is 
thought of as the ‘Liberal era’ of Egypt. Colonial political laws, it argues, can be taken as 
another example of the ways in which the function of colonial law is to produce a political 
experience totalised by the colonial Symbolic. This experience is marked by the foreclosure of 
the possibilities of giving the peasantry a role that would affect the modern regime of political 
representation. By excluding most Egyptians from this process, the repressive affect of colonial 
law continued to dominate the political, the section concludes. 
Generalised discontent, harsh repression, mass dispossession, and under-
representations of most of society's sectors in the government and legislative chambers 
ultimately led to the 1919-22 revolution. Trade unions, peasants, workers and women all played 
a role in the uprising.141 Between March and April 1919, following the arrest of four Wafdist 
leaders, including Saad Zaghloul, one of the most significant peasant revolts in the country 
took place.142 While the arrest of Zaghloul certainly played a role in the revolt, the uprising 
cannot be reduced to this. By 1918, the regular consumption of cereals and pulses had fallen to 
80 per cent of the pre-WWI average.143 During the war, the Supplies Control Board meant the 
British requisitioned food and animal which they bought at fixed prices to export them to the 
Allies. Besides, the Cotton commission purchased all the cotton crops and closed the 
Alexandria bourse.144. By 1918, food and oil were scarce in cities and the countryside.145 The 
British had offered wage employments in the Labour Corps but resorted to forcibly recruiting 
farmers when they ran out volunteers 146 . Besides, as already explained, peasants were 
increasingly marginalised from having rights. The state also had increased repression against 
them, and they had no institutions to turn to. This was happening as European powers continued 
to insist on their goodwill. In other words, reality had become so alienating it was untenable.  
When the revolt erupted, peasants cut communications and rail lines, isolating the 
capital for several weeks. By doing so, they prevented goods and men from leaving. The British 
propaganda once again called it a Bolshevik insurrection. 147 Trade unions also played an 
important role. By the mid-1900, they mobilized large numbers of urban workers. For example, 
in 1908 and 1911, the Cairo Tramway Company workers went on strike, complaining about 
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constant abuse by foreign managers and inspectors.148 The Wafd supported the strike and 
realising the mobilising potency of unions shifted its focus to urban workers and artisans.149 
Soon workers made-up a critical part of the party’s urban social base. Once in power, the Wafd 
engineered a further rapprochement with the unions, in a bid to sustain its urban support.150 
The party had tried to strengthen its patronage of unions, but it severely repressed their actions 
once in power. In 1923, tramway workers attempted to organise a strike, but were arrested and 
charged with violating public order and insulting the prime Minister, Saa’d Zaghloul.   
 
Despite great hopes, the granting of conditional independence in 1922 did little to 
improve the lower classes’ political participation. In 1923, a new constitution was proclaimed, 
the principle of popular sovereignty was adopted; a two-tier parliament was created, and 
elections were held.151 The introduction of political pluralism meant that political parties were 
formed while a growing press was relatively free.152 Despite all these structural changes, the 
monarchy retained disproportionate powers, which ultimately curtailed democratic 
developments153. While landless peasants and urban workers had been a prominent feature of 
the Wafd populist-nationalist rhetoric before it acceded to power, they remained excluded from 
the political process after the revolution. The 1930 constitution is a case point: it worked against 
the enfranchisement of the people. To be eligible, voters were required to own a specific 
amount of money (Art.81). 154  The peasants were economically invisible in the Imperial 
rhetoric, and now the (semi)-Liberal political system had inscribed their political invisibility 
constitutionally. Moreover, by ensuring that the monarchy retained control over the country's 
political apparatus, the British were able to continue their proxy-governing. The liberalisation 
of the political sphere remained a simulacrum, and the Palace retained its right to ban political 
parties. Once in government, the Wafd worked with the British and the Palace. Their alliance 
meant they were able to prevent other popular political parties from gaining power.155 For 
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example, in the 1920s, the Wafd annihilated the Communist Party of Egypt. Although 
communist parties did not have many members, their ideals and calls for greater equality 
echoed popular demands.  In 1921, the Communist-led Confederation Générale du Travail was 
formed in Alexandria, and in 1924 it led a series of strike and sit-ins that the government 
heavily repressed.  
Meanwhile, religious authorities supported the Wafdist government and also worked 
with the British. Thus in 1919 following British prompts, the Grand Mufti of Egypt issued a 
fatwa against Bolshevism. It declared communism haram because it instigated ‘the lower 
classes against all systems founded upon reasons, moral, and virtue.” 156  By the 1930s, 
communist parties in Egypt had been decimated. This curtailed for a while their influence on 
the labour movement and the unions. Other banned groups included the Muslim Brotherhood 
and Young Egypt. Ironically, the ‘liberalisation’ of the political sphere did little to increase 
popular representation. While much of the nationalist rhetoric highlighted women, peasants 
and workers, their rights remained nominal. The ‘Liberal era’ as it is often called in the 
literature remained patriarchal and dominated by the middle-class. Indeed, no land or industrial 
minimum wage reforms were passed, and women were still barred from voting. Moreover, 
while landowners dominated the Wafd, the Liberal Constitutionalists and the Sa’adist party, 
the peasantry was not organised in political parties or social movements. The Socialist Peasant 
Party was established in 1938 but had a marginal political following. The Wafd had robust 
rural support but never articulated in praxis its pro-peasant narrative.  
This section has argued that throughout the ‘Liberal’ era,  the Oedipal function of 
colonial law reified the conditions for the continued reproduction of the colonial social 
structure. It did so by partitioning the political sphere into a spectrum that reproduces the 
capitalist production of modern socio-political classes. Indeed, this experience is marked by 
the foreclosure of the possibilities of giving the peasantry a role that would affect the modern 
regime of political representation. In contrast, it affirmed the economic and political supremacy 
of the landed bourgeoisie and co-coaptated the rising nascent Egyptian bourgeoisie. It also co-
opted the nascent petty bourgeoisie by providing employment opportunities within the state 
and its instructions. The alliance of these three social layers and their active participation in the 
state's affairs gave the illusion that independence was around the corner. Modernity promised 
the becoming modern of Egypt, but this becoming modern started to sense every day more and 
more like a distorted image or mirage for most of the population. Nonetheless, the legal 
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underpinning of the absurd as the modus operendi of the modern Simulation announced the 






The first moment of this chapter has highlighted the paradoxical nature of colonial 
knowledge. It produces an absurd reality where the real is deprived of the possibility of 
signification. In Plunderland, reality is what capitalism makes of it; it obeys capitalist laws and 
totalises individuals’ sense of self and reality. As we have seen, European colonial powers 
imputed Egypt’s indebtedness on the sole responsibility of the Palace and the inability of the 
Khedive and his government to come up with a model of labour production and taxes collection 
that would ensure a stable and continued flow of capital to the state.  They refused to 
acknowledge the effect and affect that the laws of deregulated liberalism had on reality. Instead, 
they used the debt problem to gain more significant political sway and continued to foreclose 
the possibilities of Egyptians being given the right to negotiate national sovereignty. Their 
refusal of the National Programme illustrated this. As we have seen, this blocking off of 
Egyptian desire for independence/liberation eventually led to the ‘Urabi revolt. Once again, 
colonial powers foreclosed the possibility of independence by bombarding Egypt and formally 
occupying the country.  
The second moment of the chapter has highlighted how colonial law further concretised 
Egypt's colonial becoming by foreclosing the possibles that did not fit the requirements of 
capitalist desire. We can now say that the colonial simulation fixes its series of times but 
forecloses the series of times that do not fit its temporal sequencing of space. The first section 
outlined how, with the Mixed Courts, laws were used as a colonial instrument to expand 
colonial capitalism. The Courts helped consolidate and reproduce the superiority of the foreign 
landed bourgeoisie while dispossessing the peasants. The Oedipalisation of peasants coequally 
helps illustrate modern law's disciplinary power: a good subject is a subject that meets the 
requirements of capitalist desire. 
Moreover, we have seen how the trauma of Dinshaway activated a collective encounter 
with the paradoxical logic of the reality of the simulation. The Symbolic colonial was 
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suffocating the peasants’ sense of real and replacing it with a totalising simulation where their 
possible became reduced to a capitalist Oedipalisation. They were guilty even when they were 
trying to save a life. The colonial totalisation of experience as an absurd, as a ‘real’ deprived 
of signification, exposed modernity as a Simulation, this section has argued. Finally, we have 
seen how despite Egyptian pushes against the suffocation of the colonial simulation, the 
‘Liberal’ era of Egypt solidified the conditions for the continued reproduction of the colonial 
social structure by partitioning the political sphere into a spectrum that reproduces the capitalist 
production of modern socio-political classes. It affirmed the economic and political supremacy 
of the landed bourgeoisie, the co-coaptation of the rising nascent Egyptian bourgeoisie and the 
nascent petty bourgeoisie. In doing so, it had produced a social bloc that had internalised the 
absurd of modernity as the given of reality. As we will see in the next chapter, Nasser’s Arab 
Socialism reproduces the semiotic slip that characterises colonial semiosis and its world of 
simulacra. Nasserism appears as a world of all possibles yet concretised itself by foreclosing 
the reals that did not fit its laws, it will be argued. 
 
This chapter concludes from its analysis that the laws that structure the process of 
modern semiosis can be described as following a paranoid logic of enfolding.  In Les Ecrits, 
Lacan wrote: 
 
“I have myself shown in the social dialectic that structures human knowledge as 
paranoiac why human knowledge has greater autonomy than animal knowledge in relation to 
the field of force of desire, but also why human knowledge is determined in that ‘little reality’ 
(ce peu de réalité), which the Surrealists, in their restless way, saw as its limitation.”157 
 
In Chapter One, the model of the Mirror Stage exposed the phantasmatic quality of 
knowledge. The subjective production of knowledge as an Object a of thought reveals the 
simulation: thought cognises Symbolic Objects a (Ideal-Is)  produced by the Symbolic as the 
‘Real’. In this structure, the only Real is the ‘real’ produced by the Symbolic, the simulation. 
In Simulacra and Simulation, Baudrillard described postmodernity as a ‘real’ where images 
precede reality.158 Reality is turned into a procession of images in which the real is deprived of 
the possibility of signification; it slips beneath the images. This phantasmatic production of a 
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Symbolic ‘real’ also unfolds as an affective relationship. It fetishizes its ‘real’: the simulation 
unfolds as a successive series of ‘phantasms’ or ‘times’ that foreclose the series of times that 
are not compossible with its series. This oscillation between processes of fixation and 
foreclosure exposes a paranoid structure. In the words of Lacan: 
 
“The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to 
anticipation – and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial 
identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a 
form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic – and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of 
an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental 
development. Thus, to break out of the circle of the Innenwelt into the Umwelt generates the 
inexhaustible quadrature of the ego’s verifications.”159  
 
Here, we can draw a parallel between the “quadrature of the ego’s verifications” and 
the quadruple roots of representation: the identical, the similar, the analogous, the opposed.160 
The Subject of representation is a paranoid Subject who forecloses the Real and takes up the 
Symbolic as its Object of desire. The paranoid structure is uncovered by the Symbolic 
metonymy that enfolds the Subject: thought can only think the Real by bringing it to the 
principle of Identity. It thinks it through the dimensions of the identical, the same, the 
analogous or the opposed. The Real falls beneath signification, but its affect still haunts the 
Simulation, hence its foreclosure of the series of times that do not fit its temporal sequencing 
of space. As Jacques-Alain Miller notes: 
 
“As for Lacanian epistemology, it marks, in our opinion, the position of psychoanalysis 
in the epistemological break, insofar as through the Freudian field the foreclosed subject of 
science returns to the impossible of its discourse. There is therefore only one ideology of which 
Lacan theorizes: that of the “modern self”, that is to say of the paranoid subject of scientific 
civilization, of which misguided psychology theorizes the imaginary, in the service of free 
enterprise. ” 161 
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This chapter has highlighted how as a fold of Modernity, the colonial simulation 
foreclosed the series of time  - or possibles - that were not compossible with its Symbolic. 
Drawing from Lacan,  it concludes that its laws of fixation – it fixes its series of time as the 
‘real’ and of foreclosure – it forecloses the series or times that are not included in its simulation- 
highlight the paranoid structure of modern semiosis. As in a paranoid structure, the possibility 
of the real is foreclosed and replaced with a Symbolic Simulation and its successions of 
simulacra or phantasms. This uncovers that the social dialectic that produces human 
knowledge, that is, its foreclosure of the Real as a non-Symbolic is not the result of a dialectics 
between the Real and the Symbolic, but rather as Deleuze and Guattari have explained, a 
copulation between the Signifier and its Signifieds.162  The simulation simulates that Real as 
an Other, it thinks it as its opposition: it excludes it from its Symbolic. This antagonistic 
construction of a Real-Symbolic dialectics is an artifice of the simulation. Thought has never 
been able to think the Real because The Real is not in-itself external to thought. Thus, while 
Baudrillard saw the foreclosure of the Real as a postmodern phenomenon, in line with Deleuze 
and Guattari, this thesis conceives it as a phenomenon of civilisational semiosis. Fanon and 
Deleuze and Guattari, along with many others, have already denounced the pathological 
character of modernity. Deleuze and Guattari have especially emphasised the pathological 
quality of civilisational semiosis/subjectivity as its historical unfolding and enfolding. This 
thesis's remaining chapters will further outline how postcolonial semiosis reproduces a similar 
pathologisation of our relationship to the Real. This paranoid structure, it will be argued, 
produced what Fanon called pathologies of freedom. This pathologisation of liberation as a 
desiring-production continues to suffocate modern and postcolonial experience. In fact, as 
reality becomes every day more Kafkian, the words of Gilles Deleuze echo with greater 
intensity:  
 
“There is not the slightest operation, the slightest industrial or financial mechanism 
which does not reveal the insanity of the capitalist machine and the pathological character of 
its rationality {not at all a false rationality, but a real rationality of this pathology, of this 
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madness, because the machine really works, stay certain of that}. There is no danger that this 
machine will go mad, it has been mad from the start and it is from this madness that its 
rationality comes.”163
 









Colonial reality produces a pathologising of the real. It fetishizes our relationship with 
the Real by misrepresenting the Symbolic and its world of Objects as the origin of concrete 
reality. By misrepresenting the Real through the Symbolic Order's phantasmatic quality, the 
colonial Symbolic connects to our intrinsic desire to invest the social and perverts it into 
misrecognizing experience as a virtual Symbolic that mirrors concrete reality. It is then by 
acting as a drive that the Symbolic takes up an affective modality. It misrepresents affects as 
qualities of the Symbolic. Consequently, as we have seen, subjects can experience a sense of 
freedom or agency by identifying with the signifiers or Ideal-Is that the symbolic projects. In 
this case, Identification boosts the Subject's sense of selfhood; it acts as a narcissist affect. On 
the other hand, subjects can also experience Identification with these Ideal-Is as a castration of 
their sense of freedom or agency. Frantz Fanon has shown how Identification with the colonial 
Symbolic can be experienced as a dissolving of the sense of selfhood in the Subject. In this 
case, the process of Identification is marked by repression: the Subject represses the 
violence/castration experienced during Identification processes so as to continue to strive to 
identify with the colonial symbolic. In Black Skin White Masks, Fanon exposes how the 
colonized who identify with colonial Ideal-Is compensate their own repression by 
acting/projecting their power of repression on other colonized. 1  This implies an affective 
detachment/disassociation from the experience of colonization so as to rationalize its violence. 
Fanon vividly recounts being nauseated in instances when, in Paris, he met black people who 
thought of black people as the concrete representation of their colonial signifieds.2 Nausea 
became more potent as he realized, he had also been tricked into this same Simulation when 
 
1 Fanon, Black Skin White Masks, p.144, p.59,  
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he lived in Martinique. 
 
In fact, colonial reality can be so violent; it can take the Subject beyond representation. 
It can cause foreclosure. As we have seen in the previous chapter, foreclosure produces a slip 
in the semiotic process. The meaning of the Signifier is not fixed by the signified that the 
Symbolic has produced for it. Instead, it is replaced by a Signified that the Subject produces as 
a phantasm of the 'original' simulacrum. The Subject thus mediates the 'reality' of the 
Simulation through their own Symbolic assemblages or phantasms. It is in doing so that the 
Subject can re-experience a sense of selfhood, freedom and agency. In other words, when what 
is symbolically given or represented as 'the real' of a Signifier is thought as its simulacra, the 
semiotic process produces a pathologizing of our relationship to reality: the 'real' produced by 
the Symbolic is re-interpreted as its simulacra. Fanon called this the production of pathologies 
of freedom. He drew the concept from Ey who had drawn from the works of Günther Anders.3 
Colonial reality, he argued, produces mental illness as a pathology of freedom.4 The colonized 
could lose themselves in the worlds of phantasms of the Simulation. The precessions of 
simulacra produced reality as a series of phantasms that did not operate by the laws of the 
Simulation. In this case, the Subject loses its agency because it cannot use the colonial 
Symbolic to 'make' sense of the 'real' of the colonial Simulation. In his resignation letter Fanon 
writes:  
 
“La folie est l’un des moyen qu’a l’homme de perdre sa liberte”,  
which translates as  
“ Madness is one of the ways that humans have of losing their freedom”5 
 
The colonial Simulation can produce a loss of agency so deep that the Subject speaks 
it as an experience of madness. Later, Fanon expanded his vision of mental illness in general 
as a  pathology of freedom: 
  
"In any phenomenology in which the major alterations of consciousness are left aside, 
mental illness is presented as a veritable pathology of freedom. Illness situates the patient in a 
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world in which his or her freedom, will and desires are constantly broken by obsessions, 
inhibitions, countermands, anxieties."6 
 
From Fanon, we can draw that the colonial Simulation enfolds its Subject, thereby 
capturing their desire in the "obsessions, inhibitions, countermands and anxieties" of its 
Symbolic. This chapter argues that as a fold of the colonial Simulation, postcolonial thought is 
coequally captured in "the obsessions, inhibitions, countermands and anxieties" of the colonial 
Symbolic. This, it argues, is illustrated by the ways in which the paranoid structure of modern 
semiosis produces a pathologisation of the politics of liberation. The Nasserist state will be 
used as an agent of this pathologisation. Indeed, the present chapter, along with the two 
chapters that follow,  argue that the postcolonial Symbolic as articulated by Nasserist and 
Qutbist thoughts, both reproduce colonial semiosis and their Symbolic totalization of 
experience. In particular, the present chapter focuses on Nasserism's attempt to recode the 
postcolonial as a new sense of reality by using the state as an agent of recoding of national 
subjectivity. In doing so, the chapter argues, Nasser, reproduced the colonial Oedipalisation 
and its production of a two-sense reality. On the one hand, Nasserism presented itself as a 
world/Symbolic of liberation that opened up reality to all the series of time yet on the other; it 
used the state to foreclose all the series of time that did not fit its sequencing of space. Finally, 
given the state's Oedipal function, this chapter asks: how can the state be conceived as an agent 
of the Revolution? As the chapter argues, the Nasserist state is best conceptualized as a 
machine-of-capture of revolutionary desire. It reproduces the colonial pathologisation of the 
politics of liberation and its paranoid semiotic structure. 
The chapter is divided into two moments. The Fist moment looks at the processes of 
subjectivation and alienation of desire that set the scene for the postcolonial state's 
Oedipalisation of social relations.  Its first section examines the rise of political organizations 
that took up fascist tendencies in the 1930s. It argues their rise resulted from the totalitarian 
latency of the colonial state and its suppression of the masses' desire to invest the socio-political 
space in the 'liberal era.' The second section argues that in the 1950s, the Free Officers' 
dissolution of the political scene illustrates their reproduction of the colonial state's Oedipal 
desire. The Oedipalisation of relations through which the state articulated itself is further 
exemplified by subjectivization processes that assigned roles and places that redefined the 
citizens' identity in correlations with the state's desire. The second moment of the chapter sets 
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the scene for Chapter Four by illustrating how the state came to dominate the production of 
national subjectivity, thereby acting as the nodal Signifier or LAW of reality. To this end, its 
first section illustrates how social subjectivation was fed by the state's domination of the press. 
The second section examines the state's increasing grip on the religious sphere, and the final 
section turns its attention to the judicial sphere.  
 
1 CONTINUITIES IN DISCONTINUITIES: THE COLONIAL AND 
POSTCOLONIAL SUPPRESSION OF DESIRE 
 
This moment of the chapter illustrates the processes of subjectivation and alienation of 
desire that set the scene for the postcolonial state's Oedipalisation of social relations.  As 
already stated in the introduction, "Oedipalisation" can be defined as a contemporary form of 
social repression/ that reduces the forms desire takes... to those that sustain the social formation 
of capitalism".7 For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is not constructed around a lack but is instead 
apprehended as a productive, assembling force that flows in the socius. Desire is best 
understood as a desiring-production, which itself can be seen as Deleuze and Guattari's 
materialist re-conception of the Freudian id or libido: "Drives are simply the desiring-machines 
themselves".8 Accordingly, desire cannot be reduced to being an expression of the libido; it is 
first and foremost the creation of new possibilities of/in becoming. In their conception, desire 
establishes points of contact with immediate experience since it naturally flows in the socius. 
Oedipalisation occurs when desiring-production is "blocked off", and either suppressed or re-
engineered into a capitalist and/or state desire, thereby curtailing our very desiring-production 
by turning it into the Object of a Big Other.  
 
 
POSTCOLONIALISM AND ITS PRODUCTION OF EMANCIPATION AS 
OEDIPALISATION  
This section looks at the two decades preceding the rise of the Free officers and Gamal 
 
7 Tamsin Lorraine, ‘Oedipalisation’, in Adrian Parr, (ed.), The Deleuze Dictionary, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2005), pp. 189–191. 
8 Deleuze, Guattari, Anti Oedipus,  p.35 
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Abdel Nasser. It looks at processes of subjectivation and alienation of desire that set the scene 
for the postcolonial state's Oedipalisation of social relations. To this end, it presents the gradual 
fragmentation of national subjectivity illustrated by the growth of unofficial political parties. 
It argues that the rise of political organizations that took up fascist tendencies resulted from the 
totalitarian latency of the colonial state and its suppression of the masses' desire to invest the 
socio-political space in the 'liberal era'. To this end, it draws from Deleuze and Guattari's 
definition of fascism as different from the classical definition of the term.  
 
These two philosophers did not reduce the concept of fascism to the phenomena it took 
in the 20th century. Rather as argued in One Thousand Plateaus, fascism emerges when an 
attempt to move beyond the position of subjugation to different power structures is hindered 
by the internalization of the micro-forms that this power takes up in these structures. Fascism 
is first the expression of a "blocking off" of desire in its productive process. Desire becomes 
fascist when it expresses itself as an obsession for power but not in its productive capacity. It 
is a fixation on power inherited from the structures of the state through its signifying semiotics. 
As such, fascism arises out of an attempt to invest the social beyond the Symbolic of the state, 
which in its impossibility to be released, turns into a love for the form of power that the state 
produces. 9 Fascism thus emerges following a collapse of desiring-production into death. It is 
a mass revolutionary libidinal investment of the social that is potentially emancipatory but that 
when blocked off by mechanisms of suppression turns into a desire for the other’s death. This 
perversion of desire can go as far as leading one to desire his own death.10  
 Thus, this section argues that in the 1930s, the latent totalitarianism of the state- Egypt 
had gained its conditional independence but was still very much governed as a colony- was 
concomitant with a mass revolutionary desire to invest the social.  Eventually, the blocking off 
of emancipatory desire turned into a desire inherited from the state's structures: a desire for 
totalitarianism. The desire for repression is illustrated by the rise of paramilitary organizations 
and the calls for the death of imperialism and the 'agents of imperialism' whether foreigners or 
Egyptians. In theory, the function of the Al-Mamlaka al-Misreyya- the Kingdom of Egypt- and 
its constitutional monarchy was to represent the Egyptian population's interests. In praxis, the 
triangulation of power between the British, the Palace and the political factions led by the Wafd 
meant that all these actors were involved in a struggle to represent their own interests. In other 
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words, the system of representation had failed to actualize its primary function, which, in 
theory, was to represent the Egyptian masses. Indeed, despite clear calls for their inclusion, 
most Egyptians were excluded from the system of political representation. This repression of 
their desiring-production, this section argues, fed the rise of non-official parties and groups that 
were not represented in the parliament but that were supported either by the peasantry and/or 
the educated lower and middle strata of the urban class.  
Top of the list was the Muslim Brotherhood. Following the collapse of the international 
cotton price in 1929, the group expanded its influence in the villages and the Nile Delta's 
provincial towns by establishing a moral Islamic economy that opposed colonial capitalism's 
'immoralism'.11 Then in 1933, Young Egypt, a popular nationalist movement modelled on 
fascist parties in Europe, was formally founded. Its base of support was mainly urban, and it 
called for Egypt's industrialization and the Egyptianisation of the economy. To this end, it led 
a series of high-profile projects such as the "Piastre Plan" which started in 1931. The plan asked 
students to donate one piastre to support an independent national industrial plant - the tarbush 
(fez) factory.12 The objective was to replace imported goods with locally manufactured ones 
and in this case to replace Tarabeesh (Arabic plural for Tarboosh) that were imported from 
Austria. The group's youth movement drew inspiration from Mussolini's Black Shirts, which 
had inspired the German SS' Brown Shirts. Young Egypt thus created its Green Shirts who 
became famous for holding mass nationalist rallies. Participants were divided into "members" 
and "fighters" (mujahidin) with the later wearing dark green shirts. They fought for the 
unification of the Nile Valley and Sudan's incorporation in the new "Egyptian Empire." They 
denounced foreigners' privileged position in Egypt and campaigned for improved "public 
morality" by banning alcohol and prostitution. They could not run for parliament because the 
leadership was under 30 years of age (the constitution stipulated limitations on age). However, 
they still saw the Wafd as their greatest political enemy. This resulted in their support for the 
King, who was embattled in an embittered rivalry with the Wafd. In 1935 to counter the 
influence of the Green Shirts, the Wafd established the Blue Shirts. From the mid to the end of 
the 1930s, the Green and Blue Shirts recurrently engaged in violent clashes. In 1937, the Green 
Shirts attempted to murder the Wafdist prime minister. The Wafd also used the Blue Shirts to 
prove it still had some popular support. In a show of force in December 1937, the Blue Shirts 
participated in a mass demonstration in front of the King's Palace which led to the dismissal of 
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the Wafdist Prime Minister. In 1938 the government banned all "shirt" organizations. By that 
point, most Young Egypt members started to incorporate the more successful Muslim 
Brotherhood or Ikhwan.13 
The Muslim Brotherhood had eventually also set up its youth organization modelled on 
the shirts, known as the "Jawalla."14 This model drew from the Boy Scout organizations set up 
by the Greek communities in Egypt. These were also tainted with fascism and supported 
Ioannis Metaxas' dictatorship between 1936 and 1940. Like the Shirts, the Jawalla 
demonstrated in the streets in military uniforms and were allegedly receiving military training 
in camps.15 They managed to avoid the 1939 ban on the Shirts. They continued to exist after 
the second world war, although they later shifted their focus on providing social services in the 
countryside.16 By the mid-1930s, the Ikhwan had also started to co-operate with the Jam'iyyat 
al-Shuban al-Muslimin (Young Men's Muslim Association YMMA) on the Palestine issue.17 
By the late 40s, the Ikhwan had grown to 500,000 members. It also had a secret wing, al-Jihaz 
al-Sirri, whose multiple operations culminated in Nuqrashi Pasha's assassination in 1948 
following his attempt to ban the Brethren. In response to this act, the state secret services 
retaliated with the murder of Hasan al-Banna, the Brethren's Supreme Guide (al-Murshid al-
Amm). 
In addition to these paramilitary organizations, the Egyptian communists were also 
trying to gain influence. It helped that they were loathed by the King and the British and were 
persecuted by the state. The communist movement was organized in a loosely held coalition of 
extra-Parliamentary organizations that included The Egyptian Movement for National 
Liberation (EMNL), The Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL), The New 
Dawn and Iskra.18 Most of these groups were established during the 1940s and were active in 
labour organizations and university campuses.19 Repeated efforts to unify the movement failed. 
By the late 1940s, it had further splintered into a plethora of groups that all advocated similar 
goals and strategies but worked independently and sometimes even in competition with each 
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other. Nonetheless, despite its fragmentation, the Communist Movement in Egypt influenced 
political and intellectual thought, including journalism, political writings, poetry and even 
fiction.20 
By the late 40s, the student body had grown very political and demonstrations against 
the British refusal to abrogate the British-Egyptian treaty were staged. Repression was harsh. 
On February 9, 1946, for example, at least 50 students and 30 policemen were injured in Cairo. 
Up to 150 students were arrested.21 Students slogans included "Down with Britain", "To the 
Revolt," Down with Imperialism," and "Get out of the Nile Valley."22 Up until the 1950s, 
university and secondary students also joined workers and labour unions in street 
demonstrations to oppose continued British control over their country. 23   The Egyptian 
workers' movement had also increased in volume and militancy. It came to constitute an 
essential component of the social and political upheaval against both the British and the 
monarchy.24 Workers' strikes, and demonstrations were also often directed against foreign 
enterprises, and as noted by Beinin, the labour movement was commonly considered a 
component of the nationalist movement.25  
In January 1950 the Wafd had returned to power with Mustapha al-Nahhas as prime 
minister. He was a doyen figure of the party and was intent on re-legitimizing the Wafd. He 
released many political prisoners from the prisons and camps in which they had been held.26 
In October 1951, he introduced decrees unilaterally abrogating the British-Egyptian Treaty, 
which were passed by parliament and proclaimed by King Faruk. The British refused to accept 
the move and by 1951 tensions were so high that Egyptians stormed the Army's Naafi 
storehouses. A British soldier was stabbed, and two Egyptians were killed.27 Civilians formed 
Liberation battalions as the Ikhwan, and auxiliary police armed themselves.  People blocked 
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food supplies to the Suez Canal, workers were withdrawn from the base and the students and 
the Ikhwan allied to conduct a guerrilla war against the British in the Suez Canal Zone.  
In December, British bulldozers and Centurion tanks demolished fifty Egyptian mud 
houses to open a road to a water supply for the British army. On January 25, 1952, the British 
attacked an Egyptian police barracks in Ismailiyah, leading to 50 Egyptians killed and 100 
wounded. These events culminated in "Black Saturday" which took place on January 26, 1952. 
It started with a police mutiny to protest their colleagues' death, but people spontaneously 
joined in, attacking British property and some foreigners. Ultimately, 750 establishments were 
burnt or destroyed, thirty persons were killed, and hundreds were injured. The Wafdist interior 
minister was dismissed by the British and the King dismissed al-Nahhas. This led to significant 
instability as six prime ministers held office in six months. It is amidst this chaos that on July 
23, a military organization known as the Free Officers seized the state. 
Overall, the continued suppression of the masses' desire to invest the socio-political 
space meant that anti-colonial emancipatory movements increasingly came to articulate 
themselves through either a manifest or latent fascism. This fascism results from the 'blocking 
off' of a desiring-production that attempted to move beyond the colonial Symbolic's 
totalitarianism. In turn, this castration of the masses' social, libidinal investment turned into a 
love for the form of power that the colonial state produced. The stage was then set for the 
postcolonial reproduction of totalitarianism as a form of state power/desire.  
 
 
THE BIRTH OF THE REVOLUTION, THE END OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE 
CONSOLIDATION OF THE MILITARY-STATE 
This section argues that the Free Officers' dissolution of the political scene by banning 
political parties illustrates their reproduction of the colonial state's Oedipal desire. This desire 
takes up a totalitarian form of power, exemplified by subjectivization processes that assigned 
roles and places, which redefined the citizens' identity in correlations with the state's desire. 
Furthermore, the postcolonial state legitimized its totalitarianism by invoking the Revolution. 
Thus, this section asks the following question: Can Revolutionary politics be articulated 
through a totalitarian desire for power?  
Before and in the immediate aftermath of their seizing of the state,  the Free Officers 
were in regular contacts with various political forces in the country. These included the Ikhwan, 
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the Marxist groups HADETO and the DMNL. The DMNL was the communist group with the 
closest ties to the military and included Free officers such as Abd al-Halim Amr and Yusuf 
Siddiq. Ahmad Fuad or Khalid Muhi al-Din.28 Fuad and al-Din reportedly regularly met with 
Nasser to discuss a wide range of subjects that included the policies of the Wafd, the situation 
in the Middle East, the role of the United States, the King, the British occupation, land reform, 
nationalization and Palestine.29 They provided Nasser with a leftist analysis of Egypt's national 
situation and the international scene. 30  In praxis, however, the role of the Communists 
remained limited. For example, they were tasked with writing and distributing leaflets that set 
forth the Officers' movement's goals but had no real decisional power over actualising the 
democratic Revolution promised by the junta. In addition, the Officers also had contacts in the 
Palace, in some of the security apparatuses and the press. However, these relationships rapidly 
soured in the months that followed the Revolution.  
Less than two months after their coup, the Officers who had established themselves as 
a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) made their will clear: a purge was needed before 
any talk of a democratic system could even be brought up as a possibility. On September 8, 
1952, the RCC passed the law on the "reorganization of the parties", which marked a turn in 
its relationship with political parties' leaders.31 The law required parties to follow a strict 
application procedure. They had to comply with a list of demands requiring them to declare 
and detail their funding, programmes, and internal hierarchical organization.32 By October 7, 
they also had to proceed to a 'voluntary' purge of members who had participated in the previous 
regimes and of individuals who the new revolutionary command had detained.33  The Officers' 
swift turn against political parties illustrates their inability to compete with other political 
subjectivities.  
Most parties complied with the RCC's demands, aware they had little chance to win a 
challenge against the Officers due to their small size. Under the leadership of al-Nahhas, who 
was supported by his deputy Fuad Sirag el-Din, the Wafd took a different approach and decided 
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to stand up to the junta.34 Al-Nahhas was reportedly so outraged by the move that he declared 
"no power on earth can force me to give up the presidency of the Wafd except God and the 
Egyptian people."35 The RCC retorted by leading a propaganda campaign against Al-Nahhas. 
It claimed to have a dossier that showed that in 1951 when Al-Nahhas was Prime Minister, he 
had consented to the secret withdrawal of $300,000 from the Ministry of Interior to finance an 
investment for King Farouk in America.36 The dossier allegedly also proved he had used state 
funds to construct a quay for his wife's yacht and build a private road for her estate.37 The RCC 
also accused Al-Nahhas of being a "British tool and a faithful servant of imperialism" who had 
enriched himself at the expense of the poor."38 The RCC's rhetorical emphasis on al-Nahhas' 
'faith' in imperialism unfolded in the context of a national political subjectivity articulated 
around its fight against imperialism. This helps highlight subjectivization processes that the 
RCC used to consolidate itself as an ascendant political force. They also castigated al-Nahhas' 
failure to supply arms to guerrilla fighters in the Suez Canal Zone and his inaction when in 
1948 Palestinians had been provided with faulty arms.39 To help convince the population and 
spread the news, General Nagib went on a propaganda tour against Nahhas and visited the 
Delta region, including Samannud, the birthplace of Nahhas and a Wafd stronghold.40 The 
RRC's constant belittling and castigating of Nahhas also illustrates the growing totalitarian 
desire of the Free Officers' state which set the scene for its authoritarian redefinition of national 
identity. 
The decision to defy the junta had heightened tensions within the Wafd and the party 
fragmented in several nucleoli that soon denounced and attacked each other.41 The younger 
elements feared a showdown with the Free Officers and convinced the other factions to abide 
by the law.42 Things went from bad to worse when on September 15, the RCC announced that 
a revolutionary court would try members from the previous regime.43 King Farouk's entourage 
and some Wafdist ministers were arrested and arraigned. Their sentences included four 
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executions orders and long-term imprisonment.44 Following a legal challenge, executions were 
transmuted to house arrest or detention.  The RCC also tried to prevent Nahhas from remaining 
the party leader, but after the party mounted a legal challenge, the Officers accepted to let him 
have an honorary title. 45 On October 2, the RCC froze all parties' funds.46 
Eventually, in October, fifteen parties registered under the decree, among them, eight 
had existed under previous governments. These included the Wafd, Liberal-Constitutionalists, 
the Kutlah, Sa'dists, Nationalists, Socialists, Labour and Fallahin. The Muslim Brothers and 
two feminist groups, the National Feminist Party and the Daughters of the Nile, which 
previously existed, but not as political parties, also registered.47 Three new political parties also 
emerged: the Nile Democrats, Fallah Socialist, New Socialist and Democratic Parties. In 
August 1952, they were openly attacked by 'Ali Mahir, the new RCC approved Prime Minister 
who warned "They must either be reshaped and reformed or disintegrate and disappear. [….] 
They belong to the nation and not to individuals. They must have definite and specific 
programs. They must differentiate from one and another, otherwise, there is no need for the 
existence of different names for one idea.... We have had enough of differences and bad 
feelings, enough of mutual accusations and political murders, enough of imprisonment and of 
restrictions on liberty."48 Mahir further warned that from then on, parties should no longer obey 
their leaders "which is dictatorship, but the leaders have to obey the members, which is 
democracy."49 He denounced the pre-existing system for having kept Egypt in a "state of 
backwardness and retarded progress" because political parties had "remained preoccupied with 
a struggle for their own power".50  Beyond the parties it was also the constitution itself that was 
a "source of weakness and confusion." 51  Here again, Maher's rhetoric legitimized state 
repression in the name of the production of the Revolution. It portrays the very possibility of 
difference as a threat to the state and through this, a danger to the unfolding of revolutionary 
national subjectivity.  
Thus, on October 21, strict censorship was imposed to 'protect' the Revolution. On 
December 10, the constitution was abolished, and finally, on January 17, 1953, all parties were 
 
44 Ibid., p.673 
45 Cook, The Struggle for Egypt, p.48 
46 Peretz, ‘Democracy and the Revolution in Egypt’, p.28. 
47 Ibid., p.28. 
48 Ibid., p.28-29 
49 Ibid., p.28-29 
50 Ibid., p.28-29 
51 Ibid., p.28-29 
 132 
banned for the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood and their funds were confiscated.52 It was 
a humiliation for the fifteen parties that had complied with the September 8 demands.53 They 
now felt the RCC never had any intention of including them in the political process. The RCC 
swiftly confiscated their assets, including their press organs and printing press, and issued 
arrests orders for 144 parliamentarians and 44 leftist activists. A three-year transition period 
was announced during which constitutional government would be restricted. During the 
transition period, which was to end in January 1956, Naguib then the leader of the RCC, of the 
Revolution, and the Chief of State, was granted full powers in order to ‘guard’ the Revolution 
and national security. All his decrees and those of the army would from then on be exempted 
from the jurisdiction of the courts. Just a month later, Naguib abolished the 1923 constitution 
and announced the drafting of a constitution that would realize the Egyptian people's 
aspirations. A new constitution for a new revolution! The government formed a committee 
representing political groups, various professions, religious communities, and leading jurists 
to draft the document. Naguib had promised the constitution would be put to the test through a 
referendum. 54  He had also mentioned a second referendum on the end of the 
monarchy.55Things turned out in quite a different way. The newly drafted constitution was 
abandoned, and the original committee was swiftly replaced by a hand-picked group of close 
associates of Nasser. The final document was proclaimed in January 1956. There had been no 
popular input; just the Regime's will to power… 
Within a week of the announcement of the ban on all parties, the RRC set up the 
Liberation Rally, and Nasser was appointed secretary-general. It aimed to fill the vacuum 
created by the waves of ban and arrests, contain political dissidence and spread the military 
junta's vision.56 Nasser announced the organization in front of a Cairene crowd of 250,000 
people. Nasser derided political parties for having divided the people in their struggle against 
imperialism, their corruption which had created a "limited company for theft and robbery in 
which the people had no shares."57  He then went on to say: "We have decided to put an end to 
it all and to start again from the very beginning. [. . .] We have already removed the hand of 
dishonour and torn out the root of corruption in government", Nasser insisted before explaining 
that what was now needed was "a body to organize the people and to foster their unity, and to 
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coordinate the efforts of the workers. In the name of the Egyptian people . . . I announce the 
birth of the organization which will build our unity." 58 The motto of the Liberation Rally was 
"unity, discipline, and work." Nasser thus represented the Rally as the objective embodiment 
of the people. In reality, his close associates controlled the organization.  The Rally's motto 
further illustrates how the state assigned particular roles to its people. It redefines work and 
workers through a relationship of obedience and loyalty to the military regime. This also 
highlights how the subjectivization and thus subjectivation of the people's identity into the 
state's desired representations/objects were essential to the regime's reproduction. In this, the 
reconversion of national subjectivity constituted the capital of power of the regime.  
The  Rally published an 11-point programme laying out its goals. These included "a 
new constitution expressing the aspirations of all Egyptian people" and a "political system 
within which all citizens are equal before the law and in which freedom of speech, of assembly, 
the press and religion will be guaranteed within the limits of the law."59 How this ideal could 
be actualized through a centralized political organization whose members were all part of the 
junta remains a mystery. The programme also called for the British's unconditional withdrawal 
from the Suez Canal, self-determination for Sudan, and establishing a socialist welfare state. 
In September 1953 the RCC announced the formation of a Revolutionary Court that would 
‘protect’ the people and through them the Revolution from political machinations.60Here again, 
the law was used as a tool in the state's production of a totalitarian mode of governance. In the 
name of the Egyptian Revolution, the RCC arbitrarily imprisoned thousands of people. 
Anybody who threatened the subjective reconversion that the state engineered was put in jail. 
Here again, the political system of representation acted as an agent of castration of difference. 
The RCC's fixation on suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood only further exemplified its 
inability to think the social in its heterogeneity.  
Indeed, just a year later, in January 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood, which the RCC had 
relatively spared was banned and 540 of its members detained. Many of the remaining leftist 
magazines were also banned in the process. Repression against the Ikhwan became even 
harsher after one of their members attempted to shoot Nasser. The retort was immediate: the 
military and the secret police arrested 7000 people, the Military Court sentenced 287 people 
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and the People's Court, which replaced the Military Tribunals sentenced another 867. 61  
Through 1955, as many of 20,000 Egyptians including liberals, leftists and Ikhwan members 
were jailed.62 Many were sent in concentration camps, which had been built to accommodate 
the ever-expanding prison population.63 There, their everyday was rhythmed by episodes of 
torture, humiliation and terror. By the time Nasser became president, the political space had 
been decimated by mass repression, which created a subjective vacuum that the regime would 
fill. This section has argued that the Officers and then Nasserist Revolutionary state de facto 
reproduced the authoritarian form of power through which the colonial state had articulated 
itself. Their belittling of politicians and repeated attacks on political movements and their harsh 
repression of all forms of dissidence exemplified the argument. Nasser's authoritarianism was 
fed by a desire to make 'sense' of the colonial Symbolic, to recode it to produce modern reality 
as a reality that differed from the colonial Simulation. Ultimately though, the event it primarily 
birthed consolidated and the military corporatist post-independence state. To this day, this form 
both haunts and castrates the becoming revolutionary of Egypt.  
 




THE CLEANSING OF THE PRESS 
The next chapter will further investigate the processes of subjectivization that allowed 
the Nasserist state to establish itself as the Signifier of the Idea of Revolution. This moment of 
the present chapter sets the scene for the next by illustrating how the state came to dominate 
the means of production of national subjectivity in its quest to assert itself as the nodal Signifier 
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of reality. This section describes its domination of the press as a process of social 
subjectivization and subjective alienation. As this section highlights, the state used the press to 
disseminate its Ideal-Is and present them as the only acceptable ones.  
Soon after abolishing the monarchy, the Officers established the Publishing House of 
the Revolution called Dar al-Tahrir (Liberation House).64 This would allow the regime 
to operate its subjective reconversion of the masses. Indeed, despite seizing power, the 
junta was relatively unknown by the Egyptian public, and the officers needed a medium 
to increase their visibility and introduce their vision. The regime believed that to be 
born as a Self, the Revolution needed a Mirror Stage: national consciousness ought to 
identify with the regime’s Ideal-Is, and the press would project/reflect these. 
 By September 1952 al-Tahrir began to publish its bi-monthly magazine al-
Tahrir. Anti-Imperialist and leftist in tone, it mostly acted as the voice that praised the 
regime's vision and policies.65 Its first editor was Ahmad Hamrush, a leftist Officer who 
was let go because of his communist tone.66 In 1954 he was replaced by Anwar al-Sadat 
with the magazine then running weekly until 1959.67  
On January 18, 1953, some eight magazines with a fairly wide circulation were 
banned, including al-Katib. The Peace Partisans Movement (PPM) founded Al-Katib 
in 1950.  The PPM was a communist group that regrouped members from the Socialist 
Party, the National Party, the Ikhwan and the left-wing of the Wafd.68 Al-Malayin, the 
organ of HADITU and al-Mu'arada, a communist journal edited by the writer Fathi al-
Ramli, suffered the same fate.69 It critiqued the Egyptian system and denounced the 
socio-economic conditions of  'progress'. It also published socio-economic proposals 
and laws, which the RCC saw as a threat to its regime. Beyond press censorship, 
communist were harassed, arrested and harshly sentenced by military tribunals.70 Al-
Risala, a journal founded and co-edited by the political writer Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, 
was also closed. The journal was very well known and regarded. Under the British, it 
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had become a real anti-colonial forum with Arab, Islamic and democratic writings and the 
journal had denounced fascism in the 1930s and 1940s.71 Even journals such as al-Thaqafa that 
were more generalist were closed. In 1954, forty-two newspapers and magazines were abruptly 
forced to cease publishing.72 
On December 7, 1953, the Rally created its magazine, al-Gumhuriyya, whose 
first editor was also Anwar al-Sadat. At first, the magazine hosted eminent writers: 
Tawfiq al-Hakim, Louis Awad, Taha Husayn and Naguib Mahfouz who wrote 
editorials and articles on a wide range of topics. 73  They indirectly helped legitimize the 
Regime's vision for a New Egypt. As the Nasser/Naguib struggle raged, the press 
censorship was imposed, lifted and re-imposed in the name of national security, with 
Nasser arguing that freedom of the press meant freedom of the country's enemies.74 After 
Nasser asserted his supremacy over Naguib, the RCC ordered the dissolution of the Press 
Syndicate. It replaced it with a ministerial committee ran by Major Salim, who was close to 
Nasser.75 The government legitimized the move by explaining that when press censorship had 
been lifted "elements affected by corruption in the past era had betrayed themselves by 
spreading suspicion and doubts against the revolution." 76  Here the official discourse 
emphasises the theme of betrayal and by default defines the ‘wanted elements’ as loyal and 
docile subjects of the state. The government primarily targeted newspapers that had supported 
Naguib. It accused twenty-three Press Syndicate members of having received bribes of up to 
LE 48,000.77 The list included some of the country's leading journalists who had at times 
criticized the government. Amongst these were  M. Husayn Abu al-Fath, editor of the Wafdist 
journal Al-Misri who was also President of the Syndicate; its Secretary-General, M.' Abd al-
Qaddus, editor of the left-wing Rose al-Yusuf; and M. Edgard Gallad, editor of the Journal 
d'Egypte and the Sa'dist Party paper Al-Asas. The Revolutionary Tribunal sentenced several 
of the journalists, and al-Misri was banned.78 Besides, The Société Orientale de Publicité, the 
Egyptian Gazette, La Bourse Egyptienne, and Le Progrès Egyptien was turned over to a 
government trustee.  
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On April 16, 1955, the executive branch of the Union of Journalists was 
dissolved following accusations of corruption within elements of the old regime.79 
Consequently, and under the guise of similar reasons, fourteen magazines were closed, 
and twenty-three journalists were forced to leave their positions. In early May of the 
same year, two owners of al-Misri were condemned to ten and fifteen years of 
imprisonment, and the magazine was revoked.80 On May 26, the government banned 
the Party Press and the closed down 42 non-partisans magazines. By the end of 1955, 
the opposition press had been reduced to the shell of itself. The new revolutionary 
subjectivity ought to be purged from old elements. Here again, the possibility of 
heterogeneity was castrated in the name of the Revolution. 
The press was used as an agent of state semiotisation. In June 1956 the Martial 
Law and the censorship were lifted in preparation for the upcoming elections. Nasser 
was the only candidate and won with an unsurprisingly vast majority. A new 
constitution, which ended censorship, was promulgated. Paragraph 45 guaranteed the 
freedom of the press and publication "within the limits of the law". Here the term 
"within the limits of the law" meant that freedom would be defined within the limits of 
acceptability set by the state. A week after the promulgation of the new constitution 
Nasser also reportedly personally requested that all the paragraphs that exempted the 
president from journalist and writers' criticisms be removed. 81  This move was 
especially well-received as it was a first in the history of the country. However, a press-
law that defined exception cases as including national defence, the sanctity of private 
life and the ‘administration of justice’ was also issued.82 The law also demanded that 
journalists abide by the moral codes of the Union of Journalists. Nasser thus continued 
to expand his hold over the press.  For a short period, it seemed that the ideals of 
democracy and freedom from alienation projected by the regime were in the process of 
being actualized. But this was all carefully orchestrated spectacle.  
Nasser ignored the constitutional guarantee of a free press since ultimately the 
government remained in charge of issuing licenses to press organs. In July 1956, for 
example, it refused to licence 60 publications.83 Besides, in October 1956, amid the 
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tripartite aggression, censorship was reinstated. In 1957, another three magazines were closed, 
including Majallat Bint al-Nil founded by Duriyya Shafiq in 1945. The government issued a 
decree stipulating that all publications needed to seek the Censorship Department's approval 
before publication.84 Meanwhile, the regime awarded licenses to new journals, like Sabah al-
Khayr, al-Sha'ab, and al-Masa, which acted as its mouthpieces and had Officers as editors.85 
AL-Masa nonetheless rose to prominence under Khalid Muhiy al-Din’s direction. He gave 
critical writers and intellectuals a chance to expose their views. But this would not last.  
 
Following Nasser's electoral win, the Liberation rally was replaced by the National 
Union. In 1958 the regime's ever-increasing hold on the press continued to unfold with the 
passing of yet another measure.  From then on, all private owners and editor–in-chiefs were 
required to attend bi-monthly meetings to discuss co-operation with the National Union. 
Additionally, a National Union committee was created in each private publishing houses.86 In 
the same year, another women-focused magazine was closed, al-Sayyidat al-Mulsimat.87 In 
1959, a new wave of repression against the left saw hundreds of Marxist and Socialist writers 
disappear in prison and camps for years. By this point, the private publishing sphere was 
reduced to four houses:  Akhbar al-Yawm owned by 'Ali and Mustafa Amin, al-Ahram owned 
by the Taqla family, Dar al-Hilal, owned by two brothers Amil and Shukri Zaydan and Ruz al-
Yusuf, owned by Ihsan' Abd al-Quddus88.  
In May 1960, the leadership passed Law Number 56 that effectively nationalized the 
press, bringing it under the Arab Socialist Union's control, now the only political organization. 
However, the leadership insisted this was not a nationalization because technically the ASU 
was not part of the state.89 Instead, it portrayed the move as a reorganization of the press to 
create "a media of mobilization."90 The leadership insisted yet again it acted to protect the 
interest of the Revolution and allow the actualization of the now openly assumed Socialist 
vision. Officially there was only one goal: to "prevent the domination of capital in the political 
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and social media."91  A government explanatory note explained the press was being 
taken from the "capitalist owners and placed in the hands of the people to ensure press 
freedom."92It further explained that the public ownership of the means of social and 
political guidance inevitable lied in a democratic, socialist, cooperative society.93 It 
presented the National Union as an organ whose primary function was to guide the 
"positive national action" towards constructing a society based on the principle of 
popular sovereignty.94The national leadership was disappointed that its mouthpieces 
had not been able to match or surpass the success of the few remaining private 
publishing houses.95 Nasser also blamed the press for being out of touch: they focused 
on Cairene gossip and nightlife rather than ordinary Egyptians' everyday struggles. 
"The real picture of our country lies in the Nile Delta", he said. There, people worked 
hard to earn a living.96 An orientalised orientalism?   
Nasser was reportedly convinced that the capitalist owners of the press would 
not support the socialist turn. 97  What was needed then was a Socialist Press. 
"Journalism is more of a calling than a commodity."98And a Socialist Press, Nasser 
insisted, ought to be a critical one. In a meeting, he reportedly told the new board 
members and editors of the nationalized press: "Criticism is not a threat or a revenge. 
If there is anything that is in ruins, say that this is in ruins."99 According to Nasser, 
foreign embassies were engaged in a competition to use advertising to control Egyptian 
magazines and newspapers. 100  Nationalization meant that the last four publishing 
houses were transferred to the National Union. Al-Akhbar had primarily been targeted 
by the left for being an organ of capitalist propaganda.101 In 1963, the National Union 
gained further power as the official mouthpieces of the leadership including al-
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Gumhuriyya,  Watani, and Journal d'Egypte, which had been exempted from Law Number 56, 
now fell under its hold.  
It was the Union that oversaw the appointment of editors and board members of 
the press. It also gave the licences to both newspapers and journalists. According to the 
law, no one could publish or work in the media without authorization from the National 
Union. 102  Nonetheless, the law also offered exciting points. For example, it opened the 
companies' boards to journalists and employees, offering them a minority right of 
participation in decision-making and a fifty-fifty share in profits. This mode of 
organization was praised, although freedom of participation was conditioned and 
limited. Journalists and editors had to avoid issues, and subjects deemed anti-
revolutionary and had to stand behind the National Union's goal of being "a positive 
force behind the revolution".103 Moreover, gradually Officers and close associates of Nasser 
were once again placed in the boards' chairmanship. For example, Muhammad Husanayn 
Heikal was appointed chairman of al-Ahram, Dar al-Hilal, and Akhbar al-Yaoum. 104 
Meanwhile, others found themselves in trouble. This was the case for example of Mustafa 
Amin, the co-owner of Akhbar al-Yaoum. In 1961 he was appointed chairman of the board of 
directors of Dar al-Hilal and named general inspector of the newspaper's editorial board.105 
However, On July 21, 1965, Amin was arrested following accusations he had given the 
Americans sensitive information behind the regime's back.106 On August 21, he was judged 
and sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour.  He was tortured during his interrogation, 
and the attorney general demanded he confessed to something he denied ever doing.107It is 
worth noting that these developments were not particular to Egypt;  the same unfolding took 
place in Algeria, Syria or Iraq where similar waves of nationalizations took place.108 
The government's anger then turned to leftist activists, who had tried to form a National 
Democratic Front and 253 of them were arrested on May 31, on accusations of being 
"communists". In July, they were tried in military courts, with no due process, before being 
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sent to forced labour camps.109 In September, it was the university professors' turn to 
feel the wrath of the regime's revenge. The University of Cairo, a stronghold of the 
Democratic Movement, was targeted with 45 professors expelled for being either 
members of the Democratic movement or leftist elements.110On the other hand,  there 
was an increase in the printing and publishing of books, followed by a renaissance in 
the theatre, cinema, and arts in general. In other words, the regime took upon itself the 
task of carrying out a disciplined and controlled process of enlightenment – governed 
by comprehensive and strict control from above. Was this the event that permeated the 
Egyptian streets and bodies when people were denouncing the authoritarian mode of 
governance of colonial modernity? By dominating the press and continuing its 
repression of political actors, the state could posit itself as the nodal Signifier of reality. 
It recoded it in correlation with its own desire.  
 
THERE IS A NEW GOD IN TOWN: WHEN THE STATE PRODUCES NEW SIGNIFIEDS 
FOR RELIGION  
The Nasserist State started to literally occupy every space it could to recode 
them to its own representation. This, of course, included the religious sphere, a space 
which the state increasingly came to see as a threat to the subjective reconversion it 
operated. Indeed, Islam was a signifier of reality for most of the population. By 
appropriating it, the state could recode subjectivity to the requirements of its own 
Ideality. This took place through two different stages of Islah or reforms. The first set 
of reforms took place between 1952 and 1961 and targeted the Islamic establishment's 
foundations. The second reform occurred from 1961 until Nasser's death and targeted 
its institutions. In 1952, only fifteen days after the 180 Law on the land reform was 
passed, the RCC decided to nationalize the Waqfs ahli (religious endowments), which 
a Waqf ministry would administer. The move made al-Azhar dependent on the state for 
subventions and thus for its existence and subsistence. The 'Ulema were caught so off 
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guard they did not have the time to organize protests.111 In 1955, a new reform abolished the 
Mahakim shar'iyya or religious courts, thereby depriving the 'Ulemas of their administrative 
functions and their access to the magistracy. Moreover, the move put an end to the Sharia as 
the only source of law, which helped homogenize the Egyptian civil court system. This time, 
the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, Sheikh Khidr Husayn and the Vice Sheikh, Abd al-Latif Draz 
resigned from their position in protest.112 This had little impact on the regime as new and pro-
RCC Sheikhs swiftly replaced them.113  This was the beginning of a long chess game where 
pro-Officers and then pro-Nasserist were gradually put in charge. In 1953, Sheikh al-Baquri 
was named the new head of the Waqfs ministry. He was an Ikhwan member who had worked 
with the Free Officers before the 1952 coup and who took up the post against the organisation's 
wishes.114 Al-Baquri then established himself as one of the most prominent spokespersons of 
the Officers' Revolution and then of the Nasserist regime.  Nasser banked on his popularity in 
Africa and Asia to emphasize the international aspect of the Nasserist Revolution and the 
regime's desire to support other 'liberation' movements. This helped the state expand its sphere 
of influence and power well beyond the frontier of Egypt.   
Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat was named the new editor of al-Azhar's journal, Majallat al-
Azhar and used his position to help domestically disseminate the regime's ideology by outlining 
the main goals and phase of the Nasserist Revolution.115 In a laudatory editorial published in 
October 1960, he set forth the Nasserist vision of the Revolution, which would articulate itself 
through three sub-set revolutions: a socio-cultural revolution, a political revolution and a soon-
to-come economic revolution. The editorial unofficially announced the soon-to-come-
Ishtirakiyya or socialist turn.116 In the article, he also told of a fourth revolution-to-come: a 
religious revolution. He described this Revolution as a liberation of reason from "powerless 
and subservient imitation", a purification of the Sunna from "deceitful hadiths" and an 
evolution of fiqh "in the limits allowed by the Shari'yya."117 Sheikh Zayyat insisted this Islah 
was first an intellectual reform, necessary to bring Islam into modernity. This editorial is 
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critical because it semi-implicitly targeted a potent critic of Nasser's growing enemy in 
the Arab world: Saudi Arabia. Al-Zayyat's voice as a representant of the religious 
establishment and beyond it of Islam was thus used to introduce the regime's new 
policies.  It also highlights the continued theme of the need to purify national 
subjectivity as a component of the state's semiotics. 
The 'religious revolution' took place as the 'socialist revolution' was unfolding, marking 
the beginning of the second waves of religious reforms. These changed the 'Ulemas to civil 
servants' status, thereby sealing their co-dependence to the state. They now had it as a duty to 
obey it. This co-dependence also became economic as the institution would from then on be 
financed by the state. It also helped the state further exclude the 'Ulemas from the reforms 
process, this as a restructuration of al-Azhar was taking place.  In the 1950s, following 
the Free Officers' seizing of the state, a debate centred on the need for unification and 
homogenization of Egypt's school system had re-emerged. In many of their writings, 
the 'Ulemas had criticized the secularisation that the Egyptian school system's 
modernisation entailed. In 1955 the question was debated by Taha Husseyn, who 
proposed to end traditional education at the primary and secondary levels, in  Kuttabs 
and al-Azhar. He also wanted to create faculties of theology in universities that did not 
specialise in Islamic teachings. Religion would be studied beyond the boundaries of 
religious knowledge. While this model inspired reforms in Tunisia, it was not applied 
by the Officers. 118 Nasser had been able to assert his grip over the institution, which he 
used as a symbol of his legitimacy and authority. To act as an agent of Nasserist 
semiotics, al-Azhar needed to remain a national institution.  
The regime-endorsed reform, which the Grand  Sheikh ̀ Bahi, the director of the 
university then supported, fragmented Al-Azhar in five parts: the Superior Council of 
al-Azhar, the Academic Centre for Islamic research (majma al buhuth al-Islamiyya), 
which was the former administrative and judicial centre of power of the 'Ulemas, the 
Culture Directory, the University of al-Azhar and the Primary, Preparatory and 
Secondary institutes of Education. This truncation of Al-Azhar set different centres of 
powers that mutually competed with one another. Divide and Conquer! The president 
was now in charge of nominating the Grand Sheikh and the Imam. A semblance of 
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representation was still maintained as the Imam was elevated to minister in the ministry of 
Waqf, which still meant he had little power. The ministry was tightly controlled by Major 
Ahmad' Abdallah Tu'ayma, the former General Secretary of the Liberation Rally. Additionally, 
the reforms established a Superior Committee of Islamic Affairs attached to the Waqfs' 
ministry. It published the regime's official vision of Islam- a Socialist Islam- in books that were 
affordable so as to maximize the outreach. Azharis were now just the pawns of/in the regime 
propaganda. They did not have much choice. Anwar Sadat was sent to al-Azhar to relay a stern 
warning, telling an assembly of 'Ulemas; "On July 23, 1952, a revolution took place. Those 
who tried to oppose it were trampled. A new revolution is taking place now. Those who will 
oppose it will meet the same fate."119 The Hurriyya (Freedom) of the people had been eaten up 
alive by freedom as represented by the regime.  The state used its gradual redefinition of the 
religious space and Islamic identity to establish a signifying chain that equated its political 
vision to an emancipatory desire. This also helped it masks its desire for the repression of 
subjective difference.  
The state also changed the curriculum in the primary and secondary institutes of 
education and introduced a dual programme composed of both a secular and religious 
curriculum. At the university level, similar changes took place as the three schools – theology, 
Arabic language and Shari'a – all included new programmes that taught modern disciplines 
including biology, engineering, pharmacy, medicine, languages, etc…120  These reforms drew 
their inspiration from the previously proposed reforms of Mohammed Abduh, which had not 
been accepted. These ideas had also been carried forward by the Ikhwan. In the preamble of 
the Law n° 103 de 1961, the government referred to a vision shared by the Ikhwan when it 
described Islam as Din wa dunya (religion and world).121 This vision entailed the grouping of 
Religion, the domain of the spiritual and thus of the non-material world, with the materialism 
of earthly living -here meaning more statist socialization. Through this vision religion coated 
in socialism, what the regime called a Socialist Islam, gained a social utility that matched the 
Socialist reformist agenda launched by Nasser:  
 
« Al-Azhar has failed to find the path that would help it participate in the movement of 
renewal that would put it in harmony with this century [...]. Its graduates are still [...] today 
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men of religion (rigal din), who do not demonstrate a marked interest for the sciences 
of this world (dunya). Islam, in its first reality, makes no difference between the science 
of religion (din) and the science of this world (dunya). Islam is indeed a social religion 
[...]. Every Muslim must be both a man of religion and a man of the world "(Law N.103, 
1961).122 
 
In this vision, al-Azhar was often represented in official discourses as the citadel 
of Islam (Hisn) while at the same time denying that Islam could be a profession 
(Hirfa).123 This further helped the state delegitimize the 'Ulemas as a counter-subjective 
force. Nasser's grip on al-Azhar was also beneficial in counter-balancing the influence 
of the Ikhwan and then legitimizing the brutal repression by the regime against them.  
Simultaneously, the regime recuperated and appropriated the Ikhwan’s critique of al-
Azhar. The organization had criticized the institution for its collaboration with the 
British and the Palace. 124 For example, Al-Banna had critiqued the torpor in which its 
'Ulemas had befallen and decried their lack of action against the growing influence of 
foreigners on the symbolic and material reality of/in Egypt.125 Al-Ghazali, who was an 
Ikhwan member and an al-Azhar scholar, had denounced the passivity of his colleagues 
in a similar vein: 
 
"I know men among the shaykhs of the Azhar who live on Islam, as do the 
germs of bilharzia and ankylostomiasis on the blood of the wretched peasants." 126  
 
The Nasserist regime made good use of these critiques by forcing the 'Ulemas' 
hand and having them proclaim Fatwas against Islamist organizations. The official 
Azhari discourse then described them as 'corrupt', 'Sufis devoted', and as a class allied 
to the 'feudalists'. In brief, they were 'charlatans' whose main function was to trick the 
population.  This highlights how the regime used religious institutions to portray 
elements that resisted its subjectivation, which it saw as threatening the production of 
the Revolution by corrupting the people with their vision. The leadership's use of Islam 
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did not just touch al-Azhar; it also interfered with primary schools' curricula. In 1952, the RCC 
reinstated two hours of religious instruction in the first two years of primary schools, although 
no textbook had been written for them until 1958-59.127 This instruction moved away from the 
previous focus on manners, time management and good behaviour to emphasize social values 
that the regime deemed necessary to a popular reformation of society.128 This meant an increase 
of discussion on jihad as a personal struggle against temptation, injustice, or wrongdoing with 
analogies being made to the fight against the regime's external enemies.129 The state socialized 
its presentation of religion by presenting a 'faith that reward and punishment are founded on 
social justice."130  
 
The regime also used religious ceremonies and celebrations as public events where it 
could distil its ideology. Beyond religion, schools were used to produce a Nasserist cult with 
schools in the Nile Valley, making pupils chant "Nasser! Nasser! Nasser!", followed by 
revolutionary slogans. 131  In parallel, Nasser's use of Islamic symbols and images in his 
speeches also increased, a move that soon extended to other members of his government.132 
The Nasserist use of Islam as a tool for disseminating the regime's signifying semiotics 
produced quite a paradox: by asserting a statist vision of Islam the regime was able to penetrate 
the private sphere up to its most intimate. It used this intimacy to recode individual subjectivity 
and desire. 
  
 GAMAL ABDEL NASSER: 'THE LAW IS ON HOLIDAY', OR WHEN JUSTICE IS NOT 
JUST 
The Officers and then Nasser did not stop with ensuring their control of the religious 
sphere. Modernity had brought a new god. The Nasserist state was establishing itself as  The 
LAW of/on reality. This section showcases how the state used the law to suppress the elements 
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of the population that resisted its subjectivation. When the Free Officers seized the state 
in 1952, the Majlis al-Dawla, an apparatus modelled on the French Conseil d'Etat, 
initially assisted them, albeit pressure and intimidation might have been at the root of 
its acquiescence.133 For example, when the Officers formed a Regency Council to 
replace King Farouk, the Majlis al-Dawla provided a ruling that obviated the 
requirement to submit the measure constitutionally required to the disbanded 
parliament. 134  The assumption was that the Officers' authoritarianism was both a 
necessary and sufficient condition to the production of the Revolution, but that it would 
progressively transition to a more democratic mode of government.135  
As it turned out, this assumption never materialized. Besides, not one member 
of the body of legal experts appointed by the officers to draft a new constitution 
protested the banning of political parties or resigned over the move.136 Many of its 
members also argued against the submission of the to-be-constitution to popular vote 
or a review by an elected assembly.137 It is also worth noting that the domestic attitude 
also mirrored the lack of international pressure for Liberal Constitutionalism. For 
example, in the view of the United States, the most important was to prevent the 
ascension of a communist regime. Thus, the US ambassador stated that Egypt was not 
yet ready for democracy.138 
The president of the Majlis al-Dawla, Abd al-Raziq al-Sanhuri, drafted a 
constitution that would have granted women the right to vote and would have 
established a supreme constitutional court to protect the constitution.139 However, in 
1954, the drafting of this constitution stalled and eventually came to a halt. The 
relationship between the Majlis al-Dawla and the Officers broke down following the 
junta's splinting into a pro-Naguib and a pro-Nasser camp. The Majlis supported 
Naguib, who suggested a return to parliamentary life, which opposed what Nasser 
wanted. As things heated up, the president of the Majlis al-Dawla Abd al-Raziq al-
Sanhuri was physically beaten up by supporters of Nasser for attempting to restore a 
 
133 Nathan J. Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.232 
134 Ibid., p.232 
135Ibid., p.235 
136 Moustafa, The struggle for Constitutional Power, pp.180-188  
137 Ibid., pp.180-188  
138 Ibid., 180-188  
139 Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf, p.236 
 148 
constitutional government.140 Al-Sanhuri was convinced that his assault had been ordered and 
planned by RCC members, which the group denied. Two weeks later, the law that prevented 
partisans of the old regime from occupying state positions was passed, and he was forced to 
resign. In 1955 the repression continued as twenty Majlis members, most being prominent 
judges, were either forced to retire or transfer to nonjudicial positions.141 In 1959 a new law 
that restricted the Majlis' power to review and cancel administrative acts was issued.142  
Five months after the Officers had seized the state, they had also consolidated 
their control by creating exceptional courts which allowed them to circumvent the regular court 
system. The first exceptional court was the Mahkmat al-Ghadr (Court of the Treason), and it 
established an important precedent for the other exceptional courts that were to come. The 
court was "bound only by the loosest procedural guidelines; the majority of its members were 
political appointments with no judicial background; its mandate was extremely broad; and it 
seemed aimed not simply at punishing but also at embarrassing and discrediting its targets."143 
The court was composed of three senior judges appointed by the minister of (in)justice and 
four military officers appointed by the armed forces' commander-in-chief.144It had the authority 
to investigate former political officials suspected of corruption, abuse of influence, corrupting 
the political order, or interfering with the judiciary.145 In 1953 the RCC had also set up special 
military courts to try the communists, a barely covered attempt to try communism itself. The 
prosecution called on the Grand Mufti to testify against communism although, against their 
expectation, he called for establishing an Islamic State.146  The defence lawyers put up a good 
fight, but ultimately, most defendants were served the sentences that the prosecution had 
required.  
In 1953, the Mahkarnat al-Thawra (The courts of the Revolution) were established. 
These courts were exclusively made up of military men. They did not allow appeals, although 
the RCC had the authority to either approve or commute sentences.147 Again, these courts had 
a broad mandate. They could try crimes against the political order, against the Revolution or 
those accused of supporting imperialism.148 The arbitrariness of the courts is exemplified by 
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the trial of former Prime Minister Ibrahim' Abd al-Hadi. Only one charge was caught 
on camera, but when his lawyer asked to see the charge's documentation, he was refused 
access. He resigned in protest, but his client was then tried without counsel and 
sentenced to death by the court.149The trials pitted politicians against one another and 
most rushed to testify against each other, which the RCC said illustrated their corruption 
and obsession with self-interest. The trials had been for show, literally. In May 1954 a 
second chamber was opened to try "all acts of sedition which took place on April 28", 
this as the court was about to be closed.150  On this day some supporters of Naguib had 
attempted to rebel against the regime but were swiftly overpowered. Their trial served 
to embarrass Naguib, who had started to lose serious ground against Nasser.  
In November, the Mahakim al-Sha'ab (the People's courts) were established. 
They dealt with the trials of the Ikhwan members accused of attempting to assassinate 
Nasser. They included Ab'Abd al-Qadir 'Awda, a member of the Ikhwan who had 
occupied key positions within the judiciary and arrested and jailed for siding with 
Naguib in his struggle against Nasser.151 He was accused of participation in the plot 
against Nasser, was sentenced to death and hanged on December 7, 1954. 152  The 
mandate of the court was again a broad one. Officially it would put to trial individuals 
whose "actions considered as treason against the Motherland or against its safety 
internally and externally as well as acts considered as directed against the present 
regime or against the bases of the Revolution."153 Yet, these trials were another tragic 
illustration of the illiberalism of the regime. The Law of the Revolution was the law of 
resentment more than a Just law. The defendants were accused of being members of 
the Secret Organisation and directing the Ikhwan policy of violent terrorism. Still, the 
prosecution did not attempt to present facts to back up its claims.154 The trial moved 
from showing the defendants' participation in the attempt against Nasser's life to 
proving that being a member of the Ikhwan was in itself a crime. Eventually, hundreds 
of Ikhwan were tried.155 The People's court was finally closed in 1955 although it was 
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revived in 1967 and in 1971 to try Sadat's rivals. In the following years, the Nasserist leadership 
refrained from setting up new courts, but it did not have to.  
Instead, it regularly transferred cases from the regular court system to both 
military and security courts, which again afforded few procedural protections."156 Once a 
military court tried a case, all appeals to a civilian court were banned, thereby ensuring in most 
cases the verdict desired by the leadership. The law was also amended to permit trial in absentia 
in these courts. Torture and forced confessions were routine, only further discrediting the 
courts.157 In facts, these were used to harass, embarrass and torture political opponents. The 
Revolution thus openly entailed the killing of the Other as a necessity to produce the social 
goals it sought to reach. The state's representation as an emancipatory agent was now in total 
contradiction with its unleashing of killings and torture. Dissidents from various political 
landscapes were now rotting away in jails, although Ikhwan members and communists were 
the most targeted as the next chapter explains. Journalists and judges were also not spared. For 
the regime, the Revolution meant to Discipline and Punish anyone who refused to be moulded 
into the regime's representation. Unsurprisingly, this was of course done in the name of the 
elusive Revolution in-the-making. The morbid underbelly of the Officers and then of the 
Nasserist Revolution seems to contradict the very idea of their event as one of liberation. 
Looking back on the state's Oedipalisation of desire and national subjectivity coupled with its 
castration of difference, Nasserism disciplined revolutionary politics into its fold. Its 
production of the Revolution as a dialectical struggle against all other forms of national 
political subjectivity points to its pathologisation of the politics of liberation. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has highlighted how the postcolonial state acts as an agent of the symbolic 
totalization of experience that reproduces the colonial Oedipalisation of social relations. It did 
so by thinking and articulating the concept of law as an empty signifier, whose main task is to 
concretely foreclose the possibles or series of time that threatened the Nasserist totalization of 
Egyptian reality. In doing so, the chapter argues, the Nasserist state reproduced colonial 
semiosis and their production of a reality that articulates itself as two senses. On the one hand, 
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Nasserism presented itself as an agent of the anti-colonial Revolution that would 
liberate Egypt from colonial reality and finally, open up the social to all possibles or 
series of time. Yet, on the other, as we have seen throughout the chapter, Nasserism 
actively foreclosed the possibles or series of time, that did not fit its temporal 
sequencing of space. To illustrate its argument, the chapter first examined the processes 
of subjectivation and alienation of desire that set the scene for the state's Oedipalisation 
of social relations.  Ultimately the constant repression of desire by the state and its 
apparatuses meant that desire as an élan vital (vital impetus) turned into a desire for 
repression, a desire for the form of power that the state produced.158 This recoding of 
desire into Signs (Signifiers and Signifieds) of state desire set the scene for the Free 
officers and then Nasser. As soon as they seized the state, the Free Officers dissolved 
the political scene by banning most parties and delegitimizing the political actors that 
had dominated the political game before their coup. This was but the beginning of a 
long process of appropriation of reality and its possibles. Under the Officers and Nasser, 
the state established itself as the nodal Signifier of reality and used the press, the legal 
system and the religious sphere to disseminate its symbolic. In this way, the state could 
subjectivize the population into its Simulation of liberation, the chapter has argued. In 
emphasizing the state as a force of Oedipal subjectivation, this chapter illustrates the 
role of the state as a cerebral-ideality that produces sets of Ideal-Is with which the 
people must strive to conform. Indeed, the Nasserist state gradually dominated the 
means of production of national subjectivity. As a machinist assemblage of 
subjectivation processes, the state is first an Oedipal machine: to say that the state 
Oedipalizes means that it castrates our desire's immanence, thereby constraining being 
to being alienated by an Other.159  
 
"To be anti-Oedipal is to be anti-ego, as well as anti-homo, wilfully attacking 
all reductive psychoanalytic and political analyses that remain caught within the sphere 
of totality and unity, in order to free the multiplicity of desire from the deadly neurotic 
and Oedipal yoke."160 For Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipus is not a mere psychoanalytic 
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construct. Instead, Oedipus is the figurehead of imperialism, "Oedipus is always colonization 
pursued by other means it is the interior colony, and we shall see that even here at home….it 
is our intimate colonial education.."161  
 
With Deleuze and Guattari the state is colonial machine in-itself: it colonizes 
individual desire and reduces it to its Object of phantasm. All in all, then, the state and 
capitalism share a similar mode of production: private ownership of the means of 
(subjective)production. From a subjective point of view then, as citizens of a state, we are all 
in a form or another the state. Yet at the same time, as a fold of the state, we can only exist as 
its Object of knowledge/phantasms. Indeed, the Nasserist state portrayed the social as a 
homogenous bloc from which undesired elements- namely anyone that resisted its 
subjectivation- needed to literally be eliminated. They saw the social as a pure Identity. In 
concluding, the chapter has argued that in setting up the seeds of the corporatist-military state 
that to this day still haunts the possible revolutionary becoming of Egypt, set the stage for the 
continuation of the colonial castration of experience and its pathologisation of the politics of 
liberation. The corporatist-military state can here be seen as a Face of the paranoid production 
of modern semiosis. Beyond its surface of liberation, Nasserism had captured the anti-colonial 
struggle. It had become a force of suffocation, a force that fixed its series of time while 
foreclosing all other possibles. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE HAUNTOLOGY OF THE ONTOLOGY OF THE 





The preceding chapter has argued that Nasserism reproduced the colonial 
semiotics by producing a reality in which the real was deprived of the possibility of 
signification. This reality articulates itself through two senses: in appearance or surface, 
Nasserism opened up the social to all possibles (or series of time), yet on the other, it 
foreclosed the possibles that were not compossible with its Symbolic. A reality from 
which the real is deprived of the possibility of signification is as we have seen, per 
definition an absurd. The interesting thing, however, is that Egyptians experienced this 
absurd as the production of a postcolonial reality. Nasser did pass a series of laws and 
reforms that greatly benefited the population and increased the socio-economic 
standard and citizens’ rights. These included two waves of nationalisation, the 
construction of infrastructures and social housing as well as reforms in land ownership, 
education, health or labour. Yet, this was done at the cost of increasingly harsh 
repression and expanding of the state’s power of subjectivation. Just like colonialism, 
Nasserism disciplined its subjects into exclusively identifying with its Symbolic. 
Anyone who failed to do so, was, as we will see in this chapter, a deviant case, a bad 
copy that needed to be punished, humiliated and recoded. 
Furthermore, the Nasserist Revolution followed a top-down process, not a 
popular one. Firstly, although Nasser was elected president, it is the 1952 coup that led 
him to the presidency. Besides, when the Free Officers seized the state on July 23, there 
was no popular effusion of joy or support. By then, the people had lost trust in the 
political system, and at first, they mistrusted the new military regime. Yet, in the lapse 
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of fifteen years, things had taken up a very different turn.1 When Nasser offered to resign 
following the 1967 Egyptian defeat in the war against Israel, millions of people poured into the 
streets to ask him to remain president. When he died of a heart attack in 1970, five million 
people attended his funeral. Nasser’s symbiotic relationship with his people reached such 
heights; even his death was mythologised. Legend has it that he really died of a broken heart 
because after Egypt lost the 1967 war, he felt like he had let down the nation. Still, despite 
Egypt’s humiliating defeat, for millions of Egyptians, with his death, the Revolution had lost 
its’ name of the father’. 
It is as if Nasserism was able to subjectivise Egyptians into the experience of its Ideality 
or Symbolic (sur)face rather than into the full experience of the concrete reality it was 
producing. In Memories from a Revolution, Khaled Mohi el-Din, a member of the Free Officers 
who was close to Nasser, illustrated this paradox:  
 
“However, getting closer to the masses called for action geared to their interests, at least 
in part. Hence the agrarian reform and social development, to which were allocated the funds 
gathered from the Muhammad’ Ali dynasty, and whereby a school, a clinic, and a social centre 
were built in every village. Egypt, at the time, was building a school a day throughout the whole 
of the Egyptian countryside. It was then also that the slogan “Socialist Cooperative 
Democracy” emerged. All this made Nasser extremely popular with the masses and enabled 
him to deal with such issues as democracy and liberty in his own way. His popularity increased 
even more when he rejected the Baghdad Pact and led a wide-scale campaign against it. 
Peasants felt that they had been really freed from the injustices of feudalism and the ‘umda 
(village Mayor) and could never believe that the Revolution encroached on their freedom. That, 
perhaps, was the core of the idea that Nasser entertained for a long time and which permeated 
the Charter for National Action- the idea of a socialist democracy.”2  
 
In this passage, Mohi el-Din highlights the paradoxical nature of the Nasserist 
experience. Peasants experienced Nasserism as a liberation, this, as more and more Egyptians 
were being arbitrarily arrested, tried,  imprisoned and tortured in Nasserist jails. This affective 
subjectivation of experience was so strong that even after Nasser’s death, Nasserism continued 
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to act as a Signifier of the experience of postcolonial liberation. As an affect, Nasserism 
survived Nasser’s death. It had become a percept of liberation.3 The re-activation of 
Nasserist images and symbols during the 2011 Egyptian revolution exposed the 
haunting affect of Nasserism on Egyptian politics.  The spontaneous emergence of 
Tahrir square and Talaat Harb street as a nucleus of the revolutionary event, for 
example, reflect this affective sense that Nasserism is still able to act/have on reality. 
In 1954, Nasser renamed what had been ‘Soliman Pasha Street’ after Talaat Harb, a 
leading Egyptian economist of the early 1900s. He did so to erase the reminders of the 
Ali dynasty and British occupation. Then in 1960, he changed the name of Ismailia 
Square to Tahrir (Liberation) square to commemorate the end of British occupation. As 
a popular Ideal or simulacrum, Nasserism is still perceived as a moment of production 
of postcolonial reality, moment which was cut short by the unforeseen death of Nasser.  
In 2011, it was around spaces that were supposed to represent the end of colonialism 
and the beginning of a  liberated reality that Egyptians gathered to challenge the 
postcolonial as another fold of the colonial Simulation.  Forty years after its end, 
Nasserism was still able to simulate itself as revolutionary desire. How was this 
possible? 
In a moment of A Thousand Plateaus, entitled, Year Zero: Faciality, Deleuze 
and Guattari take up the concept of the Face to illustrate the subjective and affective 
alienation of the system or Big Other on individuals.4  Their concept acts as a subtle 
attack of Levinas and his concept of “face of the other”.  For Levinas, in-itself, this 
“face of the other” relates to the subjective experience of encountering the other as the 
living presence of another person.5 The face here offers the possibility of experiencing 
the encounter with the other as both a social and ethical experience. In this encounter, 
it is the face that gives us access to the real of the other as a living being. For Levinas 
then, the “face of the other” highlights the other's foundational role in constructing an 
ethical relationship to existence. Taking things at counterpoint, Deleuze and Guattari 
develop a concept of The Face as a Symbolic that overcodes subjectivity by totalising 
the individual’s sense of Selfhood.6 The Face subjectivises individuals into identifying 
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with the faces of its Symbolic.7 Here the function of the Face is to subjectivise individual into 
the laws of the Symbolic. Per definition then, it cannot give us access to the other since it 
castrates the possibilities of otherness.  
 
“[T]he Face is part of a surface-holes, holey surface, system. This system should 
under no circumstances, be confused with the volume-cavity system proper to the 
(proprioceptive) body. The head is included in the body, but the face is not. The face is 
a surface: facial traits, lines, wrinkles; long face, square face, triangular face; the face is a map, 
even when it is applied to and wraps a volume, even when it surrounds and borders cavities 
that are now no more than holes. The head, even the human head, is not necessarily a face. The 
face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases to be coded 
by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code — when the 
body, head included, has been decoded and has to be overcoded by something we shall call the 
Face. This amounts to saying that the head, all the volume-cavity elements of the head, have 
to be facialised. What accomplishes this is the screen with holes, the white wall/black hole, the 
abstract machine producing faciality.”8 
 
Deleuze and Guattari note that historically, some subjects, have been able to escape the 
universality of the face. In fact, they tie the origin of the process of facialization to a specific 
western European historical experience that starts with the Face of Christ9. Indeed, the Face of 
Christ can be seen as the Image of all European empires, from the Holy Roman Empire to The 
French and British modern empires. In modernity, the Face of Christ is also the image of 
thought of Modern imperialism whether, through its openly fascist forms such as with Hitler 
or Mussolini or its neoliberal forms such as with the U.S. Overall, the Face of Christ marks the 
emergence and spreading of a socio-political disciplining of individual subjectivity as the mode 
of governance of the state. The Face of Christ thus exposes a semiotic dislocation in the history 
of the subject. This dislocation attributes a new function to the subject: the subject must be a 
concrete representation of the faces of the state and its Symbolic. This shift in function also 
produced a new meaning for the subject: the subject moved from being a socio-political animal 
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(Man as a subject of History as Fortuna) to a socio-political individual (Man as a subject 
of History as reason). 
All in all, for Deleuze and Guattari, the Face of Christ marks a historical juncture 
whereby the state ascendingly establishes its symbolic as THE Signifier of the subjects’ 
experience. It makes us into its faces, and in this process reduces our experience to be a 
distorted mirror image of the Big Other.  As an agent of the facialization of the Big Other,  the 
state overcodes the subject with Symbolic Ideal-Is and in doing so simulates the existence of 
the subject as a successive series of Identifications. For Deleuze and Guattari, the birth 
of the Face of Christ coalesces with the influence of Neo-Platonism in Christian 
thought, which eventually led to the emergence of nominalism.10 In fine, for them, both 
the Face of Christ and the Face of Modernity takes up the individual as the basis of their 
conception of man. From a Deleuzean perspective, modernity is yet another fold of the 
Face of Christ, a fold of a semiosis that thinks being, but only after it has been totalised 
by the Idea. Modern thought reproduces Christian semiosis by thinking experience as 
the degraded copy of an original. Christian thought thinks the Idea of  Man as a 
degraded copy of Christ/God and modern thought thinks of practical reason as a 
degraded copy of pure reason. 
Their critique echoes the critique of modernity and modern reason made by Luis 
Bunuel in his film The Milky Way.11 In the movie, there is a scene in which a priest and 
a brigadier have a conversation about religion and modernity. The brigadier affirms that 
since modern science can explain everything, it challenges religious miracles as 
simulacra. For the brigadier, modern reason challenges religion as a simulation. To this, 
the priest answers:  
 
“Well, personally, I think that science has never more agreed with the 
Scriptures. That’s why everybody is catholic now.” Their conversation continues: 
“- How so, catholic? 
- Yes, the whole world.[…….]”12 
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This face of Christ as the face of modernity, Deleuze and Guattari also see it as the face 
of the White Man, and as the spreading of its facialised form of subjectivity:  
 
“Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance to the White 
man’s face, which endeavours to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly 
eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them at a given place under given 
conditions, in a ghetto, or sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides 
alterity.”13  
 
With Fanon, the black skins become white masks, and with Deleuze and Guattari, it is 
modernity that takes up a white surface and black holes.14 The modern Big Other overcodes 
the social with its racial spectrum of Ideality. The critiques of Fanon, Deleuze and Guattari 
expose the processes through which individual subjectivity is subjectivised by the surface of 
the Simulation's reality. This surface produces a head that is no longer coded by the body15; 
instead, the face overcodes the body as in the Hobbesian image of the Leviathan. On this 
surface of the Simulation, individual experience is subjectivised into the Ideal side of the 
Simulation. Experience is totalised by the concepts/Ideas or faces of the Symbolic, but the 
subject experiences the facialised social as a field of possibles. Thus, the Face's function is to 
produce an affective desire for the Symbolic's desire and the possibles its laws authorise. 
Beyond this surface of the face, experience is not totalised by the concepts/Ideas or faces of 
the symbolic; the subject struggles against this totalisation. The subject rejects this totalisation 
because it experiences the facialised social as a field that forecloses possibles.  In this case, the 
Simulation loses its affective power. As we will see in this chapter, when a subject desire 
possibles that the Nasserist Symbolic prohibits, the Face violates the integrity of their bodies. 
In this case, the Face assumes its repressive function by traumatising the subject’s bodily 
experience into desiring the possibles included in the series of time of the Nasserist Symbolic.  
This chapter draws from the concept of faciality, to argue that as a Face of enfoldment 
of the colonial Simulation, Nasserism thought liberation as a copy of its colonial simulacrum. 
Nasserism’s spiralling into the world of phantasms further illustrates its pathologisation of the 
politics of liberation. The chapter argues that its ‘liberated’ Face masks a beneath that exposes 
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the totalising violence of its repressive function. To this end, this chapter unfolds in just 
one moment that examines the Nasserist Facialization of the social as a mechanism-of-
capture of liberated possibles/desires rather than as their liberation.  The first section 
looks into the Nasserist productions of multiple Signifiers/simulacra of liberation. In 
particular, it focuses on how it thought liberation within both the international and 
domestic contexts. It will highlight how this surface Nasserism presents itself as both 
an affect and percept of liberation. The second section challenges the liberating affect 
of Nasserism by looking at how its facialization reduced the social to the Objects of 
phantasm/knowledge of its Symbolic. In doing so, the section argues, Nasserism 
became a totalising vision of subjective capture that actualised itself through a totalising 
state. Finally, its third section exposes the repressive function of the Nasserist 
Simulation by looking into the ways in which Nasserism simulated itself as a 
revolutionary affect, an affect of ‘liberated time’. The section argues this Simulation 
reproduces colonial semiosis whereby the semiotic process is totalised by the Symbolic 
and its world of phantasms. As the face or distorted mirror image of the social, 
Nasserism mediated its subjects’ sense of experience.  This Ideal-reality or Simulation 
that the Symbolic of the regime projected is particularly problematic, the section further 
argues, because it forecloses the reality/intensity of its violence from its surface. The 
totalising repression and repeated dehumanisation exemplify this violence that the state 
unleashed on dissidents.  
  MIRRORED FACES OF A REVOLUTIONARY EGO: NASSERISM AS A 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL  REVOLUTION 
 
This section examines the multiple Signifiers/simulacra of liberation used by 
Nasserism to talk about both its international and domestic contexts. At the 
international level, Nasser did so by supporting liberation movements and calling on 
the union of Arab Nations. The Nasserist vision also established a filiation between the 
domestic Egyptian Revolution and the need to move beyond the politics of Imperialism. 
In his speeches, he often used humour to draw his audience into his vision of political 
developments. At the domestic level, Nasser projected the vision of Nasserism as the 
continuation of the anti-colonial fight. Accordingly, in Nasserist terms, the Egyptian 
push against colonialism could not be reduced to a push for territorial independence. In 
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contrast, it ought to be conceived as a push against the subjective, epistemic and material 
alienation of Imperialist-Capitalist reality. In his speeches, Nasser often acknowledged that the 
struggle for change would be long, although he also always pointed out that things had already 
started to change. If he pushed one point across, it was that a revolution was in the making. In 
the Philosophy of the Revolution and his speeches, Nasser portrayed the Revolution as 
multiplicity.16 At the international level, this multiplicity involved three circles. The first circle 
is the Arab circle, which Nasser saw as the most important. Nasser’s pan-Arabist vision 
conceptualised all Arab nations as forming one unified face: 
  
“Is it still possible for us to ignore that there exists, around us, an Arab circle, and that 
this circle is part of us and we of it, our history mixed with his, our interests linked to his, in 
fact and in truth, and not just in words?”17 
 
In 1958, during the UAR establishment, Nasser further explained: “The Arab homeland 
is an indissoluble political and economic unit; no Arab territory can complete the very 
conditions of its existence if it remains isolated from other territories. The nation, the Arab 
umma, constitutes a spiritual and cultural unity; all the differences between its members are 
superficial and false and will disappear entirely with the awakening of the Arab conscience.”18 
Nasser’s goal was to unify Arab countries into one nation. To this end, Egypt attempted 
to unite with several Arab countries. In February 1958, Egypt and Syria merged to form the 
United Arab Republic, and in 1958 Yemen joined the union.19 However, the UAR collapsed in 
September 1961 following the Syrian army's seizing of power and the proclamation of Syria's 
independence.20 In March 1963, negotiations to form a new union between Egypt, Syria and 
Iraq started in Cairo but eventually failed. Nasser’s Pan-Arabism meant he also actively 
supported anti-colonial and nationalist movements in several countries. In Tunisia, he helped 
Salah Benyoussef who opposed Bourguiba before the latter became president.  In Algeria, he 
supported financially, militarily and politically the FLN, with many members finding refuge in 
 
16 Gamal Abdel Nasser , The Philosophy of the Revolution, [Publisher: S.I., 196-?], LSE Library Archives 
Special 
17 Excerpt from The Philosophy of the Revolution in. Anouar Abdel-Malek Egypt Military Society, (New 
York: Random House, 1968), op. cit., p.244 
18 Abdel-Malek, Egypt Military Society, p.248 
19 Robert McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952, 1957, (Portland: 
Taylor and Francis, 2003), p.163, pp.175-171 
20 Ibid., pp.175-171 
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Cairo.21 In the Arab peninsula, Nasser supported nationalist forces that opposed Britain, 
and in the Mashreq, he endorsed the MNA (Mouvement des Nationalistes Arabes). 
Nasser’s support for Arab liberation movement did make a difference. His support for 
the Algerian FLN, for example, played a significant role in helping Algeria’s National 
Revolution, also known as the War of Independence.22 Nonetheless, Nasser’s rhetoric 
and policies also posited Egypt at the centre of the Arab circle.  In this way, Nasser set 
Egypt and thus Nasserism as the ultimate model of Arab Revolution. Accordingly, in 
the Nasserist vision, this model ought to be reproduced by the rest of the Arab nation. 
The second circle was the Islamic circle.  As seen in the previous chapter, 
Nasser increasingly used Islamic imagery and used Islam to promote his Pan-Arab 
socialism. His push for Egypt's growing role in re-defining Islam at the international 
level mirrors his domestic level tactics.  It also entailed a fight for influence that 
opposed Egypt and Saudi Arabia, whose regime legitimacy is in part built around its 
role as custodian of Mecca as well as on its Salafi ideology. Saudi Arabia used Nasser’s 
turn to socialism to discredit his piousness. Nasser’s harsh repression of the Ikhwan 
provided further ammunitions in the rhetorical battle. In retort, Nasser denied Saudi 
Arabia's legitimacy by denouncing its ties with Western forces, insisting that “the valet 
of imperialism cannot be Muslim” 23  or that “Islam is by its nature opposed to 
imperialism, feudalism and capitalist exploitation”.24This took place the two countries 
were involved in a bitter rivalry for influence in the region, as exemplified by their 
support for warring factions in Yemen.25 At the beginning of the Saudi-Egyptian proxy 
confrontation in Yemen, Nasser made a speech in which he openly insulted Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan - who acted as its ally-, saying: “Since the first day until yesterday, 
we have had a total loss of 136 officers and soldiers, twenty-one officers and hundred 
and fifteen soldiers. Each of their shoes has more honour than the crowns of Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan.”26 Nasser’s attack was met by loud applause from his audience. 
 
21 For more on Nasser’s support for the Algerian FLN and his relationship with the Algerian people see 
Mohamed Fathi Al Dib, Abdel Nasser et la révolution algérienne, (Paris:  L'Harmattan, c1985.) 
22 Ibid., pp.167-71 
23 Port-Saïd, speech on 23 décembre 1964 in Balta Paul, Rulleau Claudine, La vision Nassérienne, (Paris: 
Ed. Sindbad, 1982), p.217 
24 Speech in a banquet in the honour of the Mauritanien President on March 27, 1967, in Ibid., p.136 
25 Gerges, Making the Arab World, p.192, p.290 
26 Speech from Nasser on December 23, 1962, Filmed archive, ‘Egypt President Nasser: Shoe More 
Honorable Than Crown of Saudi Arabia’, YouTube. Accessible from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3YA96PG9Opc  
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Another example of the rivalry is the diplomatic chess game they both played during the 
American-Syrian crisis of 1957 but that Nasser eventually won. As the crisis unfolded, the 
Eisenhower administration plotted to overthrow the Syrian regime, following reports of 
rapprochement between Syria and the Soviet leadership. 27   In October 1957, the Syrian 
government became aware of the plot and retorted by firing three American diplomats.28  The 
American administration responded by declaring the Syrian ambassador to Washington and his 
second secretary persona non-grata.29 In an effort to de-escalate the crisis, the Americans asked 
Saudi Arabia to mediate between them and Syria.  Saudi and America both agreed on the need 
to isolate Nasser and America insisted on Saudi support for regime change in Syria would help 
it consolidate its role in the Arab world.30  Due to Nasser's rise as a defender of pan-Arab 
interests, Saudi refused to officially align itself with America. Consequently, it engaged in 
diplomatic negotiations with Syria, America and a series of other Arab actors. America then 
turned to another contender, Turkey. Indeed, the country was equally concerned about Soviet 
influence and ultimately threatened intervention by amassing troops along the border with 
Syria.31 While Saudi attempted to bolster the ongoing negotiations, Nasser sent troops to the 
Syrian coastal city of Latakia. Saudi was taken by surprise and found itself marginalised from 
the rest of the talks.32 A few months later, Nasser and Syria merged into the UAR.  
Finally, the third circle was the African circle. A year after Nasser’s ascension to the 
presidency, Egypt opened its first African Affairs Bureau.  From 1959 it opened bureaus for 
the representatives of African Liberation Movements including for the Combatant de la Liberte 
of Rwanda and Burundi, the National Democratic Party of South Rhodesia, the ALC and the 
ANC from South Africa as well as the MPLA and the UNITA in Angola, the PAIGC from 
Guinea Bissau and the ZAPU from Zimbabwe.   Nasser supported all of those movements, 
both militarily and financially. In 1961 Egypt was also part of the Casablanca Group which 
comprised Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco for a short period. 
Egypt also played an essential role in the formative moment of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Nasser summarised the goals of the bloc before its first formal summit. In a speech 
on November 27, 1958, he explained: “As for our international policy, it is one of work for 
 
27 David W. Lesch, ‘Gamal Abd al-Nasser and an Example of Diplomatic Acumen’, Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Apr. 1995), pp. 362-374, p.362 
28 Ibid., p.363 
29 Ibid., p.363 
30 Ibid., p.363 
31 Ibid., p.365-366 
32 Ibid., p.367 
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easing tension now that humanity has reached a stage where it has become a necessity 
to end the Cold War and lay the foundation of peace. We support the right to self-
determination; we stand by all the nations that are struggling for their independence 
and work towards ending the power policies pursued by the big powers. We work for 
the liquidation of the spheres of influence bearing in mind that the independence gained 
real so that the smaller nations would not be toys in the hands of the big ones. We are 
struggling to prevent atomic weapons and support disarmament so that all efforts can 
be directed towards development. ... This is why we are determined that our policy be 
one of neutrality and non-alignment, a policy that works for peace, prevention of war 
and disarmament for the sake of humanity at large.”33 
For Nasser, international and national were inherently linked. Accordingly, 
national independence could not be reduced to just nominal territorial independence. 
This was made explicitly clear in a speech in which he criticised the principle of aid 
conditionality:  
 
“When we communicate with international states, we communicate to prevent 
interference in our work. However, if the United States give us aid to exercise their 
influence on us and our politics, we will tell them that we cannot accept. We will tell 
them that we are ready to drop our consumption of tea, of coffee, or other goods but 
that we will keep our independence and that we refuse to lose the gains we made in 
1956.”34 
 
The speech then broke into a joke:  
 
“Let’s talk seriously; We receive wheat, meat and chicken from America, but 
trust me, we will never receive factories from them”, Nasser told the audience as it burst 
into laughter. “[….] Yesterday the US ambassador met with the vice president's first 
secretary to discuss matters related to consumption. The ambassador was upset and 
vexed. [more laughter in the audience]. They were supposed to discuss the food aid 
 
33 Nasser's Speech to the General Co-Operatives' Conference, 27 November 1958, in Khalid I. Babaa, “The 
"Third Force" and the United Nations”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
Vol. 362, Nonalignment in Foreign Affairs (NNov.1965), pp. 81-91, p.88. 
34 Filmed archive of Nasser’s speech on refusing international aid, “Gamal Abdel Nasser discourt de refus 
de l'aide internationale”, YouTube. Accessible from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GoK3IDuwDgA 
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given to us by the US. I can’t really tell you what he said because they do not appreciate our 
mode of functioning. I personally tell those who do not like our way of doing things…as we 
say in Egypt, if you are unhappy you can go and drink….what? The water from the sea”, the 
audience replied, again bursting in laughter…35 “Should the Mediterranean not be enough, I 
can advise the red sea. [Even greater laughter]. What I want to say is that we will never lose 
our independence for 30 or 40 million pounds. We are not ready to allow them to say the wrong 
thing. We will cut the tongue of whoever says the wrong thing…”36  
 
In this speech, Nasser highlighted the continued attempts by the US to interfere in 
Egypt’s affair. He also positioned himself as the guarantor and custodian of Egyptian 
independence and through this of the Revolution. With him, Egypt had not only asserted its 
independence on the international scene; it also had regained its pride and dignity. These ideals 
are some of the signifiers that Nasser repeatedly used to describe the Nasserist Revolution.  
Another speech made in the aftermath of the 1956 tripartite aggression of the country is equally 
telling. Nasser spoke of the British propaganda against his involvement in Yemen which he 
linked to the British defeat in 1956. He insisted that his presidency had literally changed how 
other countries looked at Egypt and how Egyptians could look at themselves and act.  He also 
implicitly drew an analogy between his victory against the tripartite aggression and a message 
that ordinary Egyptians had scribbled on the walls of Port Said in response to the attack:  
 
“Last Friday, four days ago, the British broadcast station made a show about Yemen, 
the BBC. And then, they went and insulted Gamal Abdel Nasser; with bad names. But 
we….they used to bring one vessel here, and it would shake the government. Today, if they 
insult us, we can beat them with shoes and insult them from the biggest one to the smallest one. 
[laughter and applause] They brought a fleet and what happened? [More applause] They 
brought a fleet here to Port said, we defeated them. Did the fleet work for them when they 
brought them over in 1956? Or the parachutes they sent? Spent 100 million pounds and they 
came out demoralised. They came out embarrassed. And now all they can do is insult us. When 
they call us names, we feel that we are important. In the past, when Times magazine wrote 
something, the head of the Egyptian government fell. And now they want to insult us? Well, 
we can insult them. Aren’t our papers able to insult their Queen and Prime Minister? Of course, 
 
35 Filmed archive of Nasser’s speech on refusing international aid, YouTube 
36 Ibid.  
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we can. Remember the insult written on the wall in Port said. [Applause] Remember 
those word? Should we let them know what you wrote on those walls? You said your 
Queen is what?? [The audience screams the word “bitch” as Nasser hid his laughing 
face by facing the floor.] Well, if the subject is about insult…I mean.. the world is 
changing…The world has changed…We feel that we are strong. We feel that the world 
has changed. When the British came out and said Gamal Abdel Nasser is a dog, [boos 
in the crowds], we can come back and call them the sons of sixty dogs. [Applause and 
laughter]….”37 
 
As we can see from the audience's reaction, Nasser's speeches produced an 
affective sense of liberation. Egyptians could laugh at British imperialism because they 
had been freed of the yoke of colonialism. Nasserism produced political humour as a 
sense of liberation, of agency. Nasserism represented liberated desire.  
THE DOMESTIC LEVEL 
At the domestic level, the production of the Revolution took up a particular face: Arab 
Socialism. The Nasserist state repeatedly affirmed that its function was to produce a 
postcolonial socialist reality. Nasser described his vision of socialism as follow: 
 
“The goal that we seek is to abolish colonisation and to abolish exploitation. 
The Islamists say that socialism is blasphemy. Okay then, why is socialism blasphemy? 
Socialism gives the workers who shed their blood their rights. It gives the peasants their 
rights. Socialism gives opportunities to everyone. Socialism provides better access to 
healthcare; it abolishes feudalism; it changes society from a society of slave owners to 
a free society. What is Socialism? It gives back their humanity to the people. […]”38 
 
At the domestic level, the Socialist Revolution was also conceived as a 
multiplicity that involved a succession of events that each would help produce a new 
and commonly-shared reality. Nasser argued: “Every nation on earth undergoes two 
 
37 Filmed Archive of Nasser’s speech, ‘Jamal Abdel Nasser defines Socialism in his own words’, YouTube. 
Accessible from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ExaonayiLQs 
38 Ibid. 
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revolutions: One is political, in which it recovers its rights for self-government from an 
imposed despot, or an aggressive army occupying its army without its consent. The 
second Revolution is social, in which the classes of society would struggle against each 
other until justice for all countrymen has been gained, and conditions have become 
stable. [..] Other nations have preceded us along the path of human progress and passed 
through the two revolutions but not simultaneously. Hundreds of years separated the one from 
the other. In the case of our nation, it is going through the two revolutions together.”39As this 
excerpt shows, Nasser conceived the Revolution as a natural phenomenon; perhaps even a 
natural law of nation-states' development.  
According to Nasserism, Egypt’s exceptionality lied in its accomplishment of two 
simultaneous revolutions: one political, the other social. These revolutions were conceived as 
popular because beyond the question of interests, Nasser also saw the people and the state as 
one: a nation-state.  The symbiotic relationship is highlighted in the ways Nasser himself talked 
of the relationship: 
 
“It is the people who lead, and not Gamal Abdel Nasser or any other groups. Gamal 
Abdel Nasser is only the tool that carries out the will of the people.”40  
 
“No leader can create the people, but the people can create the leader…”41 
 
“My fellow citizens, every time I meet you, I feel stronger because my strength is 
derived from yours.”42  
 
“On no accounts can there be leaders feeling strong unless the people themselves are 




39  Sami Ayad Hanna, George H. Gardner (eds.) Arab Socialism. [al-Ishtirakīyah Al-ʻArabīyah]: A 
Documentary Survey, (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1969), p.101 
40 Gamal Abdel Nasser, “The People is Supreme”, Alleppo speech 18 Feb, cited in Yitzhak Oron, Middle 
East Record Volume 1, 1960,( The Moshe Dayan Center, 1960),  p.469 




In Nasser’s times, socialist thought still upheld socialism as a political doctrine 
that could change state economy from a market to a labour economy. The political 
Revolution was to be followed by a socio-economic revolution. In Arab Socialism Sami 
A Hanna and George, H. Gardner explains that: 
 
 “The social Revolution, originally made possible by a political revolution of somewhat 
limited horizons, soon sets the stage for a higher phase of political Revolution. A coup d’état 
paves the way for social changes, which culminate in socialism; and socialism, in turn, paves 
the way for true democracy, socialist democracy, which is the political counterpart, the climax 
and the objective of socialism.”44 
 
In theory, Arab Socialism implied a shift from a market to a labour economy. 
This was set as the first step towards replacing the capitalist-colonial system with a new 
reality: a socialist reality. Nasser viewed colonialism as a system in which the state 
represented the interests of a particular class: the capitalist class. This class had created 
its native twin through colonialism: an Egyptian bourgeois capitalist class with which 
it formed an international class alliance. Nasserism thus saw capitalism as a force that 
took up the form of an international class alliance that used the state as a vehicle to 
multiply their interests. In this way, the interests of the capitalists could continue to be 
represented, this even in the event of independence. In this image, state and capitalism 
are two Faces of the same coin: capitalist colonialism.45 Nasserism thus posited a 
contingency between capitalism as an economic form and a political mode of 
governance. In the Nasserist vision, this contingency produced a modern form of 
coloniality. Nasser argued that in such conditions, a capitalist democratic system could 
only create a factitious democracy. “He who monopolises and controls the fortunes of 
farmers and workers can, in consequence, monopolise and control their votes as well 
as impose his will upon them. The freedom of the loaf of bread is an indispensable 
guarantee of the freedom of the vote.”46 
 
 
44 Gardner, Arab Socialism, p.107 
45 In this sense, Egypt’s liberal era was one of Liberal economics and where the political was articulated as 
just a transliteration of the economic field:  parties could only represent the economic interests of the class 
they represented. 
46 Gardner, Arab Socialism, p.114 
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Nasser opposed the identity of Nasserism to the colonial-capitalist state. The Nasserist 
state would produce dignity and social justice. In the Nasserist image of social justice, the 
social field is organised around an equal share of the nation’s wealth, equal access to the state’s 
services and an equal opportunity for self-realisation and dignity for all citizens. Nasserism 
however, also emphasised that equality amongst all citizens is in itself impossible since it 
would aim at equalising human beings who are essentially unequal in their abilities.47 In this 
image, social justice takes up the face of social liberty, with social liberty defined as the absence 
of social alienation. Socialism is thus conceptualised not as an ideology but rather as a 
productive process through which social liberation can be achieved. 48  Furthermore, the 
Nasserist vision insisted that democracy would emerge from the new societal it was producing: 
“Democracy is political liberty; socialism is social liberty; the two cannot be separated. They 
are the two wings of true freedom, without which, or without either of which, freedom cannot 
soar up to the horizons of the anticipated tomorrow.”49 Or again “political democracy cannot 
exist under the domination of any one class.”50 
Nasserism thus appeared to be producing a new form of democracy, a socialist 
democracy where no class would have hegemony over the other. Only this would ensure the 
necessary social liberty through which political liberty could be exercised. But even in theory, 
things got complicated. The Nasserist repertoire of Revolution is an aggregate of concepts that 
are contingent on others. Thus, social liberty is contingent on social justice, and social justice 
is contingent on yet another Idea: equality. In this vision, social justice, therefore, takes up the 
form of equality.  This equality was to articulate itself as a freedom of choice with each citizen 
having the possibility to “determine his place in society by his own work and his own effort.”51 
Social justice is thus seen as a continuation at the individual level of the principle of national 
self-determination. The Nasserist vision implicitly established a contingency between national 
independence as the sovereignty to determine its mode of government and the citizens' 
individual liberty to determine their place in the societal economy.  
Domestically, at the individual level, independence was also contingent on equal access 
to opportunity: “The son of a Pasha became a Pasha at birth; he was born with a golden spoon 
in his mouth and grew up to find the countrywide open to him. The son of the overseer became 
 
47 Ibid., p.112 
48  Ibid., p.252 
49 Ibid., p.108 
50 Ibid. p.114 
51 Nasser speech on December 23, 1961, cited in Gardner Arab Socialism, p.112 
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a hired farmer on the land. Under socialism, every individual shall have a chance and 
an opportunity. This is what I mean when I talk about dissolving class barriers: there 
shall be no Pashas, no beys, no masters…Indeed, there shall be equality and freedom 
for each individual in this nation.”52 
 
This equal access needed to be produced in various sectors: 
 
 “Neither the law of justice, nor divine law allows that wealth should be 
hereditary and that poverty should be hereditary; that health should be hereditary, and 
that illness should be hereditary; that learning should be hereditary and that illiteracy 
should be hereditary; that human dignity should be hereditary and that human 
degradation should be hereditary.”53  
 
Nasser saw Socialism as a method that would ultimately foster a society where 
class hierarchy would stop being the primary sociological mode of organisation: 
 
 “I want a society in which class distinctions are dissolved through equality of 
opportunities to all citizens. I want a society in which the free individual can determine 
his own position by himself, on the basis of his efficiency, capacity and character.”54 
This was not a classless society. Instead as Sami A. Hanna and George H. Gardner 
explained, it is “a society with diverse classes, each performing a valid social function, 
and all free from domination and exploitation […] It is a vertical stratification of 
classes, so to speak, in accordance with which some are subordinate and exploited while 
others are dominant and exploitative that Nasser’s socialism rejects.”55 
 
If capitalism had been synonymous with a class hegemony, then socialism could 
not reproduce this schema. From a Nasserist point of view, capitalism was considered 
a class dictatorship. Socialism would be its positive opposite: it would produce a society 
without a class hegemony: “We are pledged to the establishment of a new socialist 
experience in our country, based on love and brotherhood and not on the domination of 
 
52 Nasser speech on December 23, 1961, cited in Gardner, Arab Socialism, p.112 
53 Ibid., p.113 
54 Nasser speech October 16, 1961, cited in, in Gardner , Arab Socialism, p.113 
55 Ibid., p.113 
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any one class, whatever name it may take….If we declare that we will not allow capitalism or 
feudalism to return, because they represent the rule of a minority, the rule of one class, we also 
declare that we will not allow the dictatorship of the proletariat, as envisaged by communism, 
because that too means the domination of a particular group over all….Our socialism, which 
rejects the rule of one class, shall not fall under the domination of any class…A small group of 
people cannot be allowed to monopolise the political scene, whether in the present or in the 
future: political action belongs to all the people.”56  
 
Nasser summarised his Arab socialism as the pursuit of sufficiency, justice and 
freedom. Sufficiency is the expansion of the nation’s wealth through the increase of production 
and the development of state services: “the true object of production is to provide the greatest 
amount of services.” 57  The national charter lists those services: medical care, education, 
employment and insurance against old age and sickness58. Sufficiency is in this sense the 
prelude to prosperity, which is itself what allows for the coming into being of a just and equal 
society: “In proportion to the expansion of the base of production….new scopes are opened, 
affording equal opportunities to all citizens.”59”  
Overall, the ideal societal form that Nasserism thought was never fully actualised. 
Although Nasserism did lead to a bettering of most Egyptians' socio-economic conditions, it 
never actualised the socialist essence it dreamt of. As seen in Chapter Three, Nasser did 
nationalise the most critical sectors of the economy, but it never deferred decisional power to 
the workers. Instead, Nasser placed his close associates in command, thereby consolidating the 
centralisation of state power that had started with Mohammed Ali and further developed by the 
colonial state. Besides, Nasserism presented a totalising vision of the social that ultimately 
posited the Nasserist regime as a necessary a priori to the production of the Revolution. This 
process of facialization of revolutionary subjectivity/desire produces individuals as the 
consumers of the Ideal-Is produced by the Nasserist Symbolic.  
The process of facialization echoes the processes through which  Society of the 
Spectacle subjectivises individuals into becoming receptacles of the Simulation. The more the 
spectator “contemplates, the less he lives; the more he identifies with the dominant images of 
 
56 Nasser speech on December 18, 1961 cited in, in Hanna, Gardner,  Arab Socialism, p.114 
57 Ibid., p.114 
58 Gardner  Arab Socialism, p.343 
59Ibid, p.109 
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the need, the less he understands his own life and his own desires.”60 Debord’s spectator 
resembles Deleuze and Guattari’s Face made of a white surface and black holes through which 
the system's faces colonise the individual’s sense of self.  
 
FROM MISRECOGNITION TO MIS-REPRESENTATIONS: HOW CAN THE 
SOCIAL BE REPRESENTED WHEN IT IS MISRECOGNISED? 
 
This section examines how Nasserist facialization reduced the social to the 
Objects of phantasm/knowledge of its Symbolic. In doing so, it argues that Nasserism 
became a totalising vision of subjective capture that actualised itself through a totalising 
state. Much has been written on the causes of the failure behind the actualisation of the 
Nasserist socialist framework. Overall most of the analyses acknowledge that the 
Nasserist regime chose to favour capital-intensive development patterns that fitted a 
capitalist model rather than labour-intensive patterns. Anouar Abdel Malek argued that 
while Nasserism successfully uprooted the “controlling position of imperialism”, the 
main issue was that “private ownership was still the dominant mode of production in 
the Egyptian economy as a whole.”61 Besides, he noted that while  
 
“the state-controlled the objectives, the priorities, and the methods of growth of 
the national economy”, economic planning ultimately remained “based on private 
enterprise and […] loosely regulated market.”62  
 
Consequently, he argued that the new economic model mostly benefitted what 
he called the new power elite, which consisted of the “medium and large landowners 
“that had replaced the old, landed aristocracy.63 Ultimately then, during Nasserism, the 
Egyptian economy remained driven by capitalism. 64  Others have argued that the 
socialism of Nasserism was more political than economic. As such, the Nasserist state 
 
60 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, p.16 
61Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society, p.xvi-xvii 
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focused more on developing social welfare to ameliorate the conditions of the working classes 
than on economic development.65  For Mahmoud Hussein, the Nasserist regime embraced 
watered-down socialism mainly due to the increasing popularity of communists in the Arab 
World.66 Indeed, it is interesting that Nasser proclaimed his attachment to Socialism while at 
the same persecuting the Egyptian left. As Peter Johnson explained in his article ‘Egypt under 
Nasser’, ‘the conspiring officers did not insert themselves into the masses to build a popular 
revolutionary organisation. Rather they erected themselves as a vanguard.”67  
Overall, the literature acknowledges an aporia between the Ideal vision of the reality 
that Nasserism claimed it was producing and the concrete reality it produced. As seen earlier, 
Nasser insisted he aimed to actualise a cooperative democracy, but in reality, Nasser 
implemented a corporatist arrangement that selectively strengthened and co-opted working-
class organisations.68 As Schmitter and Lehmbruch explain a corporatist model can be defined 
as: “A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a 
limited number of singularly, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed ( if not created) by the state and 
granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange 
for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
support.”69 
This corporatism was already premised in the Free officers’ vicious crackdown on 
striking workers in Kafr al-Dawar. Only months after the Free Officers took power, strikes 
broke out in unionised textile factories in the Delta. Workers demanded the right to form their 
unions and remove managers from the now-ousted King’s circle.70 The government agreed to 
the first demand but refused to cave to the second. Instead, four workers were summarily 
arrested.71 Then, during a strike at the Misr Spinning Company in Mahallah, police shot four 
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workers.72 Hundreds of demonstrators were wounded, and hundreds were arrested.73 
As this took place, the RCC set up a series of military tribunals to try strikers across the 
country. 74  Two workers Mustapha Kamis and Mohammed Hassan el-Bakri were 
condemned to death. To sentence them, the judge recited a quote Arab quote from the 
Iraqi Omayyad governor al-Hajjaj bin Youssuf:” I see those ripen heads, it is time to 
harvest them.”75 A few weeks later, tanks intervened to stop elections organised by 
General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions and arrested his general secretary 
Mohammed Ali Amer who was imprisoned and tortured.76  
As Maha Abdelrahman explained “Nasser wasted no time in showing his unbending 
opposition to workers’ strike irrespective of the nature of their demands. His actions 
demonstrated clearly to all workers that he had no qualm about using the violence necessary to 
quash any form of strike.”77 Moreover, as Beinin explained “the government’s concern 
for productivity and economic development limited workers’ freedom to express their 
own vision of their role in the new industrial Egypt.”78Nasser followed the same model 
to reorganise associations. By restructuring them along corporatist lines, he ensured 
their interests would coalesce with those of the state. In this context, Nasserism 
misrepresented itself by insisting it was producing a revolution that would create a free 
society.  In this way, Nasserism misrepresented the social relations it established 
between the state and its people. Rather than building a cooperative democracy, 
Nasserism planted the seed of state corporatism. The creation of the Egyptian Trade 
Union Federation (ETUF) in 1957 only further illustrate such developments. As Gilbert 
Achcar noted, ETUF leaders were drawn from the ruling party, and their task was to 
control the working-class rather than defend its interests.79 By 1956 communists had 
become increasingly critical of Nasser’s crackdown on the labour movement, which 
only intensified state repression against them.  
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It is then paradoxical, if not absurd that socialism under Nasser entailed the 
imprisonment of socialist thinkers and political figures. In doing so, Nasserism aimed 
at foreclosing the socialist possibles that did not match its temporal sequencing of space 
from its production of reality. Thus, while on the surface, Nasserism appeared to open 
up the social to a socialist reality, it foreclosed the possibility of a socialist mode of 
governance. Indeed, Nasser drew his process of socialist planification from the theory 
developed by Charles Bettelheim, who was a friend of Louis Althusser. Bettelheim’s 
theory of planification was put into praxis by several governments, including Algeria, 
Egypt and Cuba. Bettelheim opposed market economy, which he saw as the most 
developed form of capitalist economy, to planification. In a market economy, ‘the 
ultimate and real economic decisions are made by individual economic agents 
themselves driven by their economic interests.”80 In contrast, planification is the form of a 
socialist economy in which “workers are the collective proprietors of their means of 
production”.81  In this vision, the workers' ownership of their means of production ought to 
provide the foundation for the withering away of market economy.82  
In Bettelheim’s view, planification could never be fully actualised in advanced 
capitalist economies because capitalist refused to relinquish their control over the means of 
production. In such conditions, ex-colonies that wanted to depart from their colonial-capitalist 
framework presented a better possibility for the theory's actualisation. For Bettelheim, 
socialism's concretisation is contingent on the form that its social structure takes up and the 
nature of the classes that take an active part in leading this change.83 In theory, planification is 
thus in-itself contingent on the workers owning their means of productions, since, without this, 
they cannot be in charge of the fundamental economic decisions. This, however, is also 
contingent on an a priori set of conditions. Firstly, planification can only unfold in a social 
structure emptied of its capitalist imprint: everyone ought to be workers. In the words of 
Bettelheim,  society first ought to be purged of” non-workers, exploiters and other social 
parasites who enjoy the power of money.’84 Secondly, this is in-itself contingent on another a 
priori condition: it is the society as a whole, not a minority of individuals that ought to own the 
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means of production. 85  This fact then also requires another a priori condition: 
nationalisation of the principal modes of production and exchange.86   The theory's 
actualisation was itself to be supervised by technical and political managers, in other 
words, experts. 
Throughout Nasser’s time in power, the majority of the workers never owned their 
means of production. Indeed, as seen in Chapter Three,  although Nasser nationalised the 
economy and set up cooperatives, decisional power always remained in his hands. Indeed, 
when Nasser was not directly in command, he delegated to close associates of his. Besides as 
Bier noted, “over the course of the 1950s, members of the effendiyya came to provide the bulk 
of the middle and upper ranks within the public sector which by the early 1960s included not 
only agencies dealing with social service provision, but also the press, the cinema and 
publishing.[…] They belonged to an emergent and increasingly powerful state elite who, as 
Roel Meijer has argued derived their authority and influence from their claims to be agent of 
modernisation.”87 Meanwhile, as Bier also pointed out, it was rare to find in the press the voices 
of those towards which state policies were engineered, namely the peasants and the urban 
poor.88  
In theory, the Nasserist vision presented an equivalence between state interests and the 
collective interests of individuals. In this model, centralised power is re-thought as a transversal 
collective desire that ethicises the laws of the political and the reality they produce. In praxis, 
however, the Nasserist process of planification consolidated the centralisation of state power 
by foreclosing the possibilities of workers owning their means of production. Nasser, it must 
be noted, defended his non-formal approach to the actualisation of socialist theory. 
Revolutionary Socialism, he insisted, was guided by practical reason. In his address to the 
opening session of the Preparatory Committee of the National Congress of Popular Forces on 
November 25, 1961he explained: 
 
“Many people say we have no theory; they would like you to give us a theory. What is 
the theory we are following? We answer a socialist democratic cooperative society. But they 
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persist in asking for a clearly defined theory. I ask them, what is the object of a theory? I say 
that I was not asked on July 23 to stage the Revolution with a printed book, including my 
theory. This is impossible. If we had stopped to write such a book before July 23, we would 
never have succeeded in carrying out two operations at the same time. Those who ask for a 
theory are greatly complicating matters. This is torture.”89 
 
Overall, by affirming the primacy of practical reason, Nasserism did not reverse the 
colonial logic, it inversed it, it produced a copy of it. This inversion masks an antagonism 
between the transversal model of power and collective desire included in the concept of a 
socialist democratic cooperative society and the Nasserist state's corporatist reality. As this 
section argues, by foreclosing the possibilities for workers to own the means of their 
production, Nasserism exposes the repressive function of its Symbolic.  The section has argued 
that the Nasserist Symbolic prohibits the production of a reality underpinned by a transversal 
collective desire out of which ethics of political liberation could emerge. This Oedipalisation 
of individual desire produces the political as a parallax object, an object of Nasserist phantasms. 
As subjects of the political Egyptians are then subjectivised into the political Simulation of 
Nasserism and its production of the political as a simulacrum of liberation. This simulacrum, 
this chapter has further argued, is a copy of the colonial simulacrum because it affects 
individual subjectivity to the extent of colonising the individual’s sense of Selfhood and sense 
of being-in-the-world. It is the more of a machine of capture than a machine of liberation. 
 
 
BENEATH THE SURFACE: NASSERISM AND ITS AFFECT AS 
REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE 
 
This section further exposes the repressive function of Nasserist liberation by looking 
at the Nasserism simulation of itself as a revolutionary affect. The section argues this 
Simulation reproduces colonial semiosis whereby the semiotic process is totalised by the 
symbolic and its world of phantasms. As the Face of the social, Nasserism was able to act as a 
site/surface of Identification that affected its subjects’ sense of experience and this desire. The 
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Nasserist state used various mediums to capture national subjectivity and subjectivise 
Egyptian into its facialization of individual subjectivity. As seen in chapter three, it 
used the laws and the justice system, policies, strategies and disciplining techniques, 
Islam and the press. Other means of subjectivation that the state used included songs, 
the radio, and as we have seen in an earlier section, Nasser’s speeches were often 
broadcast on Egyptian radio and television. Many Egyptians gathered in cafes as well 
as in each other’s’ homes to watch him. 90  Indeed, radio and television relentlessly 
reported on his activities.91 His portraits were also present in public space and private 
spaces, renown Egyptian singers glorified him in songs, and school children were 
taught nationalist songs that honoured him. 92  National star Oum Khaltoum, for 
example, helped disseminate the regime’s signifying semiotics through her songs. She 
chanted the Suez Canal nationalisation, the land redistribution or the construction of 
the Aswan Damn, thereby relaying the ideal vision of the Revolution in the making as 
advanced by the regime. In this way, national subjectivity and regime subjectivity 
coalesced into the same image, the same being.  
Sawt al-Arab, The Voice of the Arabs, is another important medium that the 
Nasserist state used to mediate the audience’s experience/sense of reality. It captivated 
national subjectivity throughout the Nasserist period. Its radio service began on July 4, 
1953, and by 1956 it had a twenty-four-hour service. 93  The radio could reach the 
illiterate part of the population and the remote rural regions, which allowed it to reach 
out to the fellahin well beyond urban centres.  Its subjective pulling power meant it 
received an average of 3000 letters every day from its listeners. 94  Programming 
included news, commentary, press reviews, speeches as well as interviews with various 
Arab politicians. It also broadcasted an entertainment program that incorporated music 
and politics. Ahmed Said was the director of the Voice of the Arabs radio program and 
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is believed to be the author of the radio’s famous tagline “Calling on the Arab nation from the 
heart of Cairo.” He hosted two favourite programs “Truth and Lies” and “Do Not Forget” and 
rapidly gained notoriety for his acerbic political commentaries.  Of course, his sharp words 
were always directed towards the enemies of Nasserism. The radio itself was a powerful tool 
of propaganda for the regime but of interest to this section is its subjective pulling power of 
interpellation, which the programme ‘Truth and Lies’ illustrates perfectly. In the programme, 
an announcer would read newspaper articles critical of Nasser. Said would then step in to report 
and explain “the truth”. The program “Do Not Forget” was used to foster mobilisation and 
resentment against all the designated enemies of Nasserism, including imperialist powers, 
Israel, and domestic dissidents. The radio also broadcasted songs that praised Nasser and his 
accomplishments. While the radio disseminated a perfect image of the Nasserist leadership, it 
had a comedy show that parodied other Arab leaders.  
Sawt al-Arab also focused on articulating the reality of pan-Arabism by promoting Arab 
Unity and encouraged anti-imperialist revolutions across the region. It thus supported the 
political struggles in North Africa and was a potent tool in fostering Egyptian support for the 
Algerian Revolution. It also allowed the FLN access to its facilities. The radio was very critical 
of the Bagdad Pact, even calling on Jordanians to launch a campaign against their country’s 
involvement in the accord and target political figures including the prime Minister. The radio’s 
propaganda went so far that during the 1967 war, Said was claiming victory as Egypt was 
losing the war. Millions of Egyptians and beyond them Arabs religiously tuned in to hear about 
the developments and firmly believed Sawt al-Arab’s reports of victory. When the news that 
Egypt had lost surfaced, people were in shock. The cerebral-Ideality of Nasserism was 
crumbling in front of them.  
By using so many means of subjectivation, the state was able to establish its 
representation of reality as the primary signifier/surface through which experience was 
mediated. This Ideal-reality or Simulation that the Symbolic of the regime projected is 
particularly problematic because it forecloses the reality/intensity of its violence from its 
surface. The totalising repression and repeated dehumanisation exemplify this violence that the 
state unleashed on dissidents. The reality of Nasserist prisons is a tragic illustration of the 
violence inherent in producing the political as an object of phantasms of the state. Subjects that 
resisted the Nasserist processes of facialization were repressed in the harshest ways.  When the 
Face of the state fails to overcode the head of its subjects, it attacks the integrity of their bodies. 
It violates it by traumatising bodies into submission. The state's laws testify of its 
sadomasochist desire and its imposition of this sadomasochism as the only acceptable form of 
 179 
individual desire. The Nasserist laws reproduce the laws of colonial reality, whereby 
the subject needs to admit its foundational guilt. Indeed, Nasserism reifies the necessity 
of subjective castration as an a priori to its reality: a good subject is a subject that meets 
the requirements of the Nasserist state and its desire. Only then, can the subject 
experience their sense of Selfhood as a sense of agency.  
In his speeches, Nasser linked dignity, humanity, and independence to post-
colonialism, but its treatment of dissidents highlights how Nasserism thought of 
liberation as a copy of the colonial simulacra. Indeed, as the years went by, the regime's 
prisons had become the cesspool of Egyptian problems.95 All dissidents were thrown 
in them: communists, Jews, Brothers, members of the pre-52 elite, former Officers and 
even members of their families, even a former Algerian deputy.96 In the Nasserist 
prisons, prisoners were everyday plunged deeper and deeper into a hole called 
dehumanisation. The first thing taken away from them was their speech (parole): it was 
forbidden to speak even with signs. The only sounds allowed were the screams 
prisoners let out as they were being tortured, followed by the sounds of their bones 
breaking.97 The second thing taken from them was their senses: how does one sense life 
when one’s body is traumatised into being so numb it does not feel anything anymore? 
In those prisons, bodies would get punched anywhere really: the face, the guts, the feet, 
the back, the arms.98 Any little piece of skin was the territoriality of the correctional 
officers. Some beatings were so bad they could wound prisoners to the point where they 
could not walk for months. Some beatings were so harsh prisoners died. They were all 
already Khaled Saeed. At times, guards would launch a beating offensive on a group of 
prisoners that would last the whole day. Other prisoners in their cells would have to 
hear the sounds of beatings and the chains put on prisoners.99 Some prisoners’ physical 
torture was used to torture others psychologically. They were hitting two birds with one 
stone.  
Another routine included guards pumping air in the intestines of detainees. 
Abdel Kader Oda a former judge; Ibrahim el Tayeb, a lawyer; Youssef Talaat, a 
merchant and Cheikh Farghali, a theologian from Al-Azhar, who were Ikhwan 
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members all testified to having suffered such ordeal. 100  The guards’ savagery often targeted 
members of the Ikhwan and communists. Some of them who had been arrested but not yet 
charged were tied upside-down with ropes and made to hang from the ceiling.101 Others were 
stripped of their clothes and beaten for hours, with a team of guards mercilessly relaying each 
other.102 In one instance, guards filled the cells of Ikhwan detainees who were awaiting trial 
with water, forcing them to remain there for days with water up to their bellies.103 By the time 
they attended their trials, those prisoners had been reduced to mere skeletons.104 
In prisons, confinement is both material and subjective, but in Nasserist prisons, 
everything was done to make prisoner lose touch with reality. The modalities of experience 
were articulated around one axiom: the repetition of dehumanisation. Living in prisons is about 
repetition: the repetition of violence, of confinement, of trauma. Trauma is one of those things 
that can only be experienced in a modality of repetition; each repetition producing a greater 
surplus of violence… torture, screams, silence. Perhaps silence was the worst because it could 
announce the death of the prisoner who was being tortured. Prisoners found themselves 
subjectively alienated by the fear and paranoia of the present to come. Death was everywhere, 
so present it hegemonised life. Anyone could be killed in just one moment. The example of 
Farid Haddad, a young Egyptian doctor who was tortured to death in prison because he was a 
communist, is one such tragic case. Haddad, a friend of Edward Said, was summoned by State 
Security and never returned from his interrogation.105 Said later discovered what had happened 
to his friend: 
 
“He was taken directly to prison—I heard this—and stripped of his clothing, as were 
we all. Surrounded by a circle of guards, we were then beaten with clubs and canes. Everyone 
called this the welcoming ceremony. Farid was directly taken off for interrogation, though he 
had already been severely hurt and seemed stunned and very shaky; he was asked whether he 
was a Russian doctor—we were all leftists and members of various Communist groups; his and 
mine was Workers and Peasants—and he replied, ‘No, I am an Arab doctor.’ The officer cursed 
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him and flailed at Farid’s head for about ten seconds, then it was over. Farid rolled over 
dead.”106 
 
As another former prisoner called it, the best way to explain Egyptian prisons was 
through the absurd: Ionesco meets Kafka! In December 1967, Ibrahim Berto Farhi, a friend of 
Nasser who was thrown in jail because he was Jewish, anonymously wrote about his experience 
in the French newspaper L’Express.107 In the article, Fahri explained how as soon as 
prisoners entered the prison, a real war of subjectivity started: 
 
“[…] Another officer cornered me against the bars and asked my name. I told 
him. He took me by the throat. No, here no one was called by his name. Here there were 
no watches, no names, no shoes. There was not even a register: there were only 
women’s names. And he said that he knew the drill, that he had been there in 1956 
when the Israelis had hit the camp by mistake. “What else are you?” “A pervert.” “And 
you?” he said to me. I didn’t know. He landed me one straight in the plexus. You are a 
pervert, too. Your name will be Khaduga.” Another woman’s pet name. Then he 
searched me, found my tobacco and slowly spilt it over my head. A little old man got 
up on a stool and shaved our heads. Then came the disguise. With our bare feet, our 
shaven heads, our baggy trousers and our fatigues which came down to our knees, we 
looked like Mexican walk-ons who had got the wrong set. I parted ceremoniously from 
Zanuba outside his cell. The Moslem Brother who led me to mine said without turning 
his head, or moving his lips: “Don’t worry, you’re not the pervert. We all know here 
who the pervert is. Can’t you guess who is the pervert?”108 
Screams, fear, humiliation, guilt, this is the chimes Nasserist prisons sang. 
Insults after insults, beatings after beatings, humiliations after humiliations. This 
happened every day to thousands of Egyptians throughout Nasser’s times in power. It 
has not stopped since then. How can Nasserism be the Signifier of a popular liberation 
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when the people were by thousands being objectified and turned into shells of human beings? 
All clues point to its pathologisation of the politics of liberation.  
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has argued that as a Face of the fold of the colonial Simulation, Nasserism 
thought liberation as a copy of its colonial simulacrum. The first section of the chapter has 
examined the multiple Signifiers/simulacra of liberation produced by the Nasserist Symbolic. 
By giving liberation both an external (international) and internal (domestic) dimension, 
Nasserism was able to present itself as both an affect and percept of liberation. Furthermore, 
in fantasising itself as the motor for an international revolution, Nasserism projected its Identity 
as a precept of time.  The second section has challenged the liberating affect of Nasserism by 
looking at how Nasserist liberation reduced the social to the objects of phantasm/knowledge of 
its Symbolic.  In doing so, the section argued that Nasserism became a totalising vision that 
actualised itself as a totalising state. It subjectivised Egyptians into the surface of the 
Simulation by inserting itself as a Symbolic field/surface that mediated the experience and the 
being in the world of its Subjects. It did so by producing a complex system of signification for 
liberation. In this Symbolic, liberation is thought of as the production of the people into the 
faces of the state. Finally, its third section exposed the repressive function of the Nasserist 
liberation by looking into the ways in which Nasserism simulated itself as a revolutionary 
affect/desire. This Simulation, it argued, reproduces colonial semiosis because its semiotic 
process is totalised by the symbolic and its world of phantasms. This Ideal-reality or Simulation 
that the Symbolic of the regime projected is particularly problematic because it forecloses the 
reality/intensity of its violence from its surface. The totalising repression and repeated 
dehumanisation exemplify this violence that the state unleashed on dissidents.  
All in all, the analysis of this chapter has uncovered a hole, a parallax gap between the 
‘liberated’ and ‘liberating’ surface of Nasserism and its Oedipal function. The symbiotic 
relationship between Nasser and his people masks an aporetic tension between law and 
liberation. In becoming the ‘name of the father’ or  The original Face of the Revolution, 
Nasserism foreclosed the revolutionary event from the reality of the Simulation. It suffocated 
it to keep it repressed from its surface. As we have seen, the Nasserist state used various means 
of subjectivation to keep Egyptians on the surface of its Simulation, where the absurd can be 
experienced as a given. But its totalising power of subjectivation could not foreclose the 
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coming to the surface of a desire to exist beyond its regime of representations. As this 
desire grew and expanded, so did the number of prisoners. This, the chapter has further 
argued, further illustrates Nasserist pathologisation of the politics of liberation. The 
‘liberated’ Face of Nasserism thus masks a beneath that exposes a terrifying underbelly 
of violence and trauma. Rather than moving away from the colonial logic, the 
postcolonial can thus be seen as a further spiralling into the Simulation and its worlds 
of phantasms. 
All in all, the chapter has tried to show that in becoming the Ideal-Is of the state, 
we become participants to the subjective de-individuation through which facialization 
operates. We become participants in the Simulation. In making us the participants of 
its subjective Oedipal enfoldment, modernity prevents us from acknowledging that we 
share pure differences as our common ground. Instead, modern semiosis postulates that 
our role as state subjects is to erase the differences that separate us from its faces. They 
propose that we open ourselves up to possibles by becoming a concrete representation 
of the Objects of phantasms of the state: I am a good citizen, a good parent, a good 
worker, a good Nasserist;  I am the good that produces postcolonial reality. All in all, 
the laws of Nasserist speech/Symbolic say that it is by literally becoming the goods or 
possessions of the system that we can produce liberation as a concrete (capitalist) 
reality.  Nasserism thus simulated itself as a liberated desire/’time’ the chapter has 
argued. Its continued expropriation of the subject’s sense of self in profit of a capitalist 
transvaluation of both desire and subjectivity points to our continued spiralling into the 
semiosis of Simulation. This continued spiralling of postcolonial thought into the 







CHAPTER 5  





Gamal Abdel Nasser is not the only spectral affect that haunts the revolutionary becoming 
of Egypt. Fifty-four years after his execution, Sayyed Qutb still lives as an affect and percept of 
the revolution. First, there is his birth in 1906 in Musha, a village in the Assiut governorate.1 Musha 
provided the background for a folkloric childhood rocked by the financial decline of Qutb’s 
family.2 Still, Qutb reminisced fondly of his rural youth.  He loved school and developed a thirst 
for learning. Yet, this relationship was early on mystified by colonial reality. In his 
autobiographical recollections, Qutb describes how his experience of a dual education system 
triggered an ambivalence towards both traditions and modernity. Qutb was first sent to a madrasah, 
a school that taught a modern curriculum.3 There, he excelled, and according to him, was thriving. 
This stopped when he, along with other children of the village, was sent to a kuttab, a Qur’anic 
school.4 Qutb did not have fond memories of the kuttab and its rejection of modern scientific 
knowledge and modern reason.  Still, when he returned to the madrasah, he organised a Qur’an 
recitation competition against students from the kuttab. 5  As a young teenager, Qutb became 
increasingly interested in nationalist politics and the anti-colonial struggle against Britain.   
Could modernity and traditions be reconciled? Qutb did think so, at least for a while. He 
left Musha at fourteen years old to live with his uncle, a Cairo journalist. There Qutb trained to be 
a teacher and became more directly involved in politics when he joined the Wafd. He also became 
friends with Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad and published poems, critiques and debated against the 
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literary movements that rivalled al-Aqqad’s Diwan group. Throughout, Qutb’s ambivalent 
relationship with modernity and traditions remained unchanged. Qutb could move from writing a  
conservative Islamic piece to defending rationalism and scientific reason.  
In fact, the more time passed, the more Qutb grew ambivalent towards the reality produced 
by colonial modernity. He started to lose faith in the Faces of modernity. The Faces of Europe, of 
the British, of the Wafd, of the Egyptian literary scene, the Face of the Free Officers’ 
revolution…all those faces started to feel like simulacra. Qutb was now questioning the 
foundations of modern reality and its Symbolic. He found its concepts to be treacherous; they 
tricked thought into a simulation. Modern Egyptian intellectuals had been tricked into the 
Simulation of modern European thought. Qutb himself had believed in progress, in liberal ideas 
and their humanism, in modern reason and modern science. Yet despite all this more of the good, 
despite this surplus-production of goodness, modern capitalist modernity suffocated experience. 
The constant transvaluation through which it operated produced a surplus of anxiety, Qutb noted. 
Nasserism claimed it could decolonise Egyptian subjectivity, yet it still thought of Islam as a 
deviant copy. It used colonial Signifieds to think of it. For Qutb, this exposed the Nasserist 
revolution as a simulacrum.  
When he joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1953, the group was going through an 
ideological vacuum.6 Its founder, Hassan al-Banna, was murdered in 1949 and Hassan al-Hudaybi 
had replaced him as Murshid or general guide of the organisation. Al-Hudaybi was a judge who 
advocated prudence and rationality over impulsion and action. 7  Given the repressive and 
disciplinary nature of the Nasserist regime, al-Hudaybi advised the organisation should focus on 
tending to its grassroots level development rather than entering into a formal struggle against the 
state. Nasser’s repeated digs at the organisation, its guide and members, angered the organisation's 
younger members, who decried the lack of ideological and strategical vision of the Murshid. It is 
in this context that Qutb, who was an experienced writer with internal knowledge of the Free 
Officers’ junta, turned to Islam to develop a new theory of modernity. Qutb had become convinced 
that the modern history of Islam was/is marked by degradation. As a historical formation, Islam 
moved from being a passable copy, a concrete representation of the spoken of the Qur’an, to a 
simulacrum: an Islam colonised in both its Symbolic and concrete reality by the European Judaeo-
 
6 Gerges, Making the Arab World, p.231-2 
7 Ibid.  
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Christian Symbolic. Qutb’s answer to the modern Simulation is to return to an original modernity, 
a divine modernity and where reason is totally objective. For Qutb, Islam is modern in that it gives 
us access to the reality of all realities, to a reality of all possibles.  As we will see in this chapter, 
by positing the birth of Islam as the original of modernity, Qutb did not reverse but only inversed 
the colonial logic of identities. In Qutb’s Symbolic, modern western capitalist reality is backward. 
By espousing ‘Islam’ as a pure reason and fighting for its revival and continued expansion, 
Muslims can save the whole of humanity from backwardness. This logic is an inversed copy of 
the British colonial logic.  
Qutb had thought of liberation as an inversed copy of the colonial simulacra. It is interesting 
that as Qutb’s thought moved deeper into the worlds of phantasms, he became more and more 
convinced he had found a solution to the existential doubt/void that had been with him since his 
childhood. Qutb had lost trust in thought, but somehow Islam had made it a safe space again. It 
could clean subjectivity of the colonial trauma; it could get to a truth, to the truth. It could ‘make’ 
sense of modern reality by exposing it as a simulacrum. Islam presented itself as The Original 
truth, the reality of all realities. With Islam, thought had become naturally good-natured and truth-
seeking again.  In his prison writings, Qutb’s thought asserts the authority of the regime of 
representation. With him, the Islamic subject takes on a new function of representation: Muslims 
must strive to copy and forever reproduce the first decades of Islam's birth. He describes the first 
forty years of Islam as an original modernity, an Ideal that modern Muslims have to copy and re-
enact. In doing so, he also asserts the authority of Islamic Salafi reason over all other forms of 
reason. In Milestones, Qutb wrote the template of what he thought ought to constitute the basis of 
Islamic common sense. In doing so, his thought also subordinated knowledge to learning and 
culture to method.  
It is as if despite his attempt to escape capture by challenging the Simulation, Qutb’s 
thought remained a prisoner of its image of thought. This chapter argues that Qutb’s writings 
illustrate a thought that remains a prisoner of the image of thought that produces a Symbolic of 
simulations. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze explains that the image of thought is made of 
eight postulates which “crush thought under an image which is that of the Same and the Similar in 
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representation, but profoundly betrays what it means to think and alienates the two powers of 
difference and repetition, of philosophical commencement and recommencement.”8 
 
These eight postulates, Deleuze lists them as:  
1- “The postulate of Cogitatio natural universalis:  the goodwill of the thinker and the 
good nature of thought;  
2- The postulate of the ideal or common sense: Common sense as a Concordia 
facultatum with good sense underpinning this distribution;  
3- The postulate of the model or of recognition: the model or recognition as the means 
of thought and the possibility of misrecognition it implies;  
4- The Postulate of the element or representation: the primacy of representation over 
supposed elements in nature and thought, which implies that difference is subordinated to the 
dimensions of the Same, the Similar, the Analogous and the Opposed 
5- The postulate of the Negative according to which error expresses everything that 
can go wrong in thought, but only as a product of external mechanisms; 
6-   The Postulate of the Logical Function:  Designation is taken to be the locus of 
truth, sense being no more than a neutralized double or the infinite doubling of the proposition;  
7- The Postulate of the Modality, or Solutions: Problems being materially traced from 
propositions, or indeed formally defined by the possibility of their being solved 
8-  The Postulate of the End or the Result, or the Postulate of Knowledge: The 
subordination of learning to knowledge and of culture to method.”9  
 
 It is this image of thought, Deleuze argues in Difference and Repetition and in What is 
Philosophy? that keeps thought prisoner to the regime of representation and its dictatorship of the 
same and the similar. This image of thought reflects thought as a pure Ideal, a Self or Identity that 
 
8 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition p.167 
9 Ibid., p.167 
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is in-itself the same with itself.  But how can this be? Thought, Deleuze explains, works through 
the process of recognition: thought recognises objects as concepts,/Signifiers which implies that it 
senses, remembers, imagines and understand an object as being equivalent to a concept/Signifier. 
Deleuze defines the process of recognition as “the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a 
supposed same object”.10 Referencing Descartes, he further illustrates: “wax remains wax, even as 
I put it by the fire”.11 The object is then recognized when the faculties commonly relate it to an 
Identity. The objectivity of thought thus masks the role of Interpretant of the ‘I” of the thinker. In 
the process, of recognition, it is the thinking subject who organizes the various properties into a 
coherent object of symbolic knowledge. Deleuze emphasizes that we judge the Identity of things 
when the sense impressions accord. Thus overall, when the sense impressions of a subject accord, 
then thought recognizes an object as a concept/Signifier.  
The process of recognition is problematic on this basis: the accord of sense impressions 
can also trick thought into misrecognizing the Identity of things.  In Plato’s allegory of the cavern, 
for example, this process of recognition kept the prisoners, prisoners of the Simulation.12 Besides, 
recognition implies a limitation of thought: thought can only recognize. A second problem with 
the process of recognition then means that we compare the new to what we already know. As a 
result, the new can only be represented through the quadruple root of representation which brings 
difference to the level of Identity by thinking it through the dimensions of the identical, same, the 
analogous or the opposed. As Deleuze puts it: 
 
 “The form of recognition has never sanctioned anything but the recognizable and the 
recognized; form will never inspire anything but conformities”.13  
 
Thirdly, Deleuze problematizes the addition of social values in the process of recognition. 
Thought does recognize not only the object but also the values attached to it. In this way, the 
historical context in which thought thinks taints the objectivity of thought. All in all with Deleuze, 
thought is affected by the historicity of the thinker and the historicity of its regime of 
 
10 Ibid., p.133 
11 Ibid., p.169 
12 Plato, Benjamin Jowett, The allegory of the cave, (Los Angeles: Enhanced Media Publishing, 2017) 
13 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition  p.170 
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representation. As a consequence, thought constantly “rediscovers” the State, the Church, and “all 
the current values that it subtly presented in the pure form of an eternally blessed unspecified 
eternal object”.14  
The image of thought constitutes a dogmatic image of what thinking is that keeps thought 
prisoner of the Symbolic of Simulations. It acts as a Signifier/simulacra for the Identity of thought. 
This Signifier thinks thought as an Ideal-I. Thought simulates an Ideal Self to mask that its central 
system of being is founded on the disparate. This Ideal-I that thought uses as an image of its Self 
is a mirror image. Its surface hides the dimensions, volumes, and intensity that thought can take 
up. This surface masks the extensive differences or qualities of thought. Thought can be a tear, a 
jump, a scream. This chapter argues that despite his attempt to free thought of its image of thought, 
Sayyid Qutb’s prison writings produced a Signifier/simulacra for Islam's identity that thinks the 
concept as an Ideal-I or Idea. In doing so, his thought remained a prisoner of the historical a priori 
that enfolds thought in the Symbolics of Simulation.  
Although Qutb did challenge the modern Simulation, the model of thought that he 
developed to liberate thought only captured it further into the world of phantasms. Qutb 
acknowledged the need to rethink the semiosis of liberation but inversed not reversed the colonial 
regime of representation.  In doing so, he thought of liberation as the copy of a simulacrum. This 
simulacrum is analogous to the colonial simulacrum for liberation because its model reproduces 
colonial identities and their disjunction backwards/modernity and ignorance/progress, albeit in an 
inversed logic (Islamic thought is modern and modern western thought is backward; Islamic 
thought is progress and modern European thought is ignorant). Thus, this chapter proposes to see 
how Qutb’s thought moved from challenging the Simulation to falling back into its capture. To 
this end, it is divided into two big moments. The first illustrates Qutb’s writings from the late 1920s 
until the mid-1940s. The second from the mid-1940s up to the mid-1960s. This chapter does not 
claim to provide an exhaustive review of his writings but has tried to include a variety of them. 
The first moment examines how Qutb’s thought was affected by his growing ambivalence towards 
the modern progress/tradition disjunction. However, throughout this timeframe, Qutb still believed 
that this disjunction could be resolved, although he located the conditions for its resolutions in 
several areas. The second moment of the chapter further examines the shifts in Qutb’s thought. It 
 
14 Ibid., p.172 
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highlights how he gradually moved from challenging the modern Simulation to thinking of Islam 
as total reason and a totalising reality. This was bolstered by a growing conviction that western 
modernity was nothing but a simulacrum of the Real of Islam. In his increasingly 
orthodox/dogmatic vision, Qutb reproduced the very logic of alienation he tried to escape and their 
pathologisation of the politics of liberation.  
 
1 QUTB AND THE DIALECTICS OF MODERNITY: A CONTRADICTION THAT 
CAN BE RESOLVED? 
 
This moment of the chapter examines how Qutb’s thought was affected by his growing 
ambivalence towards the modernity as progress and traditions. This will be illustrated by a phase 
in which his writings highlight a paradox between progress thought as a linear of successive 
development towards the better and progress experienced by the colonised as moving backwards 
into dispossession. This percept of progress as moving in two senses that both pull reality in two 
experiences/directions reflects Qutb’s growing perception of a disjunction between the actual 
reality of modernity and the appearance of this reality. As we will see, this emerging percept 
constitutes the crust of Qutb’s problematisation of modernity as a simulation in his later writings. 
A second theme that emerges is the violence and force or speed through which materialism 
totalises existence by decoding spiritual values and recoding them into a modern capitalist system 
of values. However, between the late 1920s and mid-1940s, Qutb still believed that modernity 
opened up the social to progress and the individual to a greater sense of agency. 
QUTB’S WRITINGS BETWEEN THE LATE 1930S UNTIL THE MID-1940S: ISLAM AS 
POETIC JUSTICE? 
From the late 1920s, Qutb used Islam as a tool for his social critique. In most of those 
writings, he decried Egypt’s social conditions as much as what he saw as the Egyptian youth's 
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apathetic attitude. At this point, Qutb’s use of Islamic rhetoric remained in sync with mainstream 
Egyptian Islamic and anti-colonial thought. As it had been during the ‘Urabi revolt, and despite 
the emergence of the Wafd as the leader of the 1919-22 revolution, Islam remained a nodal element 
of the anti-colonial discourse. Between 1928-29, Qutb wrote a lot of poetry or 
critiques/commentaries on poetry.15 While his poems varied in topics and styles, a poem written 
in 1928 already illustrates Qutb’s questioning of his era’s consciousness. In it, he used the Idea of 
conscience (damir) to differentiate between justice and injustice.16 The strength of consciousness 
could be evaluated in relations to the good and/or evil in human conduct.17 Besides, the poem 
highlights the strengths and weaknesses of individual consciousness impact relationship with 
society.18 Qutb already posited an inter-dependence between individuals' moral character and the 
morality of society as a whole.  This link would become more apparent in his later writings. 
Another topic that would later surface is that of Jihad, which Qutb mentions in a poem published 
in 1929, in which he wrote: “From the Jihad I do flee not – I was never weakhearted.”19 This as it 
turned out, proved prophetic. Qutb’s reference to jihad seems to be bolstered by the rise of anti-
colonial forces. In a poem published in 1931, he commemorated Alī’ Abd al-Laṭīf as a hero. Al-
Latif was the leader of a nationalist movement in the Sudan whose aim was to dislodge the British 
army.20 He was imprisoned for seven years, and upon the end of his sentence was transferred to a 
psychiatric hospital in Cairo where he died in 1948. In the poem, Qutb derided the Egyptian 
youth’s lack of care for nationalist fighters and martyrs.  He also already expressed his desire to 
“execute the responsibility of the youth”21 This vision is precursory to his later writings. 
In some of the early 1930s’ writings, a dichotomy East/West started to emerge.22 Soon after 
graduating from Dar-al-‘Ulum in 1933, Qutb wrote an article in al-Risalah in which he warned the 
Egyptian youth against the blind limitations (taqlid) of  Western civilisation.23 He critiqued the 
rise of materialism, which, he argued compounded by a capitalist system of mass consumption, 
 
15 Sayed Khatab, The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb, The theory of jahiliyya, (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), p.52. 
16 Ibid., p.121 
17 Ibid. p.121 
18 Ibid., p.121 
19 Ibid., p163 
20 Ibid., p.62 
21 Sayed Khatab, The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb, p.62 
22Adnan Ayyub Musallam The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb’s Intellectual career and his emergence as an 
Islamic da’iyah1966-1952, PhD Thesis, (The University of Michigan, 1983), p.97 
23 Ibid., p.97 
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emptied life of its spirituality. 24 He also called for jihad to liberate his country.25In another article, 
in 1934, Qutb critiqued the Orientalists' failure to appreciate Islam's spiritual strength.26 In a poem, 
he linked what he perceived as a state of confusion regarding the different rules and laws of the 
Egyptian legal system.27  He then opposed this hybrid legal system to Islam as a total system.  In 
the same year, he wrote a considerable number of poems that were published in 1935.28 In them, 
he discussed matter, reason and spirit, Einstein’s Theory of Relativity and the relationships 
between matter, space, time and unity.29Through these theoretical linkages, he tried to develop a 
theory that focused on the great universal Unity (al-wahdah kawniyyyah al-Kubra).30 
Another theme that appeared is that of a quest for the unity of both knowledge and 
experience.  This is particularly visible in his writings on the Qur’an and its aesthetics. In his 
writings on Islamic Aesthetics, especially in Muhimmat al-Sha’ir fi al-Haya wa Shi’r al-Jil al-
Hadir, published in 1932 and al-Shati al-Majul in 1935, Qutb began to oppose the power of 
spirituality to that of reason.31 In these, the imprint of the Sufi teachings of his childhood became 
more apparent. He found solace in the quest for infinitude that spirituality offered, and which 
sharply contrasted with the crushing weight of Materialism’s emphasis on the finitude of 
existence.32 He argued that Qur’anic teachings reconciled the finitude/infinitude dichotomy by 
postulating, on the one hand, the need for man to accept the finitude of earthly life but on the other 
to seek everlasting life in the abode of reckoning.33 He argued that man’s access to the equilibrium 
offered by Islamic teachings relied on man’s ability to live a balanced life.34 In Muhimat al-Sha’ir, 
the Sufi inspiration can also be seen in Qutb’s espousing of Wahdat al-kawn- cosmic unity, through 
which man can reach a state of being in a perpetual state of presence with Allah.35 In his early 
Islamic writings, Qutb also referenced what he defined as the ‘highest Ideal’, although his 
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definition of this term remained vague. He hinted it referred to man’s quest for the good (al-kahyr) 
in his struggle between good and evil. It is in the future that Qutb located this highest Ideal:  
 
“We believe that the highest ideal of poetry and non-poetry lies in the future because the 
ideal (al-kalam) and what comes closer to it lie ahead, and it could be that we are closer today to 
this ideal than in previous era.”36  
 
Qutb’s use of Islam also reflected a larger shift in the literature. The famous Egyptian writer 
Abbas Mahmoud Al-Aqqad, for example, was then also writing about the early Islamic period, 
albeit from a historical perspective.37 As disillusion with the Wafd and the promises of the liberal 
effendi class grew, Islam, emerged as a new potential point of departure for the re-imaging of both 
the state and the nation.  The question of the becoming of Islam was also propounded by a growing 
widespread dissatisfaction with the Islamic religious establishment’s cooperation with both the 
British and the Palace. Beyond the direct impact of colonialism, Islamic circles were also affected 
by the nationalist turn and the penetration of modern modes of diffusion.38 The practice of listening 
to sermons, which in Sufism, had been identified as central to the cultivation of the sensibilities of 
the heart and through it of the mind, can be taken as a case in point.39 This practice was both 
affected by a socio-political context increasingly shaped by the penetration of secular thought and 
the rise of capitalism, the mass consumer market and mass media that are coterminous with it.40  
In particular, new modern styles of political oratory and popular media entertainment impacted the 
styles of sermon-making, their discursive structures and their reception.41 According to Charles 
Hirsckind, Qutb’s works on aesthetics and his discussion of the aesthetic images in the Quran, also 
impacted contemporary da’wa preaching.42  
Meanwhile, Qutb also critiqued Taha Husseyn, one of the most influential Egyptian writers 
of the 20th century in nationalist thought and literature. Qutb’s critique was published in a lengthy 
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article in 1939 in Sahifat Dar al-‘Ulum. He discussed the pro and cons of the views that Husseyn 
had expressed in his work, Mutaqbal al-thaqafa fi Misr (The future of Culture in Egypt).43 Again, 
Qutb’s ambivalence reflected a growing sense of disillusion with Europe and the promises of 
Liberal capitalism. Europe had been hit by an economic crisis that had fed the rise of fascism, 
which included the governments of Franco, Mussolini and Hitler. By 1939 the breaches within 
Europe had morphed into a war that now involved people long beyond its frontiers. By buying into 
the Western Ideal, Egypt ran the risk of suffering the same fate, Qutb argued. This further 
highlights Qutb’s growing suspicion of a disjunction between Modernity as an Ideal through which 
the West had exported itself and its reality as a Signifier/simulacra. 
In some of his writings, Qutb attributed the world's socio-economic and political problems 
to a phenomenon: the modern addiction to speed. 44 This phenomenon of speed addiction, he 
explained, blinded man by reducing his field of perception to an exclusively frontal one. 45 
Consequently, he argued, man had become obsessed with always moving beyond himself, without 
any regards for where that would take him.46 Subsequently, man kept repeating the same errors, 
until he inevitably reached a point of breaking down, he pointed out.47 Moreover, Qutb decried the 
ways in which the speed through which times moved had swept away the very creative force of 
literature. Consequently, he contended, literature increasingly neglected in-depth studies and 
precise analyses to the benefit of quick observations.48 In this text, Qutb opposed the addictive 
speed of materialism to the very progress of/in thought. Thus, Qutb’s view pointed to a disjunction 
between appearance and reality: modernity appeared to be a representation that did not match its 
reality. Furthermore, drawing from Ibn Qaldun, he also continued to attack Western mimicry, 
which he attributed to the conquered propensity to imitate their conquerors.49 He proposed the 
notion of vitality (Nashat) to fight back against the speed of modernity. He conceptualised vitality 
as more beneficial to both the individual and the community than haste.50 Perhaps the writings of 
Henry Bergson, which he had accessed through al-Aqqad’s library influenced him.51 
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In his early 1940s journal writings, Qutb’s nationalist stance is very present. His article 
« Hal nahnu mutahaddirûn? Al-fawâriq al-sahîqa bayna mazâhirina wa haqâ'iqina » [Are we 
civilised? The crushing differences between appearances and realities], took two questions as 
points of departure: Are we a nation? And Are we civilised? 52  Again, Qutb highlighted a 
disjunction between reality and appearances and used modernity to illustrate this disjunction. 
While colonial modernity represented itself as the vector of progress, it had produced declining 
social conditions. “How can we treat the mind when diseases so ravage the body?”, he asked, 
further referencing biology throughout the article.53 The first cause of Egypt’s social crisis was its 
lack of development., he argued. Using the health system crisis in an Egypt that epidemics had 
repeatedly hit, he wrote a scathing critique of ‘modern’ Egyptian conditions by highlighting the 
Egyptian health system's quasi-non existing state. The moral perversions, the rise of criminality 
and prostitution, and the gradual erasure of morality result from poverty, diseases and a lack of 
education. These three elements had been left aside by the various reforms of governments, he 
argued.54 Qutb’s take on prostitution is particularly interesting as he refused to blame prostitutes 
and instead placed responsibility on Egyptians’ failure to tackle the social conditions that led girls 
to prostitution.55Qutb also discussed marriage and dowry, topics that would also be essential 
elements of his later Islamist writings.56 In this critique, Qutb’s approach envisioned modernity as 
an objectivity that required Egyptians to take clear material steps towards it. This totalising vision 
would also be reproduced in his later writings, albeit with a totally different coating. Nonetheless, 
the positivist imprints on Qutb can be seen in the biological terminology that runs through the 
article as well as in his causal approach to the problems of Egypt, which he posited as material 
rather than epistemic. It was then first through action, not thought that Egypt could enter 
modernity. This further exposes Qutb’s growing mistrust for a modern epistemology that 
paradoxically still enframed his thinking.  
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Throughout the 1930s and 40s,  Qutb became entangled in the literary battles of his then 
mentor Al-Aqqad. For example, he opposed himself to the Apollo group, a romantic literary 
movement, whose rivals were Aqqad’s Diwan group. The Apollo collective had a periodical and 
a society that bore the same name.57 They aimed to promote literature and collaboration between 
Arab writers from both in and out of Egypt. His opposition to the group reflected his doubts about 
the viability of Arabism's political-cultural doctrine, which had started to gain traction in Egypt.58 
Throughout this same period, Qutb continued to compose poems. Some of them were published 
in 1935 in a collection titled The Unknown Shore, while others written in different periodicals were 
never collected in the form of a book. 59  Many of his poems, took up a lyrical style, which 
illustrated the romantic mood of the 1930s, but sharply contrasted with his journal writings in 
which he used Islam as a tool for social critique 60 Here is an example of such poem:  
 
“Come, our days are about to end, 
 Come, our breaths are about to cool,  
 Without hope, no meeting and no date. 
 
So return, here is the nest calling us; 
 Let us not O, sister destroy it with our hands; 
 Come, let us spend the rest of our lifetime, 
 
 Two comrades in good and evil 
 Two allies in wealth and poverty.”61  
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All in all, this section has argued that Qutb’s writings up to the early 1940s denote a 
growing ambivalence towards modernity. Qutb especially became suspicious of modern 
epistemology and its Big Other/Symbolic. Qutb’s writings expose an ever-increasing perception 
that the disjunction between the appearance and the real of modern reality is rooted in the tradition 
of knowledge through which modern European thought articulates itself. In contrast, Islam 
emerges as a more transparent tradition of knowledge, as a tradition that can produce a reality that 
is the same with itself in itself. Despite this problematisation, however, Qutb’s thought remained 
tainted by the positivism he increasingly rejected. Indeed, he effectively postulated that if reason 
had gone wrong, it had been due to external mechanisms: it was anchored in a perverted morality, 
in a wrong tradition of thought.  
IN BETWEEN THE REAL AND THE PHANTASM: CAN COLONIAL MODERNITY REALLY 
OPEN THE WORLD TO UNIVERSAL LIBERATION? 
This section continues to highlight Qutb’s growing perception that the reality produced by 
modernity articulated itself as a parallax object. At the same time, it also illustrates Qutb’s constant 
desire to find a way to salvage the concept of modernity and the worlds of possibles it could open 
Egypt to. In 1941, despite his growing critique of Modernity Qutb saw in WWII the opening of a 
breach that could lead to a new order. He wrote :  
 
“One might fear that the present war, which is much more violent and radical than the 
previous one, will have even more terrible and irremediable consequences than the previous one 
had it not  opened our eyes to mistakes [which followed] it and that some of the principles on 
whose behalf it is conducted are born in reaction to these errors.”62  
 
Qutb drew three lessons from this war. Firstly, he drew a social lesson. Individualism which 
weakened collective values had made it impossible for France to come together to resist the 
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invader.63 Secondly, he drew a moral lesson. In England, Empire-building had required a common 
modality of being marked by virtues of simplicity and temperance, and it is by drawing from these 
that the British had managed to put up a front against Germany. Finally, he drew a political lesson. 
Germany’s position has brought to the light the need for a more universal being-in-the-world.64 
This new being-in-the-world could be actualised through the nuclear family, he argued. 65 He 
insisted that the family nucleus still formed an objective social entity in Egypt, which put the 
country in a favourable situation.66 In this vision, we can also see Qutb’s attempt to bypass the 
coldness of reason, which he thought could be mediated by the realm of the sensible. In the same 
vein, he described traditional rural organisation as the space that allowed the preservation of 
traditions that, in turn, maintained national cohesion (al-qawmî).67  
By 1945 Qutb’s hope for Western modernity’s movement towards a more universal and 
thus more peaceful being-in-the-world seemed to have disappeared under the weight of continued 
colonialism and repression. In an article published in al-Risalah in September, he denounced 
France’s policies in the region, citing Napoleon's invasion, Cairo's bloody occupation, the 1925 
bombardment of Damascus, the suppression of nationalist revolts in Syria, Morocco and Algeria. 
For example, despite French attempt to suppress it, news of the May 1945 French army’s 
massacres in Setif, Guelma and Kherrata had spread throughout the region like wildfire. Qutb 
castigated the history of France’s presence in the East as ‘savage barbarism’ and ‘pools of blood’ 
and decried the Egyptians’ glorification of France. 68 He equally condemned   British policies and 
presence, their continued colonialism and support for Zionism, for which he also denounced 
America.69 Qutb it seems had lost faith in the world.  
However, his semi-autographical novels, A Child from the Village and Thorns, denote a 
man still hanging on to modernity's potential. To be actualised within the Egyptian context, it 
would require the dialectical resolution of conflicts between past and present, which was illustrated 
by the tension tradition/modernity. His social critique also took up a different coating by espousing 
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Wafdist nationalist ideals. He thought of social reform through the prism of ‘liberal’ nationalism, 
which articulated itself by taking as a nodal point the nation as a re-imagined community.  
 
Qutb dedicated A Child from the village, first published in 1946 to Taha Hussayn, whom 
he had earlier critiqued. In it, a young teacher goes on a venture against the superstitious beliefs of 
a village who believes that Jiins haunt a house. With his students' help, the teacher scientifically 
proves the jinns are nothing but mere rabbits. Throughout the novel, the teacher's scientism is 
characterised as the source of his creative potential, which ultimately allows him to realise his 
vocation to the fullest.70  This again highlights the imprint of scientism and positivism on Qutb’s 
perspective. It equally reflected nationalist efforts to reconcile the cultural differences between 
perceptions of the West as modern and of Egypt as non-modern.  
Qutb thus used fiction as a space that allowed him to re-imagine the entrance of Egyptian 
culture in modernity as a possible. This, however, did not entail mimesis of Western culture but 
required the affirmation of Egyptian differences, differences that formed the basis of the re-
imagination of a national modern Egyptian community.71 As such, the novel still represented 
epistemic modernity as a space of potential while also emphasising the central place of Egyptian 
rural folklore and culture in the new-national Ideal in-becoming.72 In this way, the village was re-
moulded into the site of expression of Egyptian national exceptionalism.73 Expressing cultural 
differences as not antithetical to modernisation was also a way for Qutb to distance himself from 
Taha Husseyn’s three-volume book, al-Ayam, in which he had expressed the need to emulate 
Europe culturally.74 Moreover, as Musallam notes, Qutb also used the book to critique the duality 
of the colonial system of education divided between a secular and traditional Islamic education 
and its affect as producing an Egyptian cultural identity split into two antagonistic poles.75  Qutb 
thus also used fiction to try and recontextualise Egypt in its historicity. Here the imprint of 
historicism is also visible. This re-contextualisation epistemologically entailed a more holistic 
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approach of communal modes of being-Egyptian. Another important theme that runs through the 
book is the ambivalence towards the state and the penetration of foreigners, both seen as 
hegemonical forces in the Gramscian sense.76 Depicted as forces of coercion but also of seduction, 
the state and foreigners are nonetheless associated as outsider forces that enfolded the village.   
Modernity is thought of as a time that is foreign to Egyptian subjectivity yet, also as a time 
enfoldment of Egyptian subjectivity.  
In Ashwak (Thorns), first published in 1947, Qutb’s hero makes the difficult decision to 
leave his childhood sweetheart to accomplish himself as a literary figure.77 In the book, Alain 
Roussillon saw a recurrent theme of the novelistic literature of the times, which touched on then-
actual Egyptian problematics. 78  These included the social dissolution of sociological and 
emotional ties as well as the social determinations that curtailed the moral, political and scientific 
development of the hero.79 In this, it illustrated the uncanniness of the Egyptian epistemological 
space: modernity had split space-time by articulating itself as a contradiction between a future-as-
progress and a present still dominated by past traditions. In the novel, this contradiction required 
the hero to leave behind a past that could never be fully recovered. In doing so, the hero also left 
a bit of his self. Thus, the concept of change through movement became a central fixture of Qutb’s 
narrative and was expressed through a dramatized form.  It is also interesting to note that in Sufism 
the term Ashwak is used to reference an ideational state of being of love and of one’s desire to see 
their loved one, which allows one to access the enlightening visions of the Soul.80  
In these two novels, Qutb’s Ideal of a reformed society finds its strength in a past that 
disappears in the present, but that paradoxically becomes its vector for change towards the 
actualisation of a future-to-be. The actualisation of this becoming is made contingent on the 
formulation of an enunciative differentiation between a current state of the situation and a new 
normative framework where things would fall into a more natural order of things.81 Qutb argued 
that the confusion engendered by colonisation and the coterminous entry of capitalism required a 
new re-ordering of Egyptian epistemology. This quest for a new and more ordered epistemology 
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can thus also be seen as an attempt to fill the gaps-in-meaning produced by colonisation. Overall, 
this section has argued that despite his critiques, Qutb still hanged on to the concept of modernity 
and saw the re-ordering of the Symbolic order as a way to salvage modern epistemology and 
reality.  Modern semiosis had challenged the Egyptian Symbolic,  but it could be recoded into a 
modern Symbolic able to produce a new order of things, a modern reality. 
 SUFISM AND THE REALM OF THE SENSIBLE: THE FIRST SIGNS OF QUTB’S BREAK-
UP WITH MODERN REASON? 
At the time of publication of these novels, Qutb was looking for a new way of thinking 
modernity.  In his 1940s writings on the theme of artistic representation in the Quran, which 
include Al-taswir al-fannî fî al-Qur’an, published in 1945, and Machâhid al-qiyâma fi al-Qur'ân, 
published in 1947, Qutb examined the aesthetic uniqueness of the Qur’an. In these, he developed 
an interest in a doctrine that previous scholars had called the immutability of the Qur’an - I’jaz al-
Qur’an.82  He criticised classical grammarians and rhetoricians' debates, which, he argued, centred 
on questioning whether the text’s beauty lied in its wording or meaning.83 He also noted their 
tendency to focus their analysis on small segments of verses, which he contended, made them lose 
sight of the more extensive aesthetics that gave the text its Oneness.84  Qutb argues that the I’jaz 
al-Quran results from a unique compositional principle he termed al-Taswir – an artistic 
representation.85  While Taswir had been employed in Muslim traditions of aesthetic appreciation, 
Qutb changed its use by applying it to the I’jaz.86 He defined the concept in the following terms: 
 
“Taswir is the preferred tool in the style of the Qur’an. By palpable fancied images, it 
designates intellectual meanings, psychological states, perceptible events, visual scenes, human 
types, and human nature. It then elevates these images it draws and grants them living presence or 
regenerating movement: whereupon intellectual meanings become forms or motions, 
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psychological states become tableaux or spectacles, human types become vivid and, at hand and 
human nature becomes visible and embodied. A for events, scenes, stories and sights, it renders 
them actual and immediate, pulsating with life and movement. When it adds dialogues to them, it 
brings into play all of the elements of imaginative representation into them.”87 
 
With this concept, Qutb turned the Qur’an’s words into material reality. In this vision, the 
Qur’an works like a cinematographic image that represents objective reality.88 He argued that it 
provides us with a real picture of the past, and through it, it can serve as the foundation of a new 
future to-be. Qutb also referred to the Quranic rhythm and musicality as included in this Taswir, 
which, he argued the appeal to the realm of the sensible by engaging the senses of hearing.89 Qutb 
thus articulated the uniqueness of the Qur’an through the sensory couple visual/ audio in which 
visual sensory perception retained a primacy over the audio.90 “One effect of this Qutbian vision 
on the narrative structure of a sermon is a tendency to disarticulate and alternate between segments 
with highly visual languages and those with strong phonic associations”.91 Despite englobing them 
in a movement that together gives reality to the text, Qutb maintained a disjunction between the 
two senses, albeit a complementary one.  
For Qutb, the Qur’an is transformed into the noumenon of reason, its being-in-itself. His 
emphasis on the sensible as an a priori through which the Revelation can be experienced draws 
from Sufism. Indeed, Sufism locates knowledge as first emerging from the sensible rather than the 
material.92This mirrors the very experience of the Prophet’s Revelation, prior to which he did not 
know how to read or write. By denying the Qur’an’s ability to give life to reason, Muslims had 
given up on their most important tool of knowledge; they had given up on their own epistemology. 
Implied in Qutb’s view is an attempt to move beyond representation, or what he calls the realm of 
appearances. This takes place by giving back the sensible its rightful place as that which should 
constitute the a priori through which the symbolic system emerges. A kind of spoken beyond 
language that would come to determine language itself. Qutb calls it imaginative representation 
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Qutb saw the Qur’an as a medium that gives us access to the real of thought, which constitutes the 
condition for the actualisation of reality as its perfect presentation, not representation. With Qutb, 
the Qur’an is lunately what allows us to bridge the truth/appearances antagonism that he saw as 
inherent to modernity. He also already used the term Jahiliyyah to draw an analogy between past 
and present. In this analogy, he referred to ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab, a strong opponent of the Prophet 
who had converted to Islam and had acknowledged that prior to his conversation, he lived in 
Jahiliyyah (state of ignorance).93 
The 1940s were a precursor to Qutb’s gradual shift towards a vision of Islam as a total 
system of both being and knowledge. However, they equally attested to the multiple ideational 
positions that Qutb occupied. The multiplicity of his positions seems to reflect the state of 
confusion of the world that he mentioned in his writings. His Sufi inspiration also attests to his 
desire to produce a logic of thought and of being that would move us beyond representation. In 
Qutb's writings, there is an emerging sense that the parallax gap constitutive of modern reality 
could be bridged by using the sensible to mediate reason. In doing so, Islam again appears as the 
learning method that opens the individual to objective knowledge of reality. The Qur’an has a 
power of affect on the individual’s sense of reality by positing the sensible as the first order of 
being and knowledge. With Qutb, the Islamic Revelation shows that Islam is the original form of 
thought because its Symbolic can speak the pre-symbolic. It can speak itself as a sensible 
experience.  In this emerging vision of Islam, Qutb postulates that as a form of thought, Islam is 
the form of truth. His thought, therefore, remains within the confines of the image of thought.  The 
emergence of Islamic reason as the percept of truth seems to be vectorised by three questions: how 
can the colonised move beyond his own conditions? How to move beyond materialism’ 
objectification of life?  How to access the Reality of all Realities to move beyond the disjunction 
between the Signifier and its signified? 
 
2  QUTB AND THE ABSURD OF MODERNITY: ISLAM AS THE TOTAL 
SIGNIFIER OF THE REAL 
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Between the mid-1940s and until he died in the mid-1960s, Qutb’s thinking shifted to 
understanding Islam as total reason and a totalising reality. This was bolstered by a growing 
conviction that western modernity was nothing but a simulacrum of the Real of Islam. This also 
marked an increasing resolve to produce a method that would actualise Islam as an all-
encompassing reality. Qutb’s thought increasingly subjugated learning to method and knowledge 
to culture. His growing dogmatism coalesced with his ever-expanding conviction that Islam was 
the only form of thought that could birth an unalienated reality. His model, however, only inverses 
the colonial logic of identities and repeats its semiosis. It postulates that Islam is a form of reason 
that thinks the true. In this process, reason remains absolute, and the semiotic process continues to 
be totalised by the Symbolic. Islam is thought of as an Ideal-I that gives the individual access to a 
pure reason. When Qutb appeals to practical reason as a sensible of Islamic experience, he thinks 
of practical reason as a concrete reproduction of the sensible of pure reason. With Qutb, the 
sensible remains a prisoner of the worlds of simulacra: it remains caught up in symbolism. This 
period is also a time where Qutb’s activism took up a more practical turn. He made it his mission 
to revive the Secret Apparatus (al-Nizam al-Khass), a paramilitary branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood created by Hassan al-Banna.94 He became the leader of an offshoot known as al-
Tanzim al-Sirri (The Secret Organisation), condemned for its implication in the 1954 attempt on 
Nasser’s life. Qutb was imprisoned in 1954, let out in 1964, re-arrested, re-imprisoned and 
executed in 1966. Qutb’s reproduction of colonial semiotics is further exemplified by the presence 
of the Face of the vanguard as the Ideal-I that Muslims have to emulate. Again, experience is 
reduced to being the concrete representation of an Ideal-I. The real is deprived of the possibility 
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QUTB: MODERNITY NEEDS A NEW IDENTITY 
By 1946, in between the publication of his two semi-autobiographic novels, some of Qutb’s 
writings took up more rigid positions. If he previously defended prostitutes, he was now criticising 
the immorality of women who wore swimming suits on the beaches of Alexandria, equating their 
behaviour to anarchism. 95  Beyond women, Qutb also grew more critical of the younger 
generations, decrying its lack of ethics.96 He blamed mass media, including print mediums, films 
and the radio for having influenced their ways of living.97 This evil, he contended, stemmed from 
European civilisation: “How I hate  and despise this European civilisation and eulogize humanity 
which was tricked by it and its lustre, noise, and sensual enjoyment in which the soul suffocates, 
and the conscience dies down (yakhfut), while instincts and senses become intoxicated, 
quarrelsome and excited by the red lights.”98He also pursued his critique of the Egyptian upper 
classes, which he called aristocrats, especially targeting writers, journalists and politicians. They 
hang on to the facticity of modernity while remaining indifferent to the exploitation of their 
people.99 In the article Madaris lil-sakth, Qutb used the Qur’an to attack the apathetic and passive 
relationship that Egyptians had with Islam.100  At this point he was already working on his next 
opus: Mashahid al-Qiyamah fi al-Quran, Scenes of the resurrection in the Qur’an, which he 
published in 1947. 
In 1947 Qutb briefly flirted with the pan-Arabism he had previously rejected, as is attested 
by his editorship of the Cairene pan-Arab monthly journal al-‘alam al-‘arabi  (the Arab World) 
between April and July.101 Throughout his tenure he used the journal to deliver a vision in which 
Arabism ought to be combined with Islam, the latter being the only force that could produce a 
universalism. This year also marked a turn towards Islamic imagery and symbols. This time, Qutb 
did not focus on aesthetics but on Islam's strength as a political tool against colonial subjectivation. 
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He pointed to leaders such as Jamal al-Afghani who, he argued, revived Islam's spiritual power 
and helped give rise to the ‘Urabi revolt. 
Along with seven Egyptian intellectuals, including his brother, Nagib Mahfouz, 
Mohammed al-Ghazali and four others, he also set up a journal titled The New Thought.102 The 
journal was registered under the name of an Ikhwan member, Muhammad Hilmi al-Minyawi 
because as public employees, the co-founders were prohibited by law from being publishers.103 
Qutb and his colleagues refused repeated requests from the Ikhwan to turn the journal into their 
official mouthpiece.104 They aimed to use it as an independent revolutionary journal that would 
illustrate how Islam offered the model for a society free of corruption, tyranny, and foreign 
domination.105 They nonetheless also criticised Islamic groups. In fact, so much so that the Ikhwan 
officially boycotted the journal.106 The views advanced in the journal also emphasised concerns 
about how to actualise Islam as a material socio-political reality. It advocated a return to the Islam 
of the Prophet and Abu Bakr. It also insisted that Islam ought to be both correctly understood and 
applied. The gradual emergence of a rigidity already highlighted in Qutb’s previous writings 
seemed to have morphed into a nascent orthodoxy by the end of the 1940s. Within three months, 
the journal was closed, and an arrest order against Qutb was issued.107 The then Prime Minister 
Mahmoud Nuqrashi Pasha intervened and offered Qutb a study leave in America for which Qutb 
departed on November 3, 1948. 108 
Qutb’s al-'Adâla al-Ijtimâ'iyya fî al-Islâm (Social justice in Islam), was published in 1949 
although he had completed it before going to America. Qutb dedicated the book to “the youngsters 
whom I see in my fantasy coming to restore this religion anew when it first began…fighting for 
the cause of Allah by killing and by getting killed, believing in the bottom of their hearts that the 
glory belongs to Allah, to his Prophet and the believers…To those youngsters whom I do not doubt 
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for a moment will be revived by the strong spirit of Islam from past generations to future 
generations  in the very near future.” 109  
The book was only allowed for sale after the deletion of the dedication.110 As Mussallem 
notes, at this point, Qutb did not specifically dedicate the book to the Ikhwan, although later re-
edition reflected the close association between Qutb and the group.111Throughout the book, Qutb 
emphasised the need to reconstruct an Egyptian identity cohesive with its historicity.  He also 
further developed the practical approach to resolving Egypt's identitarian problem, which he had 
already taken in New Thought.  To this end, he discussed the agrarian reform, whose importance 
had been compounded by landless peasants' question. Although the law had regularly discussed in 
the parliament, no reforms had been passed. He also tackled socialism and discussed labour rights 
through the prism of Islam. The discourse of rights that positivism had appropriated was already 
present in Islam, he contended.112  Islam, Qutb argued, provided an alternative frame to positivism 
because it had always articulated itself as social justice.113 Qutb used at least 284 verses from the 
Qur’an to support his ideas, making it the primary source of the book.114 From his perspective, 
Islam provided direct access to modernity and ought to be the point of departure of the legal, and 
socio-political system. Qutb thus again highlighted the need to move beyond a modernity of 
appearances. To this end, rather than looking at European laws or Communist ideals, Muslims 
ought to first turn to the Islamic theory of the universe, life and humankind.115  He criticized several 
important Sunni figures, including Othman bin Affan, Abu Sufyan bin Harb and his son Muawiya 
and Amr ibn al-Aas. In contrast, he praised the Qaramita movement, one of the underground Shiite 
movements that had revolted against the Abbasid Caliphate in the fourth century after the Hijrah. 
He also posited Islamic philosophy as the main epistemological point of departure for 
understanding the world and cited philosophers such as Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina. He insisted it 
could awaken people to the reality that Islamic social justice is “essentially all-embracing 
 
109 Musallam, The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb’s Intellectual career, p.191-192 
110 Ibid., p.191-192 
111 It was changed to: To the youngsters whom I see in my fantasy coming but have found them in real life 
existing”, Ibid., p192. 
 112 Roussilon, ‘Trajectoires réformistes. Sayyid Qutb et Sayyid 'Uways’, 
113 See for example Sayyid Qutb; (Trans.) John B. Hardie, Social justice in Islam,  Near Eastern Translation 
Program (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953), pp.19, 20, 29.  
114 Musallam, The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb’s Intellectual career, p.193 
115  Qutb, Social justice in Islam, p.30 
 208 
justice.”116 He argued that Islam, as an omnipotent reality, was constituted by particulars. This 
included individuals as mutually responsible for its actualisation and inter-dependence.117 This 
exposes a nominalist tendency in Qutb’s vision.  
Furthermore, he argued that the total aspect of Islam was exemplified by its regulations on 
“individual possession; on the poor-tax, on the law of inheritance, on the rules for estates, on 
politics, on commercial transactions, in a word, it will explain all the regulations prescribed by 
Islam for individuals, societies, nations and races.”118 Besides, Qutb discussed Islamic history. He 
highlighted the strength of early Muslim generations and located it in their use of the Qur’an as 
the primary source for their mode of governance.119 Social justice in Islam, includes freedom of 
conscience, complete equality and social solidarity, he wrote.120  At this point, Qutb did not call 
for a complete disassociation from the Western world or western knowledge. While he urged 
Muslims against borrowing from western socio-economic and cultural-political ideas, he equally 
acknowledged the benefits of science, albeit ambivalently. 121  Regarding constitutional 
arrangements, Qutb stipulated that Muslims should use “all the discoveries which man had made 
in the way of social legislation and systems”, as long as these fit with Islamic principles and Islamic 
theories on the birth of humanity and the universe.122 When applied in such a way, Islam could 
lessen the divide created by the capitalist mass appropriation of wealth, eliminate extreme poverty, 
increase global equality, increase the social security of disable people, and provide medical and 
educational care to all people.123  
By the late 1940s, Qutb had moved from being a critique to a dissident. By then he was a 
vivid critic of France and Great Britain for their imperialistic policies across the Arab world. The 
Palestine question, the Arab defeat and the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 must-have 
equally impacted his shift. Besides, Egypt had been severely affected by the Second World War, 
which had led to an increased presence of foreign troops. National independence, it seemed, was 
more of a myth than a reality.124 At that point beyond its Islamic coating, Qutb’s emphasis on the 
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need for action paralleled a larger shift in intellectual circles. Taha Husayn, Muhammad Hussayn 
Haykal, the economist Rashid al-Barawi and the philosopher ‘Abd al-Rahman Badawi all asserted 
the need to actualise a social reform that would guarantee that social justice is put in practice 
through direct action. 
ISLAM AS THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE PRESENT 
As many writers have pointed out, Qutb’s trip to America greatly influenced him. Although 
he had been critical of the country before being sent there, his sojourn had only asserted his feeling 
that modernity was a simulacrum. He had never been to a Western country before.125 There, he 
witnessed the extent of America’s fascism towards African Americans, which he wrote, extended 
to anyone with non-white skin colour, including Arabs.126 Beyond the racial hierarchies, Qutb said 
he was shocked by the extent of American ignorance and fear of Islam. He also decried what he 
saw as sexual deviance. The speed through which capitalism hijacked reality was again a point of 
critique. It turned existence into an empty shell: a material form without substance, a bare 
subsistence. In the mists of such feelings, Qutb’s trip to the Hajj in Mecca in the autumn of 1950 
also affected him, especially as he networked with Muslims from all around the world.127 In the 
city of Ta’if,  he met the Hijazi writer ‘Abd al-Ghafur ‘Attar, whose writings he was well 
acquainted with. He separately also met with the Indian scholar Sayyid Abu Hasan Nadwi, a 
student of Sayyid Abu al-A’la Mawdudi. Qutb gave Nadwi a copy of his book Social Justice in 
Islam.128 Impressed by Qutb, Nadwi later invited him to write the preface of his book Madha 
Khasira al-‘Alam bi al-Inhitat al-Muslimin? (What Has the World Lost with the Decline of the 
Muslims?).129  In the book, Nadwi expanded on Mawdudi’s use of the term Jahiliya- age of 
ignorance, which Mawdudi had used to discuss the then present conditions of Muslim Indians. As 
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such, his critique focused mostly on the Muslim bourgeois ruling elites in India.130 He referred to 
India’s condition as the “new Jahiliyyah.”131 Subsequently, Nadwi used the term to refer to the 
condition of the Muslim world at large. He argued that the path out of Jahiliyyah required the re-
affirmation of Islamic Identity and Islamic leadership.132 Qutb would later use it to refer to the 
conditions of the whole world.  
There is, however, some controversy over the influence of Mawdudi and Nadwi’s thoughts 
on Qutb’s thinking and his development of the concepts of Jahiliyyah and Hakimiyyah. As we 
have seen, Qutb had previously already used the term Jahiliyyah. Moreover, in pre-Islamic 
literature and to a certain degree in the Qur’an, the term was used to refer to forms of barbarism or 
attitudes of hostility and aggressiveness against the monotheistic belief.133 In Islamic thought, the 
term Jahiliyyah was gradually used to refer to the pre-Islamic period as “the Age of ignorance” of 
monotheism and divine law.134 In one of their commentary on the Qur’an, Muhammad’ Abduh 
and Rashid Rida had also used it to draw analogies between some of the tendencies of their society 
and those of pre-Islamic societies.135 The term was used similarly by Abdullah Yusuf Ali in “Do 
they then seek after a hukm al-Jahiliyyah?”136 Thus, as Shepherd notes, the term Jahiliyyah had 
been in usage in Egypt long before Qutb, Mawdudi or Nadwi.137 Besides, As Khattab points out, 
Al-Aqqad had himself used the terms in some of his writings to describe the condition of social 
injustice. Egyptians found themselves and distinguished between the truth and the deviation from 
it.138 
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In 1951 Qutb published Ma’raka al-Islâm wa al-Ra’smâliyya (The Battle between Islam 
and Capitalism), which delineated in more Manichean terms reality as an opposition of two 
systems. He opposed the positivity of Islam to the negativity of Western modernity. Qutb built on 
the critique of capitalism and communism he had written in the last pages of Islam and Social 
Justice.139 He warned that Egypt’s deteriorating conditions could not continue, especially as they 
stood in opposition to the very promises of modernity.140 They constituted the root of Egypt’s 
social, economic, and human development impediment and denied Egyptians human rights and 
dignity. Modern reality was based on a contradiction, he insisted.  It represented itself as the 
exporter and custodian of rights but actualised itself as a state of non-rights that made ‘equality of 
opportunity” and “justice between effort and its rewards” appear as a myth. This dichotomy, Qutb 
argued, led to anxiety and restlessness among individuals and groups.141 Qutb’s emphasis on the 
angst that modern condition produced further illustrates colonial reality's uncanniness and its 
continuation in the postcolonial era.  
He also continued to denounce the exploiting tyrants, a term in which he gathered men of 
religion as well as hired writers and journalists. He called for them to be thrown in jail and for their 
newspapers to be closed.142As seen in Chapter Three, a few years later, the RCC would sing to a 
similar tune. Qutb’s critique of representation had now also openly moved to the system of 
representative democracy. He saw the state as representing the needs of capitalism rather than the 
needs of the masses. Egypt’s declining conditions made a mockery of the parliamentary system’s 
claim that the nation was at the root of its power. Excessive wealth had created a class of people 
obsessed with bodily enjoyment and hedonism, this in the total indifference of the religious 
establishment, Qutb argued.143  Here again, there is a resemblance with the RCC’s critique of the 
effendis. In the face of this reality, capitalism and communism - the two blocs around which the 
world was in the process of being divided - ought to be rejected in favour of Islam, Qutb further 
contended. He asserted Islam's viability as an alternative model but insisted that to be actualised, 
it required a faithful adhesion to Islamic Idea. At that point, Qutb’s emphasis on the concepts of 
social justice, dignity and universalism are beyond their Islamic colouring, very reminiscent of 
 
139 Roussilon, ‘Trajectoires réformistes. Sayyid Qutb et Sayyid 'Uways’ 
140 Musallam, The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb’s Intellectual career, p.213 
141 Ibid., p.215 
142 Ibid, p.215 
143 Musallam, The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb’s Intellectual career p. .215 
 212 
both the colonial and the Nasserist rhetoric and the ideational visions they expressed. So did Qutb’s 
repeated calls for action. From that perspective, it becomes less puzzling to understand how Qutb 
and with him, many Ikhwan members had grown so close to the Free Officers.144 
 In 1951 Qutb also published Islam and Universal Peace, a book whose vision was 
compounded by the domestic political context. The early 1950s were a period of intense 
frustrations in Egypt. The ruling and upper classes had become increasingly involved in corruption, 
and King Farouk has been rocked by financial and sexual scandals that had turned him into a staple 
of the Cairene gossip. News of faulty armed supplied to the army in Palestine under contracts that 
had been profitable to the King and his clients, and which Nasser discussed in the Philosophy of 
the Revolution, had added to the frustrations.145  So were stories of the rigging of the Alexandria 
cotton market to the profit of Wafdist ministers. Against the backdrop of a rising cost of living and 
a shortage of basic foodstuffs, these developments almost brought down the Palace. Besides, 
behind the scenes, a military junta was preparing its takeover. 
Beyond Egypt, international politics were not more cohesive. The Cold War had emerged 
in 1946, followed by the Berlin blockade crisis of 1948, the victory of the Mao Tse Toung forces 
in China in 1949, the outbreak of the war in Korea in 1950 and continued colonialism in Africa, 
the Middle East and Latin America. Qutb explicitly referenced some of those developments in the 
book. In a chapter that was censored and reappeared under an anonymous editor in 1967, Qutb 
allegedly developed a vision of capitalism as a system in which war was used as a tool to protect 
capitalist interests, this at the costs of the lives of the masses. America had gone to war in Korea, 
he contended, to reverse the stagnant post-war economic conditions in America and Europe.146 
Qutb once again opposed Islam to capitalism: “As humanity at present is deeply concerned about 
the problem of world peace, one should ask whether Islam has a constructive opinion on this 
matter, and what are the solutions it provides. This book is meant to answer this question in 
detail.”147 In Islam, he wrote, peace means “harmony in the universe, the laws of life, and the 
origin of man, while war is the result of such violations of harmony as injustice, despotism and 
corruption.”148 It was becoming increasingly hard for him to make sense of the gaps-in-meaning 
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between modernity as Signifier and modernity as a signified. While for a time, he had believed in 
its concepts of law, peace, human rights, dignity or democracy, these had failed to materialise as 
objective realities in Egypt and beyond. In Qutb’s eyes, they had lost their meaning. In this, Islam 
is thus used to fill the gaps-in-meaning of colonial modernity by recovering them with its totality. 
This shift set the scene for Qutb’s vision in Milestones. 
In the meantime, Qutb had continued to write in leading Cairene journals, including al-
Risalah.  By then, he had engineered a rapprochement with the Ikhwan as attested by his writings 
in publications in al-Da’wah. The journal was published by Salih al-‘Ashmawi, a prominent 
member of the Ikhwan’s Executive Council (maktab al-Irshad) who had also been the first head of 
Hassan al-Banna’s Secret Apparatus. He had also been a contender for his replacement as Murshid 
after his assignation in 1949. Meanwhile, Qutb’s calls for direct actions continued. To actualise 
postcolonialism as a reality, he was now willing to work with groups he had repeatedly criticised. 
For example, he called for creating a single front that would gather nationalists, communists and 
Ikhwan members.149 Qutb’s writings between the late 1940s and early 1950s led him to reportedly 
be nicknamed the Mirabeau of the Egyptian revolution of 1952”.150  He had apparently been the 
only civilian to be aware of the 1952 coup in advance.151 He was close to Nasser and was also the 
only civilian to attend the post-coup meetings of the RCC, having been appointed adviser to the 
Committee. His nickname was put to good usage when talking to the Officers, he reportedly called 
for the suspension of the constitution and advocated rule by the bayonet. He was also adamant that 
the old regime and the effendis should pay, allegedly saying: “Oppressing ten or twenty innocents 
is better than endangering the Revolution”.152 Qutb only officially joined the Ikhwan in March 
1953. The same year he invited a young Iranian Islamist Mojtaba Mirlohi, better known as Navvab 
Safavi to Cairo where Safavi delivered a speech to Muslim Brotherhood members. Qutb’s praises 
of some Shiite movements in Islam and Social Justice had helped him gain traction in Iran. He 
saw in the country the presence of an Islamic revolutionary vitality that lacked in Egypt. In 1946,  
Safavi had founded the Fada’iyan-el-Islam, an Islamist armed group. He was also close to the man 
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who would become one of the figures of the revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini.153 It is through Safavi 
that Khomeini first heard of Qutb and later translated one of his books. Qutb’s revolutionary 
activities would soon be severely constrained by the very people whose rise to power he had 
supported. As seen in chapter three, in January 1953, the junta banned all political parties and a 
rivalry between the Officers, and the Ikhwan had now emerged for all to see. The Ikhwan had 
provided legitimacy to the Junta, but they were now being driven away from power and into the 
prisons.154  
Qutb joined the Ikhwan at a time of discord and rifts between some of its younger members 
and their new Murshid, Hassan al-Hudaybi. A decade earlier, Hassan al-Banna had created al-
Nizam al-Khass or the Secret Apparatus as a military branch. In reaction to their harsh repression 
by the Nasserist state, members of the apparatus, which had mainly been dormant, expressed their 
desire to lead a coup against the Officers. Hudaybi disagreed. A growing rivalry between the two 
camps fragmented the organisation with Hudaybi losing its grip on the younger members.155 When 
Hudaybi, wanted by the state, went into hiding, the Secret Apparatus found itself in charge. 
Meanwhile, Qutb’s role – he had been the principal chief of the anti-Nasserist propaganda- 
continued to grow, further strengthening his influence within the organisation.156 In July 1954 
Qutb was named editor of the Ikhwan’s newspaper al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, but things would come 
crashing down in September. The attempt on Nasser’s life meant the government dissolved the 
group.  In October, 450 members were arrested, including Qutb and Hudaybi.157 Qutb was released 
in 1964 at the behest of the Abdul Salam Arif, the Iraqi prime minister.158 In prison and helped 
Ikhwan members who were still on the outside keep al-Tanzim al-Sirri alive.159 He was put back 
in prison just eight months after his release and sentenced to death. This did little to qualm Qutb’s 
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resolve. From prison, he focused on developing a method that would actualise his vision of Islam 
as a total system that would replace the facticity of modernity with the Reality of all Realities.  
In 1957, Qutb wrote a poem, Bawakir al-Kifah (Firstling of Struggle) first published in al-
Kifah al-Islami, an Ikhwan journal in Jordan.160 Its editor, Abdallah Youssouf Moustafa Azzam, 
would become Bin Laden’s mentor and an essential source of inspiration for both al-Qaeda and 
ISIS.161 Here are excerpts of the poem:  
 
“Brother I am not fed up with this struggle 
 And I have not given up my weapon 
 If the army of darkness encircle me 
 I believe that the sunlight will be rising 
[….]  
I will avenge but for My Lord and my Religion 
I will continue to stand firmly on my way to victory 
 Or to the Paradise of Allah, I shall return”162 
 
The poems created a controversy with other Islamic writers responding to Qutb with their 
own poems, including al-Azzam.163 Qutb’s prison experience imprints the poem, especially the 
murdering of 21 Ikhwan members in their cells by prison guards.164 Qutb was also very aware that 
the repeated assaults of violence and torture that imprisoned Ikhwan were incessantly subjected to 
weakened both their resolve and commitment.165 The postcolonial state reproduced a form of 
totalitarian power that is similar to that of the colonial state. The freedom and dignity that 
Modernity had claimed to bear had never fully been actualised. It had all been simulacra. The 
repressive function of Nasserism only confirmed postcolonial reality as a simulation.  
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 THE PRISON WRITINGS: QUTB AND ISLAM AS AN  IDEA THAT NEEDS  
A NEW PHENOMENOLOGY 
Prison changed Qutb: ‘The prison years transformed Qutb’s thinking and writing. He 
turned his pen into a deadly weapon against the tawagheet [tyrants] and aimed at awakening the 
Umma from its prolonged slumber.”166 Prison changes anyone that enters it, but as we have seen 
in chapter four, the constant unleashing of violence and humiliation against the detainees must 
have been as traumatic as transforming. From there, Qutb gradually developed a method that his 
disciples called Fiqh al-Harakah – The operational and actionable approach.167 
In 1961, Religion of the Future was published and drew from a book, This Religion, which 
was first published in 1955. In Religion of the Future, Qutb continued to develop the Idea of Islam 
as a total system. He discussed the split between the Church and science in the Western world. It 
had created a “hideous schizophrenia” that had severed Man from the “truth”, a truth that could 
only be accessed through the acknowledgement of God’s objective truth”.168 He quoted several 
Western thinkers who shared his view to strengthen his arguments.169 He also located the Nasserist 
State within Jahiliyyah. 170  By accepting and relying on non-Islamic sources of law, Arab 
nationalism had taken up Jahili concepts that were incompossible with Islam, he argued. Beyond 
Egypt, he extended that the Islamic Ummah was forced to live according to human-made laws that 
tyrants had designed. 171 From his perspective, Islam was the only path towards the future.  
In 1962, the first part of his book, Characteristics of the Islamic Conceptions and its 
Foundations was published.172 The Idea of the Oneness/Unity of God, as well as his views on the 
relationship between the Creator and Creation, life, and humankind, are discussed. These ideas 
were as we have seen already present in his earlier writings.173 However, this time Qutb decried 
the influence of Greek Philosophy, which had drawn Islamic thinkers away from the Qur’an.174 In 
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the same year, Islam and the problems of civilisation was published. In it, he exposed Western 
civilisation as a simulacrum that produced antithetic conditions to those it ideationally projected.  
In it, he announced a future book which, he explained, would deal with the practicalities of how 
the Islamic society should deal with its present problems.175 The book titled Towards an Islamic 
Society disappeared after it reached its publisher.176 
Milestones can be then viewed as an attempt to fill the void left by this book's 
disappearance. In addition to Qutb’s activities with al-Sirri, Milestones is considered an important 
reason for Qutb’s death sentence. However, it was also used by Qutb’s lawyers as part of his 
defence.177 Qutb dedicated the book to a vanguard, which he had seen coming onto itself by 
reviving the Secret apparatus.178 As such, he described it as being first a “programme for the 
Islamic movement”.179 
 
Throughout Milestones, Qutb pursued his critique of Imperialism, Capitalism and 
Communism which are seen as repeats of the Roman Empire.180  Same difference. Similarly, he 
continued to deride the bankruptcy of positivism to which he again opposed the Real of Islam.181 
Secular-leaning Arab cultural and political movements such as Arab socialism, are described as 
‘the form of a society in which belief in Allah Almighty is denied, and human history is explained 
in terms of intellectual materialism, and ‘scientific socialism’ becomes the system.”182 Islamic 
socialism receives a similar treatment. 183  The theme of a disjunction between truth and 
appearances also persists. Firstly, modernity goes at countersense of itself since it produces 
ignorance as knowledge and progress:  
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“If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that 
the whole world is steeped in Jahiliyyah and all the material comforts and high-level inventions 
do not diminish this ignorance.”184  
 
Western modernity is thus presented as an inversion of its representation: it actualises 
progress as ignorance. This opposition implies another: modern reason is a simulacrum.  The 
facticity of modernity and its assault on reason is described in apocalyptic terms:  
 
“Mankind today is on the brink of a destruction, not because of the danger of complete 
annihilation, this hanging over its head being just a symptom and not the real decease but because 
humanity is derived of those vital values which are necessary not only for its vital development 
but also for its real progress.[…..] The period of the Western system has come to an end primarily 
because it is deprived of those live giving values, which enabled it to be the leader of mankind.”185 
 
Secondly, Jahiliya’s Simulation had contaminated Islamic reality. 186  It had folded the 
Islamic Symbolic into its Simulation and split Islam into two orders: an original and its simulacra. 
This split mirrors the division of Islam into two main branches: Sunnism and Shiism. Islam, he 
warned “is not ’a theory’ based on ‘assumptions’, instead it is a way of life working with 
‘reality’.187 It is a total system that governs all aspects of life.188 It is a universal message because 
its laws are the laws of God whose laws regulate the universe. 189 With Qutb, there are two 
contenders to the Idea of Islam, a true claimant and a deviant copy. True Islam provides a 
“universal declaration of the freedom of man on the earth from every authority except that of 
Allah.”190 The Qur’an is defined as an instruction for action, which ought to be read “as a soldier 
on the battlefield reads today’s bulletin.”191 Its message is a transhistorical method of liberation, 
Qutb argued 192 The Muslim community must comprehend that “There is no deity worthy of 
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worship except Allah,” and “commit itself to obey none but Allah, denying all other authority, and 
which challenges the legality of any law which is not based on this belief”.193 For Qutb, Islam 
offers spirituality as a concrete experience, whose emergence as a collective reality requires each 
member’s actions and commitment. 194 This is reminiscent of his insistence on responsibility and 
inter-dependence in Islam and Social Justice.   
In Milestones, it is a reconfiguration of the reality of being-Muslim that Qutb proposed.195 
To this end, he put forward a method that, he argued, would produce Islam as a perfect presentation 
of its Idea. However, he warned the path ahead would be difficult.196 The first step would be the 
most arduous since it requires a total split from the epistemological Other  (Big Other) of Jahili 
society:197 To actualise this split, Muslims ought to return to the only pure source of knowledge, 
the Qur’an and derive from it all their existential concepts.198 To this end, they ought to mimic the 
first generations of Muslims. 199  For a writer who had spent decades attacking Muslims for their 
mimicry of the West, it is ironic that he used the concept to actualise a future to-come. Qutb put 
the responsibility for this shift into a new Real in the hands of a vanguard which he described as 
an organised and active group, probably referring to al-Sirri200  The history of Islam, he contended 
is paved with Jihads. Jihad is not a war of conquest, Qutb postulated, but a war for humanity's 
liberation. In this way, Islam is seen as the ultimate decolonial tool. This liberation was made 
contingent on achieving Hakimiyyah. 201   
Just like Jahiliyyah, the term Hakimiyyah has a long historicity of usages. However, 
drawing on the term's etymology, most of those meanings establish an intrinsic filiation between 
Allah and juridical power. As Sayed Khatab notes, Ibn Duryad, the famous Iraqi philologist,  
lexicographer and poet defined it followingly: “the hakim is the one who exercises judicial 
authority; a ruler or governor…and there is none but Allah is the Highest Governor, the Ruler and 
the Supreme legal authority”.202  Meanwhile, Ibn Mansur, a Persian Sufi writer and poet defined 
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it as “Allah is the Sovereign (Ahkam) of sovereigns (hakimin) and His Qur’an is the Hakim for 
and among you.” 203  While much of the literature has approached Qutb’s use of the term 
hakimiyyah as meaning sovereignty, this section argues that another reading is possible: that of 
Hakimiyyah as Reason/Absolute Reality.  
Qutb’s use of Hakimiyyah can be seen as a synthesis of his previous development of a 
theory of God's Oneness, in which he drew from Sufism. Despite the breadth of Sufi movements 
and doctrines, in most cases, the Oneness of God, known as Wahdat al-wajud, is often compared 
to a drop entirely losing itself in the ocean of divine unity.204 This draws from the Qur’anic concept 
of Tawhid: there is only one God- Allah. With Sufism, however, the concept takes a deeper 
meaning. Tawhid is seen as “only Absolute Reality is absolutely real’ meaning that there is nothing 
Real but God. Accessing this reality is first a metaphysical experience whose evental materiality 
can be attested to by the Prophet Muhammad’s experience of the Revelation. In this event, the soul 
of the Prophet merged with God. As previously pointed, Mohammed did not know how to read 
nor write, this until the Revelation where through this union, he could write the language/words of 
God. In Sufism, the Word of God is thus understood as Logos. This Logos, or the Reality of all 
Realities, is first accessed through the heart rather than the brain.205 This is very reminiscent of 
some of Qutb’s positions taken in his works on the Aesthetics of Islam, which emphasised the 
realm of the sensible as a path to access the all-encompassing Reality of Allah. Hakimiyyah thus 
appears to be a re-working of Qutb’s I’jaz, albeit emptied of its Sufi imprints. Hakimiyyah is first 
a material objectivity, not a metaphysical experience. It, however, does not just express the 
sovereignty of God but rather through it, it promises the actualisation of the Reality of all Realities: 
God’s logos on earth. In this way, Hakimiyyah presents itself as the concrete presentation of God’s 
immanence and omnipotence. Hakimiyyah can then only produce a pure and total reality. There is 
no disjunction between the essence of things and their appearances because the two are self-
identical. By developing a concept of Islam as a pure-practical reason, Qutb thinks of a liberation 
totalised by the Symbolic world. Islam is rethought as a total system of Ideas that enframes sensible 
experience and in doing so can ‘make’ the difference between illusion and reality. Qutb presents 
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his vision of Islam as offering an objective knowledge of reality and beyond it of time. Logos, for 
Qutb, is the spoken of Allah.  
All in all, colonial reason, Nasserist thought and Qutbist thought, all think time as the 
spoken of a utopia in the making. Colonial reason thought of time as progress, which posits time 
as a  linear succession of a series of events unfolding towards a better. Time is then thought of as 
an internal limit of subjectivity. Indeed, progress implies a subjectivity that repeatedly moves 
beyond its limits. Nasserist thought thinks of time as Arab socialism, which posits time as a 
dialectical movement of history.  The dialectics also think of time as an internal limit of 
subjectivity. This vision implies the presence of a historical subject able to move beyond its 
subjective limits. Besides, socialism also thinks of time as a succession of a series of time, albeit 
a dialectical one. Finally, Qutb thought of time as Hakimiyyah. Time starts with the words of God 
and is the objective reality that these words produce. Time is thought of as an inversed dialectics: 
it is by foreclosing its present history that the subject can enter a higher level of consciousness. 
Time is then also thought of as an internal limit of subjectivity. Its vision implies a historical 
subject able to move beyond its subjective limits. In these three models of thought, the objectivity 
of knowledge is tainted by the “I” of the thinker. This narcissistic reflection of the image of thought 
keeps thought prisoner of the Symbolic order.  
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has argued that despite his attempt to free thought of its image of thought, 
Sayyid Qutb’s prison writings produced Signifiers/simulacra that identify Islam's identity as an 
Ideal-I or total Idea. In doing so, his thought remained a prisoner of the historical a priori that folds 
thought in the Symbolics of Simulation. This chapter has proposed to see how Qutb’s thought 
moved from challenging the Simulation to falling back into its capture. Its first moment highlighted 
the emergence of a percept of modernity as a simulacrum, a parallax object. Nonetheless, Qutb 
still believed that the constitutive disjunction between the appearance and the real of modernity 
could be resolved. Qutb gradually grew convinced that modern reason operated within the wrong 
tradition of knowledge and that Islam could open man up to objective knowledge. Qutb started to 
contrast the coldness and emotionless faces of modern reason and science with the warmth of 
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Islam’s affect on sensible experience. This also marks the emergence of Islam as a precept of truth. 
The second moment of the chapter further examined the shifts in Qutb’s thought. Qutb moved 
from challenging modernity as a Simulation to thinking of Islam as a total reason and a totalising 
reality. In his increasingly orthodox/dogmatic vision, Qutb reproduced the very logic of alienation 
he tried to escape.  
Although he did challenge the modern Simulation, the model of thought that he developed 
to liberate thought from the Simulation only captured it further into the world of phantasms. Qutb 
acknowledged the need to rethink the semiosis of liberation but inversed not reversed the colonial 
regime of representation.  This inversion of the regime of identities of the colonial Simulation 
meant that Qutb’s thought eventually gave rise to an image of Islam as a copy of the colonial 
absurd. ISIS, for example, can be seen as the concrete representation of the Qutbist absurd. It also 
illustrates its pathologisation of the politics of liberation. In this Simulation, experience is so 
totalised by the symbolic that the real is deprived of the possibility of signification. It is foreclosed 
from reality. In this semiotic process, the real is replaced by the true, the Ideal-I. In thinking of 
time as an internal limit of subjectivity, Qutb thought of time as an empty signifier, whose reality 
is determined by the reality of the Idea of Islam. Thus, modern European progress can be thought 
of as a simulacrum of Islamic progress. In this semiotic assemblage, the real is deprived of the 
possibility of signification and replaced with its symbolic representation. This semiotic process 
produces a reality that has two senses. On the one hand, it appears to open the social to all possibles; 
on the other, it forecloses the possibles that do not fit its laws. It functions differently from what it 
appears. Qutb uses the dogmatic image of Islam as a total Idea to rationalise the fascism with which 
its model forecloses exteriority. With Qutb, Muslims have been colonised by so many faces that 
they have forgotten the real Face of Islam, the Qur’an. Just like in the colonial and Nasserist 
models, the individual is conceptualised as a Self who ought to strive and identify with the Ideal-
Is, in this case, presented by an Islamic Symbolic. All in all, Qutb rethinks Islam as a precept of 
time and the Islamic Symbolic – Allah’s Logos- as the origin of socio-political individual and 
collective reality. Qutb’s thought thus remains a prisoner of the image of thought and its postulates. 
It thinks Islamic thought as a pure reason that is good-natured and truth-seeking. In concluding, 
Qutb’s postcolonial thought is an infolding of the colonial Simulation, a fold where the panopticon 
has lost its walls but where control has never been more total. Qutb’s line of flight had been 










« Il faut une révolution dans la révolution. » 206 
« - J’entends rien….Qu’est-ce qu’elle dit ? 
- Elle dit que les pauvres sauveront ce monde. » 207 
 
 




Overall, this thesis has argued that postcolonial thought thinks of the revolutionary 
event/experience as its colonial simulacra. Modern thought, including postcolonial thinking,  the 
thesis has argued, still reproduces Platonic Idealism by positing the Symbolic as the origin of 
experience.  This, the thesis has argued, is a Simulation of thought. Indeed, as explained in the 
Introductory Chapter, the thesis conceptualises civilisational time as a time of Symbolic 
 
206  “There needs to be a revolution in the revolution”. Sentence pronounced in the film Le Livre d’Image. Jean-
Luc Goddard, Le Livre d’Image, 2018 
207 “I am not hearing it…..What is she saying? -  She is saying that the poor will save the world”. Dialogue in 
the film Le Livre d’Image. Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
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Simulations. Consequently, it understands the colonial Simulation as a fold of the modern 
Simulation and the postcolonial Simulation as a fold of the colonial Simulation. Historical time is 
then seen as a successive series of simulations, with each Simulation producing a particular 
temporal sequencing of space. Modern semiosis, the thesis has argued, thinks the space of the Real 
as a lost past. This is exemplified by the ways in which modern thought thinks of time-in-itself 
and thus of the Real/immediate experience- as an internal limit of subjectivity. 
The ways in which  Liberalism, Marxism, Socialism and as we have seen with Qutb, 
Modern Salafism,  think of time as a successive series of Ideas or simulacra whose movement is 
either defined as a linear progression or as a dialectics, illustrate how the Real is thought as a limit 
of representation. In the Symbolics of Simulation, images precede the real and form a procession 
of simulacra. Furthermore, the affect or sense that this perception of time produces, the thesis has 
argued, is an absurd 'real', a real whose foundation is purely Symbolic. Indeed, the thesis has 
highlighted how modern semiosis produces a reality totalised by the Symbolic and its worlds of 
Objects. It has also outlined how, as folds of the modern fold, colonial and postcolonial semiotics 
reproduce this absurd.  
Finally, the thesis has also argued that the structure of modern semiosis mimics a paranoid 
structure by articulating itself through two fundamental laws. The first law is that its Symbolic 
temporal sequencing of space is the only possible series of time. The second law is that all the 
series of time that are not included in this sequencing must be foreclosed. Here again, the thesis 
illustrates how the Symbolic totalisation of time/experience produces a reality that appears to be 
split between an Ideal surface and a beneath whose reality is suppressed by the Faces of the 
'surface'. As we have seen, those Faces include the modern state, which includes both the colonial 
and the Nasserist states, capitalism but also modern thought.  Indeed, Colonial Liberalism, 
Nasserist Socialism and Qutb's Salafism all speak the speech of the surface, this speech that 
projects the Symbolic as the 'origin' of experience. This has had significant implications on how 
thought thinks liberation, the thesis postulates. Indeed, the paranoid structure of modern semiosis 
produces a pathologisation of the politics of liberation, the thesis argues. Fanon has already 
exposed that the colonial Symbolic produced mental illness as a spoken of its castration. Madness 
becomes a  form of 'liberated' speech because it speaks what the Colonial Symbolic suppresses 
from its surface or discourse; it speaks the foreclosed. Colonialism, Fanon thus argued, produced 
pathologies of freedom. This pathologisation implies a Symbolic whose speech spirals further into 
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the worlds of phantasms. The thesis has outlined how Colonial, Nasserist and Qutbist can be used 
as illustrations of thoughts that pathologise the politics of liberation by thinking liberation, that is, 
revolutionary events/experiences, as simulacra.  
Chapter 1 has examined how Egyptian subjectivity became enfolded by the colonial 
Simulation. As in Borges' fable,  this chapter has shown how the Symbolic of space that constitutes 
the colonial map, recover the Real and exclude it from its system of signification/simulation. The 
chapter used the Lacanian Mirror Stage as a model of thought that explains the processes of 
Identification. From a Deleuzean perspective, Identification/Representation/Signification are all 
orders of Simulation. The Mirror Stage can thus be used as a model that explains the colonial 
Simulation's semiotic processes, the chapter has argued. It also shows how the entrance into a 
Symbolic Simulation is experienced as castration because it implies losing a previous sense of 
'real'. This sense of castration is further exacerbated by the semiotic laws that structure the Colonial 
simulation.  The first law postulates that the previous 'real’/simulation can never be experienced 
again. The second law postulates that the Real, can only be experienced as an Object a, or phantasm 
of its Symbolic. This was exemplified by the ways in which colonial thought thinks of Egypt as a 
phantasm of its lost real. This phantasm or simulacrum divided Egypt between a True claimant of 
modernity, namely ancient Egypt, and a fake claimant, modern Egypt. This displacement of 
Egyptian historical agency illustrates how colonial thought thinks the Egyptian colonised as a 
castrated subject. In contrast, the chapter has further advanced that colonial thought thinks of the 
modern European Subject as a precept of time, a surplus/transhistorical production. Additionally,  
the has chapter also highlighted how the colonial Simulation was coalescent with the emergence 
of the Capitalist-Bourgeois Ideal and its double function of 'liberation' and castration of desire. 
The 'liberation' of capitalism offers the colonised the possibility of being an active participant in 
the modern Simulation, a subject with capital and thus agency, the chapter has contended. It is by 
articulating itself through the logic of the pleasure principle, the chapter then argued, that 
capitalism seduces subjectivity into its Simulation. Furthermore, the process of transvaluation acts 
as a regulator of the economy of Capitalist desire.  
Drawing conclusions from the first chapter, we can now say that both colonial thought and 
capitalist semiotics produce the Real as an empty signifier. In this, they can both be taken as forms 
of thought or semiosis that Nietzsche called Egyptianism. Egyptianism can be used to describe a 
form of thinking that produces a Real deprived of the possibility of signification, and instead 
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simulates it as its Symbolic Simulation. For Nietzsche,  the history of thought/philosophy is 
marked by its Egyptianism:  
 
"There is ... their hatred of even the idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they 
are doing a thing honour when they dehistoricise it, sub specie aeterni—when they make a 
mummy of it. All that philosophers have handled for millennia has been conceptual mummies; 
nothing actual has escaped their hands alive. They kill, they stuff, when they worship, these 
conceptual idolaters—they become a mortal danger to everything when they worship. Death, 
change, age, as well as procreation and growth, are for them objections—refutations even. What 
is, does not become; what becomes is not … Now they all believe, even to the point of despair, in 
that which is."209 
 
Chapter 2 has further outlined how modern thought thinks of The Law and the 'real' as 
empty signifiers. This also echoes' Nietzsche's warning that thought produces mummified concepts 
or as the chapter proposes drawing from Deleuze's critique of the Kantian turn, Ideas/concepts as 
empty signifiers. This chapter's first moment has highlighted the paradoxical nature of colonial 
knowledge and the absurd that it produces. While Plunderland presents itself as a world where all 
the series of times are possible, it forecloses the series of time that do not fit its temporal 
sequencing of space. In Plunderland, reality is what capitalism makes of it; it obeys the laws of 
capital and individuals' sense of self and reality are totalised by the colonial Symbolic's capitalist 
economy. The Mixed courts and the 'Liberal' era have illustrated how the colonial Simulation 
partitions space according to Capitalist desire and time.  While capitalist desire/time reproduced 
the superiority of the foreign landed Bourgeoisie, it expropriated the peasants from their lands. 
This helps highlight capitalism as the desire or drive that 'makes' 'organises' the modern temporal 
sequencing of space. Moreover, the Oedipalisation of peasants has illustrated the disciplinary 
power of modern law: a good subject is a subject that meets the requirements of capitalist desire. 
The repressive quality of Modern colonial rule also activated collective encounters with the 
paradoxical logic of the Simulation's reality. The Dinshaway incident can be taken as one of these 
encounters, the chapter has argued.   In its concluding remarks, the chapter has contended that its 
 
209 Friedrich Nietzsche, R.J. Hollingdale (Trans.), Twilight of the Idols , (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 
1968), p. 35 
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analysis of the modern semiotic process means it can be described as a paranoid logic of enfolding.  
Indeed,  its laws ‘fix’ subjectivity in a fixed time– they set the series of time of the Simulation as 
the 'real’ and foreclose the series or times that are not included in the Simulation. This logic of 
fixing and foreclosing mimic a paranoid structure. This paranoid structure, it further argued, means 
we have a paranoiac relationship not only to knowledge but also to the 'reality' produced by the 
Simulation. This could help explain the subjective fetish for the Objects produced by capitalism, 
already described, for example, by Marcuse in One-dimensional man.210   
Finally, we can now say that in thinking of The Law/Idea as an empty signifier, modern 
thought thinks of the Real as a form/image with no particular experience, an empty form/surface. 
If modern thought thinks of the Real as a lost origin, then it is bound to think of the three syntheses 
of time past/present/future as their posteriority. If thought thinks of time in its 
posteriority/Symbolic virtual past, then it cannot include the affect that time has on experience in 
its cognition. The Spirit of the Laws then is a hauntological Real: a Real that can only appear 
through the presence of its absence. This hauntology of the Real echoes the plastics of the 
Simulation's surface, which the thesis has highlighted.  
Chapter 3 moved to the First Face of postcolonial thought that the thesis explores: 
Nasserism. It has argued that Nasserism can be conceptualised as a postcolonial Face of the 
colonial fold. To this end, it has outlined how the Nasserist state reproduced the colonial semiosis 
of the absurd and their production of a reality that articulates itself as two senses. On the one hand, 
Nasserism presented itself as an agent of the anti-colonial revolution that would liberate Egypt 
from colonial reality and finally, open up the social to all possibles or series of time. Yet, on the 
other, it actively foreclosed the possibles that did not fit its Symbolic laws. Furthermore, the 
chapter also highlighted how the state and capitalism share a similar mode of production: private 
ownership of the means of (subjective)production.  Thus, the state and capitalism can be seen as 
nodal Signifiers of modern semiosis, hence their role as machines-of-capture, rather than as 
machines-of-liberation of desire. Indeed, the thesis contends that both the state and capitalism 
speak the speech/Symbolics of Simulation. The Nasserist state's obsession with eliminating the 
elements who/that did not fit its temporal sequencing of space further illustrated both the absurd 
of postcolonial semiosis and their production of an experience totalised by the Symbolic. Besides 
 
210 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man 
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the paranoid structure of the semiotic process can help explain the fascist latency of the Nasserist 
state and beyond it of the state in its historical dimension.  In concluding, the chapter has argued 
that in setting up the seeds of the corporatist-military state that to this day still haunts the possible 
revolutionary becoming of Egypt,  Nasserism set the stage for the continuation of the colonial 
castration of experience and its pathologisation of the politics of liberation. Beyond its surface of 
liberation, Nasserism acted as a force of suffocation: it captured not liberated revolutionary desires.  
Chapter 4 has argued that as a Face of the fold of the colonial Simulation, Nasserism 
thought of liberation as a copy of its colonial simulacrum. The chapter first examined the multiple 
Signifiers/simulacra of liberation produced by the Nasserist Symbolic to highlight how Nasserism 
simulated itself as both an affect and percept of 'liberated' time. Beyond this Ideal surface, the 
chapter highlighted the function of Facialization of the Nasserist state. In line with Deleuze and 
Guattari's concept of Faciality, the chapter has argued that the Nasserist state subjectivised 
Egyptians into the Ideal face of the Simulation by inserting itself as The Signifier/surface that 
mediated the experience and the being-in-the-world of its Subjects. It did so by producing a 
complex system of signification for liberation. Nasserism thus presented itself as a liberated 
Symbolic. It claimed it thought the production of an equal and just reality, in which Arab Socialism 
would re-code individual subjectivity to a  collective modality of consciousness. The chapter 
challenged this vision of the Nasserist Symbolic by arguing that it thought of liberation as the 
production of the people as copies of its Ideal-Is, the chapter has argued. In becoming the state's 
ideal-Is, we become participants in the subjective de-individuation through which facialization 
operates, the chapter has emphasised. We become participants in a Simulation that simulates 
'liberated' desire, the thesis contends.  Finally, the chapter exposed the repressive function of the 
Nasserist liberation by looking into how Nasserism simulated itself as a revolutionary affect/desire. 
This Simulation, it argued, reproduces colonial semiosis because its semiotic process is totalised 
by the Symbolic and its world of phantasms. This Ideal-reality or Simulation that the regime's 
Symbolic projected is particularly problematic because it forecloses the reality/intensity of its 
violence from its surface, the chapter has contended.  
All in all, the analysis of this chapter has uncovered a hole, a parallax gap between the 
'liberated and 'liberating' surface of Nasserism and its Oedipal function. We can now say that this 
parallax gap is the mark of an enfolding. The thesis postulates that this enfolding is the 
trace/imprint of a mechanism of subjective capture rather than of subjective liberation.  This 'gap' 
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uncovers the enfolding of thought into a Simulation: thought thinks the Real as an empty 
Signifier. In this logic/law of semiotics, signs are first thought from a Symbolic 
perspective: their Real is represented by a Symbolic copy. The sign becomes the Sign in 
the same way that the self becomes the Self.  The parallax quality of the Nasserist 
Simulation thus uncovers how the Nasserist Symbolic thinks 'liberation' as a Sign of the 
colonial Symbolic. In doing so, the chapter has argued, Nasserism thinks 'liberation' as the 
simulacrum of a simulacrum. As the chapter has shown, the Nasserist Symbolic can think 
and produce effects of liberation, that is sensations and perceptions of liberation. However, 
ultimately, the chapter concluded,  Nasserism does not unfold as an affect of liberation but 
as an affect of alienation of desire and subjectivity: it enfolds them. 
Finally, Chapter 5 looked at the second Face of colonial thought that the thesis 
explores. The chapter has argued that this Face is the Face of a desire for liberation that 
turned into a desire for repression. Indeed, the chapter looked at Qutb's thought as a thought 
that moved from challenging the Simulation to falling back into its capture. Despite his 
attempt to free thought from its image of thought, Sayyid Qutb's prison writings produced 
Signifiers/simulacra that identify Islam's identity as an Ideal-I or total Idea. In this, just like 
Nasserism, it thinks of liberation as the simulacra of a simulacra and remains a prisoner of 
the panoptical historical a priori that enframes modern thought. This panoptical a priori 
was approached through Deleuze's concept of the image of thought. To make this 
argument, the chapter first highlighted how Qutb's thought increasingly questioned 
Modernity as both a concrete historical formation and as an epistemic space.  
In particular, a disjunction between the appearance of modernity and its true Self 
emerged in Qutb's thought. As his writings show, Qutb looked for ways to explain the 
parallax quality of modernity. Eventually, he grew convinced that modern thought operated 
within the wrong tradition of thought. The modernity thought by modern European 
thought, Qutb argued, produced modernity as a simulacrum. To this, he opposed Islam as 
the only tradition of thought that can think of modernity as the Reality of all reality, that is 
as a reality open to all the series of times. With Qutb, the chapter has argued, Islam is 
rethought as a precept of truth. The chapter has also highlighted how, with his increasingly 
orthodox/dogmatic vision,  Qutb reproduced the very logic of alienation he tried to escape. 
Qutb acknowledged the need to rethink the semiosis of liberation but inversed not reversed 
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the colonial regime of representation. In the Qutubist Symbolic, Modern European thought is 
ignorant, while Islam thinks the true. Qutb thinks of the Islamic Subject as an inversion of its 
colonial simulacra. With Islam, the castrated subject becomes a 'liberated' Subject, who, Qutb 
contends, can access the Reality of all realities.  
 This inversion of the colonial Simulation’s regime of identities, the chapter explained,  
means that Qutb's thought eventually gave rise to Islam's image as a copy of the colonial absurd. 
ISIS, for example, can be seen as the concrete representation of the Qutbist absurd. Finally, the 
chapter argued that Qutubism illustrates the postcolonial reproduction of the colonial 
pathologisation of the politics of liberation. In this Simulation, experience is so totalised by the 
Symbolic that the Real is deprived of the possibility of signification. It is foreclosed from reality 
and replaced with its Symbolic copy. All in all, Qutb rethinks Islam as a precept of time and the 
Islamic Symbolic – Allah's Logos- as the origin of socio-political individual and collective reality. 
Qutb's thought thus remains a prisoner of the image of thought and its postulates. It thinks Islamic 
thought as a pure reason that is good-natured and truth-seeking. In concluding, the chapter has 
explained that Qutb's postcolonial thought is a fold of the colonial Simulation, a fold where the 
panopticon has lost its walls but where control has never been more total. Qutb's line of flight had 
been captured into a deathly becoming. 
We can now say that Qutb's thought can be used to illustrate what Lacan called a thought 
of the in-between-two-deaths: a line of flight that turns into a line of death.  Lacan used the concept 
in reference to the Greek tragedy Antigone.211  In the Sophocles play, Antigone is the oldest 
daughter of Oedipus and Jocasta. In Greek, her name defines as 'one who is of the opposite opinion' 
(anti = opposite, gnomi = opinion). Creon, the new King of Thebes, represents THE LAW as a 
total and totalising Symbolic. Creon thinks of 'reality' through the Reason/LAWS of the 
Simulation. He knows or thinks no Outside of the Simulation. Creon's fortune meets its limit in 
the form of Polyneices, Antigone's Brother.212 He prohibits the burial of Polyneices, thereby 
condemning him to die again after his death. In doing so, Creon has unwillingly transgressed the 
limits of the Symbolic. He went against its 'name-of-the-father: he presupposes that the Symbolic 
acts on an 'Outside'; that the Symbolic can act on series of laws that do not fit its temporal 
 
211 Jacques Lacan, Jacques-Alain Miller (Ed.), The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-60, - The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan, Book VII, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p.219 
212 Ibid., p.254 
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sequencing of space.  At first, drawing from Sophocles, Creon's 'mistake' can be seen as a 
misjudgement Lacan tells us.213 Yet, as Lacan notes, Creon's desire is a pleasure without affect: it 
is a rational desire. Lacan contrasts Creon's desire to Sadean desire, as a pleasure whose affect is 
perverse.214  It is because Creon wanted to honour his responsibility towards the polis to 'make' 
good that he Identified so strictly with  THE LAW.215  With Lacan Creon speaks the Kantian 
language of  the good, the language of practical Reason:  
 
 "one cannot at the same time honour those who have defended their country and those who 
have attacked it.  From a Kantian point of view, it is a maxim that can be given as a rule of reason 
with a universal value".216 
 
For Lacan, tragedy is the first objection to the aesthetics of the good, because it implies that:   
 
"the good cannot reign over all without an excess emerging whose fatal consequences are 
revealed to us in tragedy."217 
 
With Lacan, it is then Antigone, not Creon who is the victim of hubris – excessive pride or 
confidence. Antigone refused to obey Creon and buried her brother. She took-up a different Law, 
the Law of the Outside that Creon had overstepped. Creon had warned Antigone that should she 
fail to abide by The Law of the state, she would be immured alive, yet Antigone forged ahead and 
took her life in the aftermath. For Lacan, this exposes Antigone's real desire as a "pure and simple 
desire of death as such". 218 
Between the moment she acted out her real desire and the moment of her acting out, 
Antigone had found herself in the space of the In-between-two-deaths: she was not dead yet, but 
her desire to free herself of THE LAW of the State eventually takes her to her death. Antigone, 
Lacan tells us, connect her "desire for the Other" or as the thesis postulates, THE LAW as THE 
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REAL, to what Lacan says is her "desire for the mother", that is for "the origin of everything".  
With Lacan, Antigone desires desire in its pure form, and in doing so, braves the laws of 
Signification/Identification, she desires a desire 'liberated' from Symbolic of her Historical 
Simulation. Lacan connects Antigone's pure desire to the  Signifier of a Crime: Incest.219 Her 
family had been born into Crime, not Power: 
 
"The fruit of the incestuous union has split into two brothers, one of whom represents 
power and the other crime.  There is no one to assume the crime and the validity of crime apart 
from Antigone [...].  Antigone perpetuates, eternalises, immortalises this Até."220 
 
With Lacan Antigone wants to move beyond this Até :   
 
"What does it mean to us if Antigone goes beyond the limits of the human? What does it 
mean if not that her desire aims at the following - the beyond of Ate?"221 
 
Antigone wants to re-write the 'name of the father' and free her family from its original 
crime. She sees herself as a de-enfolded space:  as being beyond the laws of the Symbolic of her 
Historical Simulation. According to Lacan, there is something quite beautiful about Antigone's 
desire for this beyond: 
 
"The violent illumination, the glow of beauty, coincides with the moment of crossing, of 
achievement of the Até of Antigone."222 
 
 Antigone's beauty glows so brightly it blinds. She becomes sublime when her Self breaks-
down when her Self de-Identifies wi 
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th the Symbolic of her Historical Simulation. Still, to speak this Até, Antigone needs to 
assume the Crime and move beyond the Symbolic. She says herself that she dead: "I am dead, and 
I desire Death".223 She is in the in-between-two-death.224 
Overall, for Lacan, a Self cannot exist without an image, an eidos,  that precedes it. Indeed 
Antigone aimed at thinking her Até as a 'liberated speech', a 'speech' where signs are not preceded 
by images, a speech that thinks from beyond the Symbolics of Simulation. This is the speech of 
free desire. As mentioned, for Lacan, a subject who desires pure desire can only think and desire 
death. Antigone's process of de-Identification with her Self is a process of Identification with 
Death. This marks her entrance into the zone of the in-between-two-death. This Identification with 
Death is even more powerful that the Simulation it draws her into the Outside.  Lacan establishes 
an equivalence between de-Identification and the in-between-two-death. What was originally a 
line of flight, a desire that challenged the Simulation, became enfolded by death. 
The image of Antigone seems to precedes the image of Sayyid Qutb. In his desire to move 
beyond the laws of his Historical Simulation, he too, aimed at speaking an Até of free speech. Yet,  
like Antigone, he became enfolded by death. Antigone and Qutb had unwillingly both become 
heroes of the tragic. Their Faces are included in the series of times of the colonial Simulation, of 
the Nasserist Simulation and all the Faces of civilisation. Civilisational thought is just a Simulation 
of knowledge.  Their desire for free speech/desire turned into a desire for repression. It thought 
and acted a desire for repression. Their thought still spoke of the state and its Oedipal prohibition. 
The economy of their desire still mimicked the logic of the pleasure principle, in line with 
Capitalist desire. This desire thinks total pleasure or in Lacanian term, Jouissance,  as a foreclosure 
of the Real, but its Symbolic is an in-between-two-death. With Lacan, the laws of the Outside are 
laws that transgress the Simulation. These laws of transgression expose a movement from pleasure 
into a petite mort (a little death). With Lacan, Jouissance cannot be unlimited; it cannot be total 
otherwise, it would take us to the Outside of Life, and into death. The film La Grande Bouffe, for 
example, illustrates this going-towards-death of Jouissance.225 With Lacan, it is because it violates 
the laws of the Symbolic that Jouissance takes the body into its death. It is then of  Jouissance as 
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an Empty Signifier that Lacan thinks of; Jouissance as a pure desire for repression. This desire 
desires an experience that has no form, no limits. This experience for Lacan is Death/Madness. 
 
So, is a desire for free speech bound to Identify with death and take its subject into a 
movement of death? In there an Inside/Outline limit that cannot be overstepped? From a Deleuzean 
perception, no. For Deleuze, free desire is not pure desire. For Deleuze, the 'inside' is enfolded by 
the 'outside'. Jouissance is not a petite mort or little death but a bodily sur-production of vitality. 
Jouissance is then not the symptom of a lack-in-being, symptom that becomes death when it 
reaches its limits.226 Instead, it is the event of a being-in-becoming. It is not the copulation of a 
Signifier with its Signifieds but of a sign that senses itself in experience. With Deleuze, Jouissance 
is not a law of transgression; it is a law that follows the principle of the excluded middle: that 
which is neither, nor, the research argues. With Deleuze, the Real cannot be on the Outside of the 
Simulation because it is enfolded by it. The Simulation's surface projects itself as a white wall with 
black holes, but in subjectivising us into its Simulation, it 'makes' us forget that the Real permeates 
the air. It 'makes' us forget to breathe; it suffocates us. While it suffocates us, it colonises us. As 
Fanon has shown, it produces pathologies of freedom.  
The surface enfolds us back into its Simulation and continuously re-captures subjectivity 
into a paranoid semiotic structure and its analytics of the Self. Deleuze challenges the necessity of 
the Self on the self that Lacan presupposes with his concept of "agencement" or assemblages. In 
doing so, he reverses the Platonic Idealism of Lacanian thought. In his analysis of the laws of 
transgression through his analysis of Antigone, Lacan is tricked/seduced by his Platonic Idealism.  
He only thinks of free desire as pure desire. From a Deleuzean counterpoint, free desire does not 
have to be pure; it can be flow.227 It is not Oedipal but Dionysian. This flow is not the desire of a 
Subject who Identifies with Death in its quest to De-Identify from the laws of the Simulation, as 
Lacan necessarily thinks it. It is not a de--enfolded subject, a subject who does not have a Self. 
Desire as flow is the desire of a subject who un-enfolds their folds. This subject, the conclusion of 
the thesis postulates, is an assemblage of folds that thinks and acts as an un-enfolded form of 
thought.  Its assemblages are not heroes of the tragic as in Oedipus and his cursed family. They 
are the heroes of a different genre/affect: irony. The thought of this assemblage, the thesis argues 
 
226 Deleuze, Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.553 
227 Ibid, p.75-76 
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can be best approached as a thought that rethinks the Platonic Idea as a simulacrum of the Idea of 
Antigone. In this simulacrum, Antigone does not assume a crime but instead assumes a 'liberation'. 
She is not in an in-between two-deaths but in an in-between-two-folds. This Antigone thinks in 
schizo-analytical terms, not parano-analytical terms.  
Overall, the research has analysed the paranoid semiosis of modernity through a Deleuzean 
un-enfolding of its folds. This un-enfolding of the folds of thought is what Deleuze and Guattari 
called a Schizoanalysis.  In Anti Oedipus, they explain that Schizoanalysis asks the following 
questions: "What are your desiring-machines, do you put into these machines, what is the output, 
how does it work, what are your nonhuman sexes?"228 To let desire speak its free speech then is to 
allow it to un-enfold the infoldings of thought. In Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, they 
gave us a conceptual cartography of the Ideas as assemblages that a schizoanalytical thought 
thinks. These include as we have seen throughout the thesis the Urstaat as the Original Face of the 
State which they rethink as a fold of civilisational Oedipal desire. It also includes Capitalism as 
the economy of  Oedipal desire, which regulates the Symbolic economy through its own 
articulatory regulator: the pleasure principle. Then, there is the Body Without Organs (BwO) as a 
vital force which they rethink by de-facialising thought. The BwO then is a thought that operates 
without an image of thought, without a Self. This thought is an assemblage of folds whose function 
is not to repress its extensive quality by expressing itself as a purely intensive quality. THE BwO 
is a thought that uses its extensive quality to un-enfold its folds. It has no form because it is not 
preceded by an Image.  
Deleuze and Guattari have been heavily criticised for rethinking Schizophrenia as the 
semiotic structure of their free subject or in their schizo-bulary the 'self' as an assemblage of 
desiring-machines.  This conclusion highlights that Schizoanalysis is a thought that rethinks the 
paranoid semiotic structure of the Symbolic as a schizophrenic structure. From this perspective, 
there is then nothing 'irrational' to Deleuze and Guattari's rethinking of the Real as a 
simulacrum/assemblage of the Symbolic. The schizophrenic structure, Deleuze and Guattari tell 
us, is 'healthier' because it has two dimensions, not one. Earlier on, the Conclusion noted that with 
Deleuze and Guattari semiosis is not the result of the copulation of a Signifier with its Signifieds, 
but of a sign with experience. This semiosis, the Conclusion argues, has two Symbolics. The first 
 
228 Deleuze, Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.536-9 
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is a Symbolic enfolded by language. This Symbolic is a Symbolic of 
Signification/Identification/Representation. It simulates itself as the representation of an 'original' 
Real that the Subject had lost. This non -'Original-Real', the Symbolic thinks it as a time that 
includes all the series of time. This Simulation produces subjective and bodily stimuli. As we have 
seen in Chapter One, Lacan emphasises the jubilatory affect of the subjective encounter with 
Identification. When the child first encounters their image in the mirror, they sense jubilation. 
Thus, the Simulation stimulates a desire to re-experience a lost-past, a pure past of total power, a 
time of pure Identity. The second trick of the Simulation is that while it projects its time as a time 
that includes all the series of time, its Real/internal time is a lost past. It is a time that operates with 
one temporal sequencing of space. It is a time of One dimension, the time of the Symbolic as an 
enfolding of language. The second Symbolic of Schizoanalytical thought is a logic of Sense. It 
stimulates, not simulates, itself as the unmediated experience of a sign. It is the experience of the 
un-enfolding of a sign. In this Symbolic, the sign is experienced as an extensive quality of thought. 
The sign is not experienced in degrees of Identification with a Same. It is experienced as a variation 
of sensorial intensities. It can emerge out of the encounter with an enfolded sign; it can come out 
as a tear, a jump, a scream. This sign does not have an image that precedes it because it produces 
an experience. This experience is an experience where enfolded thought becomes affected by the 
affect it produces on its Other, its un-enfolded self. The enfolded Symbolic affects its self; it senses 
it as a real experience. There is no 'original' and no copies in this semiotic process, no first, second 
or third Orders. In the schizoid semiotic process, the enfolded Symbolic becomes aware of its 
affective production by encountering its Other Quality not its  Objectivity as Ideality.  
In the Schizoid semiotic process, the Representamen is not mediated by an enfolded sign 
and interpreted by the 'I' of the thinker and the image of thought that thinks it. With Deleuze and 
Guattari, the event does not start with a Representamen; it begins with the affect that the 
Representamen produces. It is then an act of recovering of the sense/affect that an experience has 
on the self as an 'assemblage' that this thought thinks. In line with Deleuzean thought, the thesis 
argues that 'Individuality' as an assemblage of Symbolic folds is then best cognised not through 
the Idea of the Self but as a machine of production and repression of memories. A machine that 
experiences its self/interiority and the world as an assemblage of sensations and perceptions that 
speaks to its present. Indeed, if the Logic of Sense un-enfolds, it speaks the effects/symptoms of 
paranoid repression. The thesis has shown these symptoms are the symptoms of 
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systematic/structural violence: desire is a desire for repression. It is then by analysing how the 
enfolded Symbolic affects the affective state of individuals that Schizoanalytical thought works.  
 
Of course, the extensive quality of the Schizoanalytical Symbolic can be dangerous. Jumps 
can be fascist jumps; tears can be tears of a blocking off of desire and screams can be screams of 
power. This conclusion postulates that scattered in Deleuze and Guattari's works are the two-
fundamental laws of the Logic of Sense. Their Logic of Sense is one particular Face of the Fold of  
Symbolic Senses. 
Its First Law, the Conclusion postulates, is that its signs are not preceded by images. Its 
Second Law is that its signs cannot be Faces; they cannot be enfolded because they are un-
enfolding. This has significant ramifications. `Deleuze and Guattari effectively propose a thought 
that is not tricked into the Simulation of  Oedipal desire, it can learn to recognise its screams of 
fascism or jumps of power and its tears of the tragic. It exposes them; it denounces them. This 
thought un-enfolds faces; it does not speak them. It is then not of a Newspeak, the Newspeak of 
the colonial, Nasserist, Qutbist, thought, this Newspeak of Antigone that Deleuze and Guattari 
speak. Deleuze proceeds by thinking simulacra of Ideas. His thought proceeds through de-
Facialization or what this thesis calls un-enfolding.  In their works, Deleuze and Guattari have left 
us keys to retrace their thought process. Deleuze exposed one of these in a chapter of  Difference 
and Repetition also published as an article, "Plato and the Simulacrum". In it, he exposes that he 
proceeds by thinking of the Idea as a simulacrum. Overall, the thesis argues that Deleuze and 
Guattari have Outdone the Simulation, not by inventing a Law of the Outside, but by coming up 
with an even greater joke: they propose we shift from a paranoid to a schizophrenic semiotic 
structure. In this Real, the Imaginary re-acquires its own multi-dimensional dimensions; it is open 
to all the series of time. The Symbolic stops being an agent of castration of the Real and the 
Imaginary but instead acts as the agent of their de-coding; it frees them from the Symbolic's 
interiority. It reverses the laws of the Simulation: 
 
'Images precedes signs'  
Becomes 
Some signs are not preceded by images. 
And,  
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'There are pure images that cannot be represented in life.' 
Becomes 
Life thinks/speaks all images. 
 
Beyond Deleuze's rethinking of the being-in-itself of the Platonic Idea,  this research has 
identified a series of Ideas that Deleuze has rethought for us. In particular. It proposes looking at 
how he has revisited Kant's three transcendental Ideas:  The Self, Time and God. Kant thinks of 
the Idea of Self as a transcendental Subject – the "I' of the thinking Subject. Deleuze rethinks it as 
an assemblage. Here the metonymy between the Self and the Idea is exposed. Kant thinks of the 
Idea of God as the being of all beings but this God, Deleuze and Guattari have unmasked it as the 
Face of Oedipus and his Sadean desire. They rethink the Idea of God as a god who takes the Face 
of Dionysus and has a masochist desire.229 Their God does not regulate its economy through a 
variation that ranges from an intensive quality of pleasure to pain.  It regulates its economy through 
variations of degrees of care.230 In this economy, images do not precede experience. There are no 
original and no copies, no good nor bad, no Real/Symbolic dialectics. Finally, Kant thinks of the 
Idea of time as the whole of social history. This time is the time of Chronos. It operates by 
sequencing or 'organising' space into a space that fits its economy of desire. It re-codes 'social 
space' - in both its Symbolic and concrete forms- into the spaces/signs that reflect the 
demands/desires that regulates the Symbolic and its desiring economy. As we have seen in this 
thesis, in modernity, this regulator is Capitalist.  Moreover, as equally illustrated, this vision of 
time implies the subject's necessary/primordial alienation. Deleuze swaps Chronos for Aion, a time 
that fits all series of time.231 It does not invent a code for social space; it let the 'social space' – or 
its community of thinkers – imagine/create series of times that fit their desiring-economy. This 
Face of the Logic of the Sense is its Ironic Face.  
This Face thinks Une pensée qui panse, that is, a thought that heals its wounds, a thought 
that cares for itself, not a thought that punishes itself for its self-inflicted wounds.232  Deleuze and 
 
229 “ The masochist body : it is poorly understood in terms of pain; it is fundamentally a question of BwO” in,  
Deleuze, Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.539 
230Ibid., 1291 p. 1285. Deleuze and Guattari drew from Bergson, Hume  and Spinosa 
231 Aion can be defined as “the past-future, which in an infinite subdivision of the abstract moment endlessly 
decomposes itself in both directions and forever sidesteps the present”, Deleuze, The Logic of  Sense, p.190 
232 Bernard Steigler, Qu’appel t-on panser? L’Immense regression (Paris: Les Liens qui Libèrent, 2018)  p.22-
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Guattari tell us that these' self-inflicted wounds' are not really self-inflicted; they are Self-inflected, 
one could say. If the interiority of the self is a fold of its outside Self, then who assumes 
responsibility for the crime/wounds? In Egypt, in 2011, the question of responsibility emerged as 
one of the nodal element of the revolutionary Symbolic. The state had manufactured a cover-up 
by claiming that Khaled Saeed had died of self-inflicted suffocation. The State and its faces were 
guilty of a Simulation. The faces of the state paid for the state's guilt, and two policemen were 
condemned to ten years in jail. But are they really the only participants in the crime? Should they 
really assume the total responsibility for Khaled Saeed's murder? If they are folds of the State and 
if in some ways, as we have seen with the thesis, we are all faces of the state, beyond it of 
Civilisation, then who should assume responsibility?  
The aporetic of responsibility is a theme mastered by the writer Albert Cossery as attested 
by his works La Violence et la  Derision, Proud Beggars, or the Jokers, for example.233 Suppose 
responsibility is an a priori image of citizenship. In that case, the citizen is thought of as either a 
docile subject who assumes the responsibilities that the Symbolic attributes to it, or as guilty of a 
crime: it fails its responsibilities. Cossery's mastery lies in his overturning of the Tragic into an 
Ironic. In his universe, tyrants and revolutionaries are participants to the same joke: they are the 
simulacra of a Simulation. The Real revolutionaries then are those who take the Simulation for 
what it is: a Joke. With Cossery, the revolutionary face of free desire is the face of the thinker who 
laughs at the joke, not the thinker who 'makes' the joke. With Cossery, as with Deleuze and 
Guattari, the revolutionary becoming starts with breath as a laugh.  
This vision of the revolution as a breath coalesces with Frantz Fanon's vision. In Algeria, 
as in the phantasmatic worlds of despots of Cossery, the leaders of the revolution are heroes of the 
tragic while the revolutionary desires of their people/movement speak irony. In the chapter, 
"Spontaneity, its strengths and weaknesses" of the Wretched of the Earth, Fanon exposes the 
double suffocation of colonial reality in the colonies: the outside of the Fold experience - the 
Colonial Symbolic and its inside, the (Anti)-colonial Nationalist Colonial Symbolic-, are 
suffocating the revolutionary event. The inside of the outside stifles the event. As Fanon explains,  
his consideration on violence 
 
233 Albert Cossery,  La Violence et la Derision, (Paris: Editions Joelle, 2013), Albert Cossery, Thomas W. 
Cushing (Trans.), Proud Beggars (New York: New York Review of Books, 2011), Albert Cossery, Anna 
Moschovakis (Trans.)  The Jokers, (New York: New York Review of Books, c2010) 
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"has led us to take account of the frequent existence of a time-lag, or a difference of rhythm, 




"The élite will attach a fundamental importance to organisation, so much so that the fetish 
of organisation will often take precedence over a reasoned study of colonial society." 235 
 
The notion of political party for Fanon is enfolded by Oedipal desire: 
 
"The notion of political party is a notion imported from the mother country. This instrument 
of modern political warfare is thrown down just as it is, without the slightest modification, upon 
real life with its infinite variations and lack of balance, where slavery, serfdom, barter, a skilled 
working class and high finance exist side by side."236 
 
Yet Fanon also shows empathy for these leaders: 
 
"For them, the fact of militating in a national party is not simply taking part in politics; it 
is choosing the only means whereby they can pass from the status of an animal to that of a human 
being."237 
 
Still, though, it is not in the humanity of political reason that Fanon locates the vitality of 
the revolutionary event/experience, but in the people "who are rebels by instinct", the peasants 
who remain on the margins of the Folds and can sense the trace of their enfolding.238 
 
 
234 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p.85 or Les Damnés de la Terre, p. 44 
235 Ibid.,Italics by the author and underline by the author of the thesis.  
236 Ibid.  
237 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 99 or Fanon, Les Damnés de la Terre, p.122 
238 Ibid. 
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It is the moment of the encounter between the nationalist leaders and a revolutionary people 
that marks both an opportunity for the un-enfolding of the revolutionary speech as a free speech 
and the moment of its capture: 
 
"These men get used to talking to the peasants. They discover that the mass of the country 
people have never ceased to think the problem of their liberation except in terms of violence, in 
terms of taking back the land of the foreigners, in terms of national struggle, and of armed 
insurrection. It is all very simple. These men discover a coherent people who go on living, as it 
were statically, but who keep their moral values and their devotion to the nation intact. They 
discover a people that is generous, ready to sacrifice themselves completely, an impatient people, 
with a stony pride. It is understandable that the meeting between these militants with the police on 
their track and these mettlesome masses of people, who are rebels by instinct, can produce an 
explosive mixture on unusual potentiality. The men coming from the towns learn their lessons in 
the hard school of the people; and at the same time these men open classes for the people in military 
and political education. The people furbish up their weapons; but in fact the classes do not last 
long, for the people come to know once again the strength of their own muscles and push the 
leaders on to prompt action. The armed struggle has begun."239 
 
For this research, the moment of liberation turns into a moment of capture when the 
movement of liberation takes up the arms of the Coloniser's Symbolic. Rather, in line with the 
vision of Deleuze,  Guattari and Cossery, there is not a war of liberation but a movement of 
liberation.  Indeed, this encounter that Fanon talks about is the exchange and a mutual process of 
Identification between the political men or political educators and the 'rebels by instincts". 240 The 
mistake here is a misrepresentation of the revolutionary speech, this conclusion contends. Free 
speech is not a dialectics between the reason and instinctiveness of man. Egypt and Algeria both 
share the same lack of/in postcolonialism. They are haunted by a war of 'origin' against the Other 
who has now taken the form of an internal and international elite that hides in people as much as 
it does in Signs. The panopticon has lost its wall. However, from the Signs of the Colonial 
Symbolic that still haunts us, as it was in the process of becoming re-captured, revolutionary 
 
239 Ibid., p.101 
240 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p.115 “political educators”.  
 242 
speech produced an enfolded Sign: Decolonisation, this conclusion contends. For Fanon 
Decolonisation is: 
 
"Decolonisation, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a program 
of complete disorder. But it cannot come as a result of magical practices, nor of a natural shock, 
nor of a friendly understanding. Decolonisation, as we know, is a historical process: that is to say 
that it cannot be understood, it cannot become intelligible nor clear to itself except in the exact 
measure that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content. 
Decolonisation is the meeting of two forces, opposed to each other by their very nature, which in 
fact owe their originality to that sort of substantiation which results from and is nourished by the 
situation in the colonies. Their first encounter was marked by violence and their existence 
together—that is to say the exploitation of the native by the settler—was carried on by dint of a 
great array of bayonets and cannons. The settler and the native are old acquaintances. In fact, the 
settler is right when he speaks of knowing "them" well. For it is the settler who has brought the 
native into existence and who perpetuates his existence. The settler owes the fact of his very 
existence, that is to say, his property, to the colonial system. 
 
Decolonisation never takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and modifies them 
fundamentally. It transforms spectators crushed with their inessentiality into privileged actors, with 
the grandiose glare of history's floodlights upon them. It brings a natural rhythm into existence, 
introduced by new men, and with it a new language and a new humanity. Decolonisation is the 
veritable creation of new men. But this creation owes nothing of its legitimacy to any supernatural 
power; the "thing" which has been colonised becomes man during the same process by which it 
frees itself.  
 
In decolonisation, there is therefore the need of a complete calling in question of the 
colonial situation. If we wish to describe it precisely, we might find it in the well-known words: 
"The last shall be first and the first last." Decolonisation is the putting into practice of this sentence. 
That is why, if we try to describe it, all decolonisation is successful."241 
 
241 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p.28 
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"Decolonisation is quite simply the replacing of a certain 'species' of men by another 
'species of men'."242 
 
Yet, Fanon also says, "Decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon."243 
 
So how do we un-enfold decolonisation? This thesis proposes that we take up free speech 
as a Schizo-tongue. Indeed, if decolonisation speaks liberation as a movement of reversal rather 
than a dialectics, then Deleuze's reversal of Platonism appears like a GOOD/CARING coordinate 
to take up. In their revolutionary tongue, Deleuze and Guattari,  speak a becoming revolutionary 
in which the revolutionaries have dropped their arms to become the Analysts of their own desiring-
productions. Indeed, Concerning violence, Deleuze proposes an alternative to the armed struggle, 
the freedom of the schizoid semiotic assemblage against the absolute reign of its paranoid 
dimension. The movement of liberation acts as a mechanism of defence against the movement of 
petrification. In this universe, The Symbolic is a percept of its Real, and the Imaginary is the 
order/precept of space/thought. Acts are guided by the affect/ethics of care rather than the politics 
of power. There is no dialectical movement of man from a savage to a domesticated animal, this 
rebel whose instincts have been rationalised. There is no political educator and no masses in need 
of education because, in this universe, knowledge is not prejudiced; it is not organised by 
Adjudication. In this over there of 'us', 'liberated' thought is a remedy against the lack-in-being of 
a Symbolic world that thinks the present as a lost Real. Bodies and thoughts have not been 
smoothed into the representations of a Symbolic surface. The Other is not gazed at because it 
doesn't exist. People are not walls with black holes; they are bodies with a Body without Organ, 
BwO. They apprehend the traces that the affects of experience leave son their bodies as the 
reflections of the affects of experience on their BwO. They process, rather than assume these 
traces; they learn to look at them, they learn to coexist with them, to digest them, to heal. In a way, 
this tongue's logic is similar to the logic of the 'unconscious'. It has the power to liberate  Signs 
from the speech of language. This universal speech sees beauty in Irony; it is not subjectivised into 
the Sublime of tragedy.  
 




In concluding,  if, after this research, i have to un-enfold my own image of thought, then 
my 'I' thinks a world where all the streets speak: 
 
“Asseguas Amegaz, el Hirak rahou labass.” 
"Happy New Year, the Hirak/Movement is in GOOD health." 
 
Postscript:  As these signs are written, the movement is fighting to keep breathing, it is being 
hunted down. So, the irony is not lost. Although this one does not repress, it throws its light on the 
event/experience that continues to un-enfold in ður becoming.* 
*Cette ironie ne m’en [me] tue pas, elle jette sa lumière sur l’événement/expérience qui continue 
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